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The notion of persecution is a pivotal element of the definition of a 
refugee set out in the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees 
(1951 Convention). Yet, this notion has been increasingly criticised because 
it has been deemed inadequate in the current geopolitical context. Therefore, 
the present thesis will explore whether the notion of persecution can adapt to 
the circumstances of refugees in the 21st century or whether a change of 
paradigm is needed in international refugee law.   
 
In particular, it will be observed that persecution has never been 
defined in the 1951 Convention. Some authors have considered that the 
absence of authoritative definition was intentional to make the concept of 
persecution adaptable to its various changing forms. Whilst the lack of a 
definition indeed makes this notion flexible, it also encourages divergent 
interpretations in the jurisprudence. As a result, a principled approach is 
needed and, in that perspective, the present thesis will explore the 
propositions made by various authors for interpreting persecution in the 
current world. 
 
The most widely accepted interpretive framework considers that basic 
human rights should be used as benchmarks for interpreting persecution. 
Although this narrative proposes objective and tangible standards of 
interpretation, it has been inconsistently applied in national jurisdictions and 
has been quite criticised by a number of authors. This thesis will analyse this 
human rights framework, as well as alternative models that have been more 
recently proposed for interpreting persecution. The benefits and limitations 
of these different models, and how they have been concretely applied in the 
jurisprudence of various countries will be assessed in order to identify the 
most suitable approach for interpreting the notion in the 21st century.  
 
Finally, the limitations of persecution will be explored in order to 
precisely delineate the contours of the current definition of a refugee at the 
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international level. It will be argued that this notion is sufficiently flexible to 
adapt to a large number of forcibly displaced people in the present world, if 
properly interpreted. Whilst, the limitations of this notion are not ignored, it 
will be contended that the 1951 Convention remains, to a large extent, 
relevant in the current geopolitical circumstances whereas other forms of 
protection could be more appropriate for individuals who do not meet the 
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A)   Background and context of thesis 
 
 
‘The twenty-first century is proving to be the century of people on the 
move’. This observation was made by Antonio Guterres, the former United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees,1 during a speech to the General 
Assembly of the United Nations on 01 November 2011.2 On this occasion, he 
noted that, in the past few decades, an unprecedented number of people have 
been displaced on the international scene and, unfortunately, they have not 
received adequate assistance from recipient countries. For him, this situation 
was partly due to the fact that international refugee law instruments were not 
sufficiently protective of ‘people on the move’, thus leaving some grey areas 
as to who should receive international protection today.  
  
The main instrument defining who is a refugee at the global level is 
the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees3 adopted in 1951 (the 1951 
Convention). It was drafted after the Second World War (WWII), when 
representatives of 26 countries4 decided to address the problem of refugees 
displaced by the conflicts in Europe. They agreed on the terms of a common 
definition, enshrined in Article 1(A)2 of the Convention. They stipulated, 
inter alia, that a refugee is a ‘person who owing to a well-founded fear of 
                                                
1 Antonio Guterres was the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees from May 2005 until 
December 2015. He then became the United Nations Secretary General on 1st January 2017.  
2 Meetings Coverage, GA/SHC/4024, 1 November 2011, General Assembly, Third Committee, 38th 
Meeting of the Sixty-sixth General Assembly ‘21st Century Proving to be ‘Century of People on the 
Move’, Innovative Approaches Needed to Address New Patterns of Forced Displacement’ available at 
https://www.un.org/press/en/2011/gashc4024.doc.html.  
3 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, Geneva 28 July 1951, entered into force 22 April 1951, 
No. 2545, UNTS Vol 189, 137.  
4 The 26 countries were: ‘Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Denmark, Egypt, 
France, Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Holy See, Iraq, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, Monaco, 
Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland (the Swiss delegation also represented Liechtenstein), 
Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain & Northern, Ireland (UK), United States of America  (US), 
Venezuela, Yugoslavia. The governments of Iran and Cuba were represented by observers’ 
Additionally, ‘At its second meeting, the Conference, acting on a proposal of the representative of 
Egypt, unanimously decided to address an invitation to the Holy See to designate a plenipotentiary 
representative to participate in its work. A representative of the Holy See took his place at the 
Conference on 10 July 1951’.  Final Act of the United Nations Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the 
Status of Refugees and Stateless Persons by the UN General Assembly, 25 July 1951, 
A/CONF.2/108/Rev.1. 
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being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a 
particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his 
nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself 
of the protection of that country’.5 
 
In this definition, the plenipotentiaries raised the notion of persecution 
as a core criterion to determine who is a refugee, making it the ‘keystone’6 of 
the Convention. In spite of its pivotal role, the term persecution was not 
defined in any instrument at that time. This lack of clarification on the 
meaning of persecution did not raise major problems in 1951 because the 
interpretation of the notion was relatively straightforward. In this period, 
persecution was commonly perceived as a repressive act carried out by 
totalitarian or oppressive states. However, the evolving geopolitical context 
at the global level progressively called into question this approach. In 
particular, concerns arose as to whether persecution should be interpreted 
only in conformity with the initial political background of the Convention or 
whether it could have a flexible meaning, making the definition of a refugee 
more adaptable to the types of harm faced by the new ‘people on the move’. 
  
This uncertainty surrounding the notion of persecution has led many 
commentators to consider that it was an archaic notion that was not adapted 
to the protection needs of refugees in the 21st century. In this sense, Guterres 
enumerated new displacement patterns that have emerged since WWII, such 
as ‘population growth, urbanization, climate change’, ‘food, water and energy 
insecurity’7 and that are not easily encompassed by the term persecution. He 
pointed out that these phenomena contributed to the emergence of new 
                                                
5 Article 1 A (2) of the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (1951) in its entirety reads as 
follows: ‘As a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951 and owing to well-founded fear of being 
persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political 
opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to 
avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the 
country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is 
unwilling to return to it. In the case of a person who has more than one nationality, the term “the country 
of his nationality” shall mean each of the countries of which he is a national, and a person shall not be 
deemed to be lacking the protection of the country of his nationality if, without any valid reason based 
on well-founded fear, he has not availed himself of the protection of one of the countries of which he 
is a national’.  
6 Hugo Storey, ‘What Constitutes Persecution? Towards a Working Definition’ [2014] 26 International 
Journal of Refugee Law 272, 272. 
7 Guterres (n 1). 
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conflicts and had not been anticipated by the plenipotentiaries in 1951, 
leaving some protection gaps on the international scene. Whilst he expressed 
some legitimate concerns regarding the application of the Refugee 
Convention today, other voices adopted a more optimistic view of the 
situation. They pointed to the rather flexible character of this instrument, 
considering that it could well adapt to the changing situations of refugees,8 if 
properly interpreted. 
 
The lack of consensus on the interpretation of the notion of 
persecution appears, nowadays, problematic because it can lead to 
inconsistent applications of the 1951 Convention. This can in turn undermine 
the global system of asylum by encouraging political detournements of the 
refugee definition, creating legal uncertainty for asylum seekers and 
providing incentives for asylum shopping with possible destabilising effects 
on refugee flows. In order to avoid these pitfalls, host countries need to adopt 
sufficiently protective and consistent approaches to the notion of persecution. 
It remains, however, unclear from the plain text of international refugee law 
instruments how these interpretive difficulties should be tackled today.  
 
B)   Research question 
 
The research question of the present thesis has addressed these issues 
by considering whether the concept of persecution, set out in the 1951 United 
Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, is adequate for the 
needs and priorities of refugees in the 21st century or whether a change of 
paradigm is ultimately needed in international refugee law? Given that 
criticisms against the adequacy of the Convention, and in particular the notion 
of persecution, have become commonplace, the present thesis has explored 
the ambit of this notion and assessed its limitations in the current context.  
                                                
8 Schoenholtz Andrew I., ‘The New Refugees and the Old Treaty: Persecutors and Persecuted in the 
Twenty-First Century’ [2015] 16 Chicago Journal of International Law 81; McAdam Jane, ‘The 
Enduring Relevance of the 1951 Refugee Convention’ [2017] 29 International Journal of Refugee 






C)    Methodology 
 
  This research has sought to advance and contribute to the literature on 
the notion of persecution in refugee law in order to answer the above 
concerns. The present thesis argued that the notion of persecution remains 
relevant nowadays if a principled interpretive approach of the notion is 
consistently applied in national contexts. 
 
i-   Sources used for the research  
This thesis has based its methodology on a desk review of various 
sources. Primary sources were considered such as international, regional and 
national instruments as well as soft law documents from International 
Organisations and reports prepared by various bodies, essentially Non-
Governmental Organisations. These sources were selected based on their 
relevance as well as recognised authority on the international scene. A 
thorough legal review of relevant case-law was also conducted. The cases 
considered in this thesis were found on various public databases through 
thematic searches. The challenges in finding adequate case law in these 
databases were however not overlooked. Such sources only provide published 
decisions and sometimes produce limited results (overlapping with other 
topics). Therefore, academic reviews of specific case law were also 
considered in order to obtain some complementary insights as to relevant 
jurisprudential trends. No attempts were made to receive unpublished cases 
from public or private bodies (such as lawyers or UNHCR) given the well-
known principle of confidentiality applied by these entities and anticipated 
reluctance to share documents. 
 
Additionally, secondary sources such as academic pieces of writing 
were relied upon. As selective approach was used in order to identify the 
sources that directly address the meaning of persecution through a legal 
perspective (rather than for instance sociological or cultural). In particular, a 
mapping of the scholarship was made in order to identity the crux of the 
debate regarding the relevance of this notion in contemporary contexts. Early 
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authors as well as more recent scholars were considered.  This research has 
essentially focused on the most prominent and recognised scholars who 
addressed the notion of persecution in refugee law in order to circumscribe 
the theoretical debate to the approaches that have gained major traction 
amongst relevant stakeholders. The objective was to propose a practical 
contribution to the field rather than questioning the notion of persecution 
through a purely conceptual lens. However, at times, references were made 
to authors who have proposed original perspectives with limited influence in 
the academic arena or in the jurisprudence, but who nonetheless were found 
to shed some light on relevant aspects of the notion of persecution.  
 
ii-   Line of argumentation of the research 
Based on the above sources, this thesis has first sought to establish the 
interpretive background of the 1951 Convention by defining the new 
geopolitical challenges that characterise forced displacements in the modern 
world. In order to better evaluate the interpretive scope of the notion of 
persecution, this research has then built on the existing literature and engaged 
in an extensive analysis of the scholarship to examine the various proposals 
made by many authors to interpret persecution. Other proposals brought 
forward by institutions of the European Union as well as the UN Refugee 
Agency (the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees), were also 
considered. This academic review has allowed to define the terms of the 
interpretive debate. The purpose of this was to explore various interpretive 
schemes and test them against the current background of refugee claims in 
order to identify different aspects of the notion of persecution that pose major 
challenges in applying the 1951 Convention today.  
 
This theoretical exercise was also accompanied by a practical 
overview of the case law in order to survey the current state of practice 
through a comparative legal perspective. This research essentially focused on 
countries that have robust refugee status determination (RSD) procedures. 
Although some countries in Africa and Latin America9 have recently 
                                                
9Alice Edwards, ‘Refugee Status Determination in Africa’ [2006] 14 African Journal of International 
& Comparative Law 204; U.S. Committee for Refugees and Immigrants and Asylum Access Ecuador, 
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developed such processes, jurisdictions that have a long-standing 
jurisprudence on asylum were particularly considered, namely Canada, the 
United States of America (USA), Australia and New Zealand, as well as some 
countries of the European Union. For practical reasons, and also due to their 
particularly advanced case law on asylum, attention was mostly paid to a 
selective choice of countries of the European Union such as the United 
Kingdom (UK)10, France and Belgium.   
 
The objective of this review was to understand how various 
interpretive models examined in the first chapters were used by decision 
makers. This study identified protection gaps in order to determine which 
developments are desirable. By drawing upon legal principles developed by 
scholars as well as refugee law practitioners, this research generally sought to 
identify adequate modes of interpretation that can be consistently applied for 
the adjudication of asylum claims at the global level. A relevant interpretive 
model was then defined through an inductive approach that takes as a 
departure point the circumstances of refugees and highlights the importance 
of intersectionality in determining protection needs, in particular in the 
context of new claims such as the ones of refugee women.  
  
It was also found relevant to engage in a specific case study of gender-
related claims because such claims particularly exemplify the current 
interpretive challenges and the difficulties for applying the notion of 
persecution in contexts that were seemingly not anticipated by the drafters of 
the 1951 Convention. A survey of feminist approaches to refugee law has also 
underpinned an analysis of the case law in order to adequately identify gaps 
in interpreting persecution in situations of gender-based violence.  
 
Lastly, the limitations of the refugee definition and the notion of 
persecution were explored. Through an overall analysis of different 
jurisprudential trends assessed against the theories defined by legal scholars 
                                                
Refugee Status Determination in Latin America: Regional Challenges and opportunities: The national 
systems of Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador and Mexico, January 2013. 
10 At the time of writing, the UK is still member of the EU in spite of ongoing discussions about the 
possibility of the country to leave the Union.  
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and a geopolitical analysis of the current displacement patterns, this research 
argued that the 1951 Convention remains an efficient tool for the protection 
of refugees, only if an adequate interpretation of the notion of persecution, in 
line with the needs and priorities of refugees in the 21st century, is given to 
the notion of persecution. In particular, it was contended that the primacy of 
the 1951 Convention should be re-asserted and that decision makers should 
go back to a more circumstantial understanding of persecution proposed by 
the United Nations High Commissioner (UNHCR) as it appears to be both 
sufficiently principled and protective of the needs of refugees nowadays.  
 
D)   Outline of research 
 
In order to assess the scope of persecution and its relevance for 
modern refugees, a preliminary chapter first analysed the historical 
background of the 1951 Convention and the context of the emergence of 
persecution as a pivotal concept in international refugee law. This chapter 
demonstrated that persecution has been perceived to be a politically biased 
notion and that, when the definition was developed, the plenipotentiaries had 
a particular meaning in mind, adapted to the necessities and circumstances of 
their time. However, they were also aware of their inability to anticipate the 
multiple forms of persecution as they could arise in the future, and therefore, 
they intended to use a flexible term in order to make the refugee definition 
malleable. It was then observed that the interpretation of persecution had not 
posed any particular problems in the bipolar world of the cold war, but that 
interpretive challenges started to arise with the emergence of new 
displacement patterns in the 1980s/1990s. The characteristics of these new 
patterns were fleshed out in order to delineate the contours of the interpretive 
debate today. 
 
The second chapter engaged in an in-depth analysis of the traditional 
interpretive frameworks that have been proposed by scholars in order to 
overcome the challenges in applying the notion of persecution to new 
refugees. These frameworks have generally relied on a basic human rights 
paradigm to define what amounts to persecution. In particular, Hathaway’s 
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proposal that persecution should be understood as a sustained or systemic 
violation of basic human rights demonstrative of a failure of state protection 
was considered and evaluated against other models and contemporary refugee 
claims. Several other basic human rights models were considered through a 
critical perspective in order to identify their advantages and limitations. A 
more general analysis of human rights theories was undertaken in order to 
assess whether human rights standards shall be considered relevant 
benchmarks of interpretation and to what extent this should be case. It was 
then argued that basic human rights do constitute relevant interpretive 
references because they provide objective norms of interpretation. However, 
a formalist reliance on a basic human rights scheme entails the risk of 
adopting a restrictive approach, that, in addition, does not necessarily foster 
consistency amongst jurisdictions for various reasons that will be expounded 
in the thesis. It was then further demonstrated that additional theoretical 
frameworks might be needed to provide adequate interpretive guidance to 
decision makers.  
  
The third chapter of the present thesis explored more recent 
interpretive schemes that have been developed in the past years and that 
proposed to enlarge the understanding of persecution beyond a basic human 
rights narrative. In particular, the definition provided by the Qualification 
Directive11 (QD) of the European Union was analysed in depth as it sets a 
new interpretive paradigm. Proposals of other scholars were also evaluated 
as well as the general framework developed by the Refugee Agency 
(UNHCR). The benefits and limitations of these various theoretical 
frameworks were evaluated against each other through the same comparative 
approach adopted in the previous chapter. It was eventually argued that a 
holistic and inductive approach, factoring in human rights norms and the 
individual circumstances of refugees appears the best adapted to the 
                                                
11 Directive 2011/95/EU of 13 December 2011 on standards for the qualification of third-country 
nationals or stateless persons as beneficiaries of international protection, for a uniform status for 
refugees or for persons eligible for subsidiary protection, and for the content of the protection granted 
[2011] OJ L 337/248 (Revised Qualification Directive). 
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protection needs of refugees whilst not contravening the initial intent of the 
plenipotentiaries.   
  
After a comparative analysis of the different paradigms proposed for 
interpreting the notion of persecution, a practical overview of the 
jurisprudential applications of these models was undertaken in chapter four. 
This chapter observed that the basic human rights framework is the approach 
that has been the most widely adopted by the jurisprudence of various 
countries for interpreting persecution. However, it was argued that this 
interpretive framework has not fostered much consistency amongst, as well 
as within, jurisdictions because multiple modalities of this model have been 
applied by refugee law judges, yielding different outcomes of asylum claims. 
The aim of this chapter was to identify protection gaps in the way the 
definition of a refugee, and more particularly the notion of persecution, are 
interpreted in domestic case law in order to demonstrate how a more holistic 
approach, factoring in, but not restricted to, basic human rights, would be 
more desirable for a more relevant and consistent protection of refugees on 
the international scene.  
 
Chapter 5 engaged in the case study of asylum claims based on 
gender-related forms of violence. The choice of a case study was deemed 
necessary in order to highlight the existence of major interpretive difficulties 
that exist for new caseloads that were not anticipated by the plenipotentiaries 
in the 1951 Convention. Gender-based violence, affecting refugee women 
who often face harm at the hands of non-state agents appeared to be a 
particularly cogent example of how the notion of persecution is sometimes 
restrictively applied although these claims have become more and more 
frequent. The share of refugee women in the world today is significantly 
higher than in previous decades and brings to the fore new concerns of 
modern societies, often related to the negation of harmful traditional practices 
or the rejection of traditional social mores. These forms of predicaments are 
particularly challenging when it comes to applying the notion of persecution 
because they were not apparently considered by the drafters of the 
Convention when they developed the refugee definition. However, they 
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correspond to the current protection needs of refugees and, as such, could be 
covered by the notion of persecution that was meant to be sufficiently flexible 
in that sense. An overview of feminist theories in refugee law was undertaken 
in order to identify major features of the protection needs of refugee women. 
This theoretical understanding of women’s asylum claims was tested against 
the case law in order to argue that the current interpretive approaches, often 
based on a basic human rights narrative, obviate some circumstances of 
refugee women and need further development through a more holistic and 
circumstantial understanding of the conditions of women in certain social 
settings.   
 
Lastly, after having engaged in a theoretical and practical tour de table 
of different interpretive schemes and identified adequate approaches that 
would make the 1951 Convention better suited to the needs and priorities of 
refugees in the 21st century, the last chapter explored the confines of the 
notion of persecution. Certain limitations to this notion were fleshed out to 
demonstrate that the 1951 Convention is not applicable in all circumstances 
of forcible displacement. It was, however, demonstrated that some countries 
have misinterpreted these limitations, in particular in contexts of mass influx. 
In these situations, countries have often avoided tackling interpretive 
challenges by resorting to complementary forms of protection, that generally 
result in lesser forms of protection, or sometimes in the denial of protection 
to individuals that would have otherwise fallen into the ambit of the 1951 
Convention if a proper understanding of the notion of persecution had been 
adopted. It was therefore argued that an adequate interpretation of the notion 
of persecution remains needed, even in situations of large movements of 
populations and that the primacy of the 1951 Convention, over any other 
complementary protection scheme, should be strongly reaffirmed. In doing 
so, it was contended that the Convention remains relevant in a large number 
of contemporary refugee situations and that adequate protection can still be 
provided to refugees.  
 
 It was, however, acknowledged that the notion of persecution has 
some inherent limitations that cannot be overcome without entirely 
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contravening the initial intent of the drafters of the Convention. These 
situations cover contexts in which various types of hardship are not directly 
caused by identifiable human agents but rather by external situations, 
whereby it is difficult to ascribe responsibility to people and consider that 
some individuals or groups are more targeted or vulnerable than others. In 
this context, it is unlikely that the 1951 Convention will be applicable. It was, 
nonetheless, argued that these limitations do not necessarily mean that a 
change of paradigm is needed in refugee law or that the 1951 Convention is 
currently obsolete. This last chapter indeed contended that the Refugee 
Convention remains relevant to protect a large number of individuals 
currently displaced on the international scene, generally as a result of some 
form of human intervention, and that complementary protection schemes 
should be kept residual in these circumstances. Other forms of displacements, 
such as for instance displacement caused by climate change, might call for 
the application of other types of normative protection schemes as one single 
legal instrument will be unlikely to encompass the situation of all the ‘people 
on the move’ in the world. It is, however, beyond the purview of the present 
research to identify the forms of protection schemes that would need to be 
developed to cover forcible displacements purely caused by external events. 
It remains that further developments are needed in these areas.12 
 
Whilst it was not denied that a change of paradigm might be 
eventually needed if displacement patterns continue to evolve and the features 
of the international community continue to change, it was argued that a 
sufficiently evolutionary and robust understanding of the notion of 
persecution will help to ensure the ‘enduring relevance’ of the 1951 
Convention, at least in the current world.
                                                
12 In that sense, see for instance the work of Alexander Betts who proposed to develop a soft law 
framework for the protection of vulnerable migrants in Alexander Betts, ‘Towards a “Soft Law” 
Framework for the Protection of Vulnerable Irregular Migrants’ [2010] 22 International Journal of 




Chapter 1: The notion of persecution: historical 
background and interpretive challenges 
 
The international definition of a refugee was developed in 1951 in 
Europe in order to determine who was eligible to asylum in the aftermath of 
WWII. Whilst the primary intention of the drafters of the 1951 Convention 
was to better organise the delivery of international aid, the development of a 
generic definition set clear ‘boundaries or limits’1 to the category of people 
who could receive assistance. Indeed, to define who is a ‘refugee’ is to restrict 
the number of people entitled to protection and to exclude those who do not 
meet the criteria of the Convention. In this sense, authors pointed out that the 
plenipotentiaries ‘privilege(d) particular concepts’2 more than others to 
delineate the contours of the states’ international engagements and limit the 
number of people entitled to refugee status.  
 
One might therefore wonder how refugeehood was conceptualised in 
this period and for which reasons. In fact, as noted by Juss, the fundamental 
question should not be ‘who is a refugee’ but ‘whose refugee’3 are we talking 
about and ‘why do we define [refugees] the way we do?’4 Understanding how 
the refugee definition was developed might shed some light on the scope of 
the 1951 Convention as well as the meaning of some pivotal concepts such 
as the notion of persecution.    
 
In a first part (Part 1), this chapter will provide an overview of the 
historical context in which the 1951 Convention was drafted in an attempt to 
explain the reasons why the plenipotentiaries chose the current eligibility 
criteria to develop the refugee definition, and more particularly, why the 
notion of persecution was introduced as an essential concept in refugee law. 
                                                
1 Jean-Francois Durieux, ‘Three Asylum Paradigms’ [2013] 20 International Journal on Minority and 
Group Rights 147, 150. 
2 Sara E. Davies, ‘Redundant or Essential? How Politics Shaped the Outcome of the 1967 Protocol’ 
[2007] 19 International Journal of Refugee Law 703, 705.  
3S. S. Juss, International Migration and Global Justice (Ashgate, Aldershot, 2006) Chapter 6, 198.  
4ibid, 199-200. 
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This will help to better evaluate the scope of this notion and to assess its 
relevance in the 21st century. It will be argued that in spite of some 
uncertainty surrounding the intention of the plenipotentiaries, it can generally 
be agreed that they intended to introduce a concept that could adapt to the 
emerging circumstances of refugees.  The second part of this chapter (Part 2) 
will then present the challenges that exist nowadays for interpreting the 
concept of persecution in light of new situations of forced displacement and 
demonstrate that a principled legal framework is needed to ensure that the 
notion of persecution is applied in a sufficiently protective and consistent 
manner to the new circumstances of refugees.   
 
Part 1) The emergence of the notion of persecution in 
international refugee law 
 
The definition of a refugee is the outcome of a historical and political 
process that led the drafters of the 1951 Convention to define refugees based 
on their reasons for flight and to consider that only people at risk of being 
‘persecuted’ should be granted refugee protection. This section will analyse 
the historical backdrop5 to the 1951 Convention in order to understand its 
basic foundations (A) and to shed light on the legal process that made the 
notion of persecution a pivotal element of the definition of a refugee in the 
1951 Convention (B).  
 
A)   Legal developments from 1920 to 1951 and the progressive 
conceptualisation of who is a refugee 
	  
	  
The concept of a refugee initially emerged in a number of European 
instruments in the early 1920s in order to designate individuals eligible for 
international protection. Before the First Word War (WWI), people used to 
                                                
5 B. S. Chimni, International Refugee Law: a Reader (2nd edn, Sage Publication 2002)1. To Chimni, 
the historical instruments defining a refugee constitute ‘the historical backdrop against which 
contemporary definitions need to be considered’. On the critical relevance of the instrument of the 
League of Nations for setting the backdrop within which the 1951 Convention was drafted: James C. 
Hathaway, ‘The Evolution of Refugee Status in International Law: 1920-1950’ [1984] 33 The 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 348, 349. To Hathaway, European countries ‘carefully 
establish(ed) the hallmarks of refugeehood’. 
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enjoy a certain freedom of movement in the world and, as such, defining a 
refugee was not a major concern for the reigning powers. However, during 
WWI, massive movements of populations took place on the continent and, 
given the high risk of destabilisation in the region, European countries 
decided to adopt a number of agreements in order to better organise the 
delivery of aid. New instruments were developed under the auspices of the 
League of Nations, to determine who was eligible for refugee status by 
referring to specific categories of people. For instance, a number of bilateral 
and multilateral treaties were created to protect individuals who had fled the 
consequences of the Russian revolution in 1917 and the problems arising out 
of the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire.6 Some other treaties covered 
different groups such as ‘Latvian refugees (…) in the territory of Ukrainian 
Socialist Soviet Republic’, ‘Greek refugees’, ‘refugees in Bulgaria’, ‘refugees 
coming from Germany’.7 Through these instruments, refugee law was 
understood as a response to the plight of certain people fleeing repressive 
state policies in a European context.  It can be observed that, in this period, 
the notion of persecution was not mentioned in any of the League of Nations’ 
documents because refugees were categorised as specific groups of 
individuals depending on their origins. To Zarjevski, this approach was quite 
                                                
6 Inter alia ‘Arrangement with respect to the issue of certificates of identity to Russian Refugees’, signed 
at Geneva, July 5th, 1922 League of Nations Treaty Series (LNTS) [1922], vol 13, 237-257; 
‘Arrangement concerning the Extension to other Categories of Refugees of certain Measures taken in 
favour of Russian and Armenian Refugees’ signed at Geneva, June 30, 1928, League of Nations Treaty 
Series (LNTS) [1929], vol 89, 47-52. 
7 Inter alia, ‘Agreement regarding the repatriation of Latvian refugees who are at present in the territory 
of Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic’, signed at Moscow, August 3, 1921 League of Nations Treaty 
Series (LNTS) [1923], vol 17, 306-315, ‘Declaration relating to the settlement of Refugees in Greece 
and the creation for this purpose of a Refugees Settlement Commission’ signed in Geneva, September 
29, 1923 League of Nations Treaty Series (LNTS) [1923], vol 20,41-43 ;  ‘Protocol relating to the 
settlement of Refugees in Greece and the creation for this purpose of a Refugees Settlement 
Commission’, signed in Geneva, September 29, 1923 League of Nations Treaty Series (LNTS) [1923], 
vol 20, pp. 29-39 ; ‘Additional Act to the Protocol of September 29, 1923, relating to the Settlement of 
Greek Refugees’, signed in Geneva, September 19, 1924, League of Nations Treaty Series (LNTS) 
[1924], vol 30, pp. 413-419 ; ‘Declaration relating to the Modifications made to the Protocol of 
September 29, 1923, with regard to the Settlement of Refugees in Greece, by the Additional Act of 
September 19, 1924’ signed in Geneva, September 25, 1924 League of Nations Treaty Series (LNTS) 
[1924], vol 30, pp. 1922-1924 ; ‘Protocol concerning the Settlement of Refugees in Bulgaria’ signed in 
Geneva, September 8, 1926 [1926], League of Nations Treaty Series (LNTS), vol 58, 245-257; 
‘Convention relating to the International Status of Refugees’ signed in Geneva, October 18th, 1933 
League of Nations Treaty Series (LNTS) [1935], vol 159, 199-217; ‘Provisional Arrangement 
concerning the Status of Refugees coming from Germany, and Annex’ signed in Geneva, July 4th, 1936 
League of Nations Treaty Series (LNTS) [1936], vol 171, 75-87; ‘Convention concerning the Status of 
Refugees coming from Germany, with Annex’ signed in Geneva, February 10th, 1938 League of 
Nations Treaty Series (LNTS), vol 192, 59-81; ‘Protocol to the Provisional Arrangement and to the 
Convention respectively signed at Geneva on July 4th, 1936 and February 10th, 1938, concerning the 
Status of Refugees coming from Germany’, opened for Signature in Geneva, September 14th, 1939 
League of Nations Treaty Series (LNTS) [1939], vol 198, 141- 145. 
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restrictive because the mandate of the ‘organizations founded by the League 
of Nations’ was limited ‘to precisely describe already existing categories of 
people’8 and did not rely on a generic definition.  
 
The reasons for such approach were expounded by Hathaway. To him, 
the period from 1920 to 19359 marked a phase when refugees were considered 
to be groups of individuals stranded outside their country of origin, and 
unable to migrate anywhere else. Then, from 1935 to 193910, states adopted, 
what Hathaway termed a ‘social approach’, when refugees were seen as 
‘helpless casualties of broad-based social or political occurrences’.11 Even 
though, as Hathaway noted,  there was a slight shift of paradigm between the 
instruments developed in both periods, it can be observed that all these 
documents generally adopted the same category-based method to determine 
who was a refugee.12 Goodwin-Gill synthetised these approaches by stating 
that, before WWII, it was sufficient to be ‘someone a) outside their country 
of origin and b) without the protection of the government of a state’13 in order 
to be eligible to international assistance. These criteria were of course 
understood in the restrictive framework of the pre-defined categories. 
 
The League of Nations was eventually dissolved at the outset of WWII 
and, as new groups of refugees appeared, the old refugee treaties became 
obsolete. Just before the beginning of WWII and in the aftermath of the 
Allies’ victory, the international community successively created, the 
Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees (ICR) in 1938, the United Nations 
Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) in 1943 and the 
International Refugee Organisation (IRO) in 1946 in order to provide 
                                                
8 Delphine Zarjevski, A Future Preserved, International Assistance to Refugees, (Pergamon Press 1988) 
12.  
9 Hathaway (n 5) 362.  
10 ibid 349. However in p. 361 of his article, Hathaway refers to a different time period, namely 1935 
to 1938. There is indeed a one-year overlap transition from one phase to another. 
11 ibid 349. 
12 ibid 362: for instance, in 1935, the League of Nations developed a plan to issue a certificate of identity 
for individuals who had left the Saar territory after a plebiscite that resulted in the union with Germany: 
this remains a category approach to defining a refugee. See also Guy Goodwin-Gill and Jane McAdam, 
The Refugee in International Law, (3rd edn, OUP 2011) (n 2) at 16: they noted that the approach for 
defining a refugee remains group-oriented: ‘even when social and political upheaval was accepted as 
giving content and meaning to refugee definitions, these remained circumscribed by particular crises 
and linked to ethnic or national origin’. 
13 Goodwin-Gill and McAdam, (n 12) 16.   
 45 
assistance to refugees. They adopted new approaches to define who was a 
refugee. The first organisation, the ICR, was in charge of facilitating the 
emigration of victims of the Nazi regime from Germany and Austria and 
considered that only individuals from these countries were entitled to receive 
international protection.14 This new approach was rather innovative given that 
it identified refugees as groups of individuals who could receive assistance 
even in their own country of origin. It was however only limited to German 
and Austrian refugees and thus still adopted the previous category-oriented 
approach. In spite of these limitations, Hathaway noted that the ICR 
developed a new paradigm, defining refugees based on ‘personalized criteria 
of political opinion, religious belief and racial origin’.15 To Hathaway, the 
ICR announced the beginning of a new phase where refugees were considered 
in ‘individualist terms’.16  
 
After the ICR, the mandates of UNRRA and IRO established new 
refugee definitions that emphasised this individualistic narrative as opposed 
to group approaches. Resolutions of the UNRRA council stated that the 
organisation is competent to provide material help to ‘displaced persons’17 
and: 
 
 ‘other persons who have been obliged to leave their country 
or place of origin or former residence or who have been 
deported therefrom, by action or activities in favour of the 
United Nations, or for the control of epidemics for the purpose 
of preventing the spread of such epidemics to United Nations 
areas or to displaced persons of United Nations nationality 
found in the particular enemy or ex-enemy area’.18  
 
                                                
14 Hathaway (n 5) 370-371: Refugees were defined as ‘1. Persons who have not already left their 
countries of origin (Germany including Austria), but who must emigrate on account of their political 
opinions, religious beliefs and racial origin, and 2. Persons as defined in (1) who have already left their 
country of origin and who have not yet established themselves permanently’. 
15 Ibid 371. 
16 Ibid 350. 
17 Appendix I, Resolutions on Policy of the Third Session of the Council, UNRRA Council Resolution 
10, 4. 
18 Appendix II, Resolutions on Policy of the Third Session of the Council, UNRRA Council Resolution 
71, 7. 
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This definition was based on a generic definition rather than referring 
to predetermine categories, thus seemingly encompassing more individuals. 
The UNRRA definition was, however, quite complex and was later 
superseded by the IRO’s constitution.19 The IRO constitution defined 
refugees as individuals belonging to specific groups but also through the 
enumeration of more general principles, such as the principle of alienage, the 
existence of reasons for forcible displacements, and exclusion considerations. 
The nature of harm prompting an individual’s flight was not characterised, 
but a new term -persecution- was introduced to designate the objections that 
refugees could raise for not wanting to return to their country of origin.20 
Through this notion, the IRO further emphasised the personal aspect of 
refugeehood by pointing to the importance of their individual circumstances. 
Fischel observed that, although the definitional provisions of the IRO were 
quite complex, they ‘represented a two-fold innovation’21 by individualising 
the term ‘refugee’, and ‘listing (…) the reasons upon which persecution was 
                                                
19  Annex I, Part 1, Section A of the Constitution of the International Refugee Organisation, 15 
December 1946, United Nations Treaty Series, vol. 18. p.1: ‘1. Subject to the provisions of sections C 
and D and Part II of this Annex, the term "refugee" applies to a person who has left, or who is outside 
of, his country of nationality or of former habitual residence, and who, whether or not he had retained 
his nationality, belongs to one of the following categories: (a) Victims of the nazi or fascist regimes or 
of regimes which took part on their side in the second world war, or of the quislings or similar regimes 
which assisted them against the United Nations, whether enjoying international status as refugees or 
not; (b) Spanish Republicans and other victims of the Falangist regime in Spain, whether enjoying 
international status as refugees or not; (c) Persons who were considered refugees before the outbreak 
of the second world war, for reasons of race, religion, nationality or political opinion. 
2. Subject to the provisions of sections C and D and of Part II of this Annex regarding the exclusion of 
certain categories of persons, including war criminals, quislings and traitors, from the benefits of the 
Organisation, the term "refugee" also applies to a person, other than a displaced person as defined in 
section B of this Annex, who is outside of his country of nationality or former habitual residence, and 
who, as a result of events subsequent to the outbreak of the second world war, is unable or unwilling to 
avail himself of the protection of the Government of his country of nationality or former nationality. 
3. Subject to the provisions of section D and of Part II of this Annex, the term "refugee" also applies to 
persons who, having resided in Germany or Austria, and being of Jewish origin or foreigners or stateless 
persons, were victims of Nazi persecution and were detained in, or were obliged to flee from, and were 
subsequently returned to, one of those countries as a result of enemy action, or of war circumstances, 
and have not yet been firmly resettled therein. 
4. The term "refugee" also applies to unaccompanied children who are war orphans or whose parents 
have disappeared, and who are outside their countries of origin. Such children, 16 years of age or under, 
shall be given all possible priority assistance, including, normally, assistance in repatriation in the case 
of those whose nationality can be determined.” 
20 Ibid, “1. In the case of all the above categories (…) persons will become the concern of the 
Organisation […] if they have definitely, (…) expressed valid objections to returning to those countries. 
(a) The following shall be considered as valid objections: 
(i) Persecution, or fear, based on reasonable grounds of persecution because of race, religion, nationality 
or political opinions, provided these opinions are not in conflict with the principles of the United 
Nations, as laid down in the Preamble of the Charter of the United Nations; (…) 
(iii) In the case of persons falling within the category mentioned in section A, paragraphs 1 (a) and 1 
(c) compelling family reasons arising out of previous persecution, or compelling reasons of infirmity 
or illness.” 
21 Jose Fischel H. De Andrade, ‘On the Development of the Concept of “Persecution” in International 
Refugee Law’ [2008] 2 Anuario Brasileiro de direito internacional 114, 120. 
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grounded’.22 More broadly, Steinbock noted that under the ICR, UNRRA and 
IRO regimes, refugees started being defined on the basis of their experiences, 
rather than based on their membership to a particular collectivity.23 Hathaway 
also emphasised the individual dimension of these definitions by pointing out 
that, at that time, refugees were defined as people escaping from ‘injustice or 
a fundamental incompatibility with the home state’ in search of ‘personal 
freedom’.24 The personalisation of the definition of a refugee in this period 
coincided with the emergence of the notion of persecution in international 
treaties.  
 
The development of various definitions of a refugee in the instruments 
predating the 1951 Convention demonstrated that different conceptions of 
refugeehood existed throughout the first half of the century. These 
conceptions were adopted in reaction to the events and political necessities of 
the time, and, therefore, were shaped by the geopolitical circumstances in 
which they emerged. According to Juss, this suggested that, ‘by the time of 
the drafting of the 1951 Convention by the international community, there 
was no axiomatic reason why one particular approach should be favoured 
over another, since there were at least three different approaches that had been 
used in the space of a few decades’.25 As such, it can be concluded that the 
approach adopted in 1951 for defining who a refugee is, reflected a certain 
political stance taken by the States Parties. Whilst it cannot be denied that the 
drafters of the 1951 Convention were motivated by genuine humanitarian 
concerns, it should not be ignored that these concerns were also tainted with 
the political interests of states that determined how refugeehood was 
conceptualised. The following will analyse more in detail the underlying 
premises of the 1951 refugee definition. 
 
                                                
22 Ibid. 
23 Daniel J. Steinbock, ‘Interpreting the Refugee Definition’ [1998] 45 UCLA Law Review 733, 806. 
According to Steinbock ‘(b)efore 1938, international protection was usually given to groups of 
displaced or stateless persons described simply by national or ethnic origin, in other words, by category. 
In 1938, for the first time in the twentieth century, persons driven from their homelands to be given 
international aid were described in individual rather than categorical or group terms’. 
24 Hathaway (n 5) 350. 
25 Juss (n 3) 196. 
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B)   Creation of the 1951 Convention and the emergence of the 
notion of persecution in the refugee definition  
 
By determining who is a refugee through the designation of groups of 
individuals, the pre-1951 definitions were meant to provide temporary 
protection to specific categories of people until they could find durable 
solutions.  However, by the end of WWII, as noted by some authors, states 
realised that the refugee problem was rather pervasive in Europe and that 
more categories of individuals would require assistance. As such it was 
decided that a permanent solution was needed.26 A new refugee agency, the 
UNHCR, was established in order to ‘provide protection’ and ‘seek 
permanent solutions for the problem of refugees’. States also decided to 
create an international treaty for the protection of displaced people in Europe. 
For this purpose, the Secretary General of the newly formed United Nations 
proposed to agree on a new convention that would organise the assistance of 
‘all persons without international protection’.27 This proposal was rejected for 
being too inclusive, in particular by the Soviet Union and its allies who 
eventually refused to take part in the creation of a new instrument.28  
 
Hathaway observed that, as a result, the states that ended up drafting 
the Convention were ‘predominantly Western’29 and, represented a relatively 
homogenous ideological bloc. This had considerable consequences on how 
the new refugee definition was conceptualised. The drafters of the 
Convention decided to define refugees as individuals who, as a result of the 
events occurring in Europe before 1951, were outside their country of origin, 
had a well-founded fear of being persecuted based on a Convention reason 
and were not able to avail themselves of the protection of their state of origin. 
                                                
26 Robinson Nehemiah, Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees: Its History, Significance and 
Contents (New York: Institute of Jewish Affairs, 1952) 6. Nehemiah stated that the Convention was 
the ‘expression of a conviction by the comity of nations that refugees are not a temporary phenomenon, 
which can be dealt with either by half measures or piece-meal, but is one requiring a concerted effort 
by all states concerned’. See also Rieko Karatani, ‘How History Separated Refugee and Migrant 
Regimes: In Search of Their Institutional Origins’ [2005] 17 International Journal of Refugee Law 517, 
531. 
27 James C. Hathaway, ‘A Reconsideration of the Underlying Premise of Refugee Law’ [1990] 31 
Harvard International Law Journal 129, 144.  
28 Ibid, 145. 
29 Ibid, 146. 
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An early commentator pointed to the comparatively broader scope of this new 
definition as opposed to the former agreements that were ‘related to a strictly 
limited groups of refugees’.30 
 
However, according to Hathaway, this definition remained quite 
narrow as he believed that it simply constituted ‘a compromise between the 
sovereign prerogative of states to control immigration and the reality of 
coerced movements of persons at risk’.31 Similarly, numerous authors pointed 
that the 1951 Convention had an inherently restrictive scope. For instance, 
Chimni viewed the Convention as a Eurocentric document addressing only 
certain types of harm.32 Bhabba also considered that its ambit was very 
limited and unlikely to encompass numerous people in need.33 In this sense, 
Chetail argued that the refugee definition was selective in nature.34 These 
limitations were also pointed by Steinbock who, on a more acquiescing note, 
considered that the plenipotentiaries ‘sought to avoid the creation of a 
potential “blank check” that might be “cashed” by unknown multitudes’.35 
For the above authors, the drafters of the Convention established a definition 
that was intentionally restrictive at the beginning to limit their own 
engagement.  
 
The notion of persecution was chosen in this specific context and was 
also perceived as restricting the refugee definition by designating only certain 
forms of harm through a biased understanding of who was a refugee. For 
instance, Hathaway stated that the state parties ‘brought to the drafting table 
their own ideological partisanship’,36 as the notion of persecution only 
covered the plight of individuals fleeing civil and political harm at the hands 
of state authorities in the Soviet bloc and, thus, was convenient for Western 
states. He noted that, conversely, persons denied basic rights such as ‘food, 
                                                
30 Nehemiah (n 26) 9. 
31 Hathaway (n 28) 133. 
32 Chimni (n 5) 2.    
33 Bhabha, ‘Internationalist Gatekeepers? The Tension between Asylum Advocacy and Human Rights’ 
[2002] 15 Harvard Human Rights Journal 155. 
34 Vincent Chetail, ‘Are Refugee Rights Human Rights? An Unorthodox Questioning of the Relations 
between Refugee Law and Human Rights Law’ in Ruth Rubio-Marín (eds), Human Rights and 
Immigration, (OUP 2014) 19-72, 24.  
35 Steinbock (n 23) 738.   
36 Hathaway (n 28) 146.  
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health care, or education (i.e. the socio-economic rights, where the Western 
states [had] a poor record were) excluded from the international refugee 
definition’.37 In this sense, he demonstrated that persecution was a ‘politically 
partisan notion’.38 Shacknove also observed that the Convention was a mere 
response to the ‘European totalitarian experience [where] refugees were 
primarily [seen as] the persecuted victims of highly organized predatory 
states’. Bhabba argued that persecution ‘was imported from the preceding 
international refugee regime as a familiar term and a useful Western tool, 
flexible enough to cover the circumstances of both victims of Nazism, and 
Soviet and other Eastern dissidents’.39 For her, persecution was meant to 
exclude ‘those forced to flee because of personal vendettas and private feuds, 
non-discriminatory economic duress, famine, or internal civil turmoil - in 
short those whose persecution is not based on some form of egregious 
systemic discrimination or rights violation’.40 In line with the views that this 
notion was biased, Coles considered that the introduction of the pivotal 
concept of persecution in this context was designed to respond to the 
particular needs of individuals in Europe at a particular time only.41 Loescher 
also stated that ‘the adoption of persecution as the central characteristic of the 
refugee was made to fit a Western interpretation as asylum seekers’.42 Bagaric 
and Dimopoulos further noted that ‘despite its universal overtones, the 1951 
Convention was limited by the fact that it protected mainly Europeans fleeing 
after the War’.43 Finally, McAdam recently stated that the notion of 
persecution had an implicit political signification and was tied to forms of 
harm perpetrated by certain repressive states in Europe,44 also highlighting 
                                                
37 Hathaway (n 28) 150. See also p 148: ‘In the end, it was agreed to restrict the scope of protection in 
much the same way as UNRRA had done: only persons who feared “persecution” in the sense of being 
denied basic civil and political rights would fall within the international mandate. (Persecution as an 
attempt to restrict the scope of individuals protected). First, the persecution standard was a known 
quantity, having already been employed to embrace Soviet bloc dissidents under the IRO regime’. See 
also Karatani who considered that the definition of a refugee was established in order to protection 
people who fled the Eastern bloc in Rieko Karatani (n 26). 
38 James Hathaway and Michelle Foster, The Law of Refugee Status, (2nd edn; CUP 2014) 8. 
39 Bhabba (n 35) 172. 
40 Babbha, ibid 167. 
41 Gervase Coles, ‘Approaching the Refugee Problem Today’ in Gil Loescher and Laila Monaghan 
(eds) Refugees and International Relations (OUP, 1989) 373-410, 374-5. 
42 Gil Loescher, Beyond Charity: International Cooperation and the Global Refugee Crisis (OUP 1993) 
57. 
43 Mirko Bagaric and Penny Dimopoulos, ‘Refugee law - time for a fundamental rethink: need as the 
criterion for assistance’ [2003] 9 Canterbury Law Review 268. 
44 Jane McAdam, ‘Rethinking the origins of persecution’ [2014] 25 International Journal of Refugee 
Law 667, 671. Jane McAdam highlights the fact that persecution was implicit in the refugee concept 
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the strong political character of the notion of persecution at that time. As such, 
for many authors, persecution was a politically-charged notion that 
corresponded to the interests of the states that drafted the Convention at a 
certain time and designated sorts of predicaments suffered by victims of 
predatory European regimes.  
 
In light of the foregoing, it can be argued that the current refugee 
definition is, indeed, the direct result of events occurring in Europe and 
neighbouring countries in the first half of the 20th century. Although the 
definition progressively changed from a category-oriented definition to a 
more generic one by introducing the notion of persecution as a pivotal 
element, it remained embedded in a particular regional, historical and cultural 
context.45 The background of the 1951 Convention is significant in that it 
points to a discrete legal movement which aimed at providing assistance to 
only some populations in need and that was imbued with a political 
dimension.46  
 
These observations are, however, in tension with the progressive 
universalisation of the definition of a refugee and the emergence of new 
protection needs as the section below will demonstrate. The ability of the 
notion of persecution to adapt to new interpretive contexts became therefore 
questionable.  
 
Part 2) Applying the 1951 Convention to new refugee situations: 
the interpretive challenge 
 
In spite of the deep regional and political imprint of the 1951 
Convention, the 1967 Protocol made the refugee definition universally 
                                                
through the analysis of the drafting record of the international instruments in that period dealing with 
the protection of refugees. 
45 Andrew E. Shacknove, ‘Who Is a Refugee?’ [1985] 95 Ethics 274, 276. According to Schacknove, 
the 1951 Convention ‘was a response to the European totalitarian experience when, indeed, refugees 
were primarily the persecuted victims of highly organised predatory states’. 
46 On this see, Michael Parrish, ‘Redefining the Refugee: The Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
as a Basis for Refugee Protection’ [2000] 22 Cardozo Law Review 223, 228. According to Parrish, 
after WWII ‘the world community considered the specific geopolitical circumstances and decided to 
develop a legal definition of “refugee” that placed primary emphasis on only one of the possible 
motivations for flight: persecution’. 
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applicable. This has raised some interpretive challenges. Indeed, the nature 
of refugee movements has significantly changed since WWII, thus 
questioning the relevance of the 1951 Convention and more particularly the 
notion of persecution in a changing international society. The section below 
will analyse how the refugee definition has been universalised (A). It will be 
then considered how refugee flows have evolved since 1951 (B) in order to 
assess whether the notion of persecution is sufficiently flexible to be 
interpreted in light of these new displacement patterns (C). Finally, possible 
basis of definition will be considered in order to guide the interpretation of 
the notion in light of new circumstances of refugees (D). 
 
A)   Universalisation of the 1951 Convention	  
	  
Although the 1951 Convention was not meant to provide protection 
to all people in need of international assistance over the world, some authors 
had pointed out that its content had an inherently universal character and 
could be used as a model for establishing a global system of protection.47  This 
view aligned with the recommendation of the Final Act of the conference of 
plenipotentiaries, expressing the desire that the Convention be applied more 
extensively, depending on the will of member states. Indeed, the Final Act 
stated that the 1951 Convention should ‘have value as an example exceeding 
its contractual scope’.48 The Act further expressed the hope that ‘all nations 
will be guided by it in granting so far as possible to persons in their territory 
as refugees and who would not be covered by the terms of the Convention, 
the treatment for which it provides’.49 This recommendation encouraged 
states to rely on the Convention for extending their assistance to a larger 
number people in need, thus emphasising the protection purpose of the 1951 
Convention. This indeed suggested that, apart from the explicit temporal and 
                                                
47 Nehemiah indeed highlighted the inherent universal character of the Convention as he pointed out 
that whilst ‘all preceding Conventions referred to European refugees only’, ’the present Convention 
can be applied to refugees from any part of the world’ in Nehemiah (n 26) 8. 
48 Final Act of the United Nations Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees and 





geographical limitations, there was a hope that the 1951 Convention could 
serve as a basis for developing an expanded system of protection. Goodwin-
Gill noted that, until 1967, in practice, many states relied on the Final Act 
recommendation for providing assistance to individuals who had been 
forcibly displaced during some major world crisis, even after 1951.50 It was, 
however, unclear whether this recommendation was meant to cover only 
individuals who met the criteria of the refugee definition after lifting the 
geographical and temporal limitations, or larger groups of people.51 Whilst 
this point remains uncertain, the recommendation of the Final Act nonetheless 
indicates that the refugee definition could also adapt to circumstances 
different than the pre-1951 events.  
 
A few years after the end of WWII, the persistence and the emergence 
of new refugee crises52 led states to reconsider the scope of the Convention. 
Davies observed that, in the post-war period, the UNHCR had ‘grown 
increasingly frustrated with its limited mandate, with growing refugee 
problems in Europe and Africa that were beyond the technical reach of the 
Convention, and with a lower than expected number of accessions to the 
Convention, particularly amongst recently decolonised states’.53 It was 
becoming clearer at this time, that the refugee problem was pervasive, beyond 
the confines of Europe. In light of this situation, Juss noted that ‘for the 
Refugee Convention to remain relevant and apply as a universal treaty, it had 
to change its Eurocentric orientation’.54 As a result, states adopted a protocol 
in 1967 that lifted the geographical and temporal limitations of the refugee 
definition,55 and made the 1951 Convention a universally applicable treaty.   
                                                
50 Goodwin-Gill and McAdam (n 12) 36. See also David (n 2) 703. According to Davies the need to 
provide a broader protection to refugee was already clear in the 1950s. 
51 Goodwin-Gill and McAdam (n 12) 36 at footnote 110. 
52 Astri Suhrke, ‘A Crisis Diminished: Refugees in the Developing World’ [1993] 48 International 
Journal, No 2 (Migrants and Refugees) 215, 217: ‘The narrowly European orientation of the 
international refugee regime established in the immediate aftermath of World War II was not seriously 
challenged until the early 1960s. Then, suddenly, Africa moved to the fore with many nearly 
simultaneous outflows of population which arose from decolonisation struggles in Algeria (i959ff), 
Zaire (i960), Rwanda(ig63), and Portuguese Africa (circa 1961) as well as the increasingly violent 
confrontation between north and south in Sudan (circa 1963)’. 
53 Davies (n 2) 703. 
54 Juss (n 3) 187.  
55 UN General Assembly, Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, 4 October 1967, No.8791 UNTS 
606, 267: Article 1(2) Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees: ‘2. For the purpose of the present 
Protocol, the term “refugee” shall, except as regards the application of paragraph 3 of this article, mean 
any person within the definition of Article I of the Convention as if the words “As a result of events 
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The 1967 Protocol, however, did not revise any of the other provisions 
of the Convention. Given these minimal changes, Hathaway considered that 
the Protocol failed to substantively reform the Convention. Hathaway 
observed that even if the Protocol universalised the refugee definition, ‘only 
persons whose migration is prompted by a fear of persecution in relation to 
civil and political rights come within the scope of Convention-based refugee 
protection’.56 This meant ‘that most Third World refugees [would] remain de 
facto excluded, as their flight is more often prompted by natural disaster, war, 
‘or broadly-based political and economic turmoil than by “persecution”, at 
least as that term is understood in the European context’.57 Due to that, 
Hathaway called the reform operated by the 1967 Protocol a ‘pyrrhic victory 
for the less developed world’.58 For him, the Protocol had not been able to 
correct the strong Western-centric bias of the Convention and to make it 
relevant to the evolution of forced migration patterns. Davies expressed the 
same concerns.59 More particularly, she noted that the 1967 Protocol did not 
lift the condition of ‘political persecution’ which was, according to her, a 
major impediment for providing protection to ‘larger numbers of people 
fleeing generalised situations of violence and abuse’60. The type of reform 
carried out by the 1967 Protocol therefore raised major concerns regarding 
the fate of the 1951 Convention. Indeed, the Protocol’s failure to provide 
substantive reform to the refugee definition questioned the relevance of the 
1951 Convention to tackle the problem of refugees in the post-cold war world. 
In the words of Juss, ‘one of the perennial questions of modern-day refugee 
law is whether the 1951 UN Convention remains applicable to today’s global 
migration crisis’.61 In order to better assess the extent to which the refugee 
definition could still be relevant today, it is first important to consider the new 
nature of the emerging global migration crisis.  
 
                                                
occurring before 1 January 1951 and...” and the words “...as a result of such events”, in article 1 A (2) 
were omitted’. 
56 Hathaway (n 28) 162. 
57 Ibid. 
58 Ibid. 
59 See discussion on this, in Davies (n 2) 708. 
60 Ibid 728. 
61 Juss (n 3) 197. 
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B) New refugee situations  
 
i- Persecution: the absence of interpretive challenges during the cold 
war period 
 
Widol de Wenden observed that the interpretation of the definition of 
a refugee and more particularly of the notion of persecution did not cause 
particular difficulty until the end of the cold war period. She explained that, 
at that time, refugees escaping from a state belonging to the opposite bloc 
were automatically granted asylum because the definition of a refugee was 
mainly used as a political tool against enemy states. As a result, the 
understanding of the concept of persecution depended simply on the political 
views of the asylum country. In order to illustrate her statements, she 
mentioned the practice of the USA, where victims of the Cambodian, 
Vietnamese or Laotian regimes were systematically granted asylum in the 
1970s, simply because those countries were affiliated to the Soviet bloc. This 
was done as the expression of a political stance and, in this context, judges in 
the USA did not have to assess whether the forms of harm claimed by the 
asylum seekers amounted to persecution.62  
 
Other scholars supported the view that, at that time, refugee flows 
were mainly perceived through the cold war polarity. For instance, Kennedy 
stated that persons eligible for international protection were defined ‘with 
political considerations in mind’.63 Suhrke also highlighted the political 
nature of forced displacements by stating that, during this period, refugees 
represented ‘a propaganda victory for the other side, which could claim, […] 
that these people were voting with their feet’.64 This mindset prevailed 
throughout the cold war. In 1980, a debate was launched at the United Nations 
on the root causes of displacements and unfortunately states again adopted a 
politically biased view of the situation. Western states generally claimed that 
the ‘mass outflows were caused by totalitarian regimes in the countries of 
                                                
62 Catherine Withol de Wenden, La Question Migratoire au XXIe Siècle: Migrants, Réfugiés et 
Relations Internationales, (2nd edn: Science Po Les Presses, Paris, 2013) 143. 
63 David W. Kennedy, ‘International Refugee Protection’ [2014] 8 Human Rights Quarterly 1, 3 
64 Suhrke (n 64) 223.  
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origin which violated human rights’ while ‘socialist and many developing 
countries responded by citing colonialism, global economic inequality, and 
apartheid as the underlying causes of social conflict and related migrant 
outflows’65 thus, perpetuating the ideological dichotomy in this period. 
 
Given the strong political use of refugee law during the cold war, the 
interpretation of the notion of persecution did not raise particular juridical 
debate amongst Western jurisdictions. As stated by Hathaway, ‘Western 
states, which initially saw the admission of refugees to be consistent with their 
more general political goals, found the persecution-based definition to be 
quite capable of embracing virtually all emigrants from the socialist states of 
Europe’.66 This situation eventually changed in the 1990s, when the system 
of political bipolarity collapsed. In a new emerging world governed by 
multilateralism, political affiliations started having a lesser, or at least a 
different, impact on the nature of protection afforded to refugees.  
 
ii- New displacement patterns 
 
Refugee claims progressively changed with the evolution of 
international relations at the end of the cold war. The demise of an old world 
sparked new conflicts in different countries and created new displacement 
patterns.67  For instance, Suhrke observed that, in this period, old protracted 
refugee crises in Asia and Latin America slowly came to an end as ‘new flows 
emerged’.68 He noted more specifically, that new forms of violence emerged 
in central Asia and the Caucasus69 and various conflicts erupted in Africa, 
such as for instance Somalia.70 These crises created new refugee flows and 
the extent of these new refugee movements was wider than before. Instead of 
remaining in their own region, as was mostly the case during the cold war,71 
                                                
65 Ibid, 219. 
66 Hathaway (n 28) 169. 
67 Alexander Betts and Gil Loescher (eds), Refugees in International Relations (OUP 2011) 32.  
68 Shurke (n 54) 215. 
69 Ibid 216. 
70 Ibid 215. 
71 Betts and Loescher (n 79) 48: ‘During the Cold War, the proxy conflicts of the 1970s, in which the 
superpower rivalry between the United States and the USSR was played out in the developing world, 
led to massive displacement in the Horn of Africa, Southern Africa, Indochina, South Asia, and Central 
America’. 
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refugees started travelling longer distances due the ‘liberalisation of the 
economies at the global level, increasing interdependence among nations 
[and] new infrastructures of transportation’.72 In particular, Audebert and 
Dorai pointed out that, in this period, ‘flows of refugees […] intensified as 
their composition […] diversified and their dynamics [became] more 
complex’.73 The UNHCR also observed that globalisation progressively 
created the ‘cultural and technical conditions’ for the mobility of refugees,74 
leading to the intensification of refugee movements. Following the 
emergence of these new trends, the number of asylum applications surged in 
developed countries. Arboleda and Hoy noted that, in the early 1990s, 
Western jurisdictions started dealing with ‘a greater number and diversity of 
Third World asylum seekers’.75 A similar observation was made by other 
authors such as Shoenholtz,76 Betts and Loescher.77  
 
 The intensification of refugee movements was also accompanied by a 
diversification of the nature and causes of displacements. As highlighted by 
the UNHCR, recent ‘issues which the original delegates […] never even 
considered’78 emerged on the international scene. For instance, Kalin 
highlighted the emergence of new claims based on persecution perpetrated by 
non-state actors.79 In particular, Audebert and Dorai pointed to the increasing 
                                                
72 Cedric Audebert and Mohamed Kamel Dorai (edn), Migration in a Globalised World, New Research 
Issues and Prospects, (Amsterdam University Press 2010) 7. 
73 Audebert and Dorai ibid 8. 
74 UNHCR, ‘The State of the World's Refugees 2006, Human Displacement in the New Millennium’ 
(Geneva, 2006) 12.  
75 Eduardo Arboleda and Ian Hoy, ‘The Convention Refugee Definition in the West: Disharmony of 
Interpretation and Application’ [1993] 5 International Journal of Refugee Law 66, 67. 
76Andrew I. Schoenholtz, ‘The New Refugees and the Old Treaty: Persecutors and Persecuted in the 
Twenty-First Century’ [2015] 16 Chicago Journal of International Law 81, 86-85 and 88.  
77 Betts and Loescher (n 73) 42. 
78 UNHCR, ‘The Refugee Convention at 50’, Editorials (Geneva 2001), available at: 
http://www.unhcr.org/news/editorial/2001/7/3b4c06f0d/refugee-convention-50.html. See also on this, 
the comments made by Messina, in Claire Messina, Refugee ‘Definitions in the Countries of the 
Commonwealth of Independent States’ in Frances Nicholson and Patrick Twomey (edn) Refugee Rights 
and Realities: Evolving International Concepts and Regimes (CUP 1999) 136-150, 136: ‘The collapse 
of the Soviet Union resulted in population displacements of an unprecedented scale and complexity. 
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flows turned international [repatriation, labour migration]; of new flows, whose typology is well known 
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79 Walter Kalin, ‘Non-State Agents of Persecution and the Inability of the State to Protect’ [2001] 15 
Georgetown Immigration Law Journal 415, 415: According to Kalin: ‘the nature of persecution is 
changing […]. Although statistics are not available, it is highly likely that the majority of today's 
refugees are fleeing dangers emanating from non-state agents’. 
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proportion of women in the migration flows,80 leading to the appearance of 
new sorts of asylum requests based on gender-based violence.81 Hoefpner 
noted more generally that asylum applications relating to harm perpetrated by 
members of the refugees’ community, and occurring in the private sphere, 
became more common at the turn of the 1990s.82 Other forms of claims that 
challenged traditional practices and social mores also became more frequent83 
as well as claims linked to types of collective violence or violence exerted at 
the hands of criminal gangs or caused by private vendettas.84 In parallel to 
these evolutions, the UNHCR started identifying some emerging trends 
amongst the asylum seekers’ profiles. For instance, in its 2016 annual report, 
the Refugee Agency noted that the number of unaccompanied children 
seeking asylum had considerably augmented in the past decades, reaching an 
unprecedented peak in 2015.85 On a different note, Betts and Loescher 
pointed to ‘the emergence of new transnational threats linked to terrorism and 
the environment’.86 The emergence of new displacement patterns involving 
mass-influx situations, natural disasters and climate change as well as mixed 
flows of persons leaving their country was also pointed out by Feller as posing 
an interpretive challenge to the notion of persecution.87 The above are only 
few examples of new forms of displacement that progressively emerged at 
the turn of the century, causing refugee applications lodged in Western 
jurisdictions to be more varied than before.  
 
Further to this, it should be noted that the emergence of new 
displacement patterns took place in a global society, where human rights 
                                                
80 Audebert and Dorai (n 74) 77.  
81 Florian Francois Hoepfner, L’Evolution de la Notion de Réfugié, Publication de la Fondation 
Marangopoulos pour les Droits de l’Homme, (Série 18, Paris Pedone, 2014) 314. Hoepfner observed 
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82 Ibid. 
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314-332 to domestic violence; and at 333-365 to sexual violence. 
84 UNHCR, ‘Guidance Note on Refugee Claims Relating to Victims of Organized Gangs’, 31 March 
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85UNHCR, ‘Global Trend, Forced Displacement 2016, 19 June 2017’, available at 
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86 Betts and Loescher (n 73) 2. 
87 Erika Feller, ‘The Refugee Convention at 60: Still Fit for Its Purpose? Protection Tools for Protection 
Needs’ in Susan Kneebone, Dallal Stevens, Loretta Baldassar (eds) Refugee Protection and the Role of 
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progressively became a central concern of geopolitical relations.88 In this 
situation, it appeared that individuals started developing an increased sense 
of rights entitlement, which led Streeck to point to the emergence of a 
growing popular discontent in the globalised world. According to him, this 
movement announced the ‘return of the repressed’.89 This larger sense of 
rights entitlement can be perceived as further contributing to the increasing 
diversity of refugee claims. As per the words of Antonio Gramsci, Streeck 
considered that the world is currently facing an ‘interregnum’ period, namely 
‘a period of uncertain duration in which an old order is dying but a new one 
cannot yet be born’.90 The old refugee order, when individuals were fleeing 
repressive state policies on account of their race, religion or political opinion 
seems to have been gradually replaced by a new order where forced 
displacements occur at a larger scale and for a broader variety of reasons. The 
needs and priorities of refugees are, therefore, changing and new 
vulnerabilities that were not anticipated by the drafters of the Convention 
have been progressively brought to light.  
 
  Interpreting the notion of persecution in this context raises more 
ambiguity than in the politically polarised world of the cold war. A transition 
from a political application of the notion of persecution towards a more 
judicialised interpretation is therefore needed. This transition has gradually 
taken place thanks to the development of jurisprudential trends that have 
provided some relevant insights to define persecution and that have been 
encouraged by the work of scholars in this field. However, in light of new 
issues that have now become major problems at the global level,91 
interpreting the notion of persecution remains increasingly contentious. For 
instance, the relevance of this notion has even been questioned through the 
emergence of regional definitions of a refugee that squarely ignore the 
                                                
88 Scott Sheeran and Sir Nigel Rodley Routledge Handbook of International Human Rights Law (Taylor 
and Francis 2014) 18: ‘Over time, human rights have become a recognised code of conduct, making 
their way into a majority of contemporary constitutions and providing a standard for relations between 
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relations’. 
89 Wolfgang Streeck, ‘The Return of the Repressed’, [2017] 104 New Left Review 5. 
90 Ibid 20. 
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concept of persecution.92  
 
This poses the question whether the notion of persecution is still 
useful to address the plight of millions of displaced people or whether it is 
sufficiently flexible to fit the current circumstances of refugees.  
 
C) Persecution: a malleable term?  
 
Whilst the notion of persecution has clearly been imbued with a 
certain political meaning as argued above, one might wonder whether it could 
be applied in the context of new displacement patterns in order to make the 
1951 Convention relevant to contemporaneous problems of refugees. On this 
point, it is noteworthy that the notion of persecution is rather vague and, 
therefore, open to various interpretations. As a result, a risk of inconsistent 
approaches is significant. This could in turn undermine the coherence of the 
overall regime of international protection and provide incentives for ‘asylum 
shopping’.93 Shoenholtz, in particular, lamented that some countries had 
adopted very restrictive interpretations of the refugee definition94 whilst 
others adopted a more extensive view, thus creating major disparities amongst 
asylum systems.95 
 
The extent to which the notion of persecution can be interpreted is 
therefore questionable. To answer that question, it should first be pointed out 
that the plenipotentiaries have not provided any explicit limitations to this 
notion. Not only there is no definition of persecution in the 1951 Convention, 
but there is also barely any guidance in the travaux preparatoires of the 
Convention.96  Different views have been expressed as to the reasons for this 
                                                
92 Organisation of African Unity (OAU), Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee 
Problems in Africa (OAU Convention), 10 September 1969, 1001 UNTS. 45, and Cartagena 
Declaration on Refugees, (adopted on 22 November 1984) OAS Doc. OEA/Ser.L/V/II.66/doc.10, 190 
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93 UNHCR, ‘The State of the World’s Refugees’, 1996 available at: 
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94 Schoenholtz (n 78) 88. 
95 Ibid 121. 
96 Steinbock (n 23) 809. See also Paul Weis, The Refugee Convention, 1951. The Travaux Préparatoires 
Analysed with a Commentary by the Late Dr Paul Weis, (CUP 1995) 8. 
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lack of guidance.97 In particular, McAdam argued that the political dimension 
of the notion of persecution was so clear to the plenipotentiaries that they did 
not feel the need to introduce a definition.98 Her view aligned with Betts’ 
contention that the creators of the 1951 Convention ‘did not anticipate that its 
obligations would be spread to the rest of the world’.99 Although Betts 
acknowledged that the refugee definition was meant to have a certain 
flexibility, he believes that the plenipotentiaries did not foresee extensive 
interpretations of the Convention outside the European context. To him, their 
choice of persecution as a central element of the definition has, in fact, been 
a bar to extensive applications of the 1951 Convention.100 In contrast with 
these authors, other commentators considered that, from the outset, even 
though the plenipotentiaries had a certain meaning in mind, they were aware 
of their inability to anticipate the diverse forms that persecution might take in 
the future and, therefore, they wanted to make persecution a flexible notion 
that could evolve depending on the changing conditions of refugees.  
 
For instance, Grahl-Madsen argued that the drafters of the Convention 
did not define persecution as they wanted ‘to introduce a flexible concept 
which might be applied to circumstances as they might arise’. To him, it 
looked like the plenipotentiaries had ‘capitulated before the inventiveness of 
humanity to think up new ways of persecuting fellow men’.101 His view was 
also shared by Chimni who stated that the plenipotentiaries ‘deliberately left 
the meaning of persecution undefined as it was an impossible task to 
enumerate in advance the myriad forms it might assume’.102 Chetail also 
considered that the lack of definition was intentional, because the drafters 
wanted to introduce a ‘concept flexible enough to encapsulate any possible 
future forms of mistreatment’.103 Chetail further argued that the drafters of 
                                                
97 UNHCR, ‘Note on The International Protection of Refugees: Interpreting Article 1 of the 1951 
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the Convention simply wanted to relinquish the meaning of persecution ‘to 
the subsequent interpretation of each state party’.104 Hathaway’s position on 
this issue is a little bit more ambiguous. As previously noted, he contended in 
1990 that the notion of persecution had a strong political imprint in the mind 
of the plenipotentiaries and did not detect any intention on their part to 
develop a malleable concept. However, he adopted a more nuanced view in 
his seminal book, The Law of Refugee Status (LORS) in 1991 (and subsequent 
editions), as he explicitly stated that the plenipotentiaries did not define 
persecution because they considered that it was impossible to enumerate ‘in 
advance all of the forms of maltreatment that might legitimately entitle 
persons to benefit from international protection’.105 Whilst this does not 
directly contradict his earlier contention, it nonetheless puts a greater 
emphasis on the malleable character of the notion as opposed to its political 
character.  
 
In an attempt to reconcile different views, the UNHCR drafted a note 
on the interpretation of Article 1 of the 1951 Convention, observing that 
‘whatever the reasons, the fact that the Convention does not legally define 
persecution is a strong indication that, on the basis of the experience of the 
past, the drafters intended that all future types of persecution should be 
encompassed by the term’.106 Whether these types of persecution were meant 
to relate to forms of harm perpetrated by oppressive states is unclear. In any 
case, the different positions on the reasons for the absence of a definition are 
both reconcilable with the fact that the absence of definition of persecution 
allows for the term to be interpreted in an evolutionary manner. This view 
appears to now be the dominant one in national courts.107 For instance, even 
though McAdam argued that the notion of persecution was meant to respond 
to the specific needs of certain refugees who fled political forms of harm, she 
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Home Department, UKHL 15 [2003] 1 WLR 856 United Kingdom: House of Lords, 20 March 2003. 
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eventually admitted that the 1951 Convention proved to have an ‘enduring 
relevance’.108 To Sztucki, although the Convention was a ‘cold war 
product’,109 ‘in the course of time it has lost its primarily cold war and 
Eurocentric character’.110 He considered that although the notion of 
persecution emerged in a specific context, it remains open to ‘a wide range of 
interpretation’.111 Supporting this view, Carlier observed that the ‘Convention 
does not suffer from any legal or conceptual weakness’112 per se and can adapt 
to various circumstances. He believed that the major obstacle to an 
evolutionary understanding of the Convention is the political reluctance of 
interpretive agents rather than the refugee definition itself.113 In line with 
these views, Durieux noted that the refugee definition has conferred a certain 
dynamism to the 1951 Convention, which explains the ‘remarkable resilience 
of a norm that was adopted over 60 years ago’.114 More specifically, Zetter 
considered that the malleability of the refugee definition has been due, in part, 
to the element of persecution which proved to be an evolutionary notion.115 
This view rejoins the one of Shoenholtz who also pointed out that the refugee 
definition ‘has proven adaptable to the changing nature of persecution’ 
nowadays.116 Hathaway finally stated in a more recent paper, that the refugee 
definition has been ‘wonderfully flexible, identifying new groups of 
fundamentally disenfranchised persons unable to benefit from human rights 
protection in their own countries’117. He noted that, amongst other term, the 
persecution limb was particularly malleable.  
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It is true that, overall, the refugee definition and more particularly the 
notion of persecution, have proven to be rather open to interpretation. 
Considering that the plenipotentiaries did not define persecution in the hope 
that it could be used in a flexible manner, rather than because the meaning of 
persecution was uncontroversial, seems to be more in line with the Final Act’s 
recommendation that the Convention should be interpreted beyond the 
confines of its initial limitations. As such, a few decades after the entry into 
force of the 1967 Protocol, a relatively positive assessment can be made in 
contrast with the pessimistic views initially expressed by early authors on the 
biased nature of the refugee definition and the notion of persecution. It 
appears, indeed, that the 1951 Convention has retained a certain relevance 
nowadays and that the notion of persecution can be interpreted in an 
evolutionary manner, adapting itself, to a certain extent, to various 
circumstances of refugees.  
 
Durieux, however, observed that, in spite of this flexible character, 
there is still some uncertainty regarding the overall scope of the refugee 
definition. For him, and as per the words used by Schaknove, it is not ‘easy 
to capture what is “essential and universal about refugeehood”’118 due to the 
indeterminacy of its elements. This confusion might indeed raise questions as 
to the extent to which the refugee definition can adapt to the changing refugee 
context, and more particularly, how the notion of persecution should be 
understood in a manner that does not entirely contravene the intention of the 
drafters of the 1951 Convention. Some concerns can here be highlighted. In 
particular, Miaini noted that the lack of definition can encourage restrictive 
applications of the 1951 Convention that are not adequate for the evolving 
needs of refugees.119 Interpretive guidance is therefore needed. To this end, it 
should be noted that some elements of interpretation do already exist. They 
will be analysed below in order to evaluate to what extent they could be used 
as relevant frameworks for interpreting the notion of persecution.     
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D)   Basis of definition 
 
In the absence of a definition of persecution in international refugee 
law, national courts have at times relied on dictionary definitions. These 
approaches have generally been rejected for being too diverse depending on 
the language of the definition.120 Guidance might therefore be sought 
elsewhere. In particular, the non-refoulement principle defined in Article 33 
of the 1951 Convention has been advanced as a starting point for defining 
persecution. Additionally, persecution has been defined in the Rome Statute 
for the purpose of criminal prosecution. The present section will assess both 
definition proposals and demonstrate that none of them are adequate to 
delineate the contours of the notion of persecution in the meaning of the 1951 
Convention. Although they provide relevant insights for interpreting certain 
aspects of persecution, further guidance needs to be found elsewhere.  
 
i-  The non-refoulement principle according to Article 33 of the 1951 
Convention  
 
Storey noted that some early approaches to interpret the notion of 
persecution searched for the definition of the notion within the dispositions 
of the 1951 Convention itself.121 These ‘hermeneutical’122 approaches 
considered that the meaning of persecution can be revealed by Article 33 of 
the Convention, which states that ‘no contracting state shall expel or return 
(‘refouler’) a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories 
where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, 
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion’. 
Seemingly encouraging this view, a number of conclusions of the Executive 
Committee (Excom) of the UNHCR also assimilate the principle of non-
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refoulement with the concept of persecution.123  These views, however, raise 
questions as to the extent of the notion of persecution and whether it should 
only be interpreted as a threat to life and freedom. The dominant opinion is 
that the concept of ‘threat to life and freedom’ can be used as a departure 
point for interpreting persecution, but it would be too restrictive to confine 
the notion to Article 33. Some authors considered that the provisions of this 
article constitute ‘core elements’ of persecution,124 but suggested that 
persecution has a broader meaning than this. In the words of Goodwin-Gill, 
persecution is ultimately a matter of ‘degree and proportion’.125 Similarly, 
Hathaway argued that persecution is premised on the more general notion of 
‘serious harm’ and was not meant to be confined to ‘consequences of life or 
death proportions’.126 In light of the above, the provisions of Article 33 might 
appear too restrictive to confine the notion of persecution to this article.  
 
This approach is in line with the UNHCR Handbook, which stated that 
a threat to life and freedom on account of a Convention ground is always 
persecution but that persecution should be more than that. In addition to the 
principles of Article 33, the UNHCR Handbook goes on to enumerate other 
forms of restrictions that could warrant refugee status. In a later document, 
the UNHCR also observed that according to the travaux preparatoires, the 
principle of non-refoulement was meant to be different than the criteria laid 
down by the refugee definition. According to the Refugee Agency:  
 
‘the words ‘where his life or freedom would be threatened […] 
were not intended to lay down a stricter criterion than the 
words “well-founded fear of” persecution figuring in the 
definition of the term “refugee” in Article 1 A (2). The 
different wording was introduced for another reason, namely 
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to make it clear that the principle of non-refoulement applies 
not only in respect of the country of origin but to any country 
where a person has reason to fear persecution’.127  
 
It appears indeed that the dispositions of Article 33 concern 
procedural issues rather than eligibility criteria to refugee status. Whilst, as 
stated by the UNHCR, these terms can indeed be considered relevant to 
designate forms of harm that amount to persecution, the notion of persecution 
ought to be interpreted in a manner that goes beyond Article 33.   
 
ii- Persecution in international criminal law  
 
The notion of persecution has also been widely discussed in the 
jurisprudence of various international tribunals128 in the context of the 
commission of war crimes. An authoritative definition of persecution was 
eventually codified in the 1998 Statute of the International Criminal Court.129 
According to this statute, persecution consists in ‘the intentional and severe 
deprivation of fundamental rights contrary to international law by reason of 
the identity of the group or collectivity’.130 However, in this definition, an act 
of persecution has to be perpetrated in connection with a crime against 
humanity, which appears to constitute a rather strict approach.131 Indeed, the 
definition of persecution in the context of the Rome Statute is meant to apply 
to the prosecution of individuals responsible of international crimes only. As 
such, it contrasts with the protection purpose of the 1951 Convention. On this 
point, Goodwin-Gill noted that the value of this definition is ‘necessarily 
limited by its criminal context’132 and therefore, transposing this definition 
into refugee law might not be adequate. This observation is in line with 
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Foster’s contention that ‘since different aims and policy objectives inform 
different areas of the law, there is a danger in transplanting approaches 
developed in an area with one set of objectives into a field that has quite 
different policy aims’.133 In this sense, Sunga also highlighted the particular 
tensions between the criminal law and refugee law as he argued that the 
definitions of persecution in both fields do not ‘denote the same meaning’.134 
However, he did not provide more explanation on this point. To fill this gap, 
Musalo later pointed to an important particularity of refugee law, namely that 
the victims should not ‘be required to prove their persecutor's intent in order 
to establish refugee status’.135 This element is starkly opposed to the 
requirement of a criminal intent in international criminal law and, therefore, 
makes persecution in international refugee law a discrete concept.  
 
Similarly, Turk and Nicholson noted the limitations of the Rome 
Statute’s definition and observed that it would not be appropriate to rely on it 
for refugee law purposes. They, however, considered that victims of 
persecution under the Rome Statute could qualify as refugees under the 1951 
Convention, in particular in view of the severity of the harm suffered. For 
them, ‘it is possible to deduce from the various crimes contained in the statute 
the conclusion that their victims are often refugees, which would indicate the 
breadth of the notion of persecution in the refugee law context’.136 In light of 
the above, it can be concluded that whilst the Rome Statute might provide an 
indication of what types of harm amount to persecution in the context of the 
refugee definition, it should not be used to restrict the notion. This view has 
not been disputed, and, in general, the Rome Statute has not been extensively 
relied upon in domestic jurisdictions to interpret the notion of persecution for 
the purpose of examining eligibility to refugee status.  
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In light of the foregoing, no comprehensive guidance can be found in 
international law for interpreting the notion of persecution, although some 
insights can be drawn from Article 33 of the 1951 Convention and Article 7 
of the Rome Statute. However, both the literature and the UNHCR tend to 
converge on this point, by considering that persecution has a wider ambit than 
the above definitions.  
Part 3- Concluding remarks  
 
The present chapter has demonstrated that the notion of persecution 
emerged in a specific historical and geopolitical context that initially gave a 
certain political orientation to the notion of persecution. In spite of this 
political imprint, the absence of a definition has conferred a flexible character 
to the notion, making the 1951 Convention adaptable to new circumstances 
of refugees. During the cold war period, the interpretation of persecution 
raised little concern in domestic jurisdictions but, after the collapse of the 
Soviet Union and the end of the global polarity between two opposing blocs, 
the new geopolitical dynamics brought inexorable changes on the 
international scene. In particular, refugee movements started to diversify. 
New types of problems, not directly related to political oppression, gradually 
emerged and constituted new causes of forced displacements.  
  
Given the relatively malleable character of the concept of persecution, 
evolutionary interpretations of the term are possible but, due to its vagueness, 
major risks of inconsistency also emerged. Therefore, whilst the meaning of 
persecution has ‘initially been relinquished to the subsequent interpretation 
of each state party’, there is now a need for a more principled and less 
subjective and political application of the notion.137 A more coherent 
approach is indeed needed for two major reasons. First, it is necessary to 
ensure that the notion of persecution is applied with sufficient flexibility in 
order to adapt to the changing circumstances of refugees and avoid 
excessively restrictive understandings of the 1951 Convention. Second, given 
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the major risk of fragmentary jurisprudence that arises from the 
diversification of asylum claims, some guidance is desirable to ensure the 
coherence of the international protection system. Asylum applications in 
Western jurisdictions have surged at the end of the cold war and still continue 
to regularly increase,138 making this necessity more pressing than ever. 
 
 This chapter has demonstrated that the 1951 Convention has a 
protective purpose that has been politically tainted, but that needs to be 
interpreted in an evolutionary manner. It has also been demonstrated that the 
notion of persecution has an individualist dimension which requires that 
refugees should face an individual risk of harm, thus setting incompressible 
boundaries to the modalities of interpretation. The extent to which the notion 
of persecution should be evolutionary within these boundaries remains 
unclear and has been debated amongst scholars. Whilst they have proposed 
various interpretive frameworks to overcome the above-mentioned hurdles, 
the dominant framework proposes an approach specifically based on basic 
human rights. The potentials and limitations of this approach will be 
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Chapter 2: Developing a framework for 
interpreting the notion of persecution: an 
assessment of the basic human rights 
interpretive model 
 
Given the lack of authoritative guidance for interpreting persecution 
and the risk of inconsistent approaches that ensues, scholars have highlighted 
the need to develop a principled approach in order to build a more coherent 
system of international protection. According to the dominant view, the 
notion of persecution should be interpreted in light of basic human rights. One 
of the major proponents of the basic human rights approach is James 
Hathaway1 who developed his proposal in the LORS. Given that his approach 
has gained major traction in the literature and the jurisprudence, particular 
attention will be lent to his work in this chapter. It will be wondered whether 
Hathaway’s narrative is an adequate one, both in terms of legitimacy and 
utility? 
 
The present chapter will first evaluate the legal justifications for using 
basic human rights as interpretive benchmarks (Part 1). To this end, reference 
will be made to authors that either shared or disputed Hathaway’s views. 
Further to this, the modalities of Hathaway’s framework will be closely 
analysed in order to assess its practical scope. These modalities include the 
quantitative and qualitative aspects of the notion of persecution (Part 2) as 
well as the role of the surrogacy principle in interpreting the notion (Part 3). 
It will be argued that a basic human rights framework does not solve the 
problem of inconsistent approaches and creates the risk of encouraging rather 
restrictive interpretations of the notion of persecution, depending on the 
different parameters relied upon by decision makers. 
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Part 1 ) Legal and theoretical justifications for referring to human 
rights as interpretive benchmarks 
 
 The nature of the 1951 Convention has been debated amongst authors. 
Hathaway and the proponents of the human rights approach consider that 
refugee law and international human rights are closely linked and that refugee 
law should be interpreted in light of human rights. Some have even argued 
that the 1951 Convention is, in itself, a human rights treaty (A). In contrast 
with these views, other commentators have contended that refugee law and 
human rights law are disconnected and that refugee law should be understood 
as establishing a self-contained regime (B). Finally, others have pointed out 
that neither perspectives are valid, but that the notion of persecution should 
nonetheless be interpreted in light of human rights because it simply has 
become the orthodoxy in refugee law (C). These different positions will be 
assessed hereunder in order to determine whether human rights should have 
a role to play in interpreting the Convention and to what extent.  
 
A) Theological approach to refugee law: the 1951 Convention as   
a human rights instrument? 
 
According to Hathaway, objective principles need to be relied upon in 
order to interpret the notion of persecution. For him, interpretive guidance 
should be sought in the rules of treaty interpretation set out in the 1969 Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT).2 In particular, he noted that, 
according to Article 31 of the VCLT, treaties should be interpreted in good 
faith, taking into account the context, object and purpose of a treaty. To this 
end, he referred to the Preamble to the 1951 Convention3 and pointed out that 
the first two paragraphs clearly mention the UN Charter, the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), and the concept of ‘fundamental 
rights and freedoms’.4 This led him to conclude that the Preamble grounds 
                                                
2 United Nations, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969, UNTS, vol. 1155, p. 331. 
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the 1951 Convention on a human rights context, making the Convention a 
tool for human rights protection. As such, he believes that human rights 
standards should be used as benchmarks for interpreting the notion of 
persecution.   
 
Hathaway’s view that human rights constitute the ‘background’5 
against which persecution should be interpreted is not new. Before him,6 
some authors had already expressed the idea that international human rights 
were valuable references for informing the purpose of the 1951 Convention.  
For instance, in 1953, Vernant highlighted the necessity of interpreting the 
notion of persecution in the most objective manner possible, through the 
human rights principles existing at that time in the UDHR. He defined the 
notion of persecution as ‘severe measures and sanctions of an arbitrary nature, 
incompatible with the principles set forth in the “Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights’”.7 Although Vernant considered that human rights standards 
could constitute interpretive benchmarks, he barely gave any doctrinal 
justification for this and did not further elaborate on the exact role of human 
rights in informing the meaning of persecution. For him, the UDHR simply 
constituted ‘a code of honor’8 that could provide normative guidance. He also 
considered that there were limitations to this framework because the UDHR 
standards were drafted in general terms.9 Therefore, he contended that more 
specific principles were needed to guide the interpretation of the notion of 
persecution but he did not provide more insight as to the nature of such 
guidance.  
 
In 1983, Goodwin-Gill also proposed to rely on human rights 
principles in order to interpret the notion of persecution.10 However, like 
Vernant, he did not extensively explain the theoretical roots for choosing this 
mode of interpretation. It was only in 1991 that Hathaway filled this doctrinal 
                                                
5 Ibid 193. 
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8 Ibid.  
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gap when he ‘systematised’11 the existence of an interpretive human rights 
framework by reference to the rules of treaty interpretations and the major 
role of the Preamble in setting the object and purpose of the Convention. 
Similar to his approach, Foster also referred to the VCLT to argue that the 
interpretation of the refugee definition should be consistent with the object 
and purpose of the Convention for which guidance is to be found in the 
Preamble.12 She added that the Convention was imbued with ‘the developing 
body of international human rights law’13, which reinforced the conclusion 
that human rights constituted relevant referential standards for interpreting 
the refugee definition. This view was further shared by Carlier who 
considered that the refugee definition should be interpreted ‘theologically’14 
in light of the principle that ‘human beings shall enjoy fundamental rights and 
freedoms without discrimination’15 as enshrined in the first recital of the 
Preamble.16 Parrish also contended that, according to the Preamble, the 1951 
Convention was established with ‘primary consideration of the UDHR’. For 
him, these references were justified by the fact that the UDHR had ‘been 
almost universally accepted and repeatedly affirmed’ and that ‘no state can 
legitimately argue that its provisions are not valid as, at the very least, 
aspirations and ideals for its own citizens’.17 Similarly, Anker supported the 
view that refugee law and human rights were closely linked as she noted that 
‘refugee law grants protection to a subset of persons who have fled human 
rights abuses’18 and it should be therefore interpreted in human rights terms. 
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As the human rights framework of interpretation gained more traction 
among scholars, some authors considered that there were more than mere 
theological links between refugee and human rights protection. They, in fact, 
argued that refugee law was a subset of international human rights law. For 
instance, Clark and Crépeau stated that the 1951 Convention should be 
considered an ‘early human right treaty’.19 They further pointed out that the 
juridical context of the Convention should be understood in an evolutionary 
manner, taking into account all the subsequent human rights treaties that have 
been adopted since 1951 to complement the Refugee Convention.20 McAdam 
adopted similar views as she noted that the Convention constituted ‘part of 
the corpus of human rights law, both informing and informed by it’. 21 She 
considered that the Convention took the UDHR as a departure point to create 
a specific protection regime for refugees based, in part, on its principles. As 
such, she stated that the 1951 Convention is in fact a ‘specialist human rights 
treaty’,22 which acts as a form of ‘lex specialis’.23 
 
Of note, however, is that the above authors referred to different types 
of human rights standards, thus indicating a lack of consensus on which 
particular human rights norms form the background of the 1951 Convention. 
Whilst some scholars simply refer to the UDHR, others talk about 
‘fundamental rights and freedoms’ and some others mention human rights, 
more generally as a concept. To clarify exactly which human rights norms 
were the most relevant for interpreting the 1951 Convention, different 
proposals have been made by scholars. Before analysing more thoroughly 
these views, the position of other authors opposing the primacy of human 
rights in interpreting the Convention, will be considered below in order to 
define more precisely the contours of the interpretive debate.  
 
B) International refugee law as a self-contained regime?  
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The view that the 1951 Convention has a human rights background 
has not been shared by all authors. Some commentators considered that 
refugee law and human rights law are actually disconnected and that the 1951 
Convention has established a self-contained regime. In particular, Tuitt 
pointed to the ‘refugee law’s reluctance to embrace human rights norms’.24 
She did not address the legal grounds for rejecting the human rights narrative 
but she rather emphasised the practical concerns raised by this narrative to 
conclude that it did not constitute an adequate mode of interpretation. On a 
similar note, Steinbock also rejected the human rights interpretive method. 
He adopted a different angle, as he addressed the legality of this approach by 
contending that a proper reading of the VCLT yields a different result from 
what Hathaway argued. To him ‘the objects and purposes [of a treaty] must 
be grounded in the terms of the treaty itself’. 25 He therefore proposed to go 
back to the plain meaning of the text.  For him, the 1951 Convention does not 
have the same purpose as other human rights treaties because it provides for 
a limited regime of protection. He pointed out that, according to the refugee 
definition, only individuals facing persecution for some reasons would be 
protected, which contrasts to the broader philosophy of human rights. 
Steinbock considered that interpreting persecution in light of human rights 
would contravene the meaning of the text and, in particular disregard the 
limitations established by the five Convention grounds.26 As such, he 
contended that a more restrictive approach should be applied, and that only a 
minimal set of rights should be referred to.27 Other authors, such as Haddad, 
also refused to consider that the Refugee Convention had a human rights 
character. Haddad contended that human rights simply do not align with the 
inherent limitations of refugee law whereby sovereign states are able to 
impose limitations on entry and on the rights afforded to refugees within their 
territory. As such, Haddad considered that refugee protection is ‘instigated 
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more by issues of state security than humanitarian concerns’28 and rejected 
the idea that human rights underpin the 1951 Convention.  
 
More recently, Cantor also argued that human rights law does not 
constitute an adequate background against which the notion of persecution 
should be interpreted. He stated that the Preamble to the 1951 Convention 
‘offers a meagre basis on which to ground a human rights-based interpretation 
of Article 1A(2)’.29 He noted that, apart from the first two paragraphs, the 
Preamble does not adopt a strong human rights narrative.30 Therefore, he 
questioned the weight that has been given to the first two paragraphs while 
the rest of the Preamble seems to have been disregarded. For him, the first 
two paragraphs have in fact a ‘backward-looking’ orientation, ‘speaking to 
the past concerns of the UN’.31 In contrast, the three remaining paragraphs 
are forward-looking, and, as such, Cantor contended that they carry more 
normative weight. According to him, they present the refugee problem as a 
‘social and humanitarian problem’32 instead of a human rights problem. He 
concluded that the plenipotentiaries, in fact, aimed at creating a regime 
‘afresh on its own intrinsic terms rather than via [at the time] novel UN human 
rights concepts’.33 He did not dispute the relevance of human rights standards 
in informing the meaning of the notion of persecution but he considered that 
they should be used as ‘illustrative rather than determinative of the concept 
of persecution’.34 For the above authors, the 1951 Convention established an 
independent legal regime, distinct from human rights law. Some of them, 
however, considered that human rights standards are not entirely irrelevant in 
interpreting the Convention but they pointed out that they should have a 
minimal role in providing interpretive guidance.35  
                                                
28 Emma Haddad, ‘Refugee protection: a clash of values’ [2003] 1 The International Journal of Human 
Rights 1,14.  
29 James Cantor, ‘Defining Refugees: Persecution, Surrogacy and the Human Rights Paradigm’ in 
Human Rights and the Refugee Definition Comparative Legal Practice and Theory (Brill Nijhoff 2016) 
349-395, 374. 
30 Ibid.  
31 Ibid 374.  
32 Ibid 375. 
33 Ibid 375. 
34 Ibid 393. 
35 In Steinbock (n 25 783, the author noted that human rights rules of customary law could be relevant 
interpretive benchmarks. In Cantor (n 29) 395, did not reject entirely the relationship between human 
rights and refugee law but he considered that the role that human rights should play in interpreting 
refugee law notions should be more ‘modest’.  
 78 
 
In line with these views, it is true that the historical background to the 
1951 Convention gave little consideration to human rights principles. In 
particular, no human rights standards were mentioned in the pre-war 
instruments for refugee protection36 as these instruments pre-dated the 
emergence of a human rights movement on the international scene. The 
travaux preparatoires also barely refer to human rights. As such, it appears 
that the elaboration of the 1951 Convention is anchored to a legal movement 
different from the development of international human rights law. This has 
been demonstrated by early authors37 who have highlighted that the 1951 
Convention was drafted as a compromise between the interests of states and 
the humanitarian needs of individuals, and that it was imbued with a particular 
political orientation as noted in chapter 1. This theoretical and political 
background, therefore, departs from the human rights purpose strongly 
advocated by recent scholars.  
 
C)  The compromise: human rights as the orthodoxy? 
 
Some commentators eventually reconciled the divergent views on the 
nature of the 1951 Convention by considering that its initial purpose does not 
have a major bearing on the way it should be interpreted. They departed form 
a theological approach to emphasise the importance of the interpretive 
practice embedded in the evolving legal context of the Convention. For 
instance, Gowland-Debbas stated that, at the beginning, ‘refugee law was 
segregated from the development of international human rights law’,38 but 
human rights law progressively gained influence on the way refugee law was 
applied. For her, only ‘legal purists’39 would reject the importance of human 
rights in informing the meaning of the Convention. Generally, she believed 
that ‘bringing refugee law out of the narrow confines in which it has been 
isolated […] has a number of advantages’40 in terms of widening refugee 
                                                
36 See chapter 1- Part 1.  
37 Ibid.   
38 Gowlland-Debbas, The Problem of Refugees in The Light of Contemporary International Law Issues, 
(Series of Papers, Gowlland-Debbad eds, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1994) 3.  
39 Ibid 4. 
40 Ibid. 
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protection. Although establishing juridical links between both fields is not 
easy, she noted that conflating human rights law and refugee law has become 
‘contemporary practice’41 and has been widely endorsed in the 
jurisprudence.42 Gowland-Debas, therefore, introduced the idea that the 
evolutionary state practice should have a major influence on the way the 1951 
Convention was applied, thus closely linking the interpretation of the refugee 
definition with the evolution of its legal context.   
 
Similarly, Chetail argued that, although the 1951 Convention was 
supposed to create an independent system of protection, disconnected from 
human rights law, this regime has been widely interpreted in light of human 
rights law in the past decades, which has eventually blurred the distinction 
between human rights and refugee protection43. He stated that ‘in a normative 
environment largely dominated by human rights, all observers are now 
convinced of the human rights nature of the Geneva Convention’.44 
According to him, ‘human rights law has thus become the new orthodoxy of 
refugee law’45 even though this was arguably not the intent of the drafters.  
On a similar note, Ghrainne observed that there is some uncertainty as to the 
relationship between human rights law and refugee law and whether both 
should be conflated. She recalled that there is no clear position in the 
scholarship on whether human rights should only influence the interpretation 
of the Convention or whether they should entirely define its parameters. In 
spite of these uncertainties, she noted that given the current legal context of 
the Convention, human rights should ‘at the very least’46 inform the meaning 
of the refugee definition. According to her, ‘the fact that an overwhelming 
majority of the Refugee Convention’s states parties are parties to at least one, 
if not many, human rights-based treaties, is relevant in the interpretation of 
the Refugee Convention’s terms’.47 As such, she also highlighted the 
importance of the developing interpretive context to conclude that human 
                                                
41 Ibid. 
42 Ibid. 
43 Chetail (n 11). 
44 Ibid 70. 
45 Ibid 71. 
46 Brid Ni Ghrainne, ‘The Internal Protection Alternative Inquiry and Human Rights Considerations -
Irrelevant or Indispensable’ [2015] 27 International Journal of Refugee Law 29, 34. 
47 Ibid 34.  
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rights principles need to be taken into consideration to interpret the 
Convention. The above arguments also support the contention made by Foster 
that, in addition to the human rights standards enshrined in the Preamble, 
other human rights treaties should be referred to in order to interpret the 
Convention as they constitute ‘relevant rules of international law’ mentioned 
in Article 31(3)(c) of the VCLT.48 In the opinion of Cantor, this disposition 
remains, however, ambiguous.  For him, Article 31(3)(b), which points to the 
importance of the ‘subsequent practice in the application of the treaty’,49 
constitutes a more adequate legal basis for interpreting the Convention. He 
nonetheless agreed with all the previous authors that the changing legal 
context in which the refugee definition is applied, should be taken into 
consideration in order to interpret its terms and further pointed out that human 
rights should not be ignored in this exercise.  
 
D)  Concluding remarks  
 
In light of the above, various positions regarding the relationship 
between international refugee law and international human rights law have 
been expressed. Some commentators argued that, given, the close theological 
links between human rights law and refugee law, human rights should closely 
influence the interpretation of the refugee definition. Others go as far as to 
affirm that the Convention is, in itself, a human rights treaty, thus implying 
that human rights have a pivotal importance in informing the application of 
the Convention. Different authors warned that caution should be exerted 
when using human rights standards as interpretive benchmarks because this 
could contravene the initial intent of the plenipotentiaries. Some of these 
authors however did not entirely reject the fact that human rights can have a 
certain influence in interpreting the refugee definition. For others, the initial 
purpose of the Convention matters less than the contextual understanding of 
its evolution and stated a human rights interpretation of the notion of 
persecution had become the new orthodoxy.  
 
                                                
48 Foster (n 12) 51-70. 
49 Cantor (n 29) 377.  
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These divergent views show that the intent of the plenipotentiaries as 
to the role of human rights standards, remains unclear. However, human 
rights law and international refugee law should not be entirely disconnected, 
as pointed out in the literature. Whilst the initial intent of the drafters should 
not be disregarded, it appears clear that the evolution of the legal practice can 
have an influence on the way the 1951 Convention should be interpreted in 
order to make it relevant to the evolving needs of refugees in line with Articles 
31(3)(b) and (c) of the VCLT. As already noted above, questions then 
emerged such as, which human rights ought to be relied upon for determining 
what forms of harm constitute persecution, and to what extent should this be 
the case? How should human rights inform the meaning of the notion of 
persecution? The interpretive exercise has to respect at least the protective 
purpose of the refugee definition, and has to be sufficiently adaptable to the 
evolving circumstances of refugees, keeping in mind that the notion of 
persecution confers an individual dimension to the harm feared.50  
 
In order to answer these questions, different views have been 
advanced on the modalities of a human rights narrative for interpreting 
persecution. Hathaway has proposed the most detailed study on this element 
and developed an interpretive framework that relies on basic human rights as 
relevant benchmarks. According to him, persecution should be understood as 
the ‘sustained or systemic violation of basic human rights demonstrative of a 
failure of state protection’.51 Through this formulation, Hathaway considered 
that persecution is composed of serious harm and failure of state protection. 
His framework will be assessed below and evaluated against the proposals of 
other authors to determine whether it encourages consistency in national 
jurisdictions and whether it is sufficiently adapted to the modern 
circumstances of refugees. 
 
Part 2) The quantitative and qualitative aspects of persecution  
 
                                                
50 As demonstrated in Chapter 1. 
51 Hathaway and Foster (n 1) 183. 
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Some authors have highlighted the bi-faceted nature of persecution, 
demonstrating that it has both a quantitative and a qualitative aspect.52 
Hathaway has subsumed these two elements into a sub-test of ‘serious harm’ 
to which he added an extra requirement of lack of state protection to evaluate 
persecution. As such, he provided a rather complex formulation to define the 
notion.  
 
This section will analyse both the quantitative and qualitative aspects of 
‘serious harm’ as defined by Hathaway, but, a greater focus will be put on the 
qualitative aspect of persecution (A), because it is the part that has been the 
most widely debated within the literature and the jurisprudence. In contrast, 
the quantitative test proposed by Hathaway has been more consensually 
rejected (B).  
 
A)   Qualitative aspect of persecution: basic human rights used as 
interpretive benchmarks  
 
In order to assess what amounts to persecution, Hathaway argued that the 
nature of the harm needs to be evaluated in light of specific human rights 
norms, namely ‘basic’ human rights. The meaning of basic human rights 
requires further analysis.  
 
i- Serious harm: which human rights should be used as benchmarks? 
 
In the first edition of his book in 1991, Hathaway stated that basic 
human rights are the norms set out in the International Bill of Rights, namely 
the UDHR, and the two international covenants, the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).53 He believed that these 
instruments are legitimate references because they have been widely ratified 
and accepted as authoritative standards on the international scene. Hathaway 
also demonstrated that a certain hierarchy of rights existed, that could guide 
                                                
52 Carlier (n 14) 45; Hathaway and Foster (n 1). 
53 Hathaway and Foster (n 1) 193. 
 83 
the interpretation of the notion of persecution. However, in light of major 
criticisms highlighting the rigidity and inadequacy of this approach, he 
abandoned this narrative in 2014. In the last edition of the LORS, he expanded 
the array of human rights standards that he believed should be considered 
‘basic human rights’ as he added that reference should also be made to certain 
specialised treaties.54  He did not consider that all specialised treaties entail 
basic human rights as he stated that only the ones that have been widely 
endorsed by states enjoy ‘normative legitimacy’.55 According to him, if the 
interest at stake is not: 
 
‘within the ambit of a human rights norm as defined by a widely 
ratified international human rights treaty […] it is unlikely to 
constitute serious harm in refugee law, since for the human 
rights fairly to be considered a generally agreed interpretive 
benchmark for the “being persecuted” inquiry, one should 
expect to see the norm having been ratified by a supermajority 
of states across a politically and geographically diverse range of 
states’.56  
 
For Hathaway, basic human rights standards are, therefore, only to be 
found in treaties that have reached some form of consensus on the 
international scene.  
 
Foster also provided extensive argument in International Refugee Law 
and Socio-Economic Rights: Refuge from Deprivation to support the 
argument that basic human rights enshrined in widely endorsed treaties can 
constitute relevant standards of interpretation.57 She further added that 
reference could also be made to customary law, as well as the work of treaty 
bodies.58 In addition to this, she mentioned new sources of basic human 
rights, namely normative standards developed in soft law instruments.59 
                                                
54 Ibid 200-201. 
55 Ibid 194. 
56 Ibid 205.  
57 Foster (n 12) 59. 
58 Ibid. 
59 Ibid 70. 
 84 
According to her, soft law norms should also be referred to for interpreting 
the notion of persecution because they ‘explicate or amplify existing 
obligations’.60 Whilst her view on the value of customary law and the 
normative production of treaty bodies was endorsed in the 2014 edition of the 
LORS – which she co-edited – her position on the value of soft law sources 
has not been retained. Indeed, to define basic human rights, Hathaway only 
referred to treaties but remained silent on the role of soft law instruments. In 
fact, in a different piece of writing, he had specifically rejected the argument 
that soft law instruments could constitute appropriate references for assessing 
the notion of persecution because, for him, soft law ‘does not bespeak a 
sufficient normative consensus’.61 In his view, these standards ‘should not 
[…] be treated as authoritative in and of themselves’.62 This position 
contrasted to the one of Foster and, as such, it leaves some uncertainty as 
which standards ought to be referred to for interpreting persecution in light of 
basic human rights.  
 
In spite of the above, the human rights framework proposed by 
Hathaway has been accepted by many commentators as adequate guidance 
for interpretation.63 For instance, similarly to Hathaway, Haines enumerated 
a series of widely endorsed international treaties to define ‘core’ human rights 
relevant, according to him, for interpreting persecution.64 This view has been 
also shared by Goodwin-Gill who proposed to develop an interpretive 
narrative that relies on basic human rights65 ‘embodied in international 
                                                
60 Ibid 72. She, however, noted that ‘basic human rights’ enshrined in international treaty norms should 
prevail (79). 
61 James C. Hathaway, ‘The Relationship between Human Rights and Refugee Law: What Refugee 
Judges Can Contribute’ in International Association of Refugee Law Judges, The Realities of Refugee 
Determination on the Eve of a New Millennium: The Role of the Judiciary (Haarlem, The Netherlands: 
international Association of Refugee Law Judges, 1999) 86. 
62 Hathaway ibid.  
63 See UNHCR, ‘Division of International Protection, ‘Gender-Related Persecution: An Analysis of 
Recent Trend’ (1997) 9 International Journal of Refugee Law 79 at 82. Also, Mark Symes, ‘Caselaw 
on the Refugee Convention: The United Kingdom’s Interpretation in the Light of the International 
Authorities’ (London: Refugee Legal Centre 2000) 70. Cited in Foster (n 12) 31. 
64 Rodger Haines, Gender-Related Persecution in Refugee Protection in International Law: UNHCR’s 
Global Consultations on International Protection (Erika Feller, Volker Turk and Frances Nicholson eds, 
CUP 2003) 327-328. 
65 Guy S. Goodwin-Gill and Jane McAdams, The Refugee in International Law, (Oxford University 
Press 2011) 91. 
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Conventions’.66 He provided a list of rights that he believes should be used as 
benchmarks, namely the: 
 
‘right to life, the right to be protected against torture, or cruel or 
inhuman treatment or punishment, the right not to be subjected 
to slavery or servitude, the right not to be subjected to 
retroactive criminal penalties, the right to recognition as a 
person before the law, and the right to freedom of thought, 
conscience and religion’.67  
 
In his view, other rights that belong to a different ‘fundamental class’ 
and that are attached to personal freedom should also serve as references for 
interpreting persecution.68 To summarise his position, he argued that 
persecution: 
 
‘comprehends measures […] which threaten deprivation of life 
or liberty; torture or cruel, in human, or degrading treatment; 
subjection to slavery or servitude; non-recognition as a person 
[…]; and oppression, discrimination, or harassment of a person 
in his or her private home or family life’.69  
 
Overall, Goodwin-Gill established a long list of human rights 
standards that he believes should be referred to for interpreting persecution 
and generally considered that those rights should be found in widely endorsed 
human rights treaties like Hathaway (and to a certain extent like Foster). 
Similarly to the above authors, Carlier proposed to rely on ‘basic human 
rights’, that he believes are the rights formulated in treaties, to assess the 
qualitative aspect of persecution.70   
 
                                                




70 Jean-Yves Carlier, ‘The Geneva refugee definition and the “theory of the three scales”’ in Frances 
Nicholson and Patrick Twomey (eds.) Refugee Rights and Realities: Evolving International Concepts 
and Regimes (CUP 1999) 37, 45-46. 
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The ‘basic human rights’ narrative has the advantage of providing 
conceptual clarity by referring to codified norms through a positivist 
understanding of the rules of treaty interpretation. However, some 
commentators criticised this view as they considered that it is either too broad 
or too restrictive. The interpretive challenges posed by this approach will be 
assessed below.  
 
ii- Basic human rights approach: a framework that is too broad? 
 
According to Steinbock, relying on ‘basic’ human rights enshrined in 
treaties does not constitutes an adequate framework. He noted that the 
formulation developped by Hathaway separated the notion of persecution 
from the Convention grounds and gave them an autonomous meaning which, 
he believed, is simply too large.71 He also considered that this human rights 
approach poses difficulties, because the catalogue of rights proposed by 
Hathaway, not only is ambiguous,72 but is unduly broad and not in line with 
the initial intent of the plenipotentiaries.73 According to him, Hathaway’s 
framework ‘would make millions of people potential refugees in today’s 
world’74 which, he considered, is not appropriate because the scope of refugee 
law should be narrower than the scope of human rights law. He also noted 
that there is not any clear reference to the UDHR in the refugee definition. 
According to him, if the refugee definition was meant to be interpreted in 
light of the principles enshrined in human rights instruments such as the 
UDHR, this would have been, simply, mentioned in the definition. Thinking 
otherwise would amount to considering that the ‘wording of the refugee 
definition was […] illustrative’75 which does not seem to be a reasonable 
approach. He, however, acknowledged that human rights law and refugee law 
overlap in the sense that refugee law protects only violations of certain 
subsets of human rights but, overall, human rights law and refugee law have 
different purposes and, therefore refugee law should be more narrowly 
                                                
71 Steinbock (n 25) 780. 
72 Ibid 782. 
73 Ibid 738. 
74 Ibid 782. 
75 Ibid 785. 
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understood than human rights law. For him, certain human rights remain 
relevant for interpreting the notion of persecution but he proposed to narrow 
down the scope of the framework and to refer only to the ‘most basic human 
rights involving the most serious harms, such as those recognized as 
customary international law’.76   
 
Steinbock justly pointed to a major deficiency of Hathaway’s 
approach, namely that it refers to international norms that are quite 
ambiguous and constitute a rather undefined catalogue of norms.  The rest of 
his proposal, however, seems quite severe as it would confine refugee law to 
the most egregious forms of hardship as defined by customary law.  This point 
is rather contentious since customary law allows for little flexibility in the 
interpretation of legal norms. It fixes an existing practice, which takes time to 
define, and as such, Steinbock’s view does not easily align with an 
evolutionary approach of the 1951 Convention. This also does not appear to 
be consistent with the possible intention of plenipotentiaries who had left the 
definition of persecution open, probably with the objective of allowing for 
adaptive interpretations of the Convention.77 Generally, Steinbock’s proposal 
that only customary law norms should be used as benchmarks has not been 
widely adopted in the jurisprudence. His opinion that the refugee definition 
was meant to have a more restrictive scope was shared by authors such as 
Haddad78 but the dominant view in the literature has generally considered that 
persecution should have a more flexible meaning. At the opposite end of the 
spectrum, authors have demonstrated that relying on basic human rights to 
interpret persecution, could in fact be too limited.  
 
iii- Basic human rights approach: a restrictive framework?  
 
Hathaway’s positivist approach could be more relevantly questioned in 
light of the developments of new normative sources. Some authors argued 
that the different protection needs of individuals might not have been covered 
                                                
76 Ibid 787. 
77 On the intention of the plenipotentiaries see A.Grah-Madsen, The Status of Refugees in International 
Law (Vol. I, 1966), 193.  
78 Haddad (n 28). 
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by all the rights codified in international treaties79 and, therefore, highlighted 
the limitations that an approach based on treaty norms can have on 
interpreting the notion of persecution.   
 
In particular, Edwards pointed to the narrow scope of basic human 
rights as she observed that they do not reflect the complexity of refugees’ 
experiences. For her, ‘it is possible that all forms of persecution have not yet 
been identified or codified in international human rights law’.80 Even though 
new human rights standards have been developed in treaties in the past 
decades, there is indeed no guarantee that these standards will be sufficient to 
respond to the rapidly evolving circumstances of refugees. In light of this 
situation, Edwards argued that ‘it would be unwise to limit [the] application 
[of persecution] to serious human rights abuses’.81 To illustrate her 
statements, she mentioned examples of gender-based violence. She explained 
that before women’s rights were codified in international treaties, gender-
based violence was, nonetheless, an existing form of persecution. She also 
mentioned that the principle of the best interest of the child, as derived from 
the recognition of specific children’s rights in international instruments, was 
an existing principle before the adoption of the Convention on the Rights of 
the Child (CRC).82 According to her, this does not mean that human rights 
should be ignored. In fact, she considered that human rights law has a role to 
play in elucidating the meaning of certain forms of persecution, but she stated 
that the interpretation of persecution should not be restricted to a rigid human 
rights framework and should take into account broader circumstances of 
refugees.83 
                                                
79 Alice Edwards, ‘Age and gender dimensions in international refugee law’ in Erika Feller, Volker 
Turk, Frances Nicholson (eds), Refugee Protection in International Law: UNHCR’s Global 
Consultations on International Protection (CUP 2003) 50. 
80 Edwards, ibid. See also Kate Jastram ‘Economic Harm as a Basis for Refugee Status and the 
Application of Human Rights Law to the Interpretation of Economic Persecution’ 143-173 in James C. 
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81 Ibid. 
82 Ibid 51. 
83 See for instance, Matter of Pierre, 15 I&N 2433 (Board of Immigration Appeals 1975). 
at [4610]. This case was adjudicated before the adoption of the CEDAW. The Board concluded that the 
domestic violence faced by the Applicant was a private issue and therefore, fell outside the ambit of 
the refugee definition.  
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Following the observation that not all forms of persecution have been 
codified in formal treaties, other authors have pointed to the development of 
soft law sources and transnational approaches to refugee law, thus further 
reinforcing Edwards’s position. For instance, Lewis noted that due to the 
continuing refugee crisis, new protection needs of refugees have emerged but 
such needs have not been covered by the existing instruments. She believed 
that there is an ‘ongoing need to further elaborate new standards and to 
develop international refugee law even if these new standards are not codified 
in international treaties’.84 Similarly, Betts explained how soft law 
instruments can constitute relevant normative sources, outside the gamut of 
treaties. He noted, for instance, that the protection of Internally Displaced 
Persons (IDPs) has been ensured through the development of soft law 
instruments rather than through codified human rights.85 Whilst he did not 
directly mention the situation of refugees, Betts made a general analysis of 
human rights law and soft law instruments, demonstrating the normative 
scope of soft law, which he considered can fill the normative gap in human 
rights law.   
 
This position is shared by Juss who observed that nowadays, legal 
norms are developing from ‘all sorts of sources’ and that ‘a new generation 
of international lawyers is now beginning to argue that one must abandon 
formal mechanisms to determine the pedigree of rules’.86 Indeed, he 
considered that the ‘majority of international normative activity takes place 
outside the ambit of traditional international law’.87 In line with the above 
views, Lambert noted that with the disaggregation of state power,88 
transnational actors and networks have contributed to the ‘international 
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normative activity and to a changing conception of the world less dominated 
by a vertical notion of international law and domestic law’.89 Lambert 
considered that, in this context, the human rights approach to refugee law 
focuses more on the content of the rules but is less ‘useful in capturing the 
complexities of the process of law formation and law developments’.90  
 
The above views are in contrast to Hathaway’s approach that proposes 
to confine his interpretive framework to basic human rights enshrined in 
widely accepted treaties only. Indeed, the aforementioned authors 
convincingly highlighted the fact that the catalogue of treaty-codified human 
rights norms appears quite restricted nowadays as the needs and priorities of 
refugees are changing rapidly, which is in stark contrast to the limited 
normative ambit of traditional treaties on the international scene. As such, the 
‘basic human rights approach’ might not adequately reflect the most recent 
evolutions of refugee situations. The promise that it could constitute an 
evolutionary approach to the notion of persecution is therefore questionable.  
 
iv- Basic human rights: vague notions?  
 
iv-(a) Shifting the interpretive exercise to an equally vague ‘discursive 
terrain’?91 
In addition to the above, it could be argued that relying on basic 
human rights will not adequately solve the problem of inconsistent 
interpretations of the refugee definition and the notion of persecution as 
contended by Hathaway. The imprecise character of basic human rights might 
in fact lead to more fragmentary applications of the refugee definition in state 
parties, which could in turn undermine the overall coherence of the protection 
regime of the 1951 Convention. In this view, commentators have pointed to 
the vague and general character of codified human rights and demonstrated 
that they can be applied in very different ways.  
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Vernant, who was one of the first scholars to propose that the notion 
of persecution should be interpreted in light of human rights standards, also 
warned against the difficulties that could arise from this interpretive approach  
as he stated that human rights codified in the UDHR were ‘couched in very 
general terms’.92 He specifically highlighted concerns with regards to certain 
rights, which he believed could pose serious challenges of interpretation such 
as the ‘right to work, to free choice of employment, to just and favourable 
conditions of work’.93 He concluded that ‘some lack of precision is […] 
inevitable’94 when using a human rights approach for interpreting 
persecution. According to him, reference to external standards enshrined in 
the international legal order was, however, necessary to guide the 
interpretation of the notion of persecution but he considered that the norms of 
the UDHR were not sufficient to constitute a proper analytical framework.  
As such, Vernant seemed to hope for the development of more precise human 
rights notions that would complement the abstract concepts of the UDHR. In 
line with his wishes, international human rights treaties developed at a rapid 
pace in the second half of the 20th century but in spite of this multiplication 
of new norms, authors have continued to argue that human rights codified in 
all sorts of treaties remain general and still raise interpretive challenges.  
 
For instance, Tobin recently demonstrated that human rights are 
imprecise in nature which often results in inconsistent interpretations. For 
him, ‘human rights are invariably vague and ambiguous’95 , and as such, he 
stated that interpreting these standards constitutes ‘a dilemma’.96 He observed 
that there is a ‘vast range of potential meanings’97 for every human right, and 
general rules of treaty interpretation are of minimal help to elucidate what the 
meaning of a right is. He stated that this difficulty is even more acute in the 
case of economic, social and cultural rights because these rights are 
particularly ambiguous. To illustrate his statements, he mentioned the 
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example of the right to health which is, according to him, a ‘nebulous right’.98 
Through his observations, he eventually concluded that human rights can be 
interpreted in very divergent manners, depending on the interpretive agent. In 
line with his view, Price also stated that human rights are not ‘self-defining’99 
and raise serious concerns of interpretation.100 For him, human rights provide 
a poor interpretive framework and are so general that they do not help to 
determine whether some specific laws (he provided the example of Islamic 
dress) are persecutory in nature.101 Similarly, Cantor contended that the 
language of human rights treaties is particularly unclear and, therefore, it 
causes conceptual difficulties when it is transposed into refugee law. 
According to him, relying on a human rights approach for interpreting the 
notion of persecution, does not provide useful guidance because it simply 
shifts ‘the interpretative exercise from the terms of the Refugee Convention 
to a new discursive terrain’.102 He mentioned the example of the prohibition 
of ‘torture or inhuman and degrading treatment’ which is as equally vague a 
concept as the concept of persecution. Therefore, according to Cantor, saying 
that ‘torture’ amounts to persecution does not provide meaningful interpretive 
guidance. Cantor generally highlighted the fact that human rights do not 
constitute specific and determinative benchmarks for eliciting the meaning of 
the notion of persecution and that the vague character of human rights 
standards enshrined in widely accepted treaties could lead to more confusion 
as to what amounts to persecution.  
 
In line with the above views, human rights scholars have also 
demonstrated that international human rights law constitutes a limited 
normative field. For instance, Ignatieff and Donelly consider that human 
rights simply provide for a minimal set of standards. Although they did not 
specifically refer to refugee law in their work, they provided valuable insight 
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into the nature of international human rights law that could be useful for 
assessing the potential and limitations of a basic human rights framework for 
interpreting persecution.  For instance, Ignatieff deemed international human 
rights a ‘thin theory’103 because, according to him, human rights values are 
applicable in any culture and traditions due to their minimal aspect. He stated 
that the role of human rights ‘is not in defining the content of culture but in 
trying to enfranchise all agents so that they can freely shape that content’.104 
As such, he highlighted the fact that human rights do not ‘prescribe the 
‘positive’ range of good lives that human beings can lead’105 and do not 
constitute a comprehensive answer to all the complex needs of individuals. 
On a similar note, Donnelly considered that human rights are broad 
concepts106 that can be relativised depending on the way they are interpreted 
or implemented. According to him, human rights ‘permit a wide range of 
particular practices’.107 In their respective analyses, Ignatieff and Donnelly 
pointed to the general character of basic human rights and demonstrated that 
human rights norms can be variably interpreted depending on the context in 
which they are applied. These observations, however, contrast with the initial 
contention of Hathaway that human rights constitute an objective basis for 
interpreting the 1951 Convention in a consistent manner.  
 
In line with the above views, it can be assumed that, in order to reach 
a common understanding amongst a large panel of different actors, states 
formulated human rights in international treaties in quite general terms. The 
impreciseness of those rights can not only lead to different outcomes but can 
also encourage narrow interpretations of the notion of persecution. In light of 
the foregoing, it can be considered that indexing an interpretive approach 
exclusively on basic human rights codified in international treaties raises the 
risk of constructing a vague framework that can foster inconsistent 
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applications of the 1951 Convention, depending on the understanding that 
interpretive agents have on the right in question.  
 
iv-(b) - Human rights jurisprudence: a solution to provide precise 
interpretive guidance?  
Hathaway and Foster have provided some answers to the above 
concerns. When difficulties of interpretation arise, notably due to the unclear 
meaning of a right, Hathaway and Foster suggested relying on the work of 
treaty bodies108 in order to clarify the content of human rights. Indeed, treaty 
bodies have been established to monitor the application of their treaty of 
reference and to provide authoritative interpretation of certain human rights 
provisions, which can help to overcome their abstract nature.109 Whether a 
human rights framework of interpretation should extensively rely on the work 
of treaty bodies as argued by Hathaway and Foster is, however, questionable 
as this could raise additional difficulties. Indeed, the jurisprudence of treaty 
bodies has been criticised for being inadequate, and at times, controversial as 
it will be demonstrated below.  
 
In particular, Edwards has pointed to many concerns surrounding the 
work of treaty bodies. Firstly, she observed that women are underrepresented 
in the decision-making process, thus raising issues as to the equal 
representation of their interests when human rights are interpreted.110 She 
provided an example of such gender bias as she stated that domestic violence 
is rarely qualified as torture by treaty bodies.111 This is particularly 
concerning given that in the past decades, an increasing number of women 
refugees have lodged asylum claims based on gender related forms of 
violence.112  
 
In addition, Edwards demonstrated that the work of treaty bodies does 
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not necessarily solve the problem of indeterminacy of human rights standards. 
For instance, in the case of individual communications, she argued that the 
legal process is generally consensual and, therefore, can ‘lead to compromise 
to the lowest common denominator’.113 Further to this, she observed that 
treaty bodies often follow an unclear methodology of interpretation, which 
regularly results in inadequate decisions. According to her, many General 
Comments simply remain broad ‘statements as to the meaning of particular 
terms of rights without explaining fully the background to, or reasons for, 
such an interpretation’.114 Finally, Edwards also observed that ‘deciding the 
subject matter for a General Comment is largely ad hoc and is not based on 
any long-term strategy.115 In this sense, she highlighted the fact that the 
overall jurisprudence of treaty bodies lacks a coherent vision. The lack of an 
overall principled approach has also been pointed out by Mechlem, who noted 
that committee members of treaty bodies often made ‘contradictory 
remarks’,116 thus undermining the coherence of the system. Similarly, 
Komanovics pointed to the inconsistent interpretations of the treaty bodies on 
certain human rights terms.117 More specifically, Goodwin-Gill demonstrated 
that the decision of treaty bodies, and in particular of the Human Rights 
Committee (HCR) can be ambiguous and mislead the interpretation of the 
terms of the 1951 Convention118 as was the case in claims relating to 
conscientious objection to military service.   
 
Additionally, another problem with the activity of treaty bodies is that 
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it seems to foster the emergence of some discrete rights that are only entailed 
in widely accepted human rights instruments. For instance, the HRC has 
developed the meaning and scope of only certain civil and political rights 
based on the normative standards of the ICCPR, such as the right to 
conscientious objection119 or Lesbian Gay Bisexual Transsexual Intersex 
(LGBTI) rights.120 The same reasoning is applicable to any treaty body that 
only interprets the rights of their treaty of reference. As a result, human rights 
jurisprudence has left untouched numerous other forms of harm such as 
collective rights of societies, as for example the right to development, that 
have not been set out in any treaty but nonetheless reflect contemporary 
concerns of individuals. 
 
 In light of the foregoing, it can be argued that there are inherent 
deficiencies in the work of treaty bodies. This view can be opposed to 
Hathaway and Foster who extensively relied on international human rights 
jurisprudence, in particular the jurisprudence of the HCR, to demonstrate that 
basic human rights should constitute relevant benchmarks for interpreting 
persecution. Whilst treaty bodies provide authoritative interpretations of 
human rights provisions, uncritical acceptance of their work appears, 
however, controversial. As such, there is no clear evidence that the normative 
activity of treaty bodies could encourage more consistency in the 
interpretation of the notion of persecution.  
 
Overall, whilst many authors have supported the positivist views 
adopted by Hathaway on the basic human rights framework, an overview of 
the criticisms relating to its practical scope raises concern for the protection 
of refugees. Not only does it appear to constitute a vague interpretive scheme, 
but it also confines the experiences of refugees to a limited set of rights 
through a rather formalist approach. As such, the interpretive exercise 
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encouraged by the basic human rights framework might raise the risk of 
disregarding important aspects of refugees’ circumstances in today’s world 
and of contributing to the criticisms that the 1951 Convention is an inadequate 
instrument.  
 
B)   Quantitative aspect of persecution 
 
i- Sustained and systemic approach: a restrictive threshold?  
 
In addition to the qualitative aspect analysed above, Hathaway 
proposed a test to assess the quantitative aspect of serious harm. For him, only 
the most egregious forms of human rights violations should warrant refugee 
status, namely violations that are ‘sustained’ or ‘systemic’. However, his 
approach has been widely criticised for being too strict as his formulation 
indicates that, in most cases, a single violation of a basic human right would 
not be enough to amount to persecution. In opposition to Hathaway, Storey 
argued that the requirement of a sustained or systemic violation of human 
rights sets an unduly high threshold for interpreting the notion of persecution 
and ‘is plainly too restrictive’.121 The condition of persistency seemed also to 
have been rejected by other scholars. For instance, Goodwin-Gill did not 
retain this criterion when he analysed the concept of persecution. For him, 
‘persecution within the Convention […] comprehends measures, taken on the 
basis of one of more of the stated grounds, which threaten’ a series of rights 
that he enumerates.122 He further stated that the ‘nature and severity of the 
restriction’123 should be taken into consideration when assessing what harms 
amount to persecution. Through such formulations, he omitted to explicitly 
mention the element of persistency, thus seemingly waiving it. In contrast, he 
stated that persecution should be a matter of ‘degree and proportion’,124 and, 
therefore, he adopted a more moderate position.   
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Although Carlier is a proponent of Hathaway’s basic human rights 
approach, he also did not maintain the criteria of persistency. Instead, he 
proposed a different threshold for assessing persecution as he considered that, 
in principle, the requirement of severity of harm must be high, but it should 
be ‘relaxed’ in certain situations.125 He developed a test based on a sliding 
scale of proportionality depending on the nature of the rights violated.126 
Similarly, Foster barely discussed the test of ‘sustained and systemic 
violations’ of human rights127 in her book. Although she agreed that 
violations of basic human rights can amount to persecution, she seemed to 
depart from the strict approach proposed by Hathaway as she did not propose 
any specific test for assessing the threshold of persecution. She simply argued 
that, ultimately, the assessment of whether some forms of harm amount to 
persecution should be relinquished to asylum decision makers. For her, 
human rights simply provided a form of guidance that should not be 
understood in a rigid manner,128 which is in contrast to the persistency criteria 
of Hathaway.   
 
Given the overwhelming criticisms against the restrictiveness of his 
test, Hathaway refined his position in 2014. He stated that his definition of 
persecution could in fact entail instances of a single harm. For him, the term 
‘sustained’ refers to an ongoing form of harm such as ‘death or severe torture’ 
and the term ‘systemic’ refers to a form of harm that is ‘endemic in a social 
or political system’.129  Even if Hathaway admitted that a single harm could 
rise to the level of persecution, the threshold that he sets appears to be, 
nonetheless, particularly severe. Indeed, the ‘ongoing’ nature of harm, 
remains a relatively vague notion and could result in applying an excessively 
strict test. For instance, he refers to ‘severe torture’, which implies the 
existence of different degrees in the infliction of torture. This could lead to 
the conclusion that a ‘simple’ act of torture, not severe enough, would not 
amount to persecution, which seems rather restrictive. Additionally, 
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Hathaway did not explain to what extent he considers that a harm should be 
endemic in the society. This could in turn suggest that certain forms of harm 
that are not widespread enough in some communities, but that nonetheless 
affect some individuals, would not amount to persecution. As such, his test 
remains unduly severe.  
 
ii- The basic human rights approach: a formalist threshold 
 
In addition to the above, it should be pointed that the basic human 
rights approach relies on a formalist view of what persecution is by 
considering that individuals ought to enjoy only certain types of entitlements 
listed in international treaties. This approach could in turn lead to a rather 
compartmentalised understanding of persecution as it encourages to consider 
different aspects of harms in an abstract manner and to posit that one single 
threshold is applicable to everybody. Foster had pointed to this caveat, in the 
context of claims based on social and economic deprivation, as she noted that 
the ‘problem with any approach that is based on categorical distinctions is 
that it can lead to a rigid analysis, which fails to take into account the reality 
of the particular circumstances of the individual applicant and the 
interconnectedness of levels of rights’.130 Storey also warned that a human 
rights approach for interpreting persecution should not obviate contextual 
considerations of the personal circumstances of individuals. According to 
him, persecution has to be ‘person-specific’ so that ‘not every violation of 
human rights will have equally serious consequences for different 
individuals’.131 Both authors cautioned against a formalist understanding of 
the threshold of persecution, detached from the context of its application. 
They demonstrated that the level of severity of a harm can be experienced 
differently depending on the context, the individual concerned and the 
existence (or not) of certain vulnerabilities. As such, even though they 
remained staunch proponents of a human rights approach, they introduced an 
element of subjectivity in assessing the concept of persecution. Their views 
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indirectly pointed to the fact that the threshold of harm required to amount to 
persecution might vary from one case to another. 
 
In line with the above analysis, other authors also pointed out that a 
formalist understanding of persecution could lead to applying inadequate 
thresholds to the notion of persecution, that could be either too low132 or too 
high by disregarding certain aspects of the harms endured by applicants.133 
This caveat was particularly concerning under the former basic human rights 
framework developed by Hathaway that was based on a hierarchy of rights. 
Fortunately, this narrative has been abandoned in the latest edition of the 
LORS, allowing for more flexibility in interpreting the notion of persecution. 
However, the above criticisms rightly highlighted a general concern that any 
formalist narrative based on a categorical approach risks obviating a more 
circumstantial dimension of persecution. As such, caution should be exerted 
when relying on an interpretive framework that only refers to external 
normative standards for interpreting a notion that touches upon personal 
aspects of refugee claims. 
 
Part 3) The surrogacy principle as part of the persecution test?  
 
Another important modality of Hathaway’s test is the notion of state 
protection. Through his formulation, Hathaway argued that the harm 
perpetrated on an individual should be ‘demonstrative of a failure of state 
protection’. Hathaway here affirms the principle of surrogacy, by 
emphasising that international protection is warranted only when the state of 
origin does not provide adequate protection to victims of human rights 
violations. It will be demonstrated that his view on surrogate protection has 
been wrongly equated with the test of persecution for it adds an extra burden 
of proof on claimants (A). Additionally, it will be pointed out that his 
approach to the relationship between Internal Flight Alternative (IFA), 
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surrogacy principle and persecution provides for a convoluted framework. 
Others views on how the notion of IFA and persecution could be better 
articulated will be considered below (B) to conclude that persecution, the 
principle of surrogacy and IFA should remain separate concepts.  
 
A)   The notion of state protection wrongly equated with the test of 
persecution? 
 
For Hathaway, refugee law is a form of ‘substitute protection’134 and 
is meant to ‘interpose the protection of the international community […] in 
situations where there is no reasonable expectation that national protection of 
human rights will be forthcoming’.135 As a result, he makes the notion of 
persecution conditional upon the absence of state protection. It has been 
pointed, however, that this view was quite ambiguous given that a similar 
principle was already mentioned in the refugee definition of the 1951 
Convention in a separate limb relating to the lack of national protection in 
one’s country.136 As such, Hathaway’s definition of persecution further 
emphasises the surrogate character of asylum and provides a different 
understanding of the additional element of state protection mentioned in the 
definition. Goodwin-Gill’s view on this point diverged from Hathaway’s as 
he considered that there is a clear distinction between the ‘well-founded fear 
of being persecuted’ and the lack of state protection concepts. He observed 
that ‘the Convention definition begins with the refugee as someone with a 
well-founded fear of persecution, and only secondly, as someone who is 
unable or unwilling, by reason of such fear, to use or take advantage of the 
protection of their government’.137 He therefore contended that ‘the point of 
reference is the individual particularly as a right-holder, rather than the 
system of government and its efficacy or intention in relation to 
protection’.138 According to him, equating state protection with persecution 
adds an extra burden to the applicants and ‘downplays’ the individual fear of 
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persecution.139 Goodwin-Gill in fact associated the notion of surrogacy of 
state protection with the overall notion of international protection rather than 
with the persecution limb of the refugee definition.  
 
On this point, Cantor also departed from Hathaway’s view. He 
considered that ‘from the perspective of the rules of treaty interpretation, 
[Hathaway’s] approach unsatisfactorily ignores the plain text of the 
definition’.140 Cantor lamented that Hathaway had ‘little to say about the 
element of the Convention refugee definition that refers specifically to state 
protection’ (‘unwilling or, owing to such fear, is unable to avail himself to 
[state] protection’)141 as he rather subsumed this element under the 
persecution test. Cantor develops a different paradigm to define the concept 
of surrogacy. He observed that the overall text of the 1951 Convention defines 
surrogate protection in relation to protection standards attached to effective 
nationality. He noted that the 1951 Convention sets protection standards for 
refugees in the host countries that are not predicated upon human rights law. 
The external surrogate protection as he theorised it, is not premised on the 
human rights paradigm but rather on protection standards in the context of 
alienage or diplomatic protection. In particular, he noted that the Convention 
makes a distinction between the rights afforded to citizens and the rights 
afforded to refugees, that are akin to the rights afforded to aliens. The rights 
afforded to aliens are restricted in comparison to the rights of citizens which 
is against the character of human rights that are normally universal and 
indivisible. Cantor stressed the difference between refugee protection and 
human rights protection by stating that ‘in contrast to the particular nature of 
each of these forms of protection – i.e. national protection and refugee 
protection – the concept of human rights is rooted in considerations that apply 
to all human beings’.142 This observation led him to conclude that ‘human 
rights law struggles to adequately describe the nature of national protection 
by the country of origin […] or the quality of protection afforded by refugee 
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status’.143 Therefore, he argued that the absence of state protection should be 
understood in broader terms, including the protection afforded to the 
nationality holders (in the context of alienage). He further observed that 
persecution is a separate concept and that ‘ultimately the persecution element 
is simply not capable of exhaustively describing the form of surrogate 
protection provided by refugee law’.144 Cantor here demonstrated that 
persecution and surrogate protection are distinct, and that persecution cannot 
be considered the ‘root’145 of surrogate protection, as Hathaway suggested. 
For him, this observation is all the more valid since surrogate protection 
should not be read in human rights terms as argued by Hathaway.  
 
B)   Persecution: a bifurcated approach to the Internal Flight 
Alternative (IFA) test? 
 
Whilst Cantor was right to point out that Hathaway dealt with the 
notion of ‘lack of state protection’ under the persecution limb of the 
Convention, thus seemingly ignoring the plain text of the Convention, his 
observation that Hathaway had little to say on the phrase ‘unable, or owing 
to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country’ 
appears quite severe. In fact, Hathaway elaborated on this portion of the 
refugee definition in a separate chapter dedicated to the internal protection 
alternative146 (also considered IFA as per the UNHCR’s official 
formulation).147 He observed that according to the refugee definition, when 
someone can ‘avail himself of the protection of [the home] country’,148 
refugee status is not warranted. In order to explore this element, Hathaway 
suggested applying an IFA test, by enquiring whether state protection is 
available in another area of the home country. If state protection is available 
in a different place than the place of origin of an applicant, then the applicant 
does not meet the eligibility criteria for refugee status. Hathaway seemed to 
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disconnect the IFA test from the persecution enquiry, thus applying a 
convoluted understanding of the notion of surrogate protection that is 
subsumed into two different elements (one is an inherent part to the notion of 
persecution and one is external). To add to the complexity of his framework, 
Hathaway suggested departing from the human rights narrative initially 
proposed for the notion of persecution. Instead, he considered that IFA should 
be interpreted in light of ‘the provision of legal entitlements and rights of the 
kind set by the Convention’149 thus further re-joining Cantor on this element. 
According to him, the legal entitlements of refugees under the Convention 
constitute the only benchmarks against which the level of state protection 
expected for an IFA enquiry should be assessed. He therefore developed two 
different paradigms for different aspects of the same refugee definition, thus 
creating a confusing interpretive scheme. This deficiency has been 
highlighted by Storey who claimed that ‘not to apply a human rights approach 
to the IFA test has increasingly apparent disadvantages. It is difficult to square 
with the growing consensus in contemporary case law that the concepts of 
persecution and protection require a human rights reformulation’.150  
 
In an attempt to provide a more coherent approach, the UNHCR has 
developed an entirely different paradigm for interpreting the notion of IFA, 
by considering that it is part of a holistic assessment attached to the overall 
refugee definition.151 The UNHCR therefore made clear that the IFA test and 
the notion of internal state protection is not an inherent component of the 
persecution element. In the guidelines on IFA, the UNHCR considered that 
the IFA test is an additional two-pronged test requiring that it should be both 
‘relevant and ‘reasonable’152 for an applicant to relocate to another area of the 
home country. In order to assess whether a relocation is reasonable, the 
UNHCR suggested that a claimant should not experience ‘undue hardship’ in 
the proposed area. The Refugee Agency also proposed that this notion could 
be interpreted in light of international human rights.153 With the 
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reasonableness criteria added to the IFA requirement, the UNHCR 
established a threshold that is much lower than the one proposed by 
Hathaway. 
 
Kelley has however criticised the UNHCR framework for interpreting 
IFA. Although she admitted that it is quite broad, she also pointed to the vague 
and general character of this approach and the subsequent risk of inconsistent 
applications in domestic jurisdictions.154 Additionally, Kelley raised concerns 
with regards to Hathaway’s position - formalised in the Michigan Guidelines 
- as she observed that ‘the guarantees in the Convention become the ceiling 
rather than the floor upon which guarantees found in later human rights 
treaties build’,155 making the test quite restrictive. She, therefore, proposed an 
alternative approach, using only human rights as benchmarks for interpreting 
the IFA concept. This view is similar to the position of Storey who contended 
that using human rights for the test of IFA is more consistent with the human 
rights narrative for interpreting persecution and offers a more objective basis 
to the IFA enquiry.156 He further specified that using the same benchmarks as 
persecution does not necessarily imply that the same threshold should be 
applied. For him, the test of IFA, through the ‘unduly hardship’ approach 
implies that the harm faced in the relocation place should be less severe than 
persecution.157 Storey also adopted a broader view of the notion of 
persecution by considering that IFA could be linked to the notion of 
persecution, but not equated with it. According to him, the causal link that 
exists between the initial feared persecution and the harm or undue hardship 
that could be faced in a relocation place suggests that IFA could be considered 
a form of ‘indirect persecution’.158 Through this view, Storey reconnects both 
notions. In any event, he criticised any restrictive approach of the notion of 
IFA as he believed that it would not be congruent with the intention of the 
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plenipotentiaries who considered that the Convention should be interpreted 
in a ‘liberal and humanitarian spirit’.159 
 
The foregoing has demonstrated that ample disagreement was raised 
regarding the relation between the tests of persecution, state protection and 
IFA. According to Hathaway’s interpretive framework, the notion of internal 
state protection should always be part of the persecution limb, whilst the 
possibility of IFA is separated and interpreted through a different paradigm, 
thus lacking conceptual clarity. In order to develop clearer approaches, some 
authors have proposed to entirely separate the surrogacy and IFA elements 
from the interpretation of the notion of persecution. In particular, the proposal 
made by the UNHCR160 that the existence of IFA should be linked to the 
overall sentence ‘well-founded fear of being persecuted’ appears valuable as 
it could lift any confusion. It alleviates the burden of proof on claimants and 
appears more in line with the plain meaning of the refugee definition.  
 
Part 4- Conclusion  
 
 
Extensive literature has been produced on the interpretation of the 
refugee definition and, particularly on the notion of persecution. However, 
some approaches developed interpretive models that do not align with the 
evolutionary understanding that should be given to the notion of persecution. 
In particular, the basic human rights framework elaborated by Hathaway in 
the LORS has been largely commented on and, in recent years, arguments 
have been voiced to demonstrate that this framework does not always provide 
an adequate answer for the changing protection needs of refugees. Firstly, the 
benchmarks that he proposed, namely basic human rights codified in 
international treaties, raise a number of difficulties because they cover a 
minimal range of individuals’ experiences. Indeed, this chapter has 
highlighted the existence of normative gaps in international human rights law, 
indicating that formal treaties might not be sufficient to adapt to the evolving 
priorities of refugees. Secondly, it was pointed out that the vague and general 
                                                
159 Storey ibid 501. 
160 UNHCR (n 147) at [3].  
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character of basic human rights does not seem adequate to solve the problem 
of inconsistent applications of the 1951 Convention. Additionally, 
Hathaway’s test to assess the severity of the harm required has been deemed 
unduly strict and has been generally rejected by scholars. Lastly, his approach 
to surrogate protection and IFA has also been debated. It has been 
demonstrated that considering state protection as an inherent part of the test 
of persecution could lead to rather restrictive interpretations of the notion of 
persecution that are not consistent with the protective purpose of the 
Convention.  
 
 Overall, this chapter has attempted to demonstrate that the dominant 
perception that refugee protection equates with surrogate human rights 
protection raises conceptual difficulties. Different opinions on the role that 
human rights should play in interpreting the notion have been expressed and 
authors do not seem to agree on the various modalities of a human rights 
interpretive framework. As put by Cantor, ‘the sheer variety of human rights-
based approaches to Article 1A(2) that are currently discernible in refugee 
law practice and scholarship calls into question the existence of a single 
interpretive paradigm’.161 This in turn questions the validity and utility of 
Hathaway’s narrative. Whilst the necessity of a principled approach has been 
widely accepted by commentators, one might wonder whether this approach 
should maintain a basic human rights narrative or whether a new paradigm is 
desirable.   
 
  It should not be concluded from the above criticisms that human 
rights law is irrelevant for interpreting the refugee definition today. It can 
indeed provide, in certain cases, normative references for assessing what 
forms of harm amount to persecution and constitute an objective guidance 
that has reached a certain consensus on the international scene. However, as 
Toufayan put it, treaty interpretation ‘far from being the accounting of raw 
interpretive data or the prioritisation of certain interpretive means over others 
                                                
161 Cantor (n 29) 392.  
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[,] is in reality a holistic construct’.162 In order to develop this holistic 
construct, other legal tools are, therefore, needed. For this purpose, alternative 
approaches for interpreting the notion of persecution have been proposed and 
will be analysed in the following chapter. 
                                                
162 Mark Toufayan, ‘Human Rights Treaty Interpretation: A Postmodern Account of its Claim to 
“Speciality”’ (Center for Human Rights. & Global Justice, Working Paper No. 2, 2005), quoted by 
John Tobin in ‘Seeking to Persuade: A Constructive Approach to Human Rights Treaty 
Interpretation”’[2010] 23 Harvard Law Journal 1, 10. 
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Chapter 3: Alternative proposals to the basic 
human rights approach for interpreting the 
notion of persecution 
 
A general overview of the literature has demonstrated that a 
framework based on basic human rights for interpreting the notion of 
persecution - as proposed by Hathaway - constitutes a coherent and principled 
approach but, at the same time, it suffers from inherent limitations. In 
particular, the formalist methodology proposed by the basic human rights 
model does not appear to sufficiently take into account the various 
circumstances of refugees and, does not solve the problem of inconsistent 
interpretations of the Convention, as pointed out by many authors. It might, 
therefore, be wondered whether an alternative paradigm for interpreting 
persecution should be developed in order to overcome these deficiencies? 
 
 The present chapter will explore alternative models for interpreting 
persecution in order to evaluate how persecution can remain relevant in the 
21st century. The first part of this chapter will analyse the development of 
alternative narratives for interpreting persecution based on models that have 
proposed expanding the basic human rights paradigm (Part 1), such as the 
definition developed by the Qualification Directive (QD) of the European 
Union and the framework proposed by Storey. However, it will be contended 
that none of these models are found adequate. A second part will then 
consider alternatives models that adopted a more subjective or circumstantial 
analysis of the situation of refugees by emphasising other aspects of 
persecution (Part 2). It will be eventually argued that a holistic approach, 
taking into consideration the basic protection needs and the personal 
circumstances of refugees, might be desirable to assess the level of harm that 
individuals are likely to face upon return to their country in a more accurate 
and transparent manner. This view does not imply that external benchmarks, 
such as basic human rights norms, should be disregarded. They can indeed be 
factored into the assessment of what amounts to persecution, but they should 
not be used as primary and unique elements for analysing persecution because 
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relying on abstract concepts risks obviating some protection needs of 
refugees. 
 
Part 1) A severe violation approach: an expanded basic human 
rights model?  
 
As demonstrated in the previous chapter, the model proposed by 
Hathaway has been rejected by many authors for being either too formalist or 
too restrictive. European law has developed an alternative approach by 
expanding this human rights framework in order to take into account different 
forms of restrictions and encourage a more holistic analysis of the notion of 
persecution. The parameters of the European framework will be evaluated 
below together with a detailed analysis of the European jurisprudence that 
this model has generated (A). Storey’s proposal to expand the QD narrative 
in order to include any relevant norm of international law as interpretive 
benchmarks1 will be also considered (B). 
 
A)   The Qualification Directive of the European Union: first 
treaty to provide a definition of persecution in refugee law 
 
i- A severe violation approach 
 
EU countries agreed in 1999, at the Tempere Summit, to create a 
Common European Asylum System (CEAS), in order to set minimum 
standards for harmonising asylum systems in Europe.2 One of the major 
instruments of the CEAS is the QD that established eligibility criteria for 
                                                
1 Hugo Storey, 'Persecution: Towards a Working Definition' in V. Chetail and C. Bauloz (eds), 
Research Handbook on International Law and Migration (Edward Elgar 2014) 459-518. 
2 Directive 2013/32/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on common 
procedures for granting and withdrawing international protection; Directive 2003/09/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 27 January 2003 laying down minimum standards for the 
reception of asylum seekers; Directive 2011/95/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
13 December 2011 on standards for the qualification of third-country nationals or stateless persons as 
beneficiaries of international protection, for a uniform status for refugees or for persons eligible for 
subsidiary protection, and for the content of the protection granted; Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 of 
the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 establishing the criteria and mechanisms 
for determining the Member State responsible for examining an application for international protection 
lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national or a stateless person; Regulation (EU) 
No 603/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on the establishment of 
'Eurodac' for the comparison of fingerprints. 
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determining who is entitled to receive international protection. McAdam 
noted that, for the first time in Europe, the QD elaborated ‘a distinct status for 
extra-Convention refugees’.3 The QD, however, did not establish a self-
contained regime separate from international refugee law. In fact, the 
directive drew extensively upon the provisions of the 1951 Convention to 
develop a European system of protection in line with international standards. 
Indeed, for Lambert, the QD is an instrument that directly ‘goes to the heart 
of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees’ and, as such, 
constitutes ‘the most important instrument in the new legal order in European 
asylum’. 4  
 
One of the most significant innovations of the QD is the development 
of a binding definition of the notion of persecution. Article 9 of the Directive 
states that persecution consists either in a ‘severe violation of basic human 
rights’, or in various measures that would have the same effect. Article 9(1) 
stated that ‘(a)cts of persecution […] must’: 
 
(a) be sufficiently serious by their nature or repetition as to 
constitute a severe violation of basic human rights, in 
particular the rights from which derogation cannot be made 
under Article 15(2) of the European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms; or 
 
(b) be an accumulation of various measures, including 
violations of human rights which is sufficiently severe as to 
affect an individual in a similar manner as mentioned in (a). 
 
Further to this, Article 9(2) goes on to enumerate, in a non-exhaustive 
manner, different types of harms that could be considered persecutory. By 
establishing a clear list of harms that could fall within the ambit of the notion 
                                                
3 Jane McAdam, ‘The Qualification Directive: An Overview’, in Karin Zwaan (eds), The Qualification 
Directive: Central Themes, Problem Issues, and Implementation in Selected Member States, 
(Nijmegen: Wolf Legal Publishers 2007) 8-30, 8. 
4 Hélène Lambert, ‘The EU Asylum Qualification Directive, Its Impact on the Jurisprudence of the 
United Kingdom and International Law’ [2006] 55 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 161, 
161. 
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of persecution, the QD provides specific and concrete guidance for decision 
makers. In particular, the UNHCR welcomed these examples as positive 
clarifications of certain grey areas of refugee law.5  
 
Through Article 9, the QD is the first international instrument that 
officially endorsed the basic human rights narrative initially proposed by 
Hathaway.6 The modalities of this interpretive framework are, however, quite 
different to the ones suggested by the author. The QD abandoned the 
persistency criteria of harm and referred to ‘severe violations’ rather than 
‘sustained or systemic’ violations. In addition to this, the QD expanded the 
definition of Hathaway by adopting a broader view that takes into 
consideration various forms of predicaments, also amounting to a severe 
violation of a basic human right. By considering the consequences that 
various other measures can have on an individual, the QD seemed to adopt a 
more pragmatic approach and encouraged decision makers to take into 
consideration a larger number of restrictions to assess the gravity that various 
restrictions have on an individual’s life. This approach is, however, limited 
by the reference to external benchmarks, as the QD stated that, in order to 
amount to persecution, such restrictions should affect an individual in a 
manner similar to ‘severe violations of basic human rights’. By setting a fixed 
threshold based on basic human rights norms, the QD therefore minimised 
the subjective approach and made the notion of ‘basic human rights’ the 
keystone of the definition of persecution.  
 
The definition proposed by the QD, whilst more flexible than the 
human rights framework developed by Hathaway, raises some conceptual 
difficulties. In particular, Lehman observed that the formulation used in the 
QD poses questions such as ‘what is a “basic” human right and how should 
severity be determined’?7 Indeed, the QD relies extensively on the notion of 
                                                
5 UNHCR, ‘UNHCR Annotated Comments on the EC Council Directive 2004/83/EC of 29 April 2004 
on Minimum Standards for the Qualification and Status of Third Country Nationals or Stateless Persons 
as Refugees or as Persons Who Otherwise Need International Protection and the Content of the 
Protection Granted’ (OJ L 304/12 of 30.9.2004’ (January 2005) 21. 
6 Storey (n 1) 478. See also McAdam (n 3) 11: The Qualification Directive ‘reflects very strongly 
Hathaway’s human rights approach to “persecution”.’
 
 
7 Julian M. Lehmann, ‘Persecution, Concealment and the Limits of a Human Rights Approach in 
(European) Asylum Law – The Case of Germany v Y and Z in the Court of Justice of the European 
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‘basic human rights’ to define persecution but there is no authoritative 
definition of what a ‘basic’ human right is in international law, thus causing 
some uncertainty as to which benchmarks should be used for interpreting 
persecution. Some guidance on how to identify a basic human right can be 
found in article 9(1)(a) of the QD that refers to non-derogable rights of the 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedom (ECHR). However, the term ‘in particular’, used in the definition, 
implies that these non-derogable rights are essentially illustrative and that 
other benchmarks could be also referred to. There is unfortunately no further 
clarification on this point. This ambiguity is concerning as it could allow 
restrictive interpretations of the notion of persecution. Klug, for instance, 
noted that the formulation of the QD ‘bears the danger of a minimalistic 
approach, restricted to the rights mentioned in Article 15 para. 2 of the 
ECHR’.8 For her, the QD does not encourage ‘an interpretation of the term 
“persecution” from a broader human rights’ perspective.9   
Whilst guidance on the meaning of those rights can be found in the 
jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), Lehman 
noted that such guidance might not be adequate for refugee law purposes. In 
particular, he mentioned that according to the ECtHR, ‘basic’ human rights 
are rights that have a non-refoulement dimension,10 and that this non-
refoulement dimension is assessed through a nebulous narrative, notably by 
referring to the notion of ‘flagrant breach’ or ‘flagrant denial’ of core 
elements of certain rights. Lehman argued that this framework is rather 
general and does not provide sufficient indication for assessing the threshold 
of persecution in refugee law. According to him, the ‘flagrant denial’ and 
‘flagrant breach’ doctrine constitutes an ‘abstract rationale for a particular 
seriousness’ and provides ‘little further guidance’11 on how to identify what 
                                                
Union’ [2014] 26 International Journal of Refugee Law 65, 71. 
8 Anja Klug, ‘Harmonization of Asylum in the European Union – Emergence of an EU Refugee 
System?’ [2004] 47 German Yearbook of International Law 594, 602. 
9 Klug ibid 62.  
10 Lehmann (n 7) 72. 
11 Lehmann ibid 73. 
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is the ‘core’ of a right and what a basic human right is. He also pointed out 
that the jurisprudence of HRC is unclear in this field.12 
Whilst the guidance of the ECHR for identifying basic rights remains 
indeed confused, it could be further argued that the threshold proposed by the 
ECHR appears, in any case, inadequate because it is particularly severe. The 
non-refoulement dimension of certain rights seems to set a test that is too 
strict. Indeed, it significantly limits the array of rights that could be referred 
to and relies on notions that are very general. In this sense, Juss noted that the 
‘flagrant breach’ doctrine sets an ‘unrealistically high threshold’.13 Costello 
also pointed to the limited ambit of the ‘flagrant breach’ theory of the ECHR 
in refugee law cases. For her, ‘refugee law can offer better protection than the 
ECHR in important aspects’.14 An example of how the non-derogable or non-
refoulement rights’ narrative has unduly limited the application of the refugee 
Convention will be assessed below by considering the recent caseload of the 
Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU).  
Another concern justly pointed out by Lehman in the definition of 
article 9(1)(a) is that the test that it proposes, namely ‘severe violations’, is 
also quite vague. For him, external guidance either in the ECHR or in the 
HCR, does not provide more precision.15 One could therefore wonder 
whether the wording of Article 9(1)(b) could present more indications as to 
the degree of harm expected. On this point however, Article 9(1)(b) seems to 
set a rather high threshold again. This portion of the definition refers to certain 
rights that are ‘sufficiently serious by their nature or repetition’ as to amount 
to persecution, but then goes on to refer to ‘non-derogable rights’16 to assess 
the level of harm required. This might indicate that one violation of a non-
derogable right that is not either serious or repeated, might not suffice to 
                                                
12 Lehmann ibid 73: The HCR developed the theory that there is a core of each right that needs to be 
taken into consideration and that, in certain cases, can never been derogated. The question that arises 
here is whether these non-derogable dispositions could be considered ‘basic human rights’ in the words 
of the QD. Lehman rejected this idea by pointing at the deficiencies of this approach due to the fact that 
there ‘is no agreed-upon and consistent method for identifying the non-derogable cores of rights’. In 
general, he convincingly concluded that human rights law ‘does not provide a conclusive answer to 
what “basic” human rights are’. 
13 Satvinder. S. Juss, International Migration and Global Justice (Ashgate, Aldershot, 2006) 204.  
14 Cathryn Costello, The Human Rights of Migrants and Refugees in European Law (OUP 2015) 197. 
15 Lehmann (n 7) 73. 
16 Through the formulation: ‘in a similar manner as (a)’. 
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constitute persecution. As such, it remains unclear how milder violations of 
non-basic human rights should be treated. By stating that they should affect 
an individual in a similar manner as a severe violation of a basic human right, 
the QD maintains a rather rigid and vague test. Additional guidance could be 
found in Article 9(2) but this list simply defines the forms that persecution 
can take and does not really say much about the degree of harm required to 
amount to persecution. 
In contrast to the above criticisms, Labayle argued that Article 9(1)(a) 
is quite clear and specific. He believes that this article should be interpreted 
as only covering the non-derogable rights under Article 15 of the ECHR17 in 
order to constitute a well-defined framework of interpretation. However, 
Labayle did not seem to take into consideration the plain text of Article 9. As 
above mentioned, Article 9 specifically stated that, ‘in particular’, non-
derogable rights should be used as benchmarks. The ‘in particular’ limb 
suggests that other human rights norms could also be relevant for assessing 
the notion of persecution. For Cantor, the non-derogable rights of the ECHR 
mentioned in the QD constitute only a ‘minimum threshold’ to evaluate what 
amounts to persecution18 and implied that a wider array of rights could be 
also relevant for interpreting the notion. In line with Cantor’s position, it 
appears more reasonable to consider that the non-derogable rights should be 
viewed as a safety net for applying the refugee definition but not as rigidly 
delineating the parameters of the interpretive framework. Otherwise, the QD 
definition would adopt a particularly restrictive approach.   
Bearing the above limitations in mind, the UNHCR warned against a 
strict interpretation of the QD that would only rely on a formalist framework 
based on codified human rights. In its annotated comments on the text of the 
QD, the UNHCR stated that:  
                                                
17 Labayle Henri, ‘Le Droit d’Asile devant la Persécution Religieuse: la Cour de Justice ne se Dérobe 
pas’, Reseau Universitaire Européen Droit de l’Espace de Liberté, Securité et Justice, 9 Sept 2012 
available at: <http://www.gdr-elsj.eu/2012/09/09/asile/le-droitdasile- 
devant-la-persecution-religieuse-la-cour-de-justice-ne-se-derobe-pas/>     
18 James Cantor, ‘Defining Refugees: Persecution, Surrogacy and the Human Rights Paradigm’ in 
Bruce Burson and Cantor David James (eds), Human Rights and the Refugee Definition, Comparative 
Legal Practice and Theory (Brill Nijhoff 2016) 349-395, 383. 
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‘while international and regional human rights treaties and 
the corresponding jurisprudence and decisions of the 
respective supervisory bodies influence the interpretation of 
the 1951 Convention, persecution cannot and should not be 
defined solely on the basis of serious or severe human rights 
violations’.19  
According the UNHCR, the assessment of persecution under the QD 
is to be undertaken on a case-by-case basis, in a more holistic manner. The 
refugee agency indeed recommended that, in general, different factors should 
be assessed in order to determine whether certain measures ‘make life in the 
country of origin so insecure from many perspectives for the individual 
concerned, that the only way out of the predicament is to leave the country of 
origin’.20 The UNHCR criticised the strict and ambiguous test established by 
the QD in its definition of persecution and recommended that more emphasis 
should be put on the impact that various measures, regardless of their nature, 
have on the daily life of an individual. Whilst the QD indeed focuses mostly 
on the nature of human rights violations, the UNHCR proposes to shift the 
paradigm by instead considering the consequences that these various 
measures have on someone’s life. This position was supported by other 
authors who considered that the QD developed a human rights narrative that 
is too rigid and disregards the subjective and personal circumstances of 
refugees.21  
ii- The restrictive guidance of the CJEU on the notion of persecution  
As mentioned above, the definition of the QD remains, to a certain 
extent, ambiguous. Therefore, after it was adopted, there was a great hope22 
that the CJEU would provide more a detailed guidance23 in order to 
                                                
19 UNHCR (n 5) 20.  
20 Statement by Ms. Erika Feller, Director, Department of International Protection, UNHCR, SCIFA 
(Brussels, 6 November 2002) available at: 
http://www.unhcr.org/admin/dipstatements/42bab1b52/statement-ms-erika-feller-director-
department-international-protection.html  
21 Klug (n 8) 603: According to Klug, the joint proposal presented a better alternative by emphasizing 
the importance of the subjective element of persecution.  
22 Roland Bank, ‘The Potential and Limitations of the Court of Justice of the European Union in 
Shaping International Refugee Law’ [2015] 27 International Journal of Refugee Law 213, 215. 
23 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), Art 267. 
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harmonise different approaches in member states. Since 2004, the CJEU has 
issued three main decisions that analysed the notion of persecution in light of 
Article 9. Unfortunately, in these decisions, the court also adopted a 
restrictive interpretation of persecution, which departed from the protection 
purpose of the 1951 Convention. 
 
In Bundesrepublik Deutschland v. Y and Z24 on 5 September 2012, the 
Federal German Court requested the CJEU to determine to what extent a 
violation of the right to freedom of religion constituted a persecutory act in 
the context of an asylum request made by two Pakistani applicants belonging 
to the Ahmadi religious minority.25 The court started by rejecting the 
traditional German doctrine that considered that there was a ‘core’ to each 
human right and that, such a core was necessary to determine whether certain 
measures amounted to persecution. The CJEU decided, instead, that all sorts 
of acts interfering with a basic human right - in the present case, the freedom 
of religion - needed to be taken into account in order to interpret persecution. 
In this sense, it adopted a broader approach than in the German courts. The 
European judges then added that a more pragmatic approach should be 
adopted for evaluating the gravity of a harm as they considered that both the 
nature of the restrictions and the consequences that they have on an individual 
should be factored into the assessment of persecution.26 For the judges, what 
mattered was the severity of the restriction, not the restriction itself.27 Whilst 
European judges seemed to initially develop a broad understanding of the QD 
by straying away from the ‘core’ human rights doctrine, they then narrowed 
                                                
24 Bundesrepublik Deutschland v Y and Z, C-71/11, C-99/11 (CJEU 5 Sept 2012).  
25  Bruce and Cantor observed that it was the very first time that a supranational court endorsed the 
human rights approach for interpreting the notion of persecution: Burson Bruce and David James 
Cantor, ‘Interpreting the Refugee Definition via Human Rights Standards’, Chapter 1 in Bruce Burson 
and Cantor David James (eds), Human Rights and the Refugee Definition, Comparative Legal Practice 
and Theory (Brill Nijhoff 2016) 1-24, 9. 
26 Bundesrepublik Deutschland v Y and Z (n 24) at [65]. 
27 See Alexandra Maria Rodrigues Araújo,‘The Qualification for Being a Refugee under EU Law: 
Religion as a Reason for Persecution  Court of Justice of the European Union (Grand Chamber), 
Judgment of 5 September 2012, Joined Cases C-71/11 and C-99/11, Bundesrepublik Deutschland v. Y 
and Z’ [2014] 16 European Journal of Migration and Law 553, 546: ‘the Court adopted the following 
touchstone: it is the severity of the measures and sanctions adopted or the liability to be adopted against 
the person concerned which will determine whether a violation of religious freedom constitutes 
persecution (…) the Court established that the acts regarded as constituting persecution must not be 
judged on the basis of the particular aspect of religious freedom that is being interfered with, but on the 
basis of the intrinsic severity of the repression inflicted on the individual and the severity of its 
consequences’. 
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down their views by imposing a very high degree to the harm required as they 
stated that persecution was only characterised if ‘an applicant for asylum, as 
a result of exercising that freedom in his country of origin, runs a genuine risk 
of, inter alia, being prosecuted or subject to inhuman or degrading treatment 
or punishment’.28 Through this formulation, the court equated the notion of 
persecution with the severity of harm required under the non-refoulement 
principle of the ECHR and the 1951 Convention and relied on rather vague 
notions. Commentators criticised the severe threshold used by the court. For 
instance, Bank considered that the court established an ‘exceptionally high 
standard for an act of persecution’.29 Other authors also noted that the test 
established by the court was rather unclear. For instance, Lehman considered 
that in ‘implicitly relying on the scope of non-refoulement under the ECHR’, 
the court endorsed ‘a very narrow, conceptually vague human rights approach 
to the notion of persecution’30 and undercut ‘the autonomous and wider scope 
of harm relevant under the Convention’s refugee definition’.31 Araujo also 
observed that, after the court decision, some ‘level of uncertainty’ remained 
as to the threshold that should be applied in cases of religious persecution.32 
Interestingly, in the present case, the European judges had pointed to the 
circumstantial dimension of persecution as they considered that it was 
necessary to assess the consequences that certain measures can have on an 
individual. Although this element could have further encouraged the judges 
to evaluate, in a holistic manner, the broad impact that certain restrictions 
have on claimants’ lives, the court unfortunately ended up restricting the 
scope of the QD by setting a very high threshold to the notion of persecution.  
 
Regrettably, the court confirmed this restrictive approach in Minister 
voor Immigratie en Asiel v X, Y and Z on 7 November 2013.33 In this case, 
the court had to examine the claim of two homosexual applicants, hailing 
from Sierra Leone and Uganda.  The European judges found that the violation 
                                                
28 Bundesrepublik Deutschland v Y and Z (n 24) at [67]. 
29 Bank (n 22) 226. 
30 Lehmann (n 7) 81. 
31 Ibid 79. 
32 Araujo (n 27) 556. 
33 X, Y, Z v Minister voor Immigratie en Asiel, C-199/12 – C-201/12 (CJEU 7 Nov 2013). 
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of the right to private and family life did not in itself amount to persecution 
because this right was a derogable right.34 The court concluded from this 
observation that: 
 
‘the mere existence of a legislation criminalising homosexual 
acts cannot be regarded as an act affecting the applicant(s) in 
a manner so significant that it reaches the level of seriousness 
necessary for a finding that it constitutes persecution within 
the meaning of Article 9(1) of the Directive’.35  
 
This approach was highly criticised by the International Commission 
of Jurists (ICJ), pointing out that the non-derogability of a right could not be 
equated with the concept of severity on which the notion of persecution 
rested.36 
 
Although the Court considered that penalisation did not amount to 
persecution, it stated that implemented penal sanctions, such as 
imprisonment, could constitute persecution. European judges then proposed 
to take into consideration ‘all the relevant facts concerning that country of 
origin’37 in order to assess whether an applicant was at risk of facing 
persecution. They did not, however, specifically mention what kind of facts 
should be examined and seemed to propose only to refer to facts relating to 
the geopolitical circumstances in the country of origin, namely to external 
facts.  Again, by not encouraging a more holistic assessment of the personal 
experiences of the claimants and affirming that penalisation of homosexuality 
did not per se amount to persecution, the judges adopted a narrow and rigid 
view of the refugee definition. The consequences that criminal laws have on 
the life of homosexuals should have been better highlighted in the judgment. 
Such laws might have devastating impacts on homosexuals who live in 
                                                
34 Ibid at 54. 
35 Ibid at [55].  
36 ‘X, Y and Z: a Glass Half Full for Rainbow Refugees’?  The International Commission of Jurists’ 
observations on the judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union in X, Y and Z v. Minister 
voor Immigratie en Asiel, International Commission of Jurists, 3 June 2014 available at : 
http://icj.wpengine.netdna-cdn.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/CommentaryXYZ-Advocacy-
2014.pdf at [49] 
37 X, Y, Z v Minister voor Immigratie en Asiel (n 33) at [58]. 
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permanent distress and are not free to express their emotions and their sexual 
orientation in public as well as to enjoy the possibility of living freely with 
their partners. Unfortunately, the court overlooked this aspect. The judges 
adopted a ‘compartmentalised’38 approach by encouraging a formalist 
assessment of abstract entitlements rather than adopting a more circumstantial 
methodology. The position of the court also disregarded the views of the 
UNHCR which considered that ‘even if irregularly, rarely or ever enforced, 
criminal laws prohibiting same-sex relations could lead to an intolerable 
predicament for an LGBTI person rising to the level of persecution’.39 In 
reaction to this judgment, the ICJ and Amnesty International issued a joint 
statement criticising the reasoning of the court. The statement affirmed that 
legislation penalising homosexuality actually fosters social homophobia with 
the tacit approval of the authorities even when it is not applied in practice.40 
In light of the foregoing, it appears that the court adopted a narrow view of 
persecution again, and should have encouraged member states to engage in a 
broader analysis of the situation faced by homosexuals in their country, by 
considering for instance that the criminalisation of homosexuality, could, 
depending on the objective country conditions and the personal circumstances 
of claimants, raise a rebuttable presumption of persecution.   
 
Not only did the cases mentioned above adopt a restrictive approach 
of the human rights narrative, but they also provided inconsistent guidance 
on what amounts to persecution, thus demonstrating that human rights law 
might not always resolve the problem of fragmentary jurisprudence. For 
instance, Heijer noted that the European judges gave contradictory 
information in relation to the requirement to conceal certain elements of one’s 
identity in order to avoid persecution. In Y and Z, the court indicated that the 
                                                
38 ICJ (n 36) at [57]: ‘the fact that consensual same-sex sexual orientation and/or acts are criminalized 
requires a thorough, individualized and holistic assessment – rather than a false and compartmentalized 
one – of whether these laws affect the lived experience of asylum applicants in their country of origin 
in such a way as to give rise to a well-founded fear of persecution’. 
39 UNHCR, Guidelines on International Protection No 9: Claims to Refugee Status based on Sexual 
Orientation and/or Gender Identity within the context of Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention and/or 
its 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, 23 Oct 2012, HCR/GIP/12/01, at [27]. 
40 Amnesty International, ‘Observations by Amnesty International and the International Commission 
of Jurists on the case X, Y and Z v Minister voor Immigratie, Integratie en Asiel’ (C-199/12, C-200/12 
and C-201/12) following the Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston of 11 July 2013, 2 October 
2013, POL 33/003/2013. 
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personal circumstances of an applicant should be taken into consideration in 
order to assess whether he would engage in public practice of his religion. 
This indicated that, although it cannot be reasonably expected of someone to 
abstain from practicing her religion in public, she might also act discreetly as 
per her personal conviction and, as such, persecution might not apply. The 
language of the court was however different in X, Y and Z, as the European 
judges clearly stated that: ‘the fact that (the applicant) could avoid the risk by 
exercising greater restraint than a heterosexual in expressing his sexual 
orientation is not to be taken into account’.41 In this case, the court adopted a 
more categorical approach in relation to the discreet attitude that one can be 
expected to have. It indicated that, under no circumstances should the 
evaluation of persecution be conducted with the eventuality in mind that one 
could try to avoid the harm feared. To Heijer, these different formulations 
demonstrate that ‘different tests apply to the persecution reasons of 
homosexuality and religion’.42 Heijer highlighted the absurdity of these 
solutions according to which it will ‘never be tolerable for a homosexual to 
conceal his identity, but it can be tolerable for a religious person to only 
worship in private’.43 These inconsistent solutions in fact reflect the variable 
approaches that can be adopted under the QD, and to a broader extent under 
the human rights narrative.  
 
In the previous cases, the court essentially dwelled on the 
interpretation of Article 9(1) but in Shepherd44 it provided some guidance on 
the interpretation of article 9(2) when this article was the object of a set of 
questions referred to the CJEU by the High Administrative Court of Bavaria. 
The court had to examine the case of a former soldier who served for two 
years in Iraq as a helicopter maintenance mechanic. He eventually deserted 
because he considered that the war was illegal and because he believed that 
war crimes were committed by his army. He argued that because of his 
desertion, he was at risk of prosecution and social ostracism in his country of 
                                                
41 X, Y, Z v Minister voor Immigratie en Asiel (n 33) at [75]. 
42 Maarten den Heijer, ‘Persecution for reason of sexual orientation: X,Y and Z’ [2014] 51 Common 
Market Law Review 1217, 1231. 
43 Heijer (n 42) 1231. 
44 Andre Lawrence Shepherd v Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Case C-472/13 (CJEU, 26 February 
2015). 
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origin. According to the QD Article 9(2), prosecution or punishment for 
refusal to perform military service may amount to persecution only when 
performing military service would involve the commission of crimes or acts 
falling under the exclusion clauses.45 This approach is quite narrow as it 
overlooks any other personal motivation that a conscientious objector could 
have for not abiding by national obligations. Not only did the CJEU endorse 
this position, but it further limited the possibilities of granting asylum based 
on conscientious objection. The court posited new conditions to the granting 
of asylum in cases of desertion from the military, namely that the commission 
of crimes should be ‘highly likely’, that desertion should be the only way to 
avoid the commission of such crimes and that an endorsement of the conflict 
by the international community should be taken into account in assessing the 
possibility of committing war crimes. Unfortunately, the result of this 
conclusion was to heighten the burden of proof for asylum seekers.46 
Commentators criticised the position of the court by considering that the 
judges did not apply a broad human rights approach as required by the QD47 
and as recommended by the UNHCR. For instance, Vicini recently contended 
that the position of the CJEU in this case was ‘incompatible with recent 
developments within international human rights law, which progressively 
protect the right to conscientious objection as an essential part of the right to 
freedom of thought, conscience and religion’.48 Additionally, the judges did 
not propose specific guidance as they did not clarify what they believed were 
the protected activities under human rights law, nor did they explain what 
infringements and limitations of such activities were admissible. In particular, 
the court seemed to accept that up to five years of imprisonment was 
acceptable for deserting the US army but did not justify why this would be 
so. The judges also did not engage in a holistic appreciation of what would 
be the exact nature of the harm feared in the country of origin of the applicant. 
                                                
45 The Qualification Directive, Art 9(2)e. 
46 Andre Lawrence Shepherd v Bundesrepublik Deutschlan, (n 44) at [46].  
47 Julian M. Lehmann, ‘Of Shepherds and Sheepdogs – Andre Lawrence Shepherd v. Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland before the Court of Justice of the European Union’, 9 March 2015, University of Michigan 
Law School blog, available at : http://www.reflaw.org/of-shepherds-and-sheepdogs-andre-lawrence-
shepherd-v-bundesrepublik-deutschland-before-the-court-of-justice-of-the-european-union/# 
48 Giuli Vicini, ‘Conscientious objection to military service and the notion of persecution in European 
Union asylum law, the Shepherd Judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union’ [2015] 13 
Journal of International Criminal Justice 845, 859. 
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In light of the foregoing, it appears that the uncertainty raised by 
Article 9 of the QD regarding the definition of persecution has not so far been 
lifted by the CJEU. Although the court endorsed the basic human rights 
approach, it used human rights standards to, in fact, adopt narrow views of 
the notion of persecution. According to Cantor, in analysing ‘subtle questions 
about the boundaries of persecution’, the Court had ‘recourse to human rights 
[…] to serve as a justification for restrictive interpretations of this element’.49 
Indeed, the European judges failed to develop a detailed framework of 
interpretation in line with broader international norms and with the UNHCR’s 
recommendations. Instead, they made used of the vague wording of the QD 
to develop restrictive standards of interpretation. As a result, the highly 
difficult task of interpreting the QD pursuant to the spirit of the 1951 
Convention still rests on the member states themselves without effective 
coordination, which further heightens the risk of inconsistent decisions within 
the European Union.  
 
B)   The Qualification Directive: a ‘template for a universal 
working definition’ of persecution?50 
 
In spite of the uncertainty surrounding the interpretation of its terms, 
the QD is the first international instrument that provides a detailed definition 
of persecution in the context of refugee law. As such, Storey considered that 
the QD could be used as a model for interpreting the notion of persecution at 
the global level. Unlike what has been argued above, Storey contended that 
the human rights narrative in the QD is adequate because it departs from the 
restrictive framework developed by Hathaway in 199151 and provides a more 
expansive narrative. By removing the restrictive elements of Hathaway’s 
framework such as the four-tier hierarchy52 and the persistency criteria, 
Storey contended that the QD marked one ‘very significant improvement’.53 
                                                
49 Cantor (n 18) 386. 
50 Storey (n 1) 478.  
51 Ibid 470. 
52 This element was also abandoned by Hathaway in the latest edition of the LORS in 2014.  
53 Storey (n 1) 472. 
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He also observed that the QD developed a broad scheme, by suggesting that 
‘other measures’ than severe human rights violations could also amount to 
persecution. He observed that a greater variety of benchmarks could be taken 
into consideration for interpreting persecution and, therefore, he praised the 
new approach of the QD as being more flexible.54 Whilst it is true that the QD 
proposed a paradigm that is broader than the definition initially developed by 
Hathaway, the optimistic vision of Storey has, however, been contradicted by 
the jurisprudence of the CJEU as previously demonstrated. The court has 
shown that the human rights paradigm adopted by the QD could also lead to 
very narrow interpretations of persecution, thus failing to provide for the 
flexible approach that was so greatly expected. 
 
In any event, Storey developed a new interesting interpretive scheme. 
He considered that the QD could constitute a good departure point for 
elaborating a universal definition of persecution but he believed that the QD 
definition was in need of some refinements, in order to make it a global 
model. According to him, not all aspects of persecution should be translated 
into human rights terms. He considered that the QD should be better anchored 
to the overall system of international public law and, for this purpose, he 
proposed that a larger spectrum of international norms be referred to. For 
instance, when harms arise in times of conflict, he argued that International 
Humanitarian Law (IHL) norms should apply instead of human rights. 
Similarly, when the notion of nationality is involved in the assessment of 
persecution, rules of nationality law might be needed. According to him, the 
model of the QD allows for such a large interpretation. To summarise his 
proposal, he stated that persecution should be understood as the ‘severe 
violations of international law norms, in particular international human rights 
norms’. He further endorsed the threshold of harm required under the QD.55 
Storey then detailed the modalities of persecution relating to the temporal, 
material and personal scope of the harm.56 
 
                                                
54 Storey ibid 471. 
55 Storey ibid 517. 
56 Storey ibid 517-518. 
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Storey advocated a wider approach for interpreting the notion of 
persecution that appears more protective of refugees than the approach 
proposed by Hathaway and, to a certain extent, than the approach of the QD. 
Indeed, he developed a more flexible framework that encompasses numerous 
parameters in order to better assess the personal impact that certain measures 
can have on an individual’s life as he considered that more norms of 
international law should be taken into consideration. As a result, his position 
takes into account a greater variety of situations. 
 
 However, one criticism that could be made of him is that his narrative 
refers to a very large array of norms and standards and, therefore, it appears 
quite ambiguous. He argued that international law norms could be referred to 
for interpreting persecution but he did not specify the exact nature of legal 
norms that he proposed to consider. Although he mentioned that nationality 
law or IHL could be used as benchmarks, he did not further state what other 
rules would be relevant for interpreting persecution. It is, for instance, unclear 
from his framework whether regional norms or soft law norms could be used 
as referential standards. Further to this, the risk of inconsistent and restrictive 
approaches to a human rights narrative has been exemplified by the recent 
case law of the CJEU and rightly pointed out by Cantor.57 This risk seems 
even greater if we consider any norm of international law in general. 
Additionally, the threshold that Storey proposes to assess the level of harm, 
namely ‘severe violations of international law norms’ remains rather 
imprecise as argued above in the case of the QD regarding severe violations 
of basic human rights.  
 
Finally, it should be pointed out that Storey specified that the 
individual circumstances of refugees should be examined for interpreting the 
notion of persecution.58 Whilst this proposal would permit the balancing of 
different aspects of refugees’ protection needs, Storey did not clearly explain 
how he would combine these different tests. As such, the definition that he 
proposed seemed to put greater emphasis on formal norms than on the 
                                                
57 Cantor (n 18) 386. 
58 Storey (n 1) 495. 
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practical protection needs of refugees, which could then, lead to a certain 
confusion. This, therefore suggests that a different focus might be needed to 
assess persecution. 
 
Part 2) Departing from a human rights narrative: alternative 
approaches for interpreting the notion of persecution 
 
The foregoing demonstrated that interpretive frameworks, exclusively 
relying on human rights and international norms, entail the risk of developing 
a rigid and restrictive methodology. Some authors have proposed alternative 
approaches that depart from a human rights and positivist narrative of refugee 
law and consider other concepts as pivotal for interpreting persecution, such 
as the concepts of identity, dignity and personhood (A) or the concept of 
discrimination (B). Whilst their proposals have gained less traction in the 
scholarship than the framework developed by Hathaway, they provide 
valuable insights on different aspects of the notion of persecution. In addition 
to the proposals of other scholars, the UNHCR has developed its own 
approach, which relies on the individual circumstances of refugees as a 
departure point for assessing what forms of harm amount to persecution (C). 
These various models will be analysed in turn to argue that UNHCR’s model 
appears the most comprehensive and protective of the situation of refugees.  
 
A)   Persecution, identity, dignity and the concept of personhood  
 
Firth and Mauthe59 developed a singular narrative that strays away 
from the formalist human rights framework and proposes to take into 
consideration a more subjective aspect of the concept of persecution. They 
suggested to rely on the notion of ‘personhood’ for determining what forms 
of harm amount to persecution. In order to do so, they considered how this 
concept has developed in various legal areas and how the jurisprudence has 
determined what makes a person a person. In particular, the authors quoted 
                                                
59 Georgina Firth and Barbara Mauthe, ‘Refugee Law, Gender and the Concept of Personhood’ [2013] 
25 International Journal of Refugee Law 470. 
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the case of the Delhi High Court, Naz Foundation v Delhi and Others60 that 
provided some guidance on how ‘personhood’ should be assessed. In this 
case, the court stated that ‘the holder of rights is (not) an isolated, lonely and 
abstract figure possessing a disembodied and socially disconnected self, 
rather people live in their bodies, their communities, their cultures, their 
places and their times’. In light of this formulation, the authors concluded that 
the personhood of an individual is shaped by various social, economic, 
psychological and cultural factors and that these factors, should be taken into 
consideration for interpreting the notion of persecution.61 This assessment 
also includes the subjective perception that individuals have of their own 
identity.62  Their view echoes the position of Slater who highlighted the major 
role of the concepts of human dignity and subjectivity in order to understand 
what persecution is. For her ‘human dignity grounds respect individual 
autonomy and justified claims to basic needs required to have a life of one’s 
own’.63 Both concepts stress the value of personal agency and presuppose the 
‘individual as autonomous and, therefore, entitled to respect for this 
autonomy’.64  
 
Firth and Mauthe believed that the notion of personhood is 
particularly adapted to women as it encourages ‘decision makers to consider 
a more complex construction of the realities of refugee women’s myriad 
experiences’.65 Their view aligned with those of numerous authors who have 
pointed to the sheer complexity of women’s activities that are not reflected in 
current international human rights paradigm based on typical males’ 
experiences66 but that nonetheless need to be taken into account. The concept 
of ‘personhood’ highlights the personal dimension of persecution and 
                                                
60 Naz Foundation v Delhi and Others [2009] 4 LRC 838 at [47] quoted in ibid 490. 
61 They argued that the concept of pershonhood can be based on the notion of ‘autonomy which enables 
an individual to attain fulfilment, grow in self-esteem, build relationships’ and ‘fulfil legitimate goals’ 
in ibid 490. 
62 Ibid 498-499. 
63 Rachel Helen Slater, A jurisprudential analysis of the interpretation of ‘persecution’ under the 1951 
convention relating to the status of refugees at the domestic level (Birmingham Law School 2014) 110.  
64 Slater ibid 116. 
65 Firth and Mauthe (n 59) 473. 
66 Charlotte Bunch, ‘Women's Rights as Human Rights: Toward a Re-Vision of Human Rights’ [1990] 
12 Human Rights Quarterly 486; Celine Romany, ‘Women as Aliens: A Feminist Critique of the 
Public/Private Distinction in International Human Rights Law’ [1993] 6 Harvard Human Rights Journal 
87; Edwards Alice, Violence against women under international human rights law, (CUP 2010) 305. 
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encourages a consideration of various aspects of an individual’s identity 
without mainstreaming people’s profiles. However, as noted by the authors 
themselves, this concept can also appear quite vague and overly subjective as 
it might ‘depend on the view that an individual has on their self, rather than 
the view of another’.67 The authors argued that this pitfall could be overcome 
by using specific criteria for determining personhood but they simply referred 
to the different approaches developed in the jurisprudence and did not 
propose any tangible criteria for defining what constitutes personhood.  
 
Whilst the concept of personhood appears valuable for reasserting the 
inherent subjectivity and complexity of individuals’ experiences, as well as 
evaluating how identity can shape the protection needs of refugees, it remains 
a rather general concept. Indeed, as admitted by the authors, it can have very 
different meanings68 depending on the context. In particular, the subjective 
element of personhood, i.e. how individuals perceive themselves, raises 
difficulties in evaluating the notion of persecution. As such, Firth and 
Mauthe’s proposal does not solve the concerns raised by authors, such as 
Valluy and Bellorgey, regarding the inherent vagueness and subjectivity of 
the refugee definition.69 These authors regretted the fact that the formulation 
of the 1951 Convention generally allows for very subjective interpretations 
and it seems that unfortunately, the notion of personhood reinforces this 
caveat.  
 
Although the concept of personhood adequately emphasises the need 
to examine various circumstances of refugees, including some subjective 
elements, it seems to be quite difficult to apply in practice. Even if this 
approach adopts a more circumstantial paradigm in contrast with the human 
rights approach, it does not constitute a practical model and raises risks of 
inconsistent interpretation. As such, it has gained very little influence in the 
literature or in the jurisprudence. More detailed and principled frameworks, 
                                                
67 Firth and Mauthe (n 59) 499. 
68 Ibid 488.  
69 Jerome Valluy, ‘La Fiction Juridique de l’Asile’ [2004] 4 Plein droit 17; Jean-Michel Belorgey, 
‘L’Asile et l’Intime Conviction du Juge’ 1 Plein droit 59.  
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also based on the analysis of the personal circumstances of refugees, need 
therefore to be further considered. 
 
B)   Persecution and the core concept of discrimination 
 
Some commentators have proposed a teleological interpretation of the 
notion of persecution that strays away from Hathaway’s narrative.  They have 
suggested to rely on the notion of discrimination in defining a refugee rather 
than focusing on human rights standards. According to these authors, the 
reason for perpetrating a harmful act is the keystone for understanding 
persecution. In their view, persecution is primarily an action aimed at the 
suppression of a difference.70 As such, they considered that the ‘unjustifiable 
and unacceptable’71 character of persecution is a major component of the 
notion. However, there has been some debate as to the scope of this narrative. 
Whilst some commentators have argued that, for a harmful act to amount to 
persecution, it should primarily be based on at least one of the five grounds 
enshrined in the 1951 Convention, others considered that this aspect of 
persecution was too restrictive, and instead contended that the broader notion 
of discrimination is sufficient to underpin the interpretation of persecution.  
 
i- Persecution as an act based on the five Convention grounds: the 
pivotal role of the Convention nexus in defining persecution  
 
One of the main authors who advocated a teleological interpretation 
of the notion of persecution is Steinbock. He considered that understanding 
the ‘core purpose of the refugee definition’72 is a major condition for 
interpreting persecution. For him, this core purpose is the ‘protection against 
the persecution of difference’.73 Whilst differences can be varied, Steinbock 
contended that the Convention has specifically delineated the contours of 
                                                
70 Jean-Francois Durieux, ‘Three asylum Paradigms’ [2013] 20 International Journal on Minority and 
Group Rights 147, 157; Daniel J. Steinbock, ‘Interpreting the Refugee Definition’ [1998] 45 UCLA 
Law Review 733, 804. 
71 Alexander Aleinikoff, ‘The Meaning of “Persecution” in United States Asylum Law’ [1991] 3 
International Journal of Refugee Law 5, 12. 
72 Steinbock (n 70) 804. 
73 Ibid 804.  
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what could amount to persecution by fleshing out five grounds, which he 
believed should constitute an inherent and pivotal element of the notion. 
Steinbock elaborated this view in opposition to the human rights narrative. 
According to him, not only does this narrative omit to feature the five 
elements as inherent aspect of persecution, but it provides too wide a 
catalogue of possible harms, which he believes is not what the 
plenipotentiaries had in mind.  
 
Steinbock, therefore, considered that only certain forms of 
infringement of peremptory norms, based on Convention reasons, should be 
considered persecution. For him, ‘the plain meaning of the term “persecution” 
in the refugee definition, read in light of its history, makes clear that 
persecution does not exist apart from a prohibited reason for the suffering that 
it produces’.74 This view has traditionally been adopted in US jurisprudence 
as pointed out by Aleinikoff.75 It seemed to have been also endorsed by the 
QD in its definition of acts of persecution.76 It has also been shared, to a 
certain extent, by Price, who considered that persecution is a harmful act that 
should be based on ‘illegitimate reasons’,77 which he believed should be 
defined by the five Convention grounds entailed in the refugee definition. He 
added an exception, as he considered that for certain egregious forms of harm, 
the Convention reasons should not be considered an essential element of the 
notion of persecution, given the gravity of such predicaments.78 However, for 
the residual harms, Price maintains that the five Convention grounds are a 
major component of persecution.79  
 
To consider the Convention grounds crucial elements of the notion of 
persecution appears, however, problematic for several reasons. It might lead 
to restrictive interpretations of the Refugee Convention by suggesting that 
                                                
74 Ibid 757. 
75 Aleinikoff (n 71). 
76 Qualification Directive, Art 9(3).  
77  Matthew Price, Rethinking asylum: history, purpose and limits (CUP 2009) 107: for Price, 
persecution is cumulatively composed of (1) serious harm that is (2) inflicted or tolerated by official 
agents (3) for illegitimate reasons. 
78 Ibid 110: Price argues for an anti-brutality norm. 
79 Ibid 108: For instance, Price stated that shock therapy perpetrated on mentally ill individuals might 
not amount to persecution, whilst it could well be considered persecution if it was meant to constitute 
a treatment of homosexuals. 
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there should be a persecutory intent behind the act itself.  From a formal point 
of view, this approach seems to ignore the plain text of the refugee definition, 
which states that a refugee is someone who has a ‘well-founded fear of being 
persecuted’ for one of the five Convention reasons. As such, tying the 
Convention reasons to the persecution limb of the definition somehow 
disregards the ‘well-founded fear’ aspect of the definition. There is indeed 
nothing to suggest in the 1951 Convention that the five Convention grounds 
should only be related to the persecution element. Additionally, adopting this 
view could heighten the burden of proof on claimants. It could be more 
difficult to demonstrate that a specific harm is based on a Convention ground, 
than to demonstrate that the overall fear of being persecuted is linked to at 
least one of these grounds. Whilst an act of persecution in itself might not be 
motivated by a Convention reason, the risk of harm might be. For instance, 
consider the case of domestic violence where a woman faced severe harm at 
the hands of her husband based on purely personal reasons. The harm inflicted 
upon her is not based on a Convention reason. However, it could be argued 
that she might not be able to seek protection from the state authorities given 
the rampant discrimination existing against women in her country. As such, 
it is the lack of state protection that is based on a Convention reason. Whilst 
authors have argued that the lack of state protection is directly tied to the 
notion of persecution,80 as previously noted, this view remains contentious. It 
could also be considered that the lack of protection is in fact linked to the 
overall ‘well-founded fear of being persecuted’ test as it contributes 
significantly to the existence of a risk.81 As such, the existence of the 
Convention grounds might be, in the above case, linked to the well-founded 
fear of part of the definition, rather than the persecution element. Regardless 
of the position adopted, it would be less circuitous to argue that the 
Convention nexus constitutes an additional test, linked to the ‘well-founded 
fear of being persecuted’ formulation as a whole, referring either to 
persecution or to the well-founded fear, depending on the case. 
                                                
80 See Chapter 2, Part 3.   
81 See for instance, Goodwin-Gill Guy and Jane McAdam, The Refugee in International Law, (3rd edn, 
OUP 2011) 100: Goodwin-Gill and McAdam argued that the absence of state protection might well be 
considered to contribute to the existence of a risk, rather than defining per se the nature of persecution. 
For them, the correlation between state protection and persecution is ‘coincidental’ not normative. 
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This view has in fact been shared by numerous authors. For instance, 
Foster considered that the Convention grounds need to be one contributing 
factor to the overall sentence ‘well-founded fear of being persecuted’.82 
Similarly, Hathaway stated that the Convention reasons should constitute a 
factor ‘in creating the risk of being persecuted’.83 As such, neither of them 
confined the Convention nexus to the notion of persecution, but linked it to 
the overall existence of a risk of persecution. On a similar note, Aleinikoff 
argued that persecution should not be tied to the Convention grounds but 
should be given a ‘free-standing meaning’.84 In light of these different views, 
an interpretive scheme that relies on the Convention nexus as a pivotal 
element of persecution can unduly heighten the burden of proof on claimants 
and, as such, appears quite restrictive. This approach, while developing an 
alternative model to the formalist human rights framework, does not seem 
able to sufficiently encompass the various types of predicament faced by 
refugees.   
 
ii- Discrimination vs persecution? 
 
Other authors also considered that the reasons for harm are major 
elements of the persecution definition but they departed from the Convention 
grounds approach and contended that persecution should be based on the 
broader principle of non-discrimination. For instance, for Aleinikoff, 
persecution should be based on a large variety of unjustifiable reasons, not 
confined to the five reasons of the Convention,85 thus highlighting the 
necessity of a broader discriminatory treatment. On a similar note, Bagaric 
and Dimopoulos argued that the notion of discrimination was the 
‘touchstone’86 of persecution. Schoenholtz also considered that the purpose 
                                                
82 Michelle Foster, ‘Causation in Context: Interpreting the Nexus Clause in the Refugee Convention’ 
[2002] 23 Michigan Journal of International Law 265, 340. 
83 James Hathaway and Michelle Foster, The Law of Refugee Status, (2nd edn; CUP 2014) 390. 
84 Aleinikoff (n 71) 13. 
85 Ibid 12. 
86 Bagaric and Dimopoulos considered that the concept of discrimination was the touchstone of 
persecution in cases of harm arising from law of general application in Mirko Bagaric and Penny 
Dimopoulos, ‘Discrimination as the Touchstone of Persecution in Refugee Law’ [2007] 3 Journal of 
Migration and Refugee Issues 14. 
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of the 1951 Convention is to provide protection against ‘persecutory 
discrimination’.87 Durieux contended the same and stated that acts of 
persecution are considered unjustifiable because they negate diversity in a 
society and punish individuals for their differences. Durieux uses, as a 
departure point, the definition of the US Court of Appeal of the 9th Circuit 
stating that persecution is a form of ‘oppression which is inflicted on groups 
of individuals because of a difference that the persecutor will not tolerate’.88 
In line with this definition, he noted that persecution has a discriminatory 
character. As per the predominant view,89 he does not believe that a mere 
discrimination amounts to persecution. He argued, instead, that a certain 
threshold is necessary to assess the level of harm required under the refugee 
definition and proposed that the notion of ‘violence’ be also considered a 
pivotal element in defining persecution.90 In his own words, persecution is a 
‘violent form of discrimination’. It ‘supposes the use of coercion towards the 
suppression of difference’.91 His model, based on the notion of 
discrimination, encourages a broad assessment of various harmful measures 
and, as such, departs from a strict basic human rights narrative. It is also not 
limited to the five Convention grounds and postulates that numerous 
discriminatory reasons can underlie an act of persecution. Similarly, Dowd 
highlighted the broad character of the notion of discrimination. She stated that 
it can refer both to various forms of serious harm and to human rights 
violations,92 and, therefore, encompasses a potentially larger variety of 
predicaments.  
 
Whilst this narrative permits the development of a seemingly wider 
analysis of the kinds of harm that amount to persecution, it remains, however, 
quite vague. Indeed, Dowd pointed to the general character of the notion of 
‘discrimination’ and stated that it has been ‘rarely discussed as a concept in 
                                                
87 Andrew I. Schoenholtz, ‘The New Refugees and the Old Treaty: Persecutors and Persecuted in the 
Twenty-First Century’ [2015] 16 Chicago Journal of International Law 81, 124. 
88 Adela Hernandez-Ortiz v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, United States Court of Appeals, 
Ninth Circuit 777 F.2d 509, decided 2 December 1985 at [20] quoted in Durieux (n 70) 157.  
89 UNHCR Handbook, at [54]. 
90 Durieux (n 70) 157. 
91 Ibid 157. 
92 Rebecca Dowd, ‘Dissecting Discrimination in Refugee Law: an Analysis of its Meaning and its 
Cumulative Effect’ [2011] 23 International Journal of Refugee Law 28, 39. 
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itself in refugee law’.93 In fact, she considered that the concept of 
discrimination is often used as a ‘catch-all’ term94 to deny refugee claims 
often considered akin to violations of various types of human rights. She 
demonstrated that, due to this, the notion of discrimination has been 
interpreted in very inconsistent ways and different standards have been used 
for different types of claim.95 In order to minimise the risk of inconsistent 
interpretations, Dowd proposed that the notion of discrimination should be 
understood in a broad manner, so as to analyse a large spectrum of measures 
and not only violations of human rights. For instance, she contended that the 
consequential impact that certain types of discrimination have on individuals 
- including the adverse psychological harm that they can cause - should be 
assessed through a holistic analysis.96 According to her, the ‘purpose of 
undertaking a cumulative analysis should be to consider the overall impact of 
discrimination on an individual's life, not merely its impact on a limited 
selection of narrowly-defined rights’.97 As such, she stated that the 
circumstances and conditions of individuals need to be taken as a departure 
point to assess how discriminations affect a person’s life.98  
 
In contrast to the views of the above authors, it could be said that the 
concept of discriminatory harm does not always reflect the reality behind 
certain forms of violence based on personal consideration, such as, for 
instance, domestic violence. As previously argued, the discriminatory intent 
can, in some contexts, be imputable to the state rather than the agent of harm 
when non-state agents of persecution are involved. According to the HRC, an 
act of discrimination implies ‘any distinction, exclusion, restriction of 
preference which is based on any ground […] and which has the purpose or 
effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by all 
persons, on an equal footing, of all rights and freedoms’.99 In this context, the 
intention to discriminate is not be needed, as long as the act has the ‘effect’ 
                                                
93 Ibid 32. 
94 Ibid 35. 
95 Ibid 46. 
96 Ibid 51. 
97 Ibid 53. 
98 Ibid 49. 
99 Human Rights Committee, General Comment, No. 18: non-Discrimination (1989) at [7]. 
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of discriminating. It might well be argued that acts of domestic violence, 
although more directly based on personal reasons, might have the effect of 
perpetuating discrimination against women in certain contexts. As such, there 
would be an underlying discriminatory element to the infliction of harm. 
Whilst this is not disputed here, proving this element might be more difficult 
than proving the discriminatory element underlying the lack or failure of state 
protection. As such, depending on the context, it remains that considering the 
notion of discrimination as an inherent part of the persecution test could add 
an extra burden of proof on certain claimants, in particular in cases of gender-
based violence. It remains, nonetheless, a relevant notion to be considered in 
certain cases of persecution.  
 
In order to understand how the notion of discrimination can be 
factored into the concept of persecution, reference to Price could be helpful. 
Indeed, Price interestingly developed the idea of a sliding scale for 
considering the reasons behind the harm perpetrated. According to him, for 
grave acts (defined through references to customary law), there is no need to 
consider the reasons behind those acts, whilst for milder forms of harm, the 
five Convention grounds become fundamental to the notion of persecution. 
Although his test seems quite severe because Price considered that only the 
violations of peremptory norms100 would remove the need for a Convention 
ground, his logic brings some insight as to how the degree of persecution is 
to be articulated with its qualitative aspect. His sliding scale could suggest 
that various restrictions, when compounded by an element of discrimination 
(which should not necessarily be restricted to the Convention Reasons) could 
amount to persecution, whilst other forms of egregious harm could be 
considered unjustifiable and unacceptable by nature, regardless of the reasons 
behind the act. In the words of the Canadian Federal Court of Appeal, for 
certain acts it can be considered that ‘brutality in furtherance of a legitimate 
end is still brutality.101 This combination of qualitative and quantitative 
                                                
100 The nature of such norms is generally debated, which undermines the accuracy of Price’s proposed 
narrative. For example, refer to the: debate on whether rape is considered Ius Cogens. On this see: 
David S. Mitchell, ‘The Prohibition of Rape in International Humanitarian Law as a Norm of Jus 
Cogens: Clarifying the Doctrine’ [2005]15 Duke Journal of Comparative & International Law 219. 
101 Cheung v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1993] 2 F.C. 314, Canada: Federal 
Court of Appeal. 
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factors appears indeed relevant to assess the notion of persecution. For more 
severe acts of violence, for instance domestic violence, no discriminatory 
intent is needed whilst for milder forms of harm, a discriminatory element 
might be needed so that the harm qualifies as persecution. In any case, it 
remains that the Convention grounds have to be attached to the overall 
formula of a ‘well-founded fear of being persecuted’. 
 
In spite of its intrinsic limitations, the above narrative has the 
advantage of putting a greater focus on the effects of persecution on 
individuals, in contrast to the various human rights frameworks, that 
somehow obviate this element by focusing on the formal existence of human 
rights violations.102 It demonstrates that both the qualitative and quantitative 
aspects need to be factored into the assessment of what persecution is, 
depending on the degree of the harm. This view in turn encourages a more 
flexible and all-encompassing analysis of the different circumstances of 
refugees.  
 
In this sense, the UNHCR has proposed a more comprehensive 
analysis of persecution, factoring in these various elements, including the five 
Convention grounds, as well as broader qualitative and quantitative criteria, 
compounded with subjective aspects of the notion of persecution. The 
UNHCR’s view on persecution will be assessed below.  
 
C)   The UNHCR’s model for interpreting persecution  
 
i- The human rights and circumstantial approaches  
 
Before Hathaway formulated his human rights framework, the 
UNHCR published a Handbook103 in 1979, whereby it proposed a two-tier 
test for interpreting the notion of persecution. Although the UNHCR’s 
                                                
102 The QD touches upon this qualitative aspect by saying that some acts are by ‘nature’ sufficiently 
serious. However, it does not say much about the nature of the harm as it says that it should amount to 
a ‘severe violations of basic human rights’, which in turn constitutes a vague threshold as argued above.  
103 UNHCR Handbook and Guidelines on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status 
under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, December 2011, 
HCR/1P/4/ENG/REV.3. 
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interpretive approach seemed to have gained less influence in the scholarship 
and in national jurisdictions than the model developed by Hathaway,104 it 
nonetheless provides some relevant insights as to how persecution should be 
interpreted.  
 
Firstly, the UNHCR Handbook stated that serious human rights 
violations could amount to persecution when based on a Convention ground. 
Indeed, the Refugee Agency stated that ‘a threat to life or freedom on account 
of [a Convention ground] is always persecution. Other serious violations of 
human rights […] would also constitute persecution’. In this first test, the 
UNHCR firmly relied on international human rights as benchmarks for 
interpreting the notion of persecution. This is in line with the official 
UNHCR’s position that the 1951 Convention has a human rights 
orientation105 and, as such, human rights should not be ignored when 
interpreting persecution. This specific test is, however, quite limited because 
it posits that, to amount to persecution, human rights violations should 
necessarily be tied to a Convention reason. This therefore restricts the 
possibilities of interpretation as mentioned above. However, according to the 
refugee agency, persecution ‘should not be defined solely on the basis of 
serious human rights violations’.106 In order to balance out this rather 
formalist approach, the UNHCR considered that if this test fails, an expanded 
framework should be applied. This second test takes the individual 
                                                
104 In particular in common law jurisdictions; chapter 4 will assess the influence of the human rights 
approach in national jurisdictions. 
105 Paragraph 25 of the UNHCR Handbook […] The High Commissioner has always pleaded for a 
generous asylum policy in the spirit of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the declaration 
on Territorial asylum, adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 10 December 1948 
and on 14 December 1967 respectively, see also UNHCR ExCom Conclusion No 50 (XXXIX) 
‘General Conclusion on International Protection’ (1988): The Executive Committee […] (b) Noted the 
direct relationship between the observance of human rights standards, refugee movements and 
problems of protection; UNHCR ExCom Conclusion No 103 (LVI) ‘The Provision of International 
Protection including through Complementary Forms of Protection’ (2005): The Executive Committee 
(c) Recognizes that refugee law is a dynamic body of law based on the obligations of State Parties to 
the 1951 Convention and its 1967 Protocol and, where applicable, on regional refugee protection 
instruments, and which is informed by the object and purpose of these instruments and by developments 
in related areas of international law, such as human rights and international humanitarian law bearing 
directly on refugee protection; UNHCR, ‘Note on The International Protection of Refugees: 
Interpreting Article 1 of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees’, [2001] 20 Refugee 
Survey Quarterly 77, 78. 
106 Statement by Ms. Erika Feller, Director, Department of International Protection, UNHCR, SCIFA 
(Brussels, 6 November 2002), DIP Statements, Geneva, published on UNHCR website 
http://www.unhcr.org/42bab1b52.html; See also Storey (n 1) 278. According to Storey, UNHCR 
considers that there ‘is a residual content to persecution uncaptured by the human rights approach’.  
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circumstances of refugees as a departure point to assess the various forms of 
harm that one can face. Storey called it the ‘circumstantial approach’. 107  
 
The UNHCR Handbook affirmed as follows:  
52. Whether other prejudicial actions or threats would amount 
to persecution will depend on the circumstances of each case, 
including the subjective element to which reference has been 
made in the preceding paragraphs. The subjective character of 
fear of persecution requires an evaluation of the opinions and 
feelings of the person concerned. It is also in the light of such 
opinions and feelings that any actual or anticipated measures 
against him must necessarily be viewed. Due to variations in 
the psychological make-up of individuals and in the 
circumstances of each case, interpretations of what amounts to 
persecution are bound to vary.  
53. In addition, an applicant may have been subjected to 
various measures not in themselves amounting to persecution 
(e.g. discrimination in different forms), in some cases 
combined with other adverse factors (e.g. general atmosphere 
of insecurity in the country of origin). In such situations, the 
various elements involved may, if taken together, produce an 
effect on the mind of the applicant that can reasonably justify 
a claim to well-founded fear of persecution on ‘cumulative 
grounds’. Needless to say, it is not possible to lay down a 
general rule as to what cumulative reasons can give rise to a 
valid claim to refugee status. This will necessarily depend on 
all the circumstances, including the particular geographical, 
historical and ethnological context.   
In this definition, the UNHCR factors in numerous aspects of the 
notion of persecution. Firstly, this test requires a consideration of the 
                                                
107 Storey (n 1) 465.  
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particular situation and vulnerabilities of refugees in order to assess the 
consequential impact that various measures have on individuals. The 
UNHCR then highlights the importance of a subjective element in assessing 
what forms of harm amount to persecution by stating that an ‘evaluation of 
the opinions and feelings of the person concerned’108 should be conducted. 
As a result, the persecutory nature of an act will depend on the personal 
background and conditions of the person claiming asylum and, therefore, the 
assessment of harm could fluctuate. The UNHCR indeed acknowledged that 
whether a certain form of harm amounts to persecution ‘will depend on the 
circumstances of each case’.109 The Refugee Agency justified this position by 
stating that, ‘due to variations in the psychological make-up of individuals 
and in the circumstances of each case, interpretations of what amounts to 
persecution are bound to vary’.110 The UNHCR Handbook added an 
additional paragraph in which it stated that various others measures can, 
based on cumulative grounds, also amount to persecution.111 Overall, the 
Refugee Agency encourages the adoption of a holistic approach but does not 
specify the level of harm required for an accumulation of measures to amount 
to persecution. This omission appears deliberate as the Handbook stated that 
‘it is not possible to lay down a general rule as to what cumulative reasons 
can give rise to a valid claim to refugee status. This will necessarily depend 
on all the circumstances’.112  
 
Indeed, according to the UNHCR, all forms of predicament, as a 
whole, and their consequences on individuals’ life should be analysed in order 
to assess persecution. The UNHCR gave more guidance in another document 
on the threshold of harm required, by stating that threatening conditions 
‘mak(ing) life in the country of origin so insecure from many perspectives for 
the individual concerned, that the only way out of this predicament is to leave 
the country of origin’113 constitute persecution.  
 
                                                
108 UNHCR Handbook (n 103) at [52]. 
109 Ibid.  
110 Ibid.  
111 Ibid at [53]. 
112 Ibid at [53]. 
113 Feller (n 106).  
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Interestingly, in the circumstantial approach, the UNHCR did not 
explicitly correlate the notion of persecution with the Convention nexus, thus 
seemingly adopting a broader view of what sorts of harm could amount to 
persecution. The view that the Convention grounds are not always linked to 
the notion of persecution is repeated in a number of UNHCR guidelines.114 
In particular, when the perpetrator of persecution is a non-state agent, the 
UNHCR connects the convention nexus to the lack of state protection115 
without necessarily linking the absence of state protection to the notion of 
persecution. For instance, the UNHCR specifically stated that there are 
situations ‘where the risk of being persecuted at the hands of a non-state actor 
is unrelated to a Convention ground’.116 Therefore, for assessing the 
Convention nexus, the UNHCR seems to establish a separate test that might 
either relate to the well-founded fear of harm or to the notion of persecution, 
depending on the circumstances at hand. In light of the foregoing, it appears 
that the circumstantial approach is broader than the human rights approach 
that is proposed in paragraph 51 of the Handbook.  
 
ii- A framework leading to inconsistent interpretations?   
 
Whilst the UNHCR’s framework encourages a holistic analysis of the 
notion of persecution, its subjective dimension may raise concern as pointed 
out by some authors. The subjective element proposed by the UNHCR 
conflicts with the view of Tobin who believed that the purpose of the 
interpretive exercise is to maintain some level of coherence within different 
fields of law. He stated that the ‘resolution of any ambiguity within the 
Refugee Convention should be informed by, among other things, an attempt 
to achieve coherence or harmonisation with the provisions of international 
human rights treaties’.117 Therefore, he considered that for interpreting 
                                                
114 UNHCR, Guidance Note on Refugee Claims Relating to Victims of Organized Gangs, 31 March 
2010; UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Guidelines on International Protection No.2: 
‘Membership of a Particular Social Group Within the Context of Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention 
and/or its 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees’, 7 May 2002, HCR/GIP/02/02. 
115 Ibid at [23]. 
116 Ibid.  
117  John Tobin, ‘Assessing LGBTI Refugee Claims: Using Human Rights to Shift the Narrative of 
Persecution Within Refugee Law’ [2012] 44 New York University Journal of International Law and 
Politics 448, 455. 
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persecution, a more didactic approach should be adopted by giving primary 
consideration to human rights standards and the way they should be applied 
in refugee law in accordance with other legal areas. For him, it would be a 
‘mistake to selectively import aspects of human rights discourse into refugee 
law in ways that were not consistent with the entire system of international 
human rights law’.118 This view strays away from the UNHCR’s approach 
that rather emphasises the importance of the personal circumstances of 
refugees to assess the level of harm in combination with human rights norms, 
only when deemed relevant. As such, the UNHCR does not seek to reinstate 
the interpretation of the notion of persecution into the broader field of 
international human rights law or to achieve coherence between refugee law 
and human rights law.   
 
The UNHCR’s methodology was also criticised by Storey who 
considered that it was not sufficiently principled.119 He believed indeed that 
it ‘encourages subjective decision making and […] divergent 
jurisprudence’.120 Storey highlighted that UNHCR’s subjective element is 
mostly contingent upon persons with different characters and thus, the 
interpretation of persecution might vary greatly depending on individuals. He 
contended that this component could encourage unfair decisions for people 
who do not display significant distress or who simply do not reasonably 
anticipate the danger that they might be at risk of facing upon return to their 
country. He believes that this is contrary to the universal character of the 1951 
Convention. On this point, he stated that ‘if Article 1A(2) is to have universal 
application then it cannot impose a requirement that certain deserving 
subcategories of persons would often be unable to meet, most notably very 
young children or disabled people who may not even be aware that they are 
on a persecutor’s death list’.121 Storey concluded that objective standards are 
needed to interpret the notion of persecution in all circumstances 122 and, by 
departing from the human rights approach, he contended that the UNHCR 
                                                
118 Ibid, 455.  
119 Storey (n 1) 468. 
120 Ibid 468.  
121 Ibid 509. 
122 Ibid 467.  
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does not adopt an appropriate framework.  His view echoes the one held by 
Hicks and Hathaway who considered that the subjective fear paradigm 
adopted in the UNHCR Handbook is equivocal and encourages divergent 
approaches.123 They called it a ‘trepidation’124 element, that they believe 
should not be factored into the refugee definition.  
 
Following the contention made by Storey and others, it cannot be 
denied that the circumstantial approach encourages a case-by-case analysis 
that can cause inconsistent interpretations of the notion of persecution. 
However, Storey seemed to place too much emphasis on the role of subjective 
fear in interpreting the notion of persecution. Firstly, it should be noted that 
the UNHCR mostly referred to this element in order to assess the ‘well-
founded fear’ limb of the refugee definition, which is distinct from the 
persecution enquiry.125 As such, the importance of subjective fear in the 
persecution test itself should be relativised.  The view that subjective fear is 
mostly relevant to the well-founded fear part of the definition has been clearly 
expressed by Hicks and Hathaway.126 Similarly, Chimni acknowledged that 
the UNHCR Handbook posited the existence of a ‘subjective test’ for 
assessing the well-founded character of a claim, but he omitted to mention 
this in his section on persecution, thus suggesting that its role was quite 
minimal for assessing persecution.127 Whilst it is true that both tests (well-
founded fear and persecution) are closely related, they should, nonetheless, 
be distinguished for conceptual clarity. The well-founded fear element 
generally requires an assessment of the likelihood that a certain harm will 
happen, whilst the test of persecution requires an assessment of the nature and 
degree of the harm.  
 
                                                
123 James C. Hathaway and William S. Hicks, ‘Is there a Subjective Element in the Refugee 
Convention's Requirement of “Well-Founded Fear”?’ [2005] 26 Michigan Journal of International Law 
505, 507.  
124 Ibid 506-507. 
125 The UNHCR Handbook, paragraphs 35 to 50 deal with the ‘well-founded fear’ element whilst 
paragraphs 51 to 53 deal with the ‘persecution’ analysis.   
126 Hathaway and Hicks (n 123) contended that the subjective element should not have a major bearing 
in interpreting the refugee definition but in their article, they mostly referred to the ‘well-founded fear’ 
part of the definition.  
127 B. S. Chimni, International refugee Law: a Reader (2nd edn, Sage Publication 2002) 3. 
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It should be acknowledged that the notion of subjective fear is also 
mentioned in the section on persecution128 in the UNHCR Handbook. Its 
importance is, however, minimised as the Handbook considers that subjective 
fear (or the frame of mind of an applicant) is relevant only when ‘supported 
by an objective situation’.129 Whilst the UNHCR relativised the scope of this 
element, the exact role that it should play when assessing persecution is 
unclear. To clarify that point, reference should be made to the overall wording 
of the UNHCR Handbook which suggests that subjective fear should not be 
used to deny refugee status. In this sense, Juss considered that this concept, 
together with other paradigms, in fact ‘adds to and embellishes’130 the 1951 
Convention, thus indicating that it should be interpreted in a manner that is 
sufficiently in line with the protective purpose of the Convention.  
 
The subjective fear test should be indeed considered relevant for 
refugees who have certain vulnerabilities so that these fragilities can be taken 
into account in order to better assess the impact that certain measures can 
have on the individuals seeking asylum. For instance, some restrictions (such 
as temporary detention) might have more adverse consequences on someone 
who has already suffered trauma, than on an able-bodied person without 
major psychological issues. In this sense, the subjective element of 
persecution appears relevant to individualise the analysis of the notion of 
persecution. This view is further confirmed in paragraph 40 whereby the 
UNHCR stated that the ‘psychological reaction’ of individuals is a relevant 
element to take into consideration when applying the refugee definition. It 
should, however, not be applied too systematically. Paragraph 52 of the 
UNHCR Handbook emphasises this point by stating that whether ‘prejudicial 
actions or threats would amount to persecution will depend on the 
circumstances of each case, including the subjective element’. The insertion 
of the word ‘including’ is significant in that it confers a minimal importance 
to the subjective fear and confines it to the analysis of persecution only in 
                                                
128 The UNHCR Handbook (n 103) at [52]. 
129 Ibid: paragraph 52 refers to paragraph 38 whereby the assessment of the ‘objective situation’ is also 
required in order to assess whether a fear is well-founded.  
130 Satvinder Juss, ‘The UNHCR Handbook and the Interface Between 'Soft law” and “Hard Law” in 
International Refugee Law’ in Satvinder. Juss and Colin Harvey (eds), Contemporary Issues in Refugee 
Law (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham 2013) 31-67, 43. 
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certain cases where the psychological element is of relevance. It does not 
require that all claimants show signs of trepidation to the thought of returning 
to their country. Consequently, the examination of subjective fear is not 
posited as a pivotal condition for interpreting persecution in all cases and its 
importance should not be overstated. The contention that the subjective fear 
component encourages subjective and divergent jurisprudence appears 
therefore a bit excessive because this should not be the case, if this notion is 
appropriately applied in the assessment of persecution.    
 
iii- Practical benefits of the circumstantial approach  
 
Unlike what the above authors have argued, the UNHCR’s approach 
presents positive insights for interpreting persecution. Firstly, it has the 
advantage of highlighting the personal and psychological aspects of 
persecution in that it proposes to assess the level of suffering one can 
experience regardless of whether external human rights have been violated or 
not. Human rights law is premised on the assumption that all individuals have 
the same protection needs and conform to one model of ‘personhood’. Whilst 
the standards developed by human rights might be suitable for a large number 
of individuals, they might inadequately dictate what types of treatment are 
bearable or unbearable for others. Evaluating the protection needs of 
individuals necessarily demands that the personal circumstances and 
psychological make-up of persons be taken into consideration. In contrast, 
human rights law tends to isolate elements of harm in light of abstract 
standards and thus, does not encourage an assessment of cumulated 
circumstances. Whilst it is true that the approach proposed by the UNHCR 
requires a case-by-case analysis, an objective line of argumentation is 
nonetheless proposed, that minimises the risk of inconsistent interpretations. 
Indeed, in encouraging an assessment of the circumstances of refugees, the 
UNHCR proposes to rely on concrete elements that constitute these 
circumstances, namely the claimants’ profile, vulnerability, past experiences 
of harm etc. These factors remain rather objective and provide solid indicators 
of the level of harm faced by a refugee. Factoring these elements into the 
assessment of what amounts to persecution would in turn encourage a more 
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transparent assessment of the consequences that certain measures can have 
on someone’s life. 
 
 As such, whilst the UNHCR maintains that human rights are 
important references for interpreting the notion of persecution, they only 
represent ‘one touchstone for determining the existence of persecution’.131  
Supporting this view, McAdam considered that human rights are important 
standards ‘in assessing whether persecution may exist in a given situation’ 
but, for her, ‘the additional subjective element of the Convention definition 
captures a need for protection that is outside the realm of a pure human rights 
assessment, and cautions against tying the concept of persecution exclusively 
to human rights law’.132 Edwards also believed that human rights law does 
not reflect the different needs of individuals, and although she believed that 
it ‘contributes in some cases to a clearer identification of particular forms of 
persecution’, she considered that ‘the 1951 Convention does not require that 
a human rights violation be acknowledged in order to establish 
“persecution”’.133 Through the circumstantial approach, the UNHCR 
proposes in fact to address the personal aspect of persecution and take the 
individual situation of refugees in its various aspects as a pivotal element in 
assessing the level of harm that they might be likely to face upon return to 
their country.  
 
A case from the Court of Appeal in the UK demonstrated the caveat 
of a rigid approach based on formalist standards of human rights protection 
vs a more circumstantial approach such as the one proposed by the UNHCR. 
In AI (Nigeria) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department,134 the Court 
of Appeal denied the asylum claim of a Nigerian woman by considering that 
the applicant did not have a well-founded fear of being persecuted. The 
claimant was a single Christian woman, head of a household who used to live 
in a predominantly Muslim area in Nigeria. She contended that she was at 
                                                
131 Cantor (n 18) 385. 
132 McAdam (n 3) 12-13. 
133Alice Edwards, ‘Age and gender dimensions in international refugee law’ in Erika Feller, Volker 
Turk, Frances Nicholson (eds), Refugee Protection in International Law: UNHCR’s Global 
Consultations on International Protection (CUP 2003) 80. 
134 AI (Nigeria) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, [2007] EWCA Civ 707, 21 June 2007. 
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risk of facing harm on account of her profile as a lone woman without male 
protection. She claimed that she had left her home area due to communal 
violence against Christians. Following this, she lived alone in charge of her 
child and in order to meet her basic needs, she had to ‘sleep with people’.135 
Whilst the court accepted that discriminations against women were rampant 
in Nigeria, and such discriminations had most certainly led the applicant to 
prostitute herself, it was decided that these predicaments did not amount to 
persecution. However, the reasoning of the court for reaching this conclusion 
was quite obscure. The court simply interpreted the notion of persecution 
against formal standards of gender-based violence and considered the concept 
of ‘prostitution’ in the abstract by stating that ‘prostitution under the threat of 
violence’ can amount to persecution, but ‘prostitution per se’ does not.136 The 
deficiency of this approach is that the Court only analysed grave forms of 
harm similar to the ones recognised in international treaties,137 such as the 
‘threat of violence’ leading to sexual exploitation. The Court considered this 
form of harm, separately from its context, to conclude that prostitution itself 
is not a form of persecution because there is no element of violence involved.  
 
Whilst it might be true that prostitution per se does not amount to 
persecution, it does not mean that the experiences of the applicant considered 
in the aggregate will not amount to persecution, as the UNHCR’s approach 
would suggest. Indeed, a closer analysis of the applicant’s circumstances 
causing her to prostitute herself would have been useful to reach a more 
informed decision. The adjudicator could have analysed the harm that the 
applicant was likely to face against her overall profile as a member of a 
religious minority (in her home area) who had been displaced without her 
family due to communal violence and who ended up lacking family and male 
protection, being a single mother, head of a household who had to prostitute 
herself to earn her living due to rampant discrimination in her country. As per 
the UNHCR guidelines on gender-related persecution, ‘if measures of 
                                                
135 Ibid at [7]. 
136 Ibid at [12].  
137 In this case, the court did not explicitly quote human rights treaties, but it referred to abstract 
standards developed in international human rights law, and as such followed the same logic as the 
human rights narrative.  
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discrimination lead to consequences of a substantially prejudicial nature for 
the person concerned, e.g. serious restrictions on the right to earn one’s 
livelihood, the right to practice one’s religion, or access to available 
educational facilities’,138 such measures could amount to persecution. This 
case shows that the appreciation of refugees as persons with various 
circumstances and a complex set of experiences offers a better understanding 
of what could amount to persecution rather than relying on a rigid approach 
that compartmentalises the assessment of various types of harm.  
 
In light of the above, it appears that the UNHCR approach encourages 
a comprehensive analysis of the various circumstances of refugees in order to 
assess how certain measures could amount to persecution. It adopts a more 
practical approach, as opposed to the formalist frameworks that rely on 
external benchmarks for assessing persecution.  
 
 
Part 3) Concluding Remarks  
 
Given the inherent limitations attached to an interpretive framework 
that only relies on basic human rights for interpreting the notion of 
persecution, various other models that encourage a more holistic analysis of 
persecution have been analysed in this chapter.  Some models, such as the 
ones established by the QD, and then by Storey, suggest to expand the basic 
human rights framework, but still consider external norms of international 
law as the keystone of persecution. Whilst these frameworks are broader than 
Hathaway’s narrative, they nonetheless adopt a rather rigid methodology by 
using objective norms as a departure point for interpreting persecution, which 
bears the risk of obviating some of the personal circumstances of refugees. 
They encourage an analysis of different human rights violations, taken in the 
abstract, and disregard other aspects of individuals’ vulnerabilities. In 
addition to this problem, the recent jurisprudence of the CJEU has 
                                                
138 UNHC Guidelines on International Protection No.1: Gender Related Persecution in the Context of 
Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention and/or its 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, 7 
May 2002, HCR/GIP/02/01. 
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demonstrated that human rights frameworks can be very narrowly and 
variably interpreted. They also do not necessarily resolve the problem of 
inconsistent interpretations of the refugee definition.  
 
Given these deficiencies, other models have been considered. These 
models departed entirely from the basic human rights approach and 
considered that other elements were pivotal for interpreting persecution. In 
particular, the concepts of ‘personhood’, ‘Convention nexus’ or 
‘discrimination’ were advanced by certain scholars. Through the notion of 
personhood, Firth and Mauthe shifted the paradigm on the individual aspects 
of persecution by placing a greater emphasis on the profile and experiences 
of refugees. This model was, however, considered too vague and too 
subjective. The narratives based on the ‘Convention nexus’ and 
‘discrimination’ rightly pointed to the qualitative aspect of persecution, 
namely the unjustifiable infliction of harm, but they also raised some 
conceptual uncertainty as demonstrated in this chapter.  
 
Finally, the UNHCR has attempted to combine various narratives into 
a two-tier test, based on a human rights approach on the one hand, and on a 
circumstantial approach on the other hand. Through this framework, the 
UNHCR stressed the importance of assessing the consequences that certain 
restrictions have on individuals rather than focusing on the nature and gravity 
of the restrictions themselves. The strength of this approach is that it 
encourages decisions makers to better take into consideration the individual 
circumstances and special vulnerabilities of refugees for interpreting 
persecution but it also considers that human rights have a role to play in 
informing an evolutionary understanding of the notion of persecution.   
 
After a theoretical tour de table of the different frameworks proposed 
for interpreting persecution, the following chapter will engage in a more 
practical assessment of various jurisprudential approaches adopted in 
countries with developed RSD systems in order to evaluate the concrete 
influence that these interpretive frameworks have had so far on the case law.
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Chapter 4: Interpretation of the notion of 
persecution in domestic jurisdictions: 
inconsistent approaches 
 
The previous chapters have analysed various theoretical approaches 
for interpreting persecution in the refugee definition. One could, however, 
wonder whether these frameworks have provided useful and concrete tools to 
national decision makers for applying the terms of the 1951 Convention in a 
manner that remains relevant to the protection needs of refugees in the 21st 
century?  
 
In order to assess how these models have been used in practice, the 
present chapter will analyse the jurisprudential approaches developed at the 
domestic level. This chapter will focus on some of the countries with the most 
advanced RSD systems, namely some countries of the European Union that 
have received a large number of asylum claims in the past decades such as 
the UK, France and Belgium (Part 1) as well as other common-law countries 
such as New Zealand, Australia, Canada, and the USA (Part 2). Through a 
general overview of different case laws, this chapter will demonstrate that the 
human rights narrative, which has been the most widely used, has not fostered 
major consistency amongst jurisdictions, nor has it proven to be always 
adaptable to the evolution of refugee claims. In general, it will be argued that 
none of the examined countries have applied a consistent framework of 
interpretation, thus creating some form of legal uncertainty for asylum 
seekers. 
 
Part 1) The definition of the notion of persecution in Europe: the 
persistency of divergent approaches 
 
All European countries have acceded to the 1951 Convention and 
have subsequently adopted their own interpretive approach to the refugee 
definition. In order to develop a harmonised legislation at the European level, 
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member states of the Union have elaborated the CEAS, consisting of a series 
of instruments, including the QD, which laid out common standards for 
interpreting the refugee definition. This section will assess the different 
judicial practices in member states before the adoption of the QD (A) and the 
impact that the human rights-oriented definition of persecution proposed by 
the QD had on national jurisprudences (B). It will be demonstrated that this 
impact was minimal and that more consistency amongst countries of the EU 
is desirable.  
 
A)   Asylum law in Europe before the Qualification Directive: 
divergent approaches for interpreting persecution  
 
Whilst no international definition of persecution existed before the 
adoption of the QD, the interpretation of the notion of persecution had 
traditionally been left to the discretion of national judges. As asylum 
applications diversified in the 1980s and 1990s, asylum judges in European 
countries started defining their own narratives for interpreting the refugee 
definition and generally adopted rather inconsistent views. Although, at that 
time, Hathaway’s framework started to gain some influence, in particular in 
common-law countries like the UK, other countries, generally of a civil-law 
tradition, tended to rely more on an ad hoc methodology for interpreting 
persecution.1 These diverse approaches led to a fragmentary state of the 
jurisprudence in Europe as pointed out by Arboleda and Hoy who noted that 
the recognition rates of asylum seekers were very varied in the 1990s. 
According to them, such disparities were due to the ‘lack of shared 
interpretation and understanding of the definition [of a refugee].’ 2 Although 
they did not specify which part of the definition raised disagreements, 
persecution as a pivotal element of the Refugee Convention had clearly been 
                                                
1  Dirk Vanheule, ‘A Comparison of the Judicial Interpretation of the Notion of Refugee’ in Jean-Yves 
Carlier and Dirk Vanheule (eds), Europe and Refugees: A Challenge? (Kluwer Law International 
1997): Vanheule demonstrated that the human rights approach has been more often adopted in common 
law countries, than in civil law countries. See also, Jerome Valluy, ‘La Fiction Juridique de l’Asile’ 
[2004] 4 Plein droit 17 and Jean-Michel Belorgey, ‘L’Asile et l’Intime Conviction du Juge” 1 Plein 
droit 59; Michelle Foster, International Refugee Law and Socio-Economic Rights: Refuge from 
Deprivation (CUP 2007) 30. 
2 Eduardo Arboleda and Ian Hoy, ‘The Convention Refugee Definition in the West: Disharmony of 
Interpretation and Application’ [1993] 5 International Journal of Refugee Law 66, 82.  
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the object of divergent views. This observation was confirmed by Storey who 
noted that before the adoption of the QD, there were ‘considerable 
variations’3 in the interpretation of the refugee definition due to the 
undetermined nature of the notion of persecution. This state of the practice, 
therefore, created some form of legal uncertainty in the Union. According to 
North and Chia, this led to unfair applications of the Convention and 
undermined the principle of justice.4  
 
The different approaches for interpreting the notion of persecution in 
countries like the UK, France and Belgium mirrored the level of 
inconsistency existing in the Union and, will be therefore analysed in turn. 
 
i- The United Kingdom: a reserved reliance on Hathaway’s 
framework? 
 
British asylum judges started to adopt a principled approach for 
interpreting the provisions of the refugee definition in the 1990s. In early 
cases, the notion of persecution was interpreted with a certain disregard to 
human rights5 but after Hathaway formulated his framework, asylum judges 
started regularly referring to basic human rights as a guiding scheme for 
assessing persecution.6 Whilst the idea that basic human rights could provide 
objective benchmarks of interpretation progressively gained influence in the 
jurisprudence, the modalities of this human rights framework remained, 
however, inconsistently applied. One of the first cases to adopt Hathaway’s 
narrative was Senathirajah Ravichandran v. Secretary of State for the Home 
                                                
3 Hugo Storey, ‘Refugee Qualification Directive: A Brave New World?’ [2008] 20 International Journal 
of Refugee Law 1, 8.  
4 Anthony North and Joyce Chia, ‘Towards Convergence in the Interpretation of the Refugee 
Convention: a Proposal for the Establishment of an International Judicial Commission for Refugees’ 
[2006] 25 Australian Yearbook of International Law 228;5 See also on inconsistent approaches in the 
EU: Raza Husain, ‘International Human Rights and Refugee Law: The United Kingdom’ Bruce Burson 
and Cantor David James (eds), Human Rights and the Refugee Definition Comparative Legal Practice 
and Theory (Brill Nijhoff 2016) 138-155, 143. 
5 See also on inconsistent approaches in the EU: Raza Husain, ‘International Human Rights and 
Refugee Law: The United Kingdom’ Bruce Burson and Cantor David James (eds), Human Rights and 
the Refugee Definition Comparative Legal Practice and Theory (Brill Nijhoff 2016) 138-155, 143. 
6 See, inter alia, Senathirajah Ravichandran v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [1996] Imm 
AR 97 United Kingdom: EWCA, 11 October 1995; Horvath v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department 1 AC 489 [2000] 3 WLR 379 United Kingdom: House of Lords (Judicial Committee), 6 
July 2000; Sepet v Secretary of State for the Home Department, UKHL 15 [2003] 1 WLR 856 United 
Kingdom: House of Lords, 20 March 2003 p.4.  
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Department,7 where the Court of Appeal considered the application of an 
ethnic Tamil from Sri Lanka who feared arbitrary detention and ill-treatment 
in his country. In this case, the court upheld the various criteria defined in the 
basic human rights model8, including the criteria of persistency.9 Whilst this 
case faithfully adopted Hathaway’s framework, later jurisprudence strayed 
away from some of its parameters, and in particular from the ‘sustained or 
systemic’ test, that was sometimes considered too restrictive.10 After this, 
Lambert pointed that, the role of the persistency criteria had remained 
‘undecided’11 in the British jurisprudence. 
 
In spite of this progressive departure from Hathaway’s framework, his 
view that persecution consisted in basic human rights violations, compounded 
by the absence of state protection, was generally maintained as an adequate 
approach. For instance, in the decision Islam v. Secretary of State for the 
Home Department; R v. Immigration Appeal Tribunal, ex parte Shah (Islam 
and Shah),12 the House of Lords implicitly endorsed Hathaway’s definition 
of persecution as a form of serious harm compounded by a lack of state 
protection. In particular, Lord Hoffman expressly affirmed that ‘the whole 
purpose of the Convention is to give protection to certain classes of people 
who have fled from countries in which their human rights have not been 
respected’.13 Whilst the Lords did not explicitly mention the formulation 
proposed by Hathaway, they closely followed his narrative. In Horvath v 
Secretary of State for the Home Department, the judges adopted a rather 
                                                
7 Senathirajah Ravichandran v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [1996] Imm AR 97 United 
Kingdom: EWCA, 11 October 1995. 
8 For instance, Judge Brown followed Hathaway’s formalist human rights narrative by considering that 
breaches to the 1966 Covenant could amount to persecution ibid. 
9 Judge Staughton also supported this approach, and added that the persistency criterion was an 
important element of the notion of persecution ibid. 
10 See for instance the UK Immigration and Asylum Tribunal case, Doymus v Secretary of State for the 
Home Department (unreported), IAT, HX/80112/99, 19 July 2000) mentioned in Hugo Storey, 
‘Persecution: Towards a Working Definition’ in Vincent Chetail and Celine Bauloz (eds), Research 
Handbook on Migration and International Law (Edward Elgar Publishing 2013) 459, 473.  
11 Hélène Lambert, ‘The Conceptualisation of “Persecution” by the House of Lords: Horvath v. 
Secretary of State for the Home Department’ [2001] 13 International Journal of Refugee Law 16, 22. 
12 Islam v. Secretary of State for the Home Department; R v Immigration Appeal Tribunal, ex parte 
Shah [1999] 2 AC 629 UKHL (Judicial Committee), 25 March 1999, 17. 
13 Ibid, 19. See other cases applying a basic human rights approach: Hassan Adan and Others v. 
Secretary of State for the Home Department, [1997] 2All ER 723, CA, EWCA13 February 1997; 8 3 
6(Risk - PDPA Member) Afghanistan v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, CG [2002] 
UKIAT 06506: restrictions against women in Afghanistan do not infringe basic human rights on a 
sustained and systemic basic. 
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similar view by considering that the element of state protection against human 
rights violations was also an inherent part of the notion of persecution.14 
Lambert, however, observed that, in this decision, the role of state protection 
remained quite ambiguous. She stated that, although the House of Lords 
endorsed the fact that state protection was tied to the notion of persecution, it 
was unclear from the statements of Lord Hope of Craighead and Lord Clyde 
whether such protection should be taken into consideration in the persecution 
limb only or in the well-founded fear analysis. The latter approach was in fact 
more manifest in other cases, thus pointing to some departure from a literal 
understanding of Hathaway’s model pertaining to the role of state 
protection.15 In spite of such uncertainty, Kneebone considered that, overall, 
the concept of surrogacy had become an important concept in UK 
jurisprudence,16 which regrettably had led to quite restrictive interpretations 
of the 1951 Convention.17  Although various views had been adopted on the 
exact role of the notion of state protection in the refugee definition, UK judges 
generally followed Hathaway’s basic human rights framework for 
interpreting persecution by extensively relying on human rights norms.  
 
Later, in Sepet v Secretary of State for the Home Department,18 the 
Lords explicitly adopted a stricter view of this model. As noted by Husain,19 
                                                
14 Horvath v Secretary of State for the Home Department 1 AC 489, [2000] 3 WLR 379. See other 
cases following the same line of analysis: Souad Noune v Secretary of State for the Home Department, 
C 2000/2666 EWCA 6 December 2000; Secretary of State for the Home Deparment v. Javed and 
Others, [2001] EWCA Civ 789, 17 May 2001: this case specifically mentioned the formulation used 
by Hathaway. Queen on the Application of Ruslanas Bagdanavicius, Renata Bagdanaviciene v. 
Secretary of State for the Home Department, [2003] EWCA Civ 1605, 11 November 2003. 
15 Lambert (n 11) 25. See another case, whereby the notion of state protection is also tied to the well-
founded fear limb of the definition: Yousfi v Secretary of State for the Home Department, [1997] UK 
IAT INLR 136, 1 April 1997: ‘it is because the Algerian authorities are unable to 
provide effective protection domestically, that the appellant's fear is rendered well founded and he 
qualifies for international protection via asylum under the Convention’. See also a similar approach in 
Svazas v Secretary of State for the Home Department EWCA Civ 74, 31 January 2002; ‘the worse the 
persecution, the more will be required to demonstrate the availability of adequate state protection; but 
that is a matter of evidence and judgment which arises once the persecution threshold has been passed’. 
Kacaj Albania v Secretary of State for the Home Department, UKIAT 00018, 19 July 2001: ‘In many 
cases, perhaps most, the existence of the system will be sufficient to remove the reality of risk’. 
16 Susan Kneebone, ‘Refugees as objects of surrogate protection: shifting identities’ in Susan 
Kneebone, Dallal Stevens, Loretta Baldassar (eds) Refugee Protection and the Role of Law: Conflicting 
Identities (Routledge Research in Asylum, Migration and Refugee Law, 2014) 98-121, 111. Kneebone 
noted that the principles developed in Horvath have been widely followed in subsequent cases. 
17 Ibid: Kneebone pointed out that for some decision makers, the existence of a ‘sufficient’ form of 
state protection was enough to reject a claim, as opposed to the requirement of a ‘total’ form of 
protection. 
18 Sepet v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2003] UKHL 15 [2003] 1 WLR 856 4. 
19 Husain (n 5) 147. 
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in this case, they followed a rigid basic human rights approach for interpreting 
persecution as they considered that, in the absence of a right to conscientious 
objection in international treaties, punishment for refusing to perform military 
service did not amount to persecution. The reasoning of the House of Lords 
in this sense demonstrated that a formalist understanding of human rights law 
could lead to narrow interpretations of persecution. Further to this, they added 
one test to Hathaway’s framework by considering that the intention of the 
persecutor was determinative for qualifying an act as persecutory, thus 
slightly departing from his framework. For Lord Bingham of Cornhill, ‘the 
reason in the mind of the persecutor for inflicting the persecutory treatment’20 
was fundamental to evaluate the notion of persecution. Fortunately, this 
approach was not upheld in the QD and, therefore, subsequent case law did 
not scrupulously follow this line of argumentation.21  
 
In general, the definition of persecution developed by Hathaway in 
1991 gained a certain influence in the UK but the modalities of this definition 
had been variably applied. In addition to resulting in different approaches, his 
framework has also led, at times, to severe outcomes. For Hussain, although 
this model had permitted certain advances,22 it had generally yielded 
‘anomalous results that [were] contrary to the protective purposes of the 
Refugee Convention’.23  
 
ii- France and Belgium: ad hoc and internally inconsistent 
approaches 
 
In the same period, other European countries disregarded the human 
rights approach developed by Hathaway and applied different narratives, 
based on a case-by-case assessment of facts without relying on external 
                                                
20 Sepet v Secretary of State for the Home Department (n 20) at [23]. 
21 For instance, in cases involving harmful traditional practices, the necessity to inflict suffering or 
persecutory treatment was not posed as a condition for assessing the notion of persecution. See, inter 
alia, FGM cases in Zainad Esther Fornah v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, [2005] EWCA 
Civ. 680, 9 June 2005; VM (FGM - Risks - Mungiki - Kikuyu/Gikuyu) Kenya v. Secretary of State for 
the Home Department, CG [2008] UKAIT 00049, 9 June 2008.  
22 Husain (n 6) 148-149. 
23 Ibid 144,   
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benchmarks. In particular, Foster observed that references to human rights 
were rare in countries of civil-law tradition.24 
 
In France, Bellorgey and Valluy pointed out that no principled 
approach was used in the judicial system, which was rather based on the 
intime conviction of the judges.25 As a result, the French judges adopted quite 
a vague and subjective approach to persecution. For instance, the 
Commission des Recours des Réfugiés (CRR), generally considered that 
persecution was caused by ‘grave acts’ or ‘grave acts resulting from 
circumstances’.26 The significance of ‘grave acts’ was not defined in the 
legislation and no guidance was spelled out to interpret persecution. 
Consequently, the different sections of the CRR generally relied on ad hoc 
approaches with unclear methodologies to interpret the notion of 
persecution.27 The CRR also tended to reach divergent conclusions, 
depending on the case at hand. This was exemplified in the case law of 
Algerian claimants fearing Islamist groups during the inter-confessional 
violence in the 1990s in Algeria. For example, in a decision dating from 1995, 
the CRR examined the case of a judge who had voiced his political opposition 
against the authorities and was sent to a locality where his life was threatened 
by Islamist factions. According to the CRR, the mere fact of posting him to 
this new locality amounted to persecution.28 Little explanation was, however, 
provided in order to justify this decision. Later, the CRR departed from this 
position. The French judges found that the death threats from Islamist groups 
against Algerian police officers did not amount to persecution. The CRR 
again gave scant justification to explain their views.29  
 
                                                
24 Foster (n 1). 
25 Valluy and Bellorgey (n 1).  
26 Jean Marc Thouvenin, ‘La Jurisprudence Récente de la Commission des Recours des Réfugiés : entre 
Continuité, Rigueur et Efforts d’Adaptation’ (1re partie), [1997] 32 Revue Trimestrielle des Droits de 
l’Homme 599, 611. 
27 CRR Sections réunies 16 October 1995 M. J. n° 94010090/270619 R; CRR SR 16 June 1999 M. D. 
n° 97010568/319172 C+; CRR 5 Février 2003 M. S. n° 02009635/407346 R: no persecution can arise 
from a general situation of violence. However, in each of those cases, the court failed to present any 
detailed explanation as to why the applicants would not be at risk of being persecuted on the basis of 
an individual characteristic in this general climate of violence. 
28 CRR Sections réunies, 17 Février 1995, 271979 Allali, Rec. ibid 613. 
29 CRR Sections réunies, 12 Mars 1996 275364 Sedikki, Rec. 51 ; See also CRR Sections réunies, 12 
Mars 1996 Bouteraa, Rec, 52; CRR Sections réunies 25 Novembre 1996 281357 Bey Osman, Rec. 61 
in Jean Marc Thouvenin (n 26) 611. 
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The later decision applied a restrictive approach whilst the earlier one 
adopted a more liberal interpretation of the refugee definition. The lack of a 
clear interpretative framework to assess persecution in French jurisdictions, 
at that time, somehow affected the overall coherence of the jurisprudence and 
gave rise to inconsistent decisions on similar claims.  
 
Analogous to the situation in France, no clear framework of 
interpretation was developed in Belgium in the same period.30 However, the 
Belgian jurisprudence adopted a more liberal approach for assessing the 
notion of persecution. The judges, generally, tended to conduct a holistic 
analysis of the individual circumstances of the asylum seekers in order to 
assess the overall consequences that certain measures had on their lives. They 
rarely referred to violations of human rights to assess the threshold of harm, 
but they thoroughly analysed the life conditions of an applicant in the country 
of origin and evaluated the impact that the treatment endured or feared could 
have on individuals. For instance, the judges considered that the life of an 
Iraqi Christian could become ‘intolerable’31 in the country of origin after 
considering a series of discriminations and harassments as well as a risk of 
punishment for illegal departure. In later examples, it was admitted that a 
Rom activist from Bulgaria who had been repeatedly harassed by unidentified 
people in his country was at risk of facing persecution upon return.32 
Similarly, an Armenian asylum seeker from Turkey, who argued that he had 
faced a series of threats and harassment from his neighbours and other 
unidentified people, was recognised a refugee.33 In this case, the judges took 
into consideration a series of facts to conclude that an accumulation of diverse 
circumstances had an adverse impact both on the applicant and his family, 
including in the form of psychological pressure.34 In general, judges in 
Belgium used to carry out a case-by-case assessment of the facts by 
considering, through a rather wide and holistic analysis, the profile and 
                                                
30 See Cioroianu Florian c. L’Etat Belge, 90/438/F169 Commission permanente de recours des réfugiés 
21 January 1993: ad hoc approach for assessing persecution.  
31 P.S.S. c. l'Etat belge,  Commission permanente de recours des réfugiés 29 Juin 1994. 
32 Décision No. 02-0266/F1595 Commission permanente de recours des réfugiés 9 Décembre 2003.  
33B.M. c. l'Etat Belge, Commission permanente de recours des réfugiés 18 April 1995. See also P.S.S 
c. l’Etat belge, Belgium : Commission permanente de recours des réfugiés, 29 Juin 1994.  
34 Ibid. 
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different experiences of applicants, thus seemingly conforming to the 
UNHCR circumstantial approach.  
 
In light of the foregoing, it can be observed that, whilst almost all the 
Western European countries had signed and ratified the 1951 Convention and 
its 1967 Protocol by the end of the 1980s, they had developed divergent 
approaches for interpreting of the notion of persecution. Although the UK 
somehow adopted the basic human rights approach of Hathaway, France and 
Belgium used to reject any reference to international human rights and 
conducted the assessment of persecution on an ad hoc basis, leading to 
internally inconsistent outcomes in France and rather liberal views in 
Belgium.  
 
B)   Practices in Europe following the adoption of the 
Qualification Directive 
 
Since the adoption of the QD in 2004, national jurisdictions have been 
encouraged to use human rights standards for interpreting persecution in 
order to ensure more harmonisation at the European level.35 There has been, 
however, no clear methodology for doing so, and decisions have remained 
quite inconsistent in the Union, both in common law jurisdictions like the 
UK, (A) and civil law jurisdictions like France and Belgium (B). 
 
i- A formalist human rights approach in the UK? 
 
  The QD does not seem to have fostered significant consistency in the 
UK. In particular, the specific role of the surrogacy principle has not been 
clarified and ambiguity remained regarding whether or not it should be 
attached to the persecution or well-founded fear limb of the Convention.36 
Additionally, various modalities of interpretation of the QD have been 
                                                
35 See detailed analysis of the QD in Chapter 3, Part 1.  
36 MS (Coptic Christians) Egypt CG v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2013] UKUT 00611 
(IAC) December 2013: the element of state protection relates to the well-founded fear element. 
However, in IM (Sufficiency of Protection) Malawi v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department [2007] UKAIT 00071, 11 July 2007: the judges were a bit more ambiguous as to the role 
of state protection and applied more strictly Horvath principles.  
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adopted, although a rather formalist methodology seems to have been favored 
by British judges who often refer to human rights codified in treaties, such as 
the regional standards of the ECHR.37 This risk of narrow interpretations has 
been pointed out by various authors who warned against the ambiguous 
wording of the QD.38  
 
For instance, in SH (Palestinian Territories)39, the Court of Appeal 
interpreted the QD quite strictly by considering that only violations of non-
derogable rights in the ECHR could amount to persecution, thus setting a 
particularly high threshold that disregards the plain text of the directive. In 
another case involving an accumulation of various predicaments of an 
economic and social nature, the Upper Tribunal considered that in order to 
meet the test for persecution, the restrictions faced should amount to 
violations of Article 3 of the ECHR (inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment).40 In this case, the tribunal analysed the claim of an Azerbaijani 
unmarried mother of Russian ethnicity and Christian religion. She had a child 
of a mixed origin out of wedlock and, because of that, she was rejected by her 
family who threatened to kill her. The tribunal accepted that ‘women in 
Azerbaijan are treated as inferior to men and there is, for example, 
discrimination in the work place’,41 that the ‘mixed African/European descent 
would at best mean that he would stand out from the rest of the population, 
and at worst that he would be shunned’,42 and that ‘corruption is 
commonplace, and a system of favours may operate when looking for housing 
or work’.43 However, the court considered that the treatment the applicant 
received was not contrary to Article 3 because there was evidence that the 
claimant could obtain a job and live a fairly decent life. This decision, 
however, did not assess how the accumulation of various restrictions could 
                                                
37 A (Iraq) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2017] EWCA Civ. 944, 11 July 2017; C 
(Albania) v Secretary of State for the Home Department v. the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees (Intervener) [2017] EWCA Civ 351, 9 May 2017; MST and Others (national service- risk 
categories) Eritrea CG [2016] UKUT 00443 (IAC), 11 October 2016. 
38 Refer to Chapter 3, Part 1 (A).  
39 SH (Palestinian Territories) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2008] EWCA civ 1150, 
22 October 2008. Also quoted in Hussain (n 6) 152. 
40 SL (Unmarried mother with mixed race child) Azerbaijan CG. Secretary of State for the Home 
Department [2012] UKUT 00046 (IAC) 13 February 2013 at [97]. 
41 Ibid at [125]. 
42 Ibid at [127]. 
43 Ibid at [128]. 
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significantly impact the applicant’s life in other ways, and thus, lacked 
comprehensive justification for rejecting this asylum claim. 
 
Conversely, the same year in JA Nigeria,44 the Upper Tribunal 
adopted a broader approach. The tribunal conducted an analysis based on 
human rights, and also adopted a more circumstantial methodology, including 
a subjective assessment of the frame of mind of the applicant who, in this 
case, was a minor. The tribunal then relied on the UNHCR guidelines by 
considering that ‘ill-treatment which may not arise to the level of persecution 
in the case of an adult, may do so in the case of a child, and the child's youth 
immaturity, vulnerability, etc. will rightly be related to how that child 
experiences or fears harm’.45 It was then concluded that the assessment of 
persecution depended ‘upon the circumstances of [the claimants’] individual 
positions, their age, no doubt and their background’46 and in this case, the 
appeal was allowed.  
 
In the cases mentioned above, different human rights methodologies 
have been used, yielding different results. In the first two cases, the judges 
relied on a rather formal human rights approach, which seemed to have led to 
restrictive interpretations of persecution, whilst in the latter, they combined a 
human rights assessment of the situation with the circumstantial approach, 
engaging in a more holistic analysis of the situation.  
 
A later decision in MA (Pakistan) and Secretary for the Home 
Department,47 the judges again departed from this holistic approach and 
maintained a rather rigid view of what amounts to persecution. In order to 
demonstrate the limitations of a strict formalist approach as most often 
                                                
44 JA(Child - risk of persecution) Nigeria [2016] UKUT 00560 (IAC) 20 December 2016. 
45 Ibid at [16]. 
46 Ibid at [26]. See also earlier cases where the Upper Tribunal proposed to engage in a holistic 
assessment of the claimant’s circumstances, rather than a formalist human rights approach: in MS 
(Coptic Christians) Egypt CG v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2013] UKUT 00611 
(IAC) 3 December 2013.  
47 MA (Pakistan) and Secretary for the Home Department, AA030622015 [2016] UKAITUR (28 
January 2016).  
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applied in the UK, detailed consideration will be lent to this case in the 
following analysis:  
i-(a) MA (Pakistan) and Secretary for the Home Department and 
the fallacy of a basic human rights approach 
In MA (Pakistan), the applicant was a married man of Shia faith, 
from North Pakistan, who used to work as a researcher in the Pakistan Forest 
Institute. He publicly denounced extensive deforestation caused by the 
Taliban. As a result, he was identified by the group as an opponent, and was 
targeted in a shooting attack in 2006. His car was hit by a bullet but the 
applicant managed to escape without injuries. He reported this incident to the 
police, but obtained no protection. He then received phone threats and a 
threatening letter, from individuals located in Kabul. Fearing for his safety, 
he eventually left his country in 2006 and went to the UK. In 2009, his wife 
and son received threats of kidnaping from the Taliban due to his past 
activities. They then joined him in the UK in the same year. The applicant’s 
brother also received a threatening letter, with a bullet inside. The tribunal 
concluded that the applicant had a well-founded fear of facing harm in his 
home area, but believed that he could relocate without any risk.   
In this case, the tribunal assessed, in conformity with the QD, different 
aspects of the claim by only considering external entitlements in a 
compartmentalised manner, without fully taking into consideration the 
applicant’s circumstances. Firstly, the tribunal assessed the applicant’s risk 
of harm against his freedom of opinion. Although express reference to this 
right was not made, the tribunal considered that the applicant’s public 
denunciation of the deforestation caused by the Taliban was part of his work 
duties, rather than the mere expression of his individual opinion.48 The 
tribunal concluded from these observations that it was unlikely that the 
applicant would reiterate his statements against the Taliban upon return. As 
such, he was said to be not at further risk of harm. Additionally, the tribunal 
did not identify any possible interference with the applicant’s freedom of 
religion by noting that ‘there is no evidence of the state preventing the 
                                                
48 Ibid at [24]. 
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building of mosques or worship within the same for the Shia minority’,49 
leading to the conclusion that there was no evidence of state-sponsored 
persecution in Pakistan.50 The tribunal further stated that the applicant’s 
relocation in Pakistan would not result in any deprivation of his human 
rights.51 Lastly, the applicant’s argument that the judiciary system was not 
capable of prosecuting members of militant groups was also rejected. The 
tribunal considered that the evidence of individuals being released by the 
Supreme Court for lack of evidence is in accordance with international 
judicial standards as a person cannot be prosecuted or convicted without 
evidence, even if they are suspected of serious crimes.52 The tribunal 
eventually rejected the asylum application, by seemingly conflating the test 
of IFA with the one of persecution in order to conclude that the claimant was 
not in need of international protection.  
 
i-(b) Compartmentalised vs holistic appreciation of harm  
In this case, the tribunal implicitly considered different types of 
human rights norms such as freedom of religion and freedom of opinion as 
recommended in the QD. It also considered other rules of international law 
such as ‘international judicial standards’,53 thus seemingly conforming its 
reasoning to the paradigm proposed by Storey.54  The applicant’s request was 
eventually rejected although evidence pointed to the possible existence of a 
risk of persecution upon return. Indeed, the abstract reasoning adopted by the 
tribunal based on external norms obviated other practical considerations in 
the case of this applicant. For instance, the tribunal considered that the 
judicial system met external standards in relation to the rules of evidence and 
concluded that there was no deficiency from this side. Whilst this is formally 
true, this observation disregards other concrete issues such as the high level 
of corruption in Pakistan and the strong influence of militant groups on the 
                                                
49 Ibid at [29]. 
50 Ibid. 
51 Ibid at [32]. 
52 Ibid at [41]. 
53 Ibid at [41]. 
54 See Chapter 3, Part 1 (B) Storey proposed to develop an interpretive framework based on ‘severe 
violations of international norms’, not limited to human rights standards in Hugo Storey, 
‘Persecution: Towards a Working Definition’ in Vincent Chetail and Celine Bauloz (eds), Research 
Handbook on International Law and Migration (Edward Elgar 2014) 459-518. 
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local police. Additionally, the tribunal’s conclusion that the applicant did not 
have a genuine opinion against the Taliban also discounted important 
elements of his profile that could place him at risk. Indeed, the judges did not 
take into consideration his personal background as a researcher, specialised 
in forestry for several years. Whether or not he holds a firm opinion that 
relates to this freedom of thought is not in itself so important as it could also 
be considered that his level of engagement in forestry studies has led him to 
be adversely perceived by the Taliban, and this would be the case in any part 
of the country if he continued working in this sector. In order to adequately 
assess the notion of persecution, the applicant should not be expected to 
refrain from engaging in working in his own field.  
 
With regard to his freedom of religion, the tribunal considered that 
Shia mosques exist and, therefore, the applicant could freely practice his 
religion. This element again is true but a holistic analysis of the applicant’s 
profile, considering his membership to a religious minority, together with 
other factors could yield a different result. A Shia man, specialised in forestry 
research, who had already been identified by two powerful militant groups in 
his locality, might have a certain level of visibility in the whole country. This 
could place him at increased risk of being further identified by extremist 
groups and create serious threats to his personal security. As such, the harm 
that he is likely to face upon return might well amount to persecution. Even 
if he relocated, his life would be impacted in a significant manner. He would 
not be able to work in the same sector and would need to limit his exposure 
in his religious community in order to avoid threats. No effective protection 
of the state is to be expected in this situation given the wide influence of 
militant groups in Pakistan. A more general analysis of the applicant’s 
circumstances, as well as his personal profile would have been desirable in 
this case in order to reach a fairer and more transparent conclusion. The 
formalist line of interpretation adopted by the judges unfortunately obviated 
practical aspects of the applicant’s protection needs. 
 
In light of the above, it can be concluded that British judges have 
continued to rely on human rights notions for interpreting persecution after 
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the adoption of the QD but they sometimes have done so in a rather 
inconsistent manner and, at times, have adopted narrow interpretations of the 
notion of persecution.  
 
Conversely to the UK, in other countries of the European Union, such as 
France and Belgium, references to human rights norms or other protection 
standards remain quite rare. Although some references to external human 
rights have been sporadically made in those jurisdictions, most cases did not 
assess the notion of persecution in light of objective benchmarks and continue 
evaluating the notion through a case-by-case analysis.  
 
ii- French jurisprudence: resistance to the adoption of a human rights 
framework? 
The situation in France has slightly evolved since the adoption of the 
QD. For instance, Phuong pointed out that France (like Germany) had 
traditionally been reluctant to acknowledge that non-state actors could be 
agents of persecution if the state was not actively condoning the acts of 
persecution.55 The QD has, however, clarified the role of non-state agents56 
and allowed for a wider interpretation of persecution in that sense in France. 
With regard to the qualitative and quantitative aspect of persecution, 
regrettably minimal changes have been noted.  
 
In general, no clear methodology has been followed by French judges, 
who only refer to human rights as benchmarks of interpretation on an 
irregular basis. In fact, in some cases, the court barely provided explanation 
for considering the absence of persecution.57 For instance, the Cour Nationale 
du Droit d’Asile (CNDA) rejected the case58 of an Armenian man married to 
an ethnic Azeri woman and fearing hostility and discrimination on this 
                                                
55 Catherine Phuong, ‘Persecution by Non-state Agents: Comparative Judicial Interpretations of the 
1951 Refugee Convention’ [2002] 4 European Journal of Migration and Law 521, 522: on the 
accountability approach that has more recently been abandoned in European jurisprudence.  
56 QD (n1) Art 6.  
57 CNDA Sections réunies,16 novembre 2011 M. B. n°10018108 R; CNDA 23 décembre 2013 Décision 
No. 11024877: no reference to any methodological approach to assess persecution is made. 
58 CNDA, ordonnance 10 octobre 2016 M. B. n° 16020922 C. 
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account. In the opinion of the court, the existence of prejudice and a sentiment 
of intolerance against minorities in Armenia did not amount to persecution. 
Unfortunately, the court did not justify this position, thus making a subjective 
assessment of the situation without evaluating the impact that various forms 
of social hostility could have on the applicants. In a different case,59 however, 
the court assessed more carefully the applicant’s profile against the situation 
in the country of origin. In this case, the applicant was a single Tamil female 
from Sri Lanka. The court considered various elements, such as the former 
membership of the applicant’s brother in the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam 
(LTTE) organisation, her current isolation and high level of visibility in her 
locality, compounded by rampant discrimination against women in the north 
of country and concluded that the predicament that the applicant was likely 
to face upon return amounted to persecution. No reference to human rights 
was made, but a general analysis of the applicant’s individual circumstances 
was conducted to evaluate the harm that she might be at risk of enduring upon 
return. A similar approach was adopted in a Nigerian case, where the Court 
engaged in a rather holistic analysis of various elements to conclude that an 
‘accumulation of facts’ including discrimination, ostracism from one’s 
family, amounted to persecution.60 In these two cases, the court adopted a 
principled and protective approach but, regrettably, such methodology has 
not been consistently applied in the French jurisprudence. 
 
  For instance, in another case61, the court again adopted an unclear 
interpretation of persecution by rejecting a Sudanese claimant from a Darfuri 
African tribe on the ground that he had not established a personal experience 
of harm. In this case, however, the Court did not take into account the overall 
circumstances of the applicant’s profile as a member of an African tribe often 
associated with rebels, who could be imputed a political opinion on that 
account. These elements could indeed have indicated the existence of a risk 
of a persecutory form of harm. The applicant was unfortunately rejected 
without further analysis and simply granted subsidiary protection on account 
                                                
59 CNDA, grande formation 8 décembre 2016 Mme K n° 14027836 C+ at [5]. 
60 CNDA, 24 mars 2015 Mlle E. n° 10012810 C+: In this case, although the court mentioned the 
definition of the QD, it did not adopt a human rights interpretive framework.   
61 CNDA, 3 juillet 2014 M. S. H. n° 13024480 C. 
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of the generalised violence. In general, it seems from the recent jurisprudence 
in France, that asylum judges have continued to interpret persecution on an 
ad hoc basis,62 without any clear line of analysis, although some sporadic 
references to human rights norms are notable.63  
iii- Belgium: a persistent reliance on a circumstantial approach?  
 Belgian case law has also failed to evolve significantly after the 
adoption of the QD. Belgian decision makers generally maintained a broad 
circumstantial approach when interpreting persecution.64 For instance, in X v 
Commissaire général aux réfugiés et aux apatrides,65 the Appeal Authority 
considered that the predicament of a Kurdish woman in Turkey who had 
faced domestic violence amounted to persecution. In this case, the Appeal 
Authority argued that ‘the assessment of a well-founded fear of persecution 
should take into account her individual circumstances, including 
psychological and physical trauma’.66 The harm that the applicant faced was 
assessed in light of her profile and cumulated experiences, without reference 
to human rights standards, eventually yielding a positive result for this 
applicant.67   
The same interpretive pattern was applied in other cases. For 
instance, in Council for Alien Law Litigation, Case No. 101488, the judges 
                                                
62 See other cases where the court adopted variable methodologies for interpreting persecution. In 
CNDA, 21 mai 2012 M W. n° 08019247 C+, the court stated that the repression against a racist man in 
Namibia from the state authorities did not amount to persecution because it was neither ‘systematic, 
nor discriminatory’ nor ‘disproportionate’ in CNDA 1er septembre 2011 Mme F ép G et Mlle G 
n°s10018546 et 10018545 C+: various acts of discriminations do not amount to persecution without 
clear explanation as to why they are not considered serious enough. However, in CNDA 18 mars 2016 
M.K n°15031443: accumulation of stigmatization, ostracism and discrimination amount to persecution.  
63 See for instance case whereby by the rapporteur of the court questioned whether the consideration of 
a right to a normal private life (absence thereof) could be relevant to assess the notion of persecution in 
an LGBTI case: CNDA, 8/06/09, 609800/07012945 in Caroline Kobelinsky, ‘L’Asile Gay, 
Jurisprudence de l’Intime à la Cour Nationale du droit d’Asile’ [2012] 82 Droit et Société 583, 592. In 
this case however, the court avoided answering this question by displacing the analysis of the refugee 
definition onto the well-founded fear terrain. See other case with references to human rights by the 
court: CNDA 4 Janvier 2011 Mme H. n° 10000337 C+: this case mostly referred to national human 
rights. See also: CNDA, 24 mars 2015 Mlle E n° 10012810 C+. 
64 Belgium: Conseil du Contentieux des Etrangers, 27 October 2016; Arrêt n° 138 876, Belgium: 
Conseil du Contentieux des Etrangers, 19 Février 2015; Arrêt n° 90 730, Belgium: Conseil du 
Contentieux des Etrangers, 30 October 2012: in this case the CCE considered that the accumulation of 
discriminations faced by the Applicant, compounded by her fragile mental state, amounted to 
persecution.  
65 X v Commissaire général aux réfugiés et aux apatrides, No 177, 178: Conseil du Contentieux des 
Etrangers, 27 Octobre 2016 [2017] International Journal of Refugee Law 29, 138. 
66 Ibid.  
67 Ibid, 139.  
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assessed the risk of persecution of a Senegalese applicant who was 
homosexual. It was considered that the penalisation of homosexuality alone 
did not amount to a risk of persecution per se, thus seemingly conforming to 
the guidance of the CJEU. However, in order to this reach the decision, the 
judges engaged in a more thorough analysis of the situation in the country, 
including the level of stigmatisation faced by homosexuals and how such 
elements could impact the applicant in light of his personal circumstances.68 
For the judges, the level of stigmatisation69 that the applicant was at risk of 
facing depended on several factors including ‘his personal experiences, the 
attitude of his family and his entourage, his social and economic situation, his 
professional profile and cultural background as well as whether or not he lives 
in an urban area’.70 Although the judges mentioned the definition of the QD,71 
they did not in fact assess the notion of persecution in light of fundamental 
human rights but rather, they proposed to take into consideration the 
applicant’s practical circumstances, eventually rejecting the asylum claim as 
a number of facts could not be established. In this case, the rejection appeared 
quite fair and transparent given the comprehensive assessment conducted by 
the judges.  
In another similar case, a claimant who was also a homosexual man 
from Senegal was granted refugee status due to a diverse set of 
circumstances.72 Again, an overall assessment of his background and 
experiences, against the conditions in the country, was conducted to reach 
this decision. In general, Belgian judges seemed to have maintained their 
circumstantial approach, and there was little evidence that they had 
significantly changed their interpretive methodology since the QD.73 
                                                
68 Arrêt n° 10148824, Belgium: Conseil du Contentieux des Etrangers Avril 2013 at [5.21].  
69 Ibid, 11. 
70 Ibid, 10.  
71 Ibid, at [5.17] 11. 
72 Arrêt n° 50967 Belgium: Conseil du Contentieux des Etrangers, 9 Novembre 2010. 
73 For instance, see Arrêt n° 177 178 Belgium: Conseil du Contentieux des Etrangers, 27 Octobre 2016: 
in this case, the judges took into consideration the applicant’s very fragile mental state to assess the 
notion of persecution and recognized her. See also similar case for a man from Kosovo:  Arrêt n° 138 
404, Belgium: Conseil du Contentieux des Etrangers, 12 Février 2015; Arrêt 89 927, Belgium: Conseil 
du Contentieux des Etrangers, 17 Octobre 2012. No human rights framework was adopted in any of the 
above cases.  
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In light of the above, it can be observed that the adoption of the QD 
has not yet fulfilled its objective of harmonisation in Europe. Battjes in 
particular pointed to the persisting variations of interpretation in EU countries 
which, according to him, are due to the vague and general wording of the 
QD.74 In spite of some advances, the QD has not fostered significant 
consistency since its adoption, nor has it encouraged a more protective 
approach in countries of the EU. It seems in fact that decision makers who 
have engaged in a broader analysis, similar to the circumstantial framework 
of the UNHCR, have reach fairer and more transparent conclusions. 
However, this has been done in quite inconsistent ways.  
 
Part 2) Irregular reliance on a human rights framework by 
common-law jurisdictions outside the EU 
 
Other countries signatories to the 1951 Convention have also 
developed their own jurisprudence for interpreting persecution. It particular, 
in New Zealand (A), Australia (B), Canada (C) and the USA (D), judges have 
adjudicated a great number of asylum claims involving complex issues 
relating to the notion of persecution. However, in doing so, they have adopted 
different interpretive narratives as the section below will demonstrate.   
 
A)  New Zealand: the human rights narrative used as a guiding 
framework 	  
 
New Zealand signed and ratified the 1951 Convention Relating to the 
Status of Refugees in 1960 and acceded to the 1967 Protocol in 1973.75 The 
refugee definition was not incorporated into domestic law until 1999.76 
Therefore, before that period, the procedures for refugee determination were 
considered the mere prerogative of the Executive.77 After the 1980s, New 
                                                
74 Vincent Chetail, Philippe De Bruycker, Francesco Maiani (eds) Reforming the Common European 
Asylum System: The New European Refugee Law (Brill Nijhoff 2016) 200. 
75 UNHCR, ‘States Parties to the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1967 
Protocol’, available at http://www.unhcr.org/protect/PROTECTION/3b730d63.pdf, 3. 
76 Immigration Amendment Act 1999, Section 40, Part 6A.  
77 Bruce Burson, ‘Give way to the Right: The Evolving Use of Human Rights in New Zealand Refugee 
Status Determination’, in Burson Bruce and David James Cantor (eds) Human Rights and the Refugee 
Definition, Comparative Legal Practice and Theory (Brill Nijhoff 2016) 25-48, 26.  
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Zealand saw an increase78 in new asylum seekers coming into the country.79  
Due to a certain upsurge in asylum applications, domestic judges began 
adjudicating a growing number of claims and, in doing so, they developed a 
detailed jurisprudence on the interpretation of the notion of persecution. 
 
In particular, the Refugee Status Appeal Authority (RSAA) started 
regularly referring to human rights for interpreting the notion of persecution 
in the early 90s,80 after the human rights framework was developed by 
Hathaway. New Zealand judges, however, did not consistently apply the 
modalities of this basic human right model. In fact, the evolution of the 
jurisprudence in New Zealand seemed to have followed a line of progressive 
emancipation from Hathaway’s narrative. 
 
For instance, in an early case, Refugee Appeal No. 11/91, the RSAA 
relied on the UDHR and ICCPR to assess whether the nature of the threats 
received by a Sikh Indian man amounted to persecution.81 In this decision, 
the judges stated that ‘the threat made to kill the appellant, if carried out, 
would be an infringement of a core human right’ as formulated in Article 3 
of the UDHR and Article 6 of the 1966 ICCPR.82 The judges seemed to adopt 
here the basic human rights paradigm proposed in the LORS but they did not 
endorse the threshold of ‘sustained or systemic’ violations. They also rejected 
the fact that state protection was part of the persecution test. They stated that 
‘the harm originally feared [was] of sufficient gravity to constitute 
persecution’ per se, but then they went on to reject the claimant’s request, 
considering that he could avail himself of the protection of the authorities.83  
                                                
78 Ibid 25. 
79 Rodger Haines, ‘Gender-Based Persecution: New Zealand Jurisprudence’ [1997] 9 International 
Journal of Refugee Law 129, 129. This increase of asylum seekers can be relativized compared to other 
common-law jurisdictions. Indeed, Haines noted that due to its isolated geographical position, the 
number of asylum applications remained relatively ‘modest on a world scale’. 
80 Ibid 138: Haines noted that, in this period, the interpretation of persecution in the jurisprudence was 
following the one of James Hathaway. See also numerous cases referring to various human rights to 
interpret the notion of persecution quoted in Refugee Appeal No 2039/93 Re MN, RSAA (12 February 
1996): Refugee Appeal No. 10/91 Re CPY (27 August 1991); Refugee Appeal No. 14/91 Re JS (5 
September 1991) (derogation); Refugee Appeal No. 29/91 Re SK (17 February 1992); Refugee Appeal 
No. 150/92 Re SS (9 December 1992) 9; Refugee Appeal No. 135/92 Re RS (18 June 1993) 23; Refugee 
Appeal No. 265/92 Re SA (29 June 1994) 12; Refugee Appeal No. 732/92 Re CZZ (5 August 1994) 13-
17; Refugee Appeal No. 1222/93 Re KN (5 August 1994). 
81 Refugee Appeal No. 11/91 Re S RSAA (5 September 1991). 
82 Ibid.  
83 Ibid.  
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In this case, the judges clearly separated the tests of persecution and state 
protection. According to Kneebone, this approach became a general trend in 
New Zealand as she observed that decision makers tended to ‘identify the 
issue of surrogate protection […] within the objective part of the well-
founded fear test’84 rather than subsuming it under the persecution test, thus 
departing significantly from Hathaway’s view.  
 
Additionally, New Zealand judges seemed to have considered early 
on the possibility of expanding the human rights narrative by analysing 
various other elements of an applicant’s claim. For instance, in cases of 
gender-based violence, Haines pointed out that, in the late 90s, some judges 
adopted a more circumstantial approach as they proposed to take into 
consideration ‘various acts of discrimination, in their cumulative effect’ and 
assess how such acts could ‘deny human dignity’.85 The jurisprudence then 
continued to evolve in a singular manner. Some cases further departed from 
the formalist human rights approach by following this circumstantial 
methodology. For instance, in Refugee Appeal No 74665/03 (7 July 2004), 
the judges considered that: 
 
‘while it is possible to identify distinct categories of obligations 
[…] the question whether the anticipated harm rises to the level 
of being persecuted depends not on a rigid or mechanical 
application of the categories of rights, but on an assessment of a 
complex set of factors which include not only the nature of the 
right threatened, but also the nature of the threat of restriction 
and the seriousness of the harm threatened’.86  
 
In this case, the judges seemed to broaden the scope of persecution by 
considering that the human rights narrative should not be adopted in a rigid 
manner but, instead, a larger set of facts should be evaluated.  
 
                                                
84 Kneebone (n 16) 114.  
85 Haines (n 79) 138. 
86 Refugee Appeal No. 74665 RSAA (7 July 2004) at [80].  
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Whilst some decision makers adopted a singular approach for 
interpreting the notion of persecution, it should be noted that New Zealand 
judges in general remained influenced by Hathaway’s paradigm as they 
tended to regularly refer to human rights for interpreting the notion of 
persecution.87 Consistently with the dominant human rights narrative at that 
time, judges used to consider that only the treaties of the International Bill of 
Rights constituted relevant references for evaluating what forms of harm 
amount to persecution. Burson, however, noted that some domestic judges 
progressively strayed away from this model, perceived as being too rigid. In 
a handful of cases, the judges expanded their scope of analysis and 
progressively started referring to other treaties, such as specialised human 
rights treaties for interpreting persecution.88 The view that specialised human 
rights treaties could also be valuable for interpreting persecution was only 
endorsed by Hathaway in 2014.  
 
As early as 2005, the RSAA also rejected Hathaway’s proposal that a 
hierarchy of rights should be considered for interpreting persecution. In 
Refugee Appeal Nos 75221 and 75225 (23 September 2005),89 RSAA 
considered possible violations of the ICESCR but made very clear that 
‘overly rigid categorisations of rights in terms of hierarchies are […] to be 
avoided’,90 thus enlarging the array of possible human rights standards that 
could be considered relevant when interpreting the definition of a refugee. In 
a recent case, DS Iran 800788 (2 February 2016), the judges of the 
Immigration and Protection Tribunal further emphasised the benefits of 
interpreting the notion of persecution through a wider human rights 
framework as they affirmed that ‘given the non-hierarchical approach to 
human rights which applies in New Zealand […] a broad range of harm is 
[…] potentially within the scope of Convention-based protection’.91 Again, 
                                                
87 Refugee Appeal No. 71404/99 RSAA (29 October 1999), referring to Refugee Appeal No. 1039/93 
Re HBS and LBY RSAA (13 February 1995),19-20; Refugee Appeal No 2039/93 Re MN RSAA (12 
February 1996) 14-16. Mentioned in Rebecca Dowd, ‘Dissecting Discrimination in Refugee Law: an 
Analysis of its Meaning and its Cumulative Effect’ [2011] 23 International Journal of Refugee Law 28, 
32. 
88 Burson (n 77) 34. See also Refugee Appeal Nos. 76226 and 76227 RSAA (12 January 2009), at [88] 
and [102] the RSAA refers to the CEDAW and at [111] to the CRC.  
89 Refugee Appeal No. 75221 and 75225 RSAA (23 September 2005). 
90 Ibid, para 81. 
91  DS (Iran) 800788 NZIPT (2 February 2016) at [177]. 
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on this point, the jurisprudence in New Zealand seemed to have anticipated 
the desirable evolution of the human rights interpretive framework. Hathaway 
only followed this view when he abandoned his theory on the hierarchy of 
rights in the last edition of the LORS.  
 
Although judges in New Zealand jurisprudence have retained the idea 
that basic human rights were valuable benchmarks for interpreting 
persecution, they have used different parameters of interpretation to factor in 
their human rights analysis. Indeed, they usually combine the human rights 
approach with a more pragmatic methodology by assessing various forms of 
restrictions. Judges continue to explicitly mention Hathaway’s model as a 
reference in their decisions but in practice they rather rely on the notion of 
‘serious harm’ for assessing persecution.92 This tendency has recently been 
observed by Cantor who noted that Hathaway’s narrative is perceived as 
setting an imprecise threshold and, therefore, some decision makers have felt 
compelled to developing more pragmatic approaches through the ‘serious 
harm test’.93 For instance, in Refugee Appeal No. 76015 (4 November 2007), 
the RSAA mentioned that for a violation of the ICESCR to amount to 
persecution, ‘[t]he breach must go to the core of the right and must occasion 
serious harm. A breach at the margins of a right or one that does not bring 
about serious harm, will not reach the being persecuted threshold’.94 In fact, 
this approach developed in the jurisprudence proved to be more protective of 
the rights of refugees and more transparent, as judges seemed to be 
encouraged to assess a larger variety of factors in order to assess the level of 
‘seriousness’ of the harm. 
 
 This approach was exemplified in a recent case, in AB (Slovakia), AF 
(Czech Republic), where the Immigration and Protection Tribunal had 
granted refugee status to members of a Roma family from Slovakia. The 
                                                
92 Q (Pakistan) 800675 NZIPT (29 April 2015) at [35]; BN (Fiji) 800688 NZIPT (20 April 2012) at 
[29]. AC (Lebanon) 800688 NZIPT (5 March 2015) at [31] In these cases, the test of persecution 
according to Hathaway’s formulation is supplemented with the test of ‘serious harm’. 
93 James Cantor, ‘Defining Refugees: Persecution, Surrogacy and the Human Rights Paradigm’ in 
Burson Bruce and David James Cantor (eds), Human Rights and the Refugee Definition Comparative 
Legal Practice and Theory (Brill Nijhoff 2016) 349-395, 383.  
94 Refugee Appeal No. 76015 RSAA (4 Nov. 2007) para. 37 quoted in Dowd (n 87) 47.  
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claimants related a series of harassments, verbal abuse, random physical 
attacks by strangers and skinheads in their country for many years. The 
tribunal did not analyse their predicament only in light of basic human rights 
but also considered that ‘if the family were to return to their village, the 
harassment and mistreatment would immediately resume at the same, 
undoubtedly serious level’.95 The tribunal assessed the series of predicaments 
faced by the family in the aggregate and concluded that it was sufficiently 
serious, thus lending a major importance to the quantitative aspect of 
persecution.  
 
In conclusion, it can be observed that asylum judges in New Zealand 
initially adopted Hathaway’s narrative, but they seemed to have progressively 
departed from it, in order to develop more practical approaches. The 
assessment of whether a harm constitutes persecution is therefore assessed on 
a case-by-case basis with the human rights narrative mostly used as a guiding 
framework, but not confined to it. This approach echoes the view of Foster 
who considered that ‘human rights treaties are designed to provide guidance, 
not to constitute an inflexible grid which dictates the outcome in every 
case’.96 
 
B)  Australia: variable approaches to the notion of persecution as 
a result of jurisprudential tensions with the statutory 
definition   
 
 
Australia signed and ratified the 1951 Convention in 1954 and the 
Protocol in 1973.97 In the 1980s, the refugee definition was incorporated into 
national law when the Migration Act was amended.98 Similarly to the 
evolution observed in New Zealand, Australian Courts progressively 
acknowledged the importance of human rights in interpreting the refugee 
                                                
95 AB (Slovakia), AF (Czech Republic) [2015] NZIPT 800734-738, 29 June 2015. 
96 Michelle Foster, International Refugee Law and Socio-Economic Rights: Refuge from Deprivation 
(CUP 2007) 79.  
97 UNHCR (n 75) 2. 
98 Migration Amendment Act (N.2) 1980, No -175. See also J. Kirk, ‘Island Nation: The Impact of 
International Human Rights Law on Australian Refugee Law’, in Burson Bruce and David James 
Cantor (eds), Human Rights and the Refugee Definition, Comparative Legal Practice and Theory (Brill 
Nijhoff 2016) 49-85, 49. 
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definition.99 For the first time in 1989, judges considered that persecution 
could be defined through references to human rights violations in Chan vs. 
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs but they referred to the UNHCR 
Handbook to justify this view.100 Although the judges noted that human rights 
constituted relevant interpretive references, they did not further explore this 
line of argumentation. However, by introducing the concept of human rights 
into their legal analysis, they set the foundation for the development of a new 
jurisprudence. Human rights then became increasingly referred to in the 
1990s, when Hathaway published the first edition of the LORS.101 Although 
his definition was not always expressly quoted and uncertainty remained as 
to which human rights were relevant, a certain influence of his paradigm on 
Australian judges was quite noticeable. For instance, in Applicant A v MIEA, 
Brennan observed that ‘when a person has a well-founded fear of persecution, 
the enjoyment by that person of his or her fundamental rights and freedoms 
is denied’. In the same case, Dawson J affirmed that: ‘there is general 
acceptance that a threat to life or freedom for a Convention reason amounts 
to persecution’.102  They thus demonstrated a certain inclination to rely on 
human rights norms for interpreting persecution.  
 
In spite of this perceptible evolution, Kirk pointed out that the use of 
basic human rights standards raised some controversy amongst Australian 
judges. Indeed, she highlighted the emergence of two distinct jurisprudential 
trends regarding the role that human rights should have in interpreting 
persecution. On the one hand, she noted that some judges were inclined to 
refer to human rights because they viewed the 1951 Convention as an 
                                                
99 Alex de Costa, ‘Assessing the Cause and Effect of Persecution in Australian Refugee Law: Sarrazola, 
Khawar and the Migration Legislation Amendment Act’ [2001] 30 Federal Law Review 535, 558. De 
Costa pointed out that ‘the reference to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948 ('the Universal 
Declaration’) in the Convention's preamble marks it as an instrument for the protection and realization 
of human rights has been acknowledged in Australian refugee jurisprudence’. 
100 Chan vs. Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs HCA 62; 169 CLR 379 F.C. 89/034, (9 
December 1989) at [23]. 
101 Case No. N93-02362 RRTA 369 (27 February 1995) at 3; Case No. N93-02050 RRTA 484 (10 
March 1995) at 3; Wang v. Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, FCA 1599 (10 
November 2000); NACM of 2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs 
FCA 1554 (22 December 2003) at [54]; Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous 
Affairs v Sarrazola FCA 263 (21 March 2001) at [31].  
102 Applicant A v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs HCA 190 CLR 225 (24 February 1997) 
at 232, mentioned in Mirko Bagaric, Kim Boyd, Penny Dimopoulos, John Vrachnas (eds), Migration 
and Refugee Law: Principles and practice in Australia (CUP 2005) 223. 
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instrument providing a surrogate human rights protection to refugees.103 On 
the other hand, she also observed that some judges were more reluctant to 
adopt such an approach because they considered that the primary objective of 
the Convention was to regulate and control refugee flows rather than protect 
human rights.104 Her analysis pointed to a certain hesitation of the Australian 
judges to actively endorse the human rights narrative. 
 
Kirk also observed that, in the early 2000s, some judges dissociated 
themselves with Hathaway’s formalist narrative in order to adopt a more 
expansive interpretation of persecution.105  For instance, in Kord v Minister 
for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, Judge Hely considered that the 
definition of Hathaway was too restrictive and that ‘unjustifiable and 
discriminatory conduct, officially tolerated, directed at an applicant by reason 
of his race [constituted] persecution unless the impact of that conduct on the 
applicant [was] trivial or insignificant.’106 In this decision, Judge Hely 
seemed to imply that any form of harm that creates an impact on an 
individual’s life which is more than trivial or insignificant could possibly 
amount to persecution, which appears overly large. In another case,107 judge 
Wilcox also adopted a rather broad interpretation of persecution by stating 
that ‘being denied the opportunity to work in [the applicant’s] chosen field 
was sufficient’108 to warrant refugee status. No further explanation was given 
to assess the level of harm that this sort of predicament can cause. Some 
Australian judges therefore started developing a broader understanding of the 
notion of persecution, without following any clear line of analysis to justify 
their position. Dimopoulos and Bagaric regretted this trend109 as they 
considered that Australian judges had enlarged the notion of persecution to 
such an extent that even a ‘slight harm’ could entitle an asylum seeker to 
                                                
103 See for instance: Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Haji Ibrahim HCA 55 
S156/1999 (26 October 2000) at [65]; Wang v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, FCA 
1599 (10 November 2000) at [80]. 
104 Kirk (n 98) 49.  
105 Ibid 50. 
106 Kord v. Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, FCA 1163 (24 August 2001) para 15.   
107 Kirk (n 98) 64.  
108 Kirk ibid.  
109 Regarding this trend see also Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Khawar, FCA N 
1379 (23 August 2000), where Judge Hill J stated at [8] that ‘Persecution involves, in a general sense, 
an element of harm which is not insignificant’.  
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refugee status.110 They summarised how Australian decision makers 
interpreted the notion of persecution by identifying two major, conflicting, 
trends in the jurisprudence: ‘the first is that the concept of persecution is 
connected with notions of human rights and dignity. Secondly, persecution 
can include the deprivation of interests that do not come close to threatening 
subsistence.’111 
 
In view of these jurisprudential developments (amongst other 
reasons), the Australian Parliament decided to narrow down the definition of 
a refugee in order to avoid too generous an approach to the 1951 Convention. 
As a result, in 2001, the Parliament passed a new law, introducing a statutory 
definition of the notion of persecution, which entailed a threefold analysis.112 
According to Section 91 R of the Migration Act:  
Article 1A(2) of the Refugees Convention as amended by the 
Refugees Protocol does not apply in relation to persecution for 
one or more of the reasons mentioned in that Article unless: 
(a)  that reason is the essential and significant reason, or those 
reasons are the essential and significant reasons, for the 
persecution; and 
(b)  the persecution involves serious harm to the person; and  
(c)  the persecution involves systematic and discriminatory 
conduct. 
 
 This new definition was meant to clearly limit the interpretational 
activity of the judges and to provide a restrictive understanding of the 
definition of a refugee in the 1951 Convention. It is noteworthy that the new 
statutory definition raised the reasons for persecution as an essential 
component of the notion of persecution which was not the approach adopted 
                                                
110 Mirko Bagaric and Penny Dimopoulos, ‘The Shifting Meaning of Persecution in Australian Refugee 
Law: How Much Must One Suffer to be Deserving of Asylum?’ [2003] Bond Law Review Editorial 
Committee 314, 314.  
111 Ibid 322. 
112 Migration Legislation Amendment Act (No 6.) 2001 Section 91R(1).  
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by judges before this. Additionally, the statutory definition imposed a 
relatively strict threshold by stating that persecution should cumulatively 
involve systematic and discriminatory conduct and serious harm. By adding 
these new criteria, the Parliament adopted an approach that stringently 
restricted the interpretive creativity of Australian judges and further limited 
the potential of the human rights narrative that had been used in a rather 
inclusive manner thus far.113  
 
In spite of these changes, Kirk noted that the legislation in fact 
‘received limited attention from Australian Courts’,114 which continued 
interpreting the notion of persecution quite broadly and, in practice, with 
some sporadic references to international human rights standards through ad 
hoc interpretive schemes.115 For Croc, however, the judges who used human 
rights as referential benchmarks remained a minority.116 It seemed that, in 
fact, no consistent methodology was relied upon. For instance, Bargaric et al 
pointed out that the notion of serious harm in the legislation was quite broad 
and could be understood in different ways, so that there was ‘ample scope for 
divergent judicial interpretations’.117 It appears, indeed, that judges oscillated 
between referring to human rights or evaluating the notion of serious harm 
through more subjective lenses. Kneebone also highlighted the  
 
‘uncertainty as to the interrelationship between Section 91R 
and the Refugee Convention’. She pointed out that ‘in some 
cases, the judges have confirmed that the Refugee Convention 
applies “without limiting” the statute (SAAO v Minister for 
Immigration, 2002). In others, judges have queried whether s 
91R limits the Refugee Convention (SBBG v Minister for 
                                                
113 In this sense, Kneebone argued that Section 91R seems ‘to mask the explicit articulation of the 
human rights framework’ in Susanne Kneebone ‘The Australian Story: Asylum Seekers Outside the 
Law’, in Susanne Kneebone (eds) Refugees, Asylum Seekers and the Rule of Law: Comparative 
Perspectives (CUP 2009) 171–227, 222. 
114 Kirk (n 98) 68.   
115 For instance, see Judge Kirby who specifically referred to the Hathaway’s definition of persecution 
in Applicant NABD of 2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs HCA 
29 S70/2004 (26 May 2005) para 111. However, in Case No.0903537, RRTA 851 (30 July 2009) a 
more circumstantial approach based on the concept of discrimination was relied upon. 
116 Mary Crock, ‘Judging Refugees: The Clash of Power and Institutions in the Development of 
Australian Refugee Law’ [2004] 26 Sydney Law Review 51.  
117 Bagaric et al. (n 102) 225. 
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Immigration, 2003). In yet others, the judges have suggested 
that it does (WADP v Minister for Immigration, 2002) but in 
others, that the two are consistent (VBB v Minister for 
Immigration, 2003; SCAT v Minister for Immigration, 2003, 
per Madgwick and Conti JJ)’.118  
 
Kneebone further explained that some uncertainty had arisen in 
relation to the notion of surrogate protection, which was, at times, tied to the 
notion of persecution and, at other times, examined under the overall phrase 
‘fear of persecution’,119 thus variably attached to the ‘well-founded fear’ test 
or to persecution. Similarly, De Costa had also pointed to the different 
approaches with regard to the role of state protection where persecution is 
perpetrated by non-state agents.120  
 
Due to the absence of concrete changes in the jurisprudence and the 
internally inconsistent approaches adopted by Australian judges, the 
Parliament passed a second amendment to the Migration Act in 2014, 
amending the onshore protection visa regime of individuals coming to 
Australia. The amendment removed references to the 1951 Convention in the 
Migration Act in an attempt to create a ‘new independent and self-contained 
statutory framework’,121 thus isolating Australian Courts from the influence 
of other international jurisprudences and from international human rights law.  
 
Since then, references to international human rights are less common, 
with ad hoc approaches being rather adopted.122 Very broad decisions are also 
                                                
118 Susan Kneebone, ‘What we Have Done with the Refugee Convention: The Australian Way’ [2005] 
22 Law in Context 83.  
119 Kneebone (n 16) 110.  
120 See analysis in Alex de Costa, ‘Assessing the Cause and Effect of Persecution in Australian Refugee 
Law: Sarrazola, Khawar and the Migration Legislation Amendment Act’ [2001] 30 Federal Law 
Review 535.  
121 Explanatory Memorandum to the Migration and Maritime Powers Legislation (Resolving the 
Legacy Caseload) Bill 2014, 168 at [1153]. Available at 
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/bill_em/mamplatalcb2014832/memo_0.html.  
122 Inter alia: Case No. 1420100, AATA 4383 (6 September 2016); Case No. 1501978 AATA 3621 (9 
November 2015); Case No. 1605812, [2017] AATA 158 (16 January 2017): None of these cases relied 
on a human rights approach.  
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rare.123 However, in some cases, Australian judges have continued adopting 
quite expansive interpretations of persecution, and at times, have continued 
to refer to human rights norms. In particular, Kirk mentioned two recent 
cases, SZTEQ v Minister for Border Protection124 and Minister for 
Immigration and Border Protection v WZAPN,125 whereby the courts recently 
reiterated that the refugee definition should be applied consistently with 
international standards. In SZTEQ v Minister for Border Protection, the court 
referred to human rights law and human rights contained in the International 
Bill of Rights in order to analyse the notion of persecution. The court further 
expanded the human rights framework by adding that this interpretive scheme 
should be applied as part of a holistic analysis.126 In this case, the judges 
considered that the assessment of a violation of a human right should be 
compounded by other considerations relating to the personal circumstances 
of the asylum seeker. The court later concluded that not every deprivation of 
liberty constitutes persecution but that it was in fact a matter of degree and 
circumstances.127 In this case, the court relied on a loose human rights 
narrative as part of the analysis of what constitutes persecution and 
complemented it with other considerations based on circumstantial elements, 
thus adopting a more pragmatic approach, similar to the position developed 
by the UNHCR.  
 
This view was also adopted in a recent case whereby the Appeal 
Tribunal considered a wide variety of factors in order to assess the seriousness 
of the harm feared by an Indonesian single woman, head of a household, of 
minority Chinese ethnicity and who had faced abuses and ostracism in the 
local community on account of her disability. The tribunal noted that the 
prevailing ‘societal norms (in Indonesia), compounded by difficulties in 
accessing employment, facilities and services, mean that people with 
                                                
123 See for instance: Case No.1503327, AATA 4341 (24 August 2016), Case No. 1502343, AATA 4053 
(6 July 2016): the applicant’s claim was rejected after circumstantial analysis of her claim rather than 
a human rights approach. 
124 SZTEQ v Minister for Border Protection, FCAFC 39 (11 February 2015), cited in Linda J. Kirk (n 
100), 69.     
125 Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v WZAPN, HCA 22 (17 June 2015), cited in Linda 
J. Kirk (n 98) 69.    
126 SZTEQ v Minister for Border Protection (n 124) at [92].  
127 Ibid [155].  
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disability in Indonesia face a high degree of societal and official 
discrimination’.128 It was further considered that another factor increasing 
‘the seriousness of the harm on the applicant is the fact that she is a single 
mother’ and thus was exposed to stigma in her country.129 Through a holistic 
analysis, the decision makers concluded that the applicant had a well-founded 
fear of facing persecution upon return to Indonesia.   
 
In light of the foregoing, it can be concluded that the conceptual battle 
between the Australian Parliament and Australian judges on the definition of 
persecution had led to the application of different approaches for interpreting 
the notion. At times, judges had relied on a human rights narrative, through 
different parameters, whilst some recent cases adopted a more circumstantial 
approach, allowing for a broad application of the refugee definition, which 
the Australian Parliament has tried so far to restrict. It seems that in the case 
of the Australian jurisprudence, the human rights narrative has been used in 
a rather protective manner, to expand the understanding of the notion of 
persecution without strictly referring to the framework modalities proposed 
by Hathaway. Unfortunately, the jurisprudence remains, overall, internally 
inconsistent because no clear interpretive framework has so far been adopted 
in spite of the legislation introduced by the Australian parliament. In this 
sense, Kneebone noted that the narrative used by decision makers is ‘both 
pragmatic and confused’,130 thus raising legal uncertainty for individuals who 
seek asylum in Australia.  
 
C)  Canada: an unclear interpretive practice underpinned by a 
human rights approach? 
 
Canada signed and ratified the 1951 Convention and the 1967 
Protocol in 1969. Similarly to the evolution observed in other countries, the 
Canadian jurisprudence developed quite significantly in the 1980s.131 At that 
time, there was no specific legal framework for interpreting the notion of 
                                                
128 Case No.1419893 AATA 4338 (19 August 2016) at [43]. 
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130 Kneebone (n 16) 112.  
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persecution. In fact, Simeon observed that in early decisions, judges were 
quite reluctant to refer to international human rights standards as an 
interpretive narrative for applying the 1951 Convention,132 which he 
attributed to the complex dual legal system where international human rights 
cannot be directly invoked before courts by citizens. He noted that, in 1982, 
the country adopted the Charter of Rights and Freedoms that, in substance, is 
similar to the International Bill of Rights, and most certainly led judges to 
favour national human rights, instead of international norms.133  
 
In the 1990s, the influence of Hathaway’s approach on the 
jurisprudence became, however, quite significant. At that time, domestic 
judges started to rely increasingly on basic human rights standards in order to 
interpret the 1951 Convention and, more particularly, the notion of 
persecution. For instance, in 1993, in the seminal decision of Canada v Ward, 
the Supreme Court of Canada explicitly referred to Hathaway’s definition of 
persecution as a guiding principle to interpret the notion134 but then departed 
from this approach, by considering that state protection should not be 
considered an inherent component of persecution. Indeed, Kneebone 
observed that in this case, Judge La Forest tied the test of state protection to 
the well-founded fear limb of the refugee definition rather than the notion of 
persecution.135 
 
In subsequent cases, references to Hathaway’s narrative were still 
notable but judges tended to consistently stray away from some of the 
modalities of his framework. In 1994, in Ramirez v. Solicitor General of 
Canada, the Federal Court adopted Hathaway’s view that the International 
Bill of Rights should be used as a relevant benchmark to assess persecution 
as the court considered that ‘protection from property confiscation is a fourth-
level right’.136 The court went on to conclude that a violation of this right does 
                                                
132 James C. Simeon, ‘The Human Rights Bases of Refugee Protection in Canada’ Burson Bruce and 
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not per se amount to persecution because it is not of sufficient gravity.137 The 
Court implicitly rejected the persistency criteria by not mentioning it, and 
rather based its analysis of the notion of persecution on the concept of 
‘gravity’. In 1995, in Narvaez, the Federal Court of Canada also expressed 
the view that the 1951 Convention was premised on the respect of 
fundamental human rights and that Hathaway’s human rights scheme should 
be used to interpret persecution138  but again, the rest of his framework was 
not referred to. Conversely, the Supreme Court adopted a more consistent 
approach to Hathaway’s model in Chan v Canada139 by stating that ‘the 
concern of refugee law ought to be the denial of human dignity in any key way 
with the sustained or systemic denial of core human rights as the appropriate 
standard’.140 From the above, it can be observed that international human 
rights, as entailed in the International Bill of Rights, had progressively been 
relied upon in Canadian jurisprudence to assess the notion of persecution, in 
spite of the initial reluctance of decision makers to refer to these standards. It 
seemed, however, that Canadian judges adopted ad hoc human rights 
approaches by not consistently relying on the modalities defined in 
Hathaway’s framework. 
 
  In 2001, the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA) 
incorporated into domestic law the 1951 refugee definition and further 
enlarged the realm of refugee protection. According to the Act, refugee status 
is conferred on individuals who meet the criteria set out in the 1951 
Convention but also to other individuals ‘in need of international 
protection’,141 including individuals at risk of torture in the meaning of the 
Convention against Torture from 1984.142 While the present discussion 
focuses on the methodology adopted by Canadian judges to interpret the 
notion of persecution, it is beyond the purview of this analysis to further 
assess the broad character of the Canadian approach to asylum. It is, however, 
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138 Cecilia Narvaez, Miguel Alexandro Narvaez et Daniel Antonio Narvaez c. Ministre de la 
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noteworthy that this statutory definition explicitly made reference to 
international human rights standards in order to designate people in ‘need of 
international protection’. Therefore, it further strengthens the view adopted 
by some judges, namely that international human rights could constitute 
relevant interpretive benchmarks in asylum cases.   
 
Further encouraging this tendency, Section 3 of the IRPA also relied 
on international human rights by defining the ‘objectives’ of Canadian 
refugee policy. For instance, Section 3(2) states that ‘the objectives of this 
Act with respect to refugees are […] b- to fulfil Canada’s international legal 
obligations […]’ and Section 3(3) states that ‘this Act is to be construed and 
applied in a manner that […] (f) complies with international human rights 
instruments to which Canada is signatory’. In light of this regulation, Simeon 
observed that ‘the overall context in which decisions about refugee protection 
are made in Canada is circumscribed by direct and explicit reference to human 
rights instruments of domestic and international origin’.143 
 
In spite of the express recognition of the importance of basic human 
rights in the legislation, Canadian judges have only sporadically relied on 
international human rights norms for interpreting the notion of persecution in 
recent years. Although references were made to international human rights in 
some cases,144  it seems that the jurisprudence had more recently started to 
interpret the notion of persecution on an ad hoc basis, without referring to any 
particular benchmark.145 For instance, in Mohilov and Others, the court stated 
that with respect to the punishment imposed for refusing to serve in the 
military ‘the possibility of imprisonment for a period of up to 56 days does 
not constitute excessive or draconian punishment or persecution’.146 There 
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was, however, no explanation as to why 56 days of prison did not constitute 
excessive punishment for this specific individual. The court did not refer to a 
human rights narrative, nor did it engage in a broader analysis of the personal 
circumstances of the claimant for assessing the impact of the harm faced. As 
such, no clear line of interpretation seemed to have been adopted in this case. 
Conversely, in another decision, X v. Canada, the Immigration and Refugee 
Board of Canada assessed the notion of persecution in light of human rights 
but did not follow any clear framework of interpretation. The Board stated 
that ‘being coerced into a religious behavior that is against one’s conscience 
amounts to a violation of one’s human rights’147 but no further explanation 
was provided to assess the consequences that the said measures had on the 
applicant.   
 
Through a comprehensive study of the Canadian jurisprudence, Meili 
noted that references to human rights treaties in the Canadian case law have 
in fact started declining at the end of the 1990s.148 According to him, ‘only 
11.3 per cent of published RPD [Refugee Protection Division] and Federal 
Court decisions since 1990 contained either direct or indirect references’ to 
one of the six major international human rights treaties considered in the 
study.149 Meili then observed that, although ‘the legislation [should] be 
interpreted in a manner consistent with Canada’s human rights treaty 
obligations, […] human rights treaties have had seemingly little impact on 
refugee jurisprudence’.150 He calls this phenomenon the ‘Canadian 
contradiction’151 and attributes it to diverse factors such as the fact that 
lawyers are not necessarily human rights experts,152 that judges seem to suffer 
from a form of human rights fatigue,153 and that human rights standards are 
so widely accepted in the legal system of the country that judges do not feel 
the need to express direct references to international treaties.154  
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Although the Canadian jurisprudence had tended to use human rights 
as interpretive benchmarks in the past, it seems indeed that such references 
have significantly decreased in recent years. From a different standpoint, Zinn 
and Perryman observed that higher instance courts have tended to refer more 
widely to human rights enshrined in the Charter than lower courts. To 
substantiate their findings, they provided examples of cases involving claims 
of religious persecution whereby the courts referred to freedom of religion as 
enshrined in the Charter.155 They concluded that ‘the judiciary's supervision 
of the Convention has been more significantly influenced by changes in 
Canada's domestic human rights laws’,156 thus demonstrating the significant 
impact that domestic human rights law had on the evolution of the Canadian 
jurisprudence. Whilst this is certainly true, it is, however, of note that 
Canadian judges have generally departed from a basic human rights narrative 
without relying on any other clear methodology, thus failing to adopt an 
explicit line of interpretation. References to other models, such as the 
UNHCR approach to persecution have also been quite sporadic even though 
the UNHCR guidelines have at times been quoted as interpretive guidance in 
relation to various others topics.157  
 
Given the overall lack of a principled approach in the Canadian 
jurisprudence, it is difficult to define a clear practice as to the interpretation 
of the notion of persecution, although it appears that human rights have to a 
certain extent underpinned the development of the jurisprudence. It seems, 
however, that cases are generally adjudicated more on an ad hoc basis, with 
a risk of inconsistent interpretations.  
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D)  United States: a subjective approach to the notion of 
persecution?   
 
 
In 1980, the USA incorporated the provisions of the 1951 Convention 
into national law through the Refugee Act158 but never defined the notion of 
persecution in the legislation. The interpretation of the notion of persecution 
therefore has remained merely a jurisprudential construct, without a clear line 
of interpretation, as regretted by some authors.159 
 
In order to understand the geopolitical context in which this 
jurisprudence has evolved, consideration should be given to the role of the 
USA on the international scene in the first years of the Cold War. After the 
signature of the 1951 Convention, the USA started distancing themselves 
from the international human rights movement by refusing to sign and ratify 
a number of human rights treaties. In this sense, Henkin noted in the late 
1970s that, the USA had ‘adhered to hardly any international human rights 
agreements’ and had signed the UDHR only because it did not have ‘the status 
of law or international obligation’.160 As a result, asylum judges in the USA 
had little incentive to refer to international standards in their decisions. They 
instead adopted a case-by-case approach to the notion of persecution, based 
on the subjective evaluation of the judge. According to Hathaway, the 
American jurisprudence represented at that time, ‘the zenith of a 
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fundamentally subjective approach to the identification of persecutory 
harm’,161 leading to very inconsistent decisions.   
 
For instance, in 1985, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) stated 
in Matter of Acosta that persecution: 
 
‘was construed to mean either a threat to the life or freedom 
of, or the infliction of suffering or harm upon, those who differ 
in a way regarded as offensive […] The harm or suffering 
inflicted could consist of confinement or torture. […] It also 
could consist of economic deprivation or restrictions so severe 
that they constitute a threat to an individual’s life or 
freedom’.162  
 
While this definition was relatively broad, it was also quite vague and 
did not provide for a clear line of analysis. In another seminal decision, Matter 
of Kasinga, the BIA provided an entirely different definition of the notion of 
persecution without referring to any interpretive framework, let alone human 
rights standards. The BIA stated that ‘persecution can consist of the infliction 
of harm or suffering by a government, or persons a government is unwilling 
or unable to control, to overcome a characteristic of the victim’.163 The BIA 
here seemed to flesh out the discriminatory element underlying the notion of 
persecution, but remained again very general, thus failing to adopt a clear 
methodology of interpretation.   
 
Conversely to the above decisions, some early cases were marked by 
a more restrictive understanding of persecution, as numerous judges 
considered that the Convention grounds were inherent to the definition of 
persecution.164 Aleinikoff criticised this view, stating that adjudicators 
adopted ‘narrow and technical readings of the specified grounds for 
persecution, once an applicant has demonstrated that, in fact, he or she is 
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likely to be persecuted if returned home’.165 Unfortunately, this position 
seems to have later prevailed in some recent cases.166 This was further 
inconsistent with other decisions that relied on the broader notion of 
discrimination, rather than on the five Convention grounds to define 
persecution. For instance, in one early case, the BIA considered that 
persecution was the ‘oppression which is inflicted on groups of individuals 
because of a difference that the persecutor will not tolerate’.167 In another 
decision, the BIA gave another formulation, stating that persecution was the 
‘harm or suffering that is inflicted upon an individual in order to punish him 
for possessing a belief or characteristic a persecutor seeks to overcome’.168 
Overall, it appeared that the US jurisprudence did not follow a consistent 
approach for assessing the notion of persecution.  
 
Unfortunately, this lack of consistency has prevailed today. For 
instance, in Nagoulko v INS, the court adopted a very subjective view of what 
amounts to persecution by stating that it consists in ‘the infliction of suffering 
or harm upon those who differ (in race, religion or political opinion) in a way 
regarded as offensive’.169  In some other decisions, adjudicators followed a 
similar line of analysis as they assessed persecution from their own standpoint 
rather than in consideration of the particular circumstances of the applicant. 
In particular, in Begzatowksi v INS, the court considered that persecution 
amounted to acts ‘that this country does not recognize as legitimate’.170 In 
another case, the judges used a different methodology by characterising 
persecution as meaning ‘more than plain harassment and may arise from 
actions such as detention, arrest, interrogation, prosecution, imprisonment, 
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(United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit 2016) at [11]. 
167 Adela Hernandez-Ortiz v Immigration and Naturalization Service, F.2d 509 (United States Court of 
Appeals, Ninth Circuit 777 1985) at [20] quoted in Jean-Francois Durieux, ‘Three Asylum Paradigms’ 
[2013] 20 International Journal on Minority and Group Rights 147, 157. 
168 Kretkowski (n 159) 338: In re Acosta, 19 I & N Dec 211, 211-12 (BIA 1985). In 2006, the BIA 
reaffirmed Acosta in Re C-A-, 23 1 N Dec 951, 955 (Board of Immigration Appeal 2006).  
169 Michelle Foster, International Refugee Law and Socio-Economic Rights: Refuge from Deprivation 
(CUP 2007) 37. 
170 Begzatowski v Immigration and Naturalization Service, No 01-2225 (United States Court of Appeals 
for the Seventh Circuit 2002). 
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illegal searches, confiscation of property, surveillance, beatings, or 
torture’.171 In Matter of M-F-W, the BIA gave yet another definition of 
persecution by stating that ‘persecution involves significant suffering or harm 
because of a protected ground in the Act’ and should not cause ‘merely 
harassment or discomfort’. 172  
 
Not only did the above proposed definitions differ in nature, but they 
are also quite imprecise. As such, in the absence of a coherent framework, the 
approaches adopted by US judges have tended to vary. Confirming this view, 
in Aldana Ramos v Holder173, the Court of Appeal emphasised the ad hoc 
nature of the approach adopted by US judges by noting that ‘whether a set of 
experiences rises to the level of persecution is decided on a case-by-case 
basis’.174  
 
Vittor and Anker considered that this lack of a principled approach 
led decision makers to be, at times, ‘cautious and conservative’.175 However, 
the authors pointed out that international human rights have, to a certain 
extent, influenced the evolution of the US jurisprudence, thus providing some 
form of guidance to define what sorts of harm amounted to persecution. For 
instance, they observed that human rights have become a central and integral 
part of the training of decision makers.176 Indeed, the official training manual 
for the officers of the Asylum Office provides basic courses in human rights 
and encourages the officers to consider human rights violations when they 
determine what forms of harm amount to persecution.177  
 
                                                
171 Tesfu v Ashcroft, 322 F.3d 477, 481 (7th Circuit Court 2003). 
172 Matter of M-F-W- & L-G-, 24 I&N Dec 633 (Board of Immigration Appeal 2008).  
173 See other cases where the assessment of the notion of persecution was based on a rather subjective 
test, without reference to any clear benchmarks: Hernandez-Lima v Lynch, Attorney General, No.15-
1983, United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, 7 September 2016, 10: the threats received 
by an applicant did not amount to persecution because they were not ‘sufficiently menacing’ as they 
did not involve any physical harm. Matter of Z-Z-O-, 26 I&N Dec. 586 (Board of Immigration Appeal 
2015) at 589: Economic sanctions and threat to be forcibly sterilized did not amount to persecution in 
this case, but the board did not further explain why. 
174 Aldana Ramos v Holder, 13-2022, 57 F 3d 9, 15 (1st Circuit Court 2014) 13. 
175 Deborah Anker and Josh Vittor, ‘International Human Rights and US Refugee Law: Synergies and 
Contradictions’ in Burson Bruce and David James Cantor (eds), Human Rights and the Refugee 
Definition, Comparative Legal Practice and Theory (Brill Nijhoff 2016) 109-137,121. 
176 Ibid 110. 
177 Ibid 116. 
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In addition, Anker demonstrated that human rights activists have 
contributed to the development of human rights in the US jurisprudence. 
According to her, the human rights narrative has progressively gained 
influence in the decisions of the BIA, allowing for a broader acceptation of 
different forms of harm. In particular, Anker studied how gender-based 
asylum claims have been historically adjudicated178 in the US and explained 
that through the human rights advocacy of different stakeholders, gender-
based forms of violence have been increasingly accepted by decision makers. 
Anker and Vittor also noted that the UNHCR guidelines had a major 
importance in the development of the case law in the US.179 Whilst they only 
considered that the UNHCR’s normative activity was part of the wider human 
rights movement, it should be also noted that the UNHCR Handbook has 
departed from a strict human rights narrative for interpreting persecution and 
encouraged a more circumstantial approach, which has also been referred to 
in the American jurisprudence.180 As such, it appears that both the basic 
human rights paradigm and the interpretive narrative of the UNHCR 
Handbook have underpinned, to some extent, the development of the case law 
in the US.  
 
Although no clear interpretive methodology has been developed in the 
American jurisprudence, it can be generally observed that the judges have, in 
some cases, interpreted the notion of persecution in an evolutionary manner, 
by recognising that various forms of harm could warrant refugee status. For 
instance, Vittor and Anker noted that US courts have recognised the existence 
of emotional harm,181 economic harm,182 denial of property183 and denial of 
health care184 as new types of predicaments amounting to persecution. Such 
conclusions either relied on a holistic assessment of the circumstances of the 
                                                
178 Deborah Anker, ‘Legal change from the bottom up: The development of gender asylum 
jurisprudence in the United States’, Chapter 2 in Efrat Arbel, Catherin Dauvergne, Jenni Millbank (eds) 
Gender in Refugee Law- from the Margins to the Centre (Routledge 2014) 46-72, 48.  
179 Anker and Vittor, (n 175) 119.  
180 Inter alia, Fengchu Chang v Immigration and Naturalization Service, 96-3140 (United States Court 
of Appeals for the Third Circuit 1997). Hongke Zhang v John Ashcroft, Attorney General, 03-70930 
(United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 2004). Bringas-Rodriguez v Session, Attorney 
General, 13-72682 (United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 8 March 2017) 17.  
181 Anker and Vittor (n 175) 126. 
182 Ibid 132. 
183 Ibid 133. 
184 Ibid 134. 
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applicants or on ad hoc references to external human rights standards without 
a clear framework of interpretation. For instance, in Matter of T-Z, the court 
noted that there may be situations in which ‘an extraordinarily severe fine or 
wholesale seizure of assets may be so severe as to amount to persecution even 
though the basic necessities of life might still be attainable’,185 thus adopting 
a rather broad understanding of the notion of persecution. Conversely, in 
Chen v Holder, the court assessed diverse human rights violations 
compounded by a series of other restrictions in order to conclude that ‘a claim 
of persecution based on economic deprivation generally requires a showing 
of a deliberate imposition of severe economic disadvantage or the deprivation 
of liberty, food, housing, employment or other essentials of life’,186 therefore 
adopting a stricter view of what sorts of harm amount to persecution.  
 
Without the clear use of a defined framework for interpreting the 
notion, there remains a certain risk of uncertainty and lack of transparency in 
the adjudication of asylum claims lodged in the US. Indeed, a 2007 study of 
the jurisprudence conducted by Schoenholtz et al. confirmed this view by 
demonstrating that there were significant disparities between the different 
American courts adjudicating cases, which led them to call the asylum system 
in the US, a ‘refugee roulette’.187 Recent findings made by the appeal court 
are quite telling in that regard and indicate that their observations remain 
relevant today. In Pan v. Holder, the court reviewed the appeal claim of a 
Christian male of Korean ethnicity originating from Kyrgyzstan who 
recounted a series of incidents whereby he and his family were mistreated by 
some non-state actors due to their religion. At first instance, the BIA rejected 
his claim on the ground that the harm faced did not amount to persecution but 
the BIA did not provide a clear explanation. The Appeal Court granted the 
claimant’s petition for review considering that the Board had failed to explain 
why his past experiences were ‘insufficiently egregious to constitute 
                                                
185 In Re T-Z-, Respondent 24 I&N Dec 163 (Board of Immigration Appeal 2007) Interim Decision 
#3564, 171. 
186 Chen v. Holder, Attorney General of the United States, Bo. 08-2836 (United States Court of Appeals 
for the Seventh Circuit 2010) 16. 
187 Andrew I. Schoenholtz, Jaya Ramji-Nogales, Philip G. Schrag ‘Refugee Roulette: Disparities in 
Asylum Adjudication’ [2007] 60 Stanford Law Review 295, 379: For these authors, the lack of statutory 
definition for the notion of persecution is not necessarily the cause of discrepant interpretations. They 
impute it instead to other circumstantial factors in refugee procedures. 
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persecution’,188 pointing at the necessity to better substantiate the assessment 
of what forms of harm amount to persecution and why. This assessment is 
regrettably often absent in many decisions in the USA. 
 
In conclusion, American judges do not explicitly rely on any clear 
methodology to interpret the notion of persecution. However, as 
demonstrated above, international human rights law and UNHCR guidance 
have, at times, guided the evolution of the jurisprudence in such a manner that 
various forms of harm are nowadays considered to amount to persecution, 
although the threshold of persecution remains unclear. Even when human 
rights standards have been referred to in various cases, in the absence of a 
specific interpretive pattern, there is still a risk that decision makers will adopt 
inconsistent or arbitrary methodologies for interpreting persecution.  
 
Part 3- Concluding remarks  
 
An overview of the above jurisprudences has demonstrated that there 
is still a significant level of inconsistency in interpreting what forms of harm 
amount to persecution, thus leading to some legal uncertainty for asylum 
seekers and questioning the relevance of this notion in certain cases. This 
tendency is noticeable, not only between national jurisdictions but also within 
them. Whilst common-law countries, save for the USA, have tended to refer 
more often to human rights for interpreting persecution, civil-law countries, 
such as France and Belgium, have been more reserved, even after the QD 
officially endorsed a human rights approach in Europe. Although a certain 
influence of international human rights is discernable in these countries, in 
particular through express references made to the QD, it remains quite unclear 
how human rights have underpinned the evolution of the case law in these 
jurisdictions. As such, ad hoc approaches are still quite dominant, thus 
creating some form of legal uncertainty for asylum seekers. The timid 
adoption of a more circumstantial approach has, however, yielded more 
generous results in Belgium than in France.  
                                                
188 Pan v. Holder, Attorney General, No 13-203 (2d Circuit Court 2015). 
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In countries that have referred more often and explicitly to human 
rights, such as in the UK, New Zealand and Australia, it does not appear that 
this narrative has fostered more consistency in the jurisprudence. Although a 
certain influence of the model developed by Hathaway is noticeable, decision 
makers seemed to have variably applied the parameters of his framework. In 
the words of Cantor, the human rights paradigm has proven to be ‘not 
cohesive’ but has rather reflected ‘a number of divergent understandings of 
the role of human rights in the interpretive exercise’189 of various 
jurisdictions. As such, the human rights approach based on objective 
standards of interpretation has not really fulfilled its promise of encouraging 
more coherence in the application of the 1951 Convention in the 21st century. 
Other countries, such as Canada and the USA have followed their own 
evolution with a certain influence of human rights law but there are still 
divergent views on how to assess the notion of persecution in the 
jurisprudence of these jurisdictions.  
 
Whilst the human rights framework has not been applied consistently, 
it does not appear that national jurisprudences have scrupulously developed 
or followed alternative models. The UNHCR’s circumstantial approach has 
been quite irregularly relied upon, although as noted above, it seems to have 
been quite welcomed in practice in Belgium and, to a certain extent, in New 
Zealand. In general, decision makers have been careful when referring to the 
UNHCR provisions. This could be explained by the fact that such guidance 
is not binding on states. Indeed, according to Feller, ‘judges may be reluctant 
to embrace standards that have no clear legal authority in their national 
laws’.190 This statement is also true for international human rights models, in 
particular in dualist legal systems. It seems, however, that this concern is 
more meaningful in the case of interpretive frameworks based on soft law 
                                                
189 James Cantor, ‘Defining Refugees: Persecution, Surrogacy and the Human Rights Paradigm’ in 
Burson Bruce and David James Cantor (eds), Human Rights and the Refugee Definition Comparative 
Legal Practice and Theory (Brill Nijhoff 2016) 349-395, 379. 
190 UNHCR, Address by Ms Erika Feller, Director, Department of International Protection, on the 
occasion of the 4th International Conference of the International Association of Refugee Law Judges 
(Berne, 25 October 2000). 
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instruments, such as UNHCR documents, as decision makers might want to 
avoid ‘any impression of judicial law-making’.191  
 
In 1999, Carlier noted that, according to the results of a comparative 
analysis of the jurisprudence in 15 countries, the ‘reasoning for decisions 
relating to refugee status is poor or non-existent’. He pointed that ‘too often, 
the grounds for a decision to recognise or reject refugee status, if given at all, 
are limited to general considerations’.192 Almost 20 years later, progress has 
been made, but significant discrepancies are still noted in the approaches used 
to interpret the notion of persecution. It could be, therefore, argued that some 
jurisprudential harmonisation is still needed between countries in order to 
ensure more coherence of the international system of refugee law. 
Harmonisation could be achieved notably through a broader recognition of 
the normative value of UNHCR guidance. Indeed, as proposed in the UNHCR 
Handbook, the application of an interpretive framework based on objective 
standards such as human rights norms, compounded by more practical 
approaches, is desirable in order to adopt interpretive schemes that are more 
consistent and better in line with the current protection needs of refugees. For 
instance, the jurisprudence developed in New Zealand demonstrated that the 
human rights framework can be used as a guiding principle to assist the 
analysis of the notion of persecution but not as a rigid framework. Indeed, in 
New Zealand, the human rights framework is often complemented by 
practical considerations given to the individual circumstances of asylum 
seekers and refugees. Although no explicit reference is made to the UNHCR 
approach, New Zealand judges seem, nonetheless, to adopt, a similar view by 
using human rights as general guidelines and complementing them with a 
more circumstantial approach.  
 
The concrete benefits and limitations that diverse interpretive 
approaches have on certain caseloads will be more closely evaluated in the 
                                                
191 Ibid.  
192 Jean-Yves Carlier, ‘The Geneva refugee definition and the ‘theory of the three scales’ in Frances 
Nicholson and Patrick Twomey (eds) Refugee Rights and Realities: Evolving International Concepts 
and Regimes (CUP 1999) 37-54, 40.  
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Chapter 5: Interpreting persecution in the 
context of gender-related violence 
 
As noted in previous chapters, persecution has traditionally been 
perceived as a form of harm perpetrated by oppressive regimes against 
individuals in the public sphere.1 Consequently, and for a long time, 
persecution was not considered to encompass private forms of violence 
suffered by women within their family or their community.2 This view, 
however, progressively changed in the 1980s and 1990s, when an increasing 
number of women lodged asylum applications based on their fear of violence 
from non-state agents.3 In this period, domestic jurisdictions started to 
adjudicate those claims in a more favourable manner, considering that 
persecution could occur within the private sphere and be specifically directed 
at women.4 In spite of a growing recognition of victims of gender-based 
violence as refugees, these forms of harm still pose significant interpretive 
challenges and are inconsistently addressed in domestic jurisdictions. In light 
of this situation, one might therefore wonder whether the notion of 
persecution is actually relevant for gender-sensitive claims and which 
interpretive method is the most desirable in these cases?  
 
                                                
1 See Chapter 1 and the traditional understanding of persecution according to the plenipotentiaries. See 
also Jane McAdam, “Rethinking the Origins of Persecution” [2014] 25 International Journal of Refugee 
Law 667, 674. McAdam mentioned the early League of Nations instruments indicating that ‘the men 
would run the risk of all kinds of persecution, while the women, children and old people would succumb 
to the hardships of the present economic conditions’.  
2 Jean-Yves Carlier, ‘The Geneva refugee definition and the ‘theory of the three scales’ in Frances 
Nicholson and Patrick Twomey (eds) Refugee Rights and Realities: Evolving International Concepts 
and Regimes (CUP 1999) 37-54, 39. 
3 Susan Kneebone, ‘Women Within the Refugee Construct: “Exclusionary Inclusion” in Policy and 
Practice — the Australian Experience’ [2005] 17 International Journal of Refugee Law 7, 9. See also 
Florian Francois Hoepfner, L’évolution de la notion de réfugié, Publication de la fondation 
Marangopoulos pour les droits de l’homme (Série 18, Paris Pedone 2014) 265.  In James C. Hathaway 
and Michelle Foster, The Law of Refugee Status, (2nd edn, CUP 2014) 193 Hathaway observed that, 
around the same period, refugee movements were “prompted by a risk of harm from persons 
unconnected to the state, such as insurgent groups, local criminal gangs, or at the hands of members of 
a family clan, or tribe”. In Walter Kalin, ‘Non-State Agents of Persecution and the Inability of the State 
to Protect’ [2001] 15 Georgetown Immigration Law Journal 415, 432. the author noted that the ‘world-
wide decline of State power and the emergence of non-state agents of persecution’ constituted major 
‘developments [that] have had the most profound impact on refugee law during the past ten years’. 
4 Carlier (n 2) 39. For Carlier, this change of paradigm reflected well how the notion of persecution had 
evolved in the 20th century. 
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Given the rising proportion of refugee women in the world5 and the 
conceptual difficulties in addressing their claims, the present chapter will 
engage in a case-study of decisions involving gender-based persecution. 
Whilst there is no legal definition of gender-related persecution in 
international law,6 the UNHCR defines it broadly as a form of harm that 
encompasses ‘the range of different claims in which gender is a relevant 
consideration in the determination of refugee status’.7 Gender-based violence 
covers a great variety of harms, such as, but not limited to, ‘acts of sexual 
violence, family/domestic violence, coerced family planning, female genital 
mutilation, punishment for transgression of social mores, and discrimination 
against homosexuals’.8 These various types of violence could not be 
comprehensively addressed in this chapter. However, some of the claims that 
have been the most regularly lodged in jurisdictions and that have raised 
contention, will be considered below, namely Female Genital Mutilation 
(FGM), domestic violence and trafficking in persons (hereunder trafficking) 
(Part 2).9 Prior to this, a theoretical analysis of the nature of gender-based 
violence will be conducted in order to delineate the contours of the 
interpretive debate (Part 1).  
 
This chapter will conclude that decision makers tend to overlook some 
aspects of the violence faced by women, and this, sometimes, leads to 
restrictive or inadequate outcomes. It will be contented that international 
                                                
5 Numbers vary but, women are consistently represented as constituting at least 50 per cent of the entire 
refugee population. UNHCR, Women, at http://www.unhcr.org/women.html. Kim mentioned estimates 
reporting that about three quarters of the refugee population are women and children in Sunny Kim, 
‘Gender-Related Persecution: A Legal Analysis of Gender Bias in Asylum Law’ [1994] 2 Journal of 
Gender and the LW 107, 109. 
6 UNHCR Guidelines on International Protection No. 1: Gender-Related Persecution Within the 
Context of Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention and/or its 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of 
Refugees, 7 May 2002, HCR/GIP/02/01, at [1]. 
7 Ibid at [1]. 
8 Ibid at [3]. 
9 In Kneebone (n 3) 20, the author identified some major categories of gender-related claims including 
sexual violence, FGM and domestic violence.  Anker and Lufkin followed the same line of analysis in 
Deborah Anker and Pail Lufkin, ‘Gender and the symbiosis between refugee law and human rights law’ 
(Migration Information Sources 2003) online article available at 
https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/gender-and-symbiosis-between-refugee-law-and-human-
rights-law. See also Heaven Crawley, ‘Engendering International Refugee Protection: Are We There 
Yet?’ in Burson Bruce and David James Cantor (eds), Human Rights and the Refugee Definition 
Comparative Legal Practice and Theory (Brill Nijhoff 2016) 322-347, 330. The present chapter will 
roundly adopt the same line of analysis. However, given that the issue of sexual violence is rather broad, 
this chapter will focus more specifically on one aspect of sexual violence, namely trafficking, due to 
the conceptual difficulties that these cases raises as it will be analysed below. 
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human rights law had a positive influence on the adjudication of gender-based 
claims, but the strict application of a human rights framework has not really 
encouraged protective and consistent approaches. In particular, the role that 
human rights should play in interpreting persecution has been inconsistently 
understood. Additionally, decision makers who have relied on a formalist 
human rights framework have often focused on stereotyped forms of harm10 
and, therefore, have often disregarded diverse circumstances of refugee 
women.  
 
Part 1) Gender-based violence and interpretive challenges   
 
The below section will demonstrate that the development of human 
rights on the international scene has encouraged an evolutionary approach to 
the notion of persecution as contended by some authors (A). In spite of these 
changes, it will be argued that interpretive challenges for cases of gender-
based harms are still persistent (B).  
 
A)   The influence of human rights law on the growing recognition 
of gender-based violence as a form of persecution 
 
  In the second half of the 20th century, states started considering that 
the condition of women in the private sphere should be regulated through 
international human rights law. In 1979, the Convention on the Elimination 
of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) was adopted as 
members of the international community proclaimed the necessity to bring 
‘the female half of humanity into the focus of human rights concerns’11 in 
order to change ‘the traditional role of men [and] women in the society and 
in the family’.12 This new focus on women’s rights arguably influenced 
international refugee law. Indeed, a few years after the adoption of the 
                                                
10 In Megan Denise Smith, ‘Rethinking gender in the international refugee regime’ [ 2016] 53 FMR 65: 
the author stated that ‘measures to improve RSD and expand the Convention definition for gender-
related persecution have tended to portray ‘essential’ refugee women’s identities that are constructed 
by UNHCR, the media and governments but not by refugee women themselves. Key to this victimhood 
narrative are certain images and categories, such as the lumping together of ‘women and children’. 
11 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, 18 December 1979, 
UNTS 13 Vol 1249, Introduction. 
12 Ibid.  
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CEDAW, the UNHCR started issuing documents, recommending that the 
typical predicaments faced by women should also be considered a basis for 
asylum.13 In 1991, the UNHCR then released formal guidelines on the 
protection of women, stating that a gender-based approach should be adopted 
for interpreting the terms of the 1951 Convention in cases involving refugee 
women.14 These guidelines in turn encouraged Canada, the USA, Australia 
and the UK to develop their own interpretive guidance for claims based on 
gender-related persecution.15  
 
In light of this evolution, some authors pointed out that human rights 
had exerted a growing influence on the understanding that decision makers 
had of the notion of persecution. For instance, Anker and Lufkin argued that 
human rights had a determining impact on the jurisprudence and have led to 
the recognition of an increasing number of victims of gender-related 
violence.16 Kneebone also noted that, even if persecution was traditionally 
perceived as a form of harm based on ideological differences, the human 
rights framework positively influenced the way gender-related persecution 
was interpreted in refugee law.17 Similarly, Edwards contended that the 
emergence of specialised treaties had ‘advanced global trends towards gender 
inclusion and equal treatment between the sexes’, thus leading to more 
generous approaches to those claims. 18  
 
                                                
13 In 1985 the UNHCR ExCom stated that: ‘women asylum seekers who fear harsh or inhumane 
treatment due to their transgressions of societal mores in their home countries” may fall within the 
protection regime of the 1951 Convention, UNHCR ExCom conclusion No 39 (XXXVI) – 1985 – 
Refugee Women and International Protection. Inter alia, see also conclusion defining gender-based 
violence as a form of persecution; UNHCR ExCom conclusion No 73 (XLIV) – 1993 – Refugee 
Protection and Sexual Violence; ExCom conclusion No. 77 (XLVI) – 1995; ExCom conclusion No 79 
(XLVII) – 1996; ExCom conclusion No 87 (L) – 1999. 
14 UNHCR, Guidelines on the Protection of Refugee Women, July 1991.   
15 Kneebone (n 3) 15. 
16 Anker and Luftin (n 9). See also Deborah Anker, ‘Legal Change from the Bottom Up: The 
Development of Gender Asylum Jurisprudence in the United States’ in Efrat Arbel, Catherin 
Dauvergne, Jenni Millbank (eds) Gender in Refugee Law, From the Margins to the Centre (Routledge 
2014) 46-72, 42. See also: Rachel Bacon and Kate Booth, ‘The Intersection of Refugee Law and 
Gender: Private Harm and Public Responsibility: Islam; Ex Parte Shah Examined’ [2000] 23 University 
New South Wales 135, 142: “developments in the international human rights field indicate that a 
significant shift has taken place in the international community’s understanding of gender issues more 
generally.”  
17 Kneebone (n 3) 9. 
18 Alice Edwards, ‘Age and gender dimensions in international refugee law’ in Erika Feller, Volker 
Turk, Frances Nicholson (eds), Refugee Protection in International Law: UNHCR’s Global 
Consultations on International Protection (CUP 2003) 50. 
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In spite of these positive developments, some other scholars have 
argued that there were some limitations existing in the refugee definition that 
could not be overcome even through the application of a human rights 
scheme. For instance, in the late 1990s, Haines raised a major concern for the 
recognition of gender-related persecution cases because of the surrogacy 
principle. For him, the accountability theory applied by certain European 
countries regarding the role of the state in acts of persecution was an 
important obstacle to the recognition of women as refugees.19 According to 
these countries, a claimant would be granted refugee status only if the state 
actively encouraged or tolerated the infliction of harm, thus adding an extra 
burden of proof on women claimants. This practice had been mostly used in 
civil countries such as France and Germany20 but fortunately has been 
progressively abandoned since the QD21 was adopted and is more rarely relied 
upon in the recent jurisprudence. Whilst some jurisdictions still tend to reject 
asylum applications by placing an undue emphasis on the role of state 
protection,22 the human rights scheme, in particular developed through the 
QD had in fact helped to partly overcome this issue, at least in Europe. 
Although state protection has, at times, been considered in other jurisdictions, 
an extensive discussion of this element would fall outside the purview of the 
present analysis. Indeed, as discussed in Chapter 3, the test of state protection 
should not be considered an inherent part of the persecution test. As 
mentioned, by Kneebone in her analysis of gender-based persecution cases, 
‘the true position is that the lack of state protection is relevant to the question 
of the reasonableness of the fear of persecution, but is not a requirement of 
persecution as such’.23 The present section will instead focus on the nature of 
the harm required to amount to persecution as it has also raised major 
contentious in a number of decisions. 
 
                                                
19 Rodger Haines, “Gender-Based Persecution: New Zealand Jurisprudence” [1997] 9 International 
Journal of Refugee Law 129, 139. 
20 Catherine Phuong, ‘Persecution by Non-State Agents: Comparative Judicial Interpretations of the 
1951 Refugee Convention’ [2002] 4 European Journal of Migration and Law 521. 
21 Article 6 of the QD.  
22 Hoepfner (n 3) 318 regarding the practice in Canada.  
23 Kneebone (n 3) 39. Similarly, see Hoepfner (n 3) 319 on the view of Canadian jurisprudence.  
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In addition to concerns related to the role of state protection in asylum 
claims, some authors have observed that the refugee definition is unable to 
encompass all forms of violence against women due to the absence of 
‘gender’ or ‘sex’ as a Convention ground.24 For them, this omission generally 
discouraged a gender-sensitive interpretation of the 1951 Convention, and 
raised concerns regarding the flexibility of the refugee definition and its 
ability to be interpreted in an evolutionary manner. The UNHCR somehow 
responded to these arguments by expressing the view that gender-based 
violence25 could be easily accommodated within the current definition as 
women could, depending on the circumstances, fall within the Membership 
to a Particular Social Group (MPSG) ground. National jurisprudences26 
generally followed the same view.  
 
Some authors, such as Anker, also supported this position. According 
to her, there was no need for a ‘gender’ ground to be included within the 1951 
Convention because a gender-based approach should be generally applied 
when interpreting the whole refugee definition.27 She argued that the 
development of human rights should be viewed as encouraging a gender-
based approach to all the Convention reasons, without the necessity to add a 
specific ground of ‘gender’. In Europe, the recast QD adopted this position 
by stating that persecution can be of a specific gender-related nature,28 thus 
further encouraging states to adopt an overall gender-sensitive interpretation 
of the 1951 Convention without amending the definition of a refugee. This 
approach is currently the dominant one, given the absence of concrete 
prospect to amend the Convention. The interpretive difficulty seems, 
                                                
24 Joanna J. Kallinosis, ‘Refugee Roulette: A Comparative Analysis of Gender-Related Persecution in 
Asylum Law’ [2017] 6 DePaul Journal of Women, Gender and the Law 55, 90-92. See also Alice 
Edwards, ‘Distinction, Discretion, Discrimination: The new frontiers of gender-related claims to 
asylum’
 
European University Institute, Florence, Italy, 18-19 June 2012, 1-13, 13 available at 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/4ffd430c2.html and Kim (n 5) 108-109 and 113.  
25 UNHCR ExCom conclusion No. 39 (XXXVI) – 1985 – Refugee Women and International 
Protection. UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Guidelines on the Protection of Refugee 
Women, July 1991, at [72]. 
26 Inter alia, Islam v Secretary of State for the Home Department; R v Immigration Appeal Tribunal, ex 
parte Shah [1999] 2 AC 629 United Kingdom: House of Lords (Judicial Committee), 25 March 1999; 
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Khawar HCA 14 (11 April 2002); Case No. 
0900571, RRTA 303 (16 April 2009); Matter of A-R-C-G 26 I&N Dec. 388 (Board of Immigration 
Appeal 2014);  
27 Anker (n 16) 51. 
28 Article 9(2)(f) QD.  
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however, to have been displaced onto the interpretation of the term 
persecution, rather than the Convention grounds as it will be below 
demonstrated. 
 
Whilst the influence of human rights has most certainly encouraged 
an evolutionary understanding of the refugee definition, one might, 
nonetheless, wonder to what extent this has been the case. In particular, it 
should be questioned whether human rights have permitted a flexible and 
adaptable interpretation of the notion of persecution. What follows will 
highlight some theoretical deficiencies in the human/woman rights narrative 
in order to assess the limitations that the human rights approach can have in 
interpreting gender-related forms of persecution. 
 
B)   Interpretive challenges  
 
Recent criticisms have been voiced against the gender bias that 
underpinned the development of basic human rights on the international 
scene. Authors have pointed to the fact that the international human rights 
narrative is not neutral but is based on typical male circumstances.29 This 
paradigm perpetuates the hierarchical subjection of women to men in 
patriarchal societies and fails to fulfil the liberal promise of human rights to 
‘emancipate the individual from the oppression of political structures’.30 In 
this sense, Crawley noted that the ‘ideas of what constitutes human rights 
follow an androcentric model’ which posits males’ experiences as the norm 
and presents women as helpless victims.31 In a similar manner, Edwards 
considered that, although the recent development of women’s rights on the 
international scene was a positive step towards a more inclusive and gender-
sensitive approach to refugee claims, the human rights paradigm 
unfortunately remains anchored into the traditional dichotomy between men 
and women. According to her, ‘men’s experiences are posited as the norm of 
                                                
29 Inter alia see Charlesworth et al, ibid; C. Kim (n 5); C. Romany, ‘Women as Aliens: A Feminist 
Critique of the Public/Private Distinction in International Human Rights Law’ (1993) 6 Harvard Human 
Rights Journal 87, 87; Crawley (n 10) 339: Crawley speaks of the ‘gendered nature of IHRL’. 
30 Romany ibid 90.  
31 Crawley (n 10) 341. See also Alice Edwards, ‘Transitioning Gender: Feminist Engagement with 
International Refugee Law and Policy [2010] 29 Refugee Survey Quarterly 21, 31.  
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international law and women only gain access to the system by equating their 
experiences to these masculine norms’.32 In order to illustrate her statements, 
she provided the example of the prohibition of torture, which is still perceived 
as an act perpetrated by state actors, or individuals in positions of state 
authority, for the purpose of extracting information. She explained that these 
experiences usually relate to men’s roles in the society more than women’s33 
and that the violence against women has to reach a certain threshold of gravity 
in order to be considered torture, thus adding an extra burden on women to 
demonstrate that they have been victims of severe human rights violations. 
This view has been supported by many authors such as Crawley34 or Firth and 
Mauthe who also lamented that ‘women have to conform to a particular 
cultural stereotype in order to succeed in their asylum claims’.35 On a similar 
note, Smith noted that in order to ‘gain state protection, a woman must 
demonstrate that she behaves in the proper way […] that is, as a de-
politicised, voiceless victim of an oppressive culture’,36 thus further 
highlighting the gender-biased interpretations of the refugee definition. 
  
Authors argued that one of the major reasons for the dysfunctionality 
of the human rights and asylum systems is the separation between public and 
private spheres that is operated in international human rights law.37 Females’ 
experiences are typically perceived to unfold in the private sphere, while 
males continue to be major actors of the public sphere. For Edwards, this 
distinction engages a limited requirement of the state to protect individuals in 
the private sphere which is inadequate in certain refugee claims.38 Robert also 
noted that this distinction between the private and public sphere is misleading 
because it creates the wrong assumption that harms perpetrated in the private 
                                                
32 Alice Edwards, Violence against women under international human rights law, (CUP 2010) 305. 
33 Ibid 206.  
34 Crawley (n 10) 323. 
35 Georgina Firth and Barbara Mauthe, ‘Refugee Law, Gender and the Concept of Personhood’ [2013] 
25 International Journal of Refugee Law 470, 482. 
36 Megan Denise Smith, ‘Rethinking gender in the international refugee regime’ [ 2016] 53 FMR 65, 
66.  
37 Edwards (n 32) 237. See also inter alia, Charlotte Bunch, ‘Women's Rights as Human Rights: Toward 
a Re-Vision of Human Rights’ [1990] 12 Human Rights Quarterly 486; for a general discussion on the 
distinction between private/public sphere or state/civil society see: Frances E. Olsen, ‘International 
Law: Feminist Critiques of the Public/Private Distinction’ [1993] 25 Studies in Transnational Legal 
Policy 157. For a general overview of the debate: Tuuli Karjala, Sixty Years of Silence: Gender 
Discrimination under International Refugee Law (Stellenbosch University, 2016-03) 65. 
38 Ibid 238-239.   
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sphere are only motivated by personal reasons.39 Similarly, Firth and 
Mauthe40 pointed out that human rights offer a narrow view of women’s 
experiences because the traditional distinction between public/private 
harms41 has an adverse impact on the way asylum applications are 
adjudicated. According to them, ‘there is little space within the dominant 
discourses for context-specific, accurate representations of refugee women’s 
diverse experiences or agency’.42  
 
A feminist approach to international human rights law, therefore, 
shows that the current human rights paradigm for interpreting persecution 
does not adopt a neutral language. It highlights the fact that human rights law 
is based on behavioural standards rooted in men’s daily experiences within 
the public sphere and does not adequately reflect the complexity of women’s 
circumstances, pictured as having protection needs mostly within the private 
sphere. Whilst the private aspect of women’s experiences should not be 
denied, a larger understanding of the public dimension of the violence that 
they face, and how their roles are shaped by traditional structures of societies, 
would encourage a more holistic understanding of the nature of gender-based 
persecution. In fact, the basic human rights narrative runs the risk of 
simplifying the interpretive exercise of the notion of persecution by 
identifying only certain forms of harm and overshadowing others. This view 
is in line with the oft quoted observations of Charlesworth, Chinkin and 
Wright who stated that ‘the normative structure of international law has 
allowed issues of particular concern to women to be either ignored or 
undermined’.43 
 
For example, it is nowadays well established that gender violence 
such as sexual abuse or rape44 constitutes a human rights violation. However, 
                                                
39 Anthea Roberts, ‘Gender and Refugee Law’ [2002] 22 Australian Year Book of International Law 
159, 190. 
40 Firth and Barbara Mauthe (n 35) 481. 
41 Ibid 476. Anker also pointed out that some judges adopted the same view, in Deborah Anker, 
‘Refugee Law, Gender, and the Human Rights Paradigm’ [2002] 15 Harvard Human Rights Journal 
133.  
42 Firth and Mauthe (n 35) 482. 
43 Hilary Charlesworth, Christine Chinkin, Shelley Wright, ‘Feminist Approaches to International Law’ 
[1991] 85 American Journal of International Law 613, 625. 
44 Anker (n 41) 141-144. 
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other aspects of a victim’s life are barely touched upon by human rights or 
refugee law. On this point, reference can be made to Liberman who 
highlighted the importance of the notion of shame, as structuring the roles of 
men and women in certain societies.45 She described the major implications 
that this element can have on the safety of women as she stated that: 
 
 ‘in numerous cultures if a woman is raped or subjected to 
spousal abuse and she tries to seek redress, her family and 
community may ostracize her and treat her as ruined property, 
unworthy of remarriage. By the same token, the alternative for 
a woman who refuses FGM is ostracisation, shame, and 
derision as either a promiscuous woman, or an inadequate, 
overgrown child’. 46  
 
In spite of this, the element of shame, underlying the acts of gender-
related persecution, is rarely acknowledged as a form of violence, let alone a 
form of persecution in asylum jurisdictions. It is, nonetheless, a powerful tool 
by which perpetrators keep women in a subversive position in certain social 
settings.  
 
For instance, a victim of rape, in the context of indiscriminate criminal 
violence might be unlikely to face the same form of abuse if she goes back to 
her country. It should not, however, be concluded that she is not at risk of 
harm upon return. Focusing only on the prospective risk of human rights 
violation (the rape) would displace the discursive debate onto the wrong form 
of predicament. The harm that the victim might suffer if she goes back to her 
community, could be very much attached to the ‘shame’ that the rape has 
bestowed upon the family, leading in the worst cases to honor killings, but 
also to various forms of ostracism, stigma and trauma that can have in turn a 
major impact on the individual’s life. Whilst this aspect of gender-based 
                                                
45 Irena Liberman, ‘Women and Girls Facing Gender-Based Violence, and Asylum Jurisprudence’ 
[2002] 29 Online Human Rights Magazine of the American Bar, no 3 available at: 
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/crsj/publications/human_rights_magazine_home.html.      
46 Ibid.  
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violence is increasingly discussed in national jurisdictions, it remains too 
often forgotten.  
 
 For the reasons laid out above, it appears that a human rights 
framework for interpreting the notion of persecution does not sufficiently 
encourage a holistic assessment of the various circumstances that refugee 
women could face in their place of origin, which appears in fact in opposition 
to the arguable intention47 of the plenipotentiaries to allow for an evolutionary 
understanding of the notion of persecution.  
 
With this theoretical background in mind, the following section will 
engage in a study of selected cases in order to evaluate how the harms claimed 
by women have been addressed in various jurisdictions and what evolutions 
are further desirable.  
 
Part 2) The notion of persecution and jurisprudential approaches 
to gender-based violence 
 
Certain forms of violence perpetrated in the refugee’s community or 
family, such as FGM (A) coupled with/or domestic violence (B) have formed 
the basis of numerous refugee claims. Similarly, criminal activities, 
perpetrated by transnational networks forcing people into trafficking have 
been increasingly invoked in domestic jurisdictions (C). Although men can 
be trafficked under various circumstances, a very large number of the 
trafficking victims are women and girls,48 therefore falling within the 
category of gender-related violence.49 The above harms are only few 
examples of the forms that gender-based violence can take but they have been 
adjudicated quite inconsistently, thus raising some legal uncertainty for 
asylum seekers. This section will analyse how the notion of persecution has 
                                                
47 Chapter 1, Part 2 (C). 
48 Report of the General Assembly on Trafficking in women and girls A/71/223, 27 July 2016 at [9]. 
See Saito Kaori, Research Paper No 149, ‘International protection for trafficked persons and those who 
fear being trafficked’ Policy Officer Division of Human Resource Management UNHCR, December 
2007, Geneva, 9. 
49 UNHCR Guidelines on International Protection No7: The Application of Article 1A(2) of the 1951 
Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees to Victims of Trafficking and Persons At 
Risk of Being Trafficked, 7 April 2006, HCR/GIP/06/07 at [21].  
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been applied to such claims and argue that this notion remains relevant for 
these specific cases if a more circumstantial approach is adopted.  
 
A)   The practice of FGM and its persecutory dimension 
 
i-FGM: a general overview 
 
According to the World Health Organization (WHO), FGM consists 
in ‘all procedures involving partial or total removal of the external female 
genitalia, or other injury to the female genital organs, for non-medical 
reasons’.50 Due to the severe medical complications and suffering imposed 
by the act of FGM, the WHO considers that ‘FGM is a violation of the human 
rights of girls and women’.51 The practice of FGM is a ritual performed in 
certain traditional societies in order to mark the passage from childhood to 
adulthood, and often takes place in the traditional context of arranged or 
forced marriage. Middleburg and Bala pointed out that FGM is generally 
‘believed to be a requirement for marriage and necessary to control women’s 
sexuality’.52 Lewis also highlighted the traditional aspect of FGM by 
explaining how it structures the role of women within their community.53 This 
deep customary imprint and the private dimension of FGM has been viewed 
by some as a major barrier to the recognition of FGM victims as refugees.54 
For instance, Steinbock rejected the possibility that FGM could be a basis for 
asylum as he considered that the 1951 Convention was not meant to provide 
protection against such forms of harms. For him, it was ‘hard to justify the 
application of the refugee definition to this traditional practice of many 
                                                
50 WHO, ‘Eliminating Female Genital Mutilation: An Interagency Statement’ (2008) 4; WHO, ‘Female 
Genital Mutilation’, Fact Sheet No 241 (Feb 2014) 
<http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs241/en/>. 
51 Female Genital Mutilation’, Fact Sheet No 241 (updated Feb 2017) 
<http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs241/en/>. 
52  Annemarie Middelburg, Aline Balta, ‘Female Genital Mutilation/Cutting as a Ground for Asylum 
in Europe’ [2016] 28 International Journal of Refugee Law 416, 416-417.  
53 In Hope Lewis, ‘Between Irua and Female Genital Mutilation: Feminist Human Rights Discourse 
and the Cultural Divide’ [1995] 8 Harvard Human Rights Journal 1, 30, the authors mention the analysis 
of Jomo Kenyatta who calls for awareness of the cultural context of FGM. Although caution should be 
exerted in relying on cultural relativism arguments to justify FGM, the view that FGM is deeply rooted 
into social structures, is important.  
54 Ibid 8. Lewis mentioned that considering FGM has raised ‘complex cultural, gender, and racial 
questions’ and thus is not easily considered a human rights violation. 
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centuries’ standing based on the historical background of the Convention’55 
because he considered that there was ‘no evidence whatsoever that the 
drafters or practitioners of refugee law in the post-war period intended to 
encompass known, traditional, gender-based inequalities’.56 His view, 
however, did not gain major traction amongst decision-makers and scholars 
as FGM became a central concern of refugee women towards the end of the 
cold war.   
 
ii- FGM as a physical harm: an act of persecution? 
 
As of the 1990s,57 an increasing number of claims relating to the fear 
of being subjected to FGM started being lodged in national jurisdictions. This 
period coincided with the growing influence of the human rights approach 
proposed by Hathaway, which arguably had a certain impact on the 
adjudication of these cases. This evolution led to a growing acceptance that a 
risk of FGM, due to the extreme suffering that it entails, could amount to 
persecution. For instance, as early as 1994, Canada acknowledged that a risk 
of facing FGM could warrant refugee recognition.58 This has remained the 
interpretive line in the jurisprudence since then, but the methodology for 
reaching such a conclusion was and remains rather unclear. In some cases, 
Canadian decision makers seemed to rely on human rights to assess FGM-
based claims, although quite implicitly,59 whilst in other cases, they adopted 
ad hoc approaches.60  
 
The US jurisprudence also adopted a favourable view on FGM claims. 
For instance, in the landmark case Matter of Kasinga, the BIA considered that 
FGM, ‘which results in permanent disfiguration and poses a risk of serious, 
potentially life-threatening complications, can be the basis for a claim of 
                                                
55 Daniel J. Steinbock, ‘Interpreting the Refugee Definition’ [1998] 45 UCLA Law Review 733, 778. 
56 Ibid.   
57 Hoepfner (n 3) 292. 
58 Khadra Hassan Farah, Mahad Dahir Buraleh, Hodan Dahir Buraleh [1994] No T93-12198, T93-
12199, T93-12199, T12197 Canada: Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada: in this case the Board 
acknowledged that the risk of FGM would be contrary to the CRC. 
59 Ibid. See also MA1-07929 [2002] Immigration and Refugee board of Canada (refugee division) 2.  
60 Faustina Annan v Minister of Citizenship and Immigration of Canada [1995] IMM-215-95 Canada: 
Federal Court: the Court qualified FGM as a ‘cruel and barbaric’ practice and granted refugee status to 
the claimant at [3]. 
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persecution’.61 This position has been quite consistent since then in the US 
jurisprudence. Although no clear line of interpretation is noticeable for those 
cases, authors have argued that the development of human rights has 
significantly influenced the decisions of judges. For instance, Hathaway 
mentioned a series of cases in the US in which FGM has been considered a 
human rights violation.62 Anker63 also noted that the jurisprudence in this 
field evolved through the influence of human rights law. In line with the 
above developments, Australia also considered that a future risk of FGM, or 
a risk of being re-subjected to genital mutilation, amounts to persecution.64 
The influence of human rights was notable, for instance, in Case No 1101038, 
where the Refugee Tribunal of Australia (RRTA) considered that FGM 
involved a ‘threat to life’65 and hence constituted persecution. 
A favourable approach to FGM claims has been also adopted in 
Europe.66 In particular, in the UK, judges often considered that a risk of FGM 
can amount to persecution67. For instance, in Fornah, the House of Lords 
agreed that the harm faced by the applicant consisted in a human rights 
violation.6869 Similar to the above evolution, France and Belgium also tended 
                                                
61 Matter of Kasinga; 21 I&N Dec 357, 365 (Board of Immigration Appeal 1996); see other cases in 
the US which adopted the same approach: Abankwah v. INS, 185 F.3d 18, 23-24 (2nd Circuit Court 
1999); Abay. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 634 (United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit 2004). Matter 
of A-T, Respondent, 24 I&N Dec (Decided by the US Attorney General 2008); Khadija Ahmed 
Mohamed v Alberto R. Gonzales, Attorney General 400 F.3d 785 (US Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit 
2005): the Court found that FGM amounts to ‘continuing and permanent persecution’ at 3085. 
62 James C. Hathaway and Michelle Foster, The Law of Refugee Status (2nd edn, CUP 2014) 215. 
63 Anker (n 16) 54.  
64 Australia: FGM and forced marriage amount to serious harm hence persecution in RRT Case No 
1101038 [2011] RRTA, 307 (14 April 2011); RRT Case No 0808751 [2009] RRTA 217 (18 March 
2009). 
65 Ibid. 
66 Hana Cheikh Ali, Christel Querton and Elodie Soulard, Gender-related Claims in Europe: 
Comparative Analysis of Law, Policies and Practice Focusing on Women in Nine EU Member States 
(Directorate General for Internal Policies, Policy department C: Citizens’ rights and Constitutional 
Affairs, European Parliament, 2012) 36.  
67 However, a researcher pointed out that very few negative decisions were published in the UK, and 
efforts to obtain samples remained unanswered, thus relativizing this positive observation in Maja 
Grundler, The Protection of Asylum Seekers Against Female Genital Mutilation in the UK (Humboldt-
Universität zu Berlin Centre for British Studies 2015) 41.  
68 Zainad Esther Fornah v Secretary of State for the Home [2006] UKHL 46, 18 October 2006: see 
Baroness Held of Richmond at [94] ‘it is a human rights issue, not only because of the unequal treatment 
of men and women, but also because the procedure will almost inevitably amount either to torture or to 
other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment’.  
69 See other cases granting refugee status to victims of FGM: VM (FGM - Risks - Mungiki - 
Kikuyu/Gikuyu) Kenya v Secretary of State for the Home Department, CG [2008] UKAIT 00049, 9 
June 2008. K and others (FGM) The Gambia CG v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, [2013] 
UKUT 00062(IAC), April 2013. 
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to consider that an act of FGM could rise to the level of persecution70 although 
they rarely relied on a human rights scheme. In the case of Melle Diop,71 the 
French judges stated that FGM could be a basis for asylum for reasons of 
membership to a particular social group. They, nonetheless, restricted the 
scope of persecution as they posited that refugee status could only be granted 
if the practice of FGM was condoned or actively tolerated by the state, thus 
insisting on the necessary public dimension of the notion of persecution. 
Hoepfner regretted this approach as he noted that the requirement of an active 
participation of the authorities in these kinds of harm had discouraged 
claimants to lodge asylum on that account until the early 2000s in Europe.72 
Fortunately, the jurisprudence further evolved in France, in particular after 
the adoption of the QD and the abandoning of the accountability theory.  
Nowadays, prospective victims of FGM in France tend to be granted refugee 
status without having to demonstrate that they had sought protection from the 
authorities before leaving their country.73  
Regrettably, France has, however, recently developed a restrictive 
jurisprudential trend for children born after their parents’ departure from their 
place of origin. In Mlle K, 74 the CNDA considered that girls born in France 
and fearing to undergo FGM in their country would not meet the criteria of 
the 1951 Convention. According to the French judges, these claimants should 
instead be granted subsidiary protection. No clear framework of analysis has 
been, however, adopted to justify this position as the court merely stated that 
there is no reasonable likelihood that these girls will be individually singled 
out in their place of origin. This approach clearly disregards important 
discriminatory elements of FGM perpetrated against women.75 In another 
case,76 the court adopted an even narrower view by rejecting the application 
                                                
70 See Arrêt n° 61.832, Belgium: Conseil du Contentieux des Etrangers, 19 Mai 2011; CNDA 21 
Décembre 2012 N° 332491; Arrêt n° 138 876, Belgium: Conseil du Contentieux des Etrangers, 19 
Février 2015. 
In France, another case also recognized that FGM amounts to persecution: CRR, 16 Juin 2005, N 
492440, Mlle S.  
71 CRR, 17 juillet 1991, 164078, Mlle Diop Aminata.  
72 Hoepfner (n 3) 299.  
73 Ibid 300.  
74 CNDA, Decision du 12 Mars 2009, Mme Mariam Diarra ép. Kouyate, n° 638891; CNDA Décision 
du 25 mars 2010 M. S. n° 08017355 C+. 
75 UNHCR, Guidance Note on Refugee Claims Relating to Female Genital Mutilation, May 2009 at 
[1]. 
76 Hoefpner (n 3) 305. 
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of a child born in France on the mere ground of her young age. Hoepfner 
pointed out that this interpretation was concerning, because the element of 
‘age’ does not normally constitute a bar to refugee status under the 1951 
Convention.77 The above cases exemplify the pitfalls of ad hoc interpretive 
frameworks that tend, at times, to present little or inaccurate justifications for 
a decision. The French jurisprudence on that point has been qualified as 
“ambiguous” by a report of the European Parliament.78  
Various interpretive approaches have been adopted in national 
jurisdictions for adjudicating FGM claims, but it can be noted that the general 
influence of human rights has been positive for claimants and has led to an 
increasing recognition of individuals at risk of undergoing FGM. However, 
by focusing on the physical act of FGM and its consequences on the 
applicant’s health and security, decision makers have at times disregarded 
other aspects of the applicant’s claim as will be considered below. For 
instance, peripheral aspects of FGM such as the claims of parents whose girls 
are at risk of facing FGM, or girls who themselves can manage to avoid FGM 
upon return to their country are inconsistently addressed. In these cases, ad 
hoc methodologies seemed to have been adopted, thus yielding different 
results.  
iii-Peripheral aspects of the harms surrounding the act of FGM    
 
Hoepfner observed the emergence of subsequent waves of FGM 
claims, involving parents of little girls79 at risk of genital mutilation in their 
country. The conceptual difficulties that arise from these types of claim, 
concern the forms of harm that the parents themselves are likely to face in 
their place of origin. A human rights interpretive framework often fails to 
address issues of concern, relating to the mental suffering of the parents of 
the girl who avoided the FGM, as well as the ostracism or stigmatisation of 
these parents. Indeed, refusing to engage in FGM can have even wider 
repercussions on the family itself in certain tribal societies. Whilst these 
                                                
77 Hoepfner ibid.   
78 Cheikh Ali et al (n 66) 37. 
79 Hoepfner (n 3) 302. 
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claims might not always be viewed as being gender-related per se, they are 
nonetheless tied to a specific perception of the roles of women in the society. 
Additionally, the claims of girls who managed to avoid FGM and are not risk 
of further FGM acts upon return (i.e. for instance when they are supported by 
their own parents) also raise concerns that are larger than the mere physical 
harm, such as for instance risks of stigmatisation or ostracism.  
 
In France, the CNDA usually considers that the parents’ opposition to 
their daughter’s excision is not sufficient to establish their fear of persecution. 
Whilst some cases have granted refugee status to the parents of little girls who 
escaped their country with their child,80 the court has more regularly denied 
these applications. In the view of the court, parents should demonstrate that 
they had actively expressed their position when they were in their country and 
that, as a result, they are at risk of being individually targeted.81 The ad hoc 
methodology used in France does not provide any justification as to why these 
forms of harm are not considered persecutory in nature. According to this 
approach, it can be observed that no consideration is given to the weight of 
traditional rules in the community, nor to the possible pressure that parents, 
or children who want to avoid FGM, can face upon return.  
 
In the USA,82 the Board also denied the application for withholding 
of removal of a father who refused to return to his country because of the risk 
of FGM that his child could face. The Board concluded that because the father 
repeatedly claimed that he was afraid more for his daughter than for himself, 
there was no risk that ‘his life or freedom would be threatened’.83 The 
claimant, however, insisted several times that he would be harassed and 
humiliated upon return. He also referred to the UNHCR guidance stating that, 
depending on the individual circumstances, parents of children likely to face 
FGM could have a refugee claim. It should also be pointed out that this 
claimant further mentioned the possibility of facing ‘emotional persecution’. 
                                                
80 Ibid. 
81 CNDA SR 12 March 2009 Mme K. n° 08019372/638891 R; CNDA 25 mars 2010 M. S. n° 08017355 
C+. 
82 Kane v Holder, 581 F.3d 231, 240–42 (United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 2009).  
83 Ibid at [23]. 
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The court rejected this argument and concluded that, in order to warrant 
refugee status, ‘emotional persecution’ should be directly and purposely 
inflicted on the victim. However, this position is not in line with previous 
jurisprudence84 as well as with the recommendations of the UNHCR.85 
Additionally, the court stated that no derivative claims could be considered. 
As such, the court did not consider the existence of a personal claim, resulting 
from possible harassment, pressure from the community and stigmatisation, 
therefore adopting a narrow understanding of the different forms of harm that 
can be caused by the imposition of FGM on a girl child. The refusal of family 
members to subject their child to the ritual of FGM can indeed have major 
consequences as it contravenes social norms. Whilst it is not argued that every 
parent of a child born in the country of asylum and originating from a country 
where FGM is prevalent should be recognised, a more thorough assessment 
of the applicant’s individual circumstances should be conducted, in order to 
minimise the risk of arbitrary decisions. The UNHCR, in particular, 
encourages decision makers to consider different forms of harm that could be 
suffered by parents who are ‘forced to witness the pain and suffering of the 
child’ or ‘who are opposed to the practice’.86   
 
In recent years, some cases have, in fact, been adjudicated more 
favourably, although reservations remained in relation to the legal grounds 
for protection. For instance, in the UK, the Appeal Tribunal87 dismissed the 
claims for protection under the 1951 Convention of a family who feared 
returning to Sudan because their daughter was at risk of facing FGM. In this 
case, the tribunal adopted a rather narrow understanding of persecution, as 
the judges seemed to have conflated the Convention grounds with the notion 
of persecution. The tribunal rejected the fact that young girls at risk of FGM 
could constitute a particular social group (PSG) and concluded that there was 
no real risk of persecution.88 The tribunal, however, considered non-
refoulement obligations as it stated that the claimants, including the parents, 
                                                
84 Matter of Kasinga (n 61). 
85 UNHCR, (n 75) at [11].  
86 Ibid.  
87 MH and Others (Article 3 – FGM) Sudan CG [2002] UKIAT 02691, 16 July 2002. 
88 Ibid at [23]. 
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were all at risk of facing violations of rights entailed in the ECHR. To the 
tribunal, to send the ‘first appellant and his family back to a country where 
circumcision would take place to the first appellant's daughter, would be 
degrading for the appellant as a family member, and would amount to a 
breach of Article 3 of the ECHR’.89 The tribunal’s interpretation of both the 
Convention nexus and the concept of persecution was quite restrictive and 
inconsistent with the view that victims of FGM can constitute a PSG,90 and 
that persecution does not necessarily have to encompass the Convention 
grounds.91 However, the idea that parents of FGM victims could face harm 
upon return is noteworthy, although it was not found to constitute a basis for 
refugee status under the 1951 Convention. A later case further developed that 
view and eventually stated that ‘given the first appellant’s abhorrence of 
FGM, any infliction of it upon either of her daughters is, we find, reasonably 
likely to have so profound an effect upon the first appellant as to amount to 
the infliction on her of persecutory harm’.92  
 
Similarly, in another case, the tribunal made a general statement that 
FGM in ‘any of forms 1-4 is persecution for a Convention reason not only of 
a girl child but also of the parents of a minor child where they are opposed to 
the procedure and where there is a real risk of its infliction’.93 In this case, 
only the claim of the child was considered, but the tribunal affirmed a 
principle that parents of children could have an individual claim, even when 
they had not actively expressed their opposition in the country of origin as 
was the case in this situation. This approach was more closely aligned with 
the recommendation of the UNHCR guidelines94 and by following this line 
of argumentation, the tribunal adopted a view that was more protective for 
the claimants. This decision is not isolated as other few cases lodged in other 
countries by parents fearing FGM for their children have been adjudicated in 
                                                
89 Ibid at [14]. 
90 As recommended by UNHCR (n 76) and accepted in the Jurisprudence. See, for instance, Fornah (n 
69).  
91 See discussion, Chapter 3, Part 2 (B). 
92 FM (FGM) Sudan v Secretary of State for the Home Department, CG [2007] UKAIT00060, 27 June 
2007 at [161]. 
93 K and others (FGM) The Gambia CG v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, [2013] UKUT 
00062(IAC), April 2013 at [13]. 
94 Ibid at [12]. 
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a more favourable manner,95 albeit quite rarely. Of note, however, is that 
refugee status tends to be granted when the imposition of FGM appears highly 
likely. Consideration of what would happen to parents or girls who managed 
to avoid the act is, however, rarely part of the jurisprudence, although the 





In all the cases mentioned above, decision makers tended to adopt 
various approaches that have led to inconsistent results. The human rights 
narrative has indeed appeared inadequate in these kinds of cases as it mainly 
focuses on the physical act of FGM and disregards other aspects of the 
suffering that can ensue from this practice. This situation has led Marouf to 
regret that the psychological and emotional aspects of FGM are rarely taken 
into account96 in courts.  It appears, however, that methodologies that are 
closer to the UNHCR’s circumstantial approach, have the capacity to yield 
more protective results by encouraging a holistic analysis of refugee claims, 
factoring in the above aspects. Although asylum applications involving 
parents of children at risk of FGM are not particularly frequent in national 
jurisdictions, they tend to raise contention. These claims reveal important 
aspects of FGM as a traditional practice that is deeply embedded in certain 
societies and structures the roles of women in relation to men. As a result, 
opposing this practice has wider implications than the mere risk of physical 
harm that this can cause, both for the victims and their relatives. 
 
It is acknowledged that such claims should certainly be treated with 
caution as they could potentially concern a very large number of claimants 
                                                
95 Arrêt n°45.395 Belgium: Conseil du Contentieux des Etrangers, 24 June 2010: in this case, the fear 
expressed by the applicant that her daughter could be subjected to FGM was sufficient to consider that 
she would be perceived as opposing traditions and social mores upon return. See also Nwaokolo 
Immigration and Naturalization Service, 314 F.3d 303 (United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh 
Circuit 2002): The Court of Appeal returned a case to the BIA as the BIA only assessed the risk of 
FGM for the main applicant, but failed to consider that her daughter could also face a real risk if she 
had to return with her mother and did not analyze the impact that this could have on both individuals. 
96 Fatma Marouf, ‘The Rising Bar for Persecution in Asylum Cases Involving Sexual and Reproductive 
Harm’ [2011] 22 Columbia Journal Gender and Law 81, 85-86. 
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and constitute an avenue for fraud. Nonetheless, for the sake of fair and 
transparent decisions, a more thorough and transparent analysis of the risk of 
persecution of the relatives implicated in a potential risk of FGM should be 
conducted. Similarly, the claims of girls who are not at risk of facing FGM 
upon return (for instance because the parents are opposed to it), should be 
more comprehensively assessed so as to take into account various forms of 
predicaments that they could endure back in their country.  
 
B)   Domestic violence  
 
i-General overview of the notion of domestic violence in asylum cases  
	  
Harmful practices against women can also take the form of domestic 
violence when they are perpetrated by family members. Traditionally, asylum 
judges have been quite hesitant to grant refugee status to victims of domestic 
violence as they considered that such situations fell outside the ambit of the 
1951 Convention97 because of the perceived private nature of the harm.98 For 
instance, a decision of the US BIA in 1975 denied the application of a victim 
of domestic violence because the motivation behind her husband’s alleged 
actions was deemed ‘strictly personal’.99  However, legal developments on 
the international scene led to a consideration that the violence perpetrated 
within the family sphere was in fact in breach of human rights law and that it 
could fall within the refugee definition.100101 In this sense, the UNHCR 
                                                
97 Roberts (n 39) 161-163. See also Anker (n 41) 133. 
98 Michael G. Heyman ‘Domestic Violence and Asylum: Toward a Working Model of Affirmative 
State Obligations’ [2005] 17 International Journal of Refugee Law 729, 730. For him, domestic 
violence ‘challenges the common understanding of persecution as an act occurring within the public 
sphere’. 
99 Matter of Pierre, 15 I&N 2433 (Board of Immigration Appeals 1975) at [4610]. See also on the same 
issue Matter of R-A-, 22 I&N Dec 906 (BIA 1999). 
100 In past decades an increasing number of international instruments addressed the treatment of women 
in the context of their traditional community and their family. For instance, Article 16 CEDAW laid 
out measures for eliminating discrimination between men and women in the context of their marriage. 
See also: Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, General Recommendation 
No 19 (llth session, 1992). In 1993, the General Assembly adopted a Declaration on the Elimination of 
Violence Against Women, stating that reprehensible violence against women encompasses “physical, 
sexual and psychological violence occurring in the family, including battering, sexual abuse of female 
children in the household, dowry-related violence, marital rape, female genital mutilation and other 
traditional harmful practice UN General Assembly 48/104.  Declaration on the Elimination of Violence 
against Women, 20 December 1993, A/RES/48/104, Art 2 (a). 
101 See Anker (n 16) and Kneebone (n 3) who argued that human rights influenced the way gender-
based persecution was interpreted.  
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guidelines on gender-related persecution stated that domestic violence can 
amount to persecution depending on the circumstances.102  
 
Whilst domestic jurisdictions have been increasingly inclined to 
consider that domestic violence itself could constitute persecution, 
inconsistent approaches have been adopted with regard to the different 
elements that needed to be considered in assessing such claims, and in 
particular, in relation to the role of state protection.103 However, overall, 
decision makers have not required the active participation of the authorities 
and granted refugee status as long as there was no reasonable possibility that 
the state could provide efficient protection to the victims. A general overview 
of the different interpretive frameworks adopted in cases of domestic violence 
will, instead, reveal that significant interpretive issues rather lie in the level 
and nature of harm required to amount to persecution and further question the 
relevance of this notion in such cases. Whilst the human rights framework 
remains the dominant one, divergent views have been expressed on what 
forms of human rights violations could amount to persecution, both between 
and within jurisdictions, thus reinforcing the legal uncertainty surrounding 
the adjudication of such cases.  
 
ii- Conceptual confusion regarding the degree of harm in cases of 
domestic violence in common-law jurisdictions 
 
As noted by Hoepfner, asylum applications relating to domestic 
violence started to significantly increase in Canada and New Zealand as of 
the 1980s and 1990s.104 One of the first landmark decisions to address the 
issue of domestic violence was Mayers105 where the Federal Court of Canada 
considered that the risk of ill-treatment faced by the claimant (beating, rape 
and witnessing the ill-treatment of her children) compounded by the 
indifference of the authorities, amounted to persecution. The court simply 
                                                
102 UNHCR (n 7) at [9]. 
103 Kneebone (n 3) 38; Hoepfner (n 3) 315-324: this element has been particularly discussed in the 
jurisprudence in Canada and New Zealand.  
104 Hoepfner (n 3) 315. 
105  Canada c Mayer [1992] A-544-92 Canada: Federal Court.  
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highlighted that the violence endured by the claimant should not be 
considered as private given the clear indifference of the authorities to her 
plight. In this case, the court conflated the existence of harm with the absence 
of state protection, thus seemingly conforming to Hathaway’s framework.  
Whilst the court adopted a rather protective view, no detailed interpretive 
methodology was applied, and, as such, little explanation was presented as to 
why these forms of harm constituted persecution.  
 
The view that domestic violence could amount to persecution was 
later confirmed by the same court in Narvaez.106 In this case, however, the 
court explicitly adopted a human rights approach as it was stated that the ill-
treatment received by the claimant at the hands of her husband was contrary 
to the principles enshrined in the UDHR. The court further followed 
Hathaway’s approach by considering that the violation of human rights 
should be either sustained or systemic. Whilst the above cases resulted in a 
positive outcome for the claimants, it should be noted that the mistreatment 
they had faced was particularly severe.107 Although it became clear that 
severe instances of domestic violence could constitute a basis for asylum, the 
bar set by the human rights approach appeared quite high. As a result, 
question marks remained for interpreting persecution in light of milder forms 
of ill-treatment. Subsequent jurisprudence did not lift the uncertainty 
regarding these cases in Canada because, in practice, many cases tend to be 
rejected on various other issues, in particular on credibility grounds.108 
However, when claimants are victims of severe physical violence and 
harassment at the hands of their family members, the harm they experienced 
would usually be considered persecution without much controversy. 
Unfortunately, high thresholds seem to have been generally applied.  
 
                                                
106  Cecilia Narvaez, Miguel Alexandro Narvaez et Daniel Antonio Narvaez c Ministre de la Citoyenneté 
et de l’immigration [1995] 89 F.T.R 94 (TD) Canada: Federal Court, Trial Division. 
107 In Mayers and Narvaez both claimants faced instances of beating, physical ill-treatment and rape 
over many years.  
108 Hoepfner (n 3) 322. See examples of cases rejected on credibility or IFA: Canada MA4-07115 
[2006] Canada: Immigration and Refugee Board; X v Canada VB3-02197 [2014] Canada: Immigration 
and Refugee Board; X v Canada, MB3-04040 [2014] Canada: Immigration and Refugee Board of 
Canada.   
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In New Zealand, the jurisprudence is more variable. Judges, who tend 
to rely on ad hoc human rights approaches, have made inconsistent decisions, 
adopting either broad or restrictive views of the notion of persecution. For 
instance, the RSAA109 granted refugee status to an Iranian applicant who had 
never experienced individual instances of physical aggression but who was 
quite outspoken against the patriarchal nature of Iranian society and was 
deeply affected by the fate her two of cousins who had been killed by family 
members for not conforming to the society’s norms. In this case, the RSAA 
quoted earlier jurisprudence that referred to Hathaway’s definition. However, 
the RSAA ended up analysing a series of human rights violations, without 
relying on Hathaway’s interpretive modalities. The RSAA also engaged in a 
more circumstantial analysis, by considering subjective elements such as the 
psychological state of mind of the applicant and how it impacted the 
assessment of the harm. Additionally, the notion of shame and its 
consequences were analysed110 to conclude that the harm feared was of 
‘sufficient gravity’ to amount to persecution. In this case, the RSAA adopted 
an expanded human rights approach by referring to multiple aspects of the 
applicant’s situation through a holistic analysis and ended up relying on a 
rather protective interpretation of the notion of persecution.  
 
Conversely, in later cases, the RSAA seemed to impose a stricter test 
to assess the notion of persecution, thus departing from its previous approach. 
For instance, in another decision,111 the RSAA explicitly adopted the 
formulation of Hathaway and concluded that the series of predicaments faced 
by the applicant was not sufficient to rise to the level of persecution. In this 
case, an applicant was considered at risk of facing harassment, persistent 
phone calls and extortion. She had also faced one instance of physical assault 
by her husband. However, according to the RSAA ‘such harassment, while 
possibly extremely unpleasant, does not amount to a sustained or systemic 
                                                
109 Refugee Appeal No. 2039/93 Re MN, New Zealand: RSAA (12 February 1996). 
110 The RSAA pointed out that ‘phenomenon of “honour and shame” bears a direct relation to family 
ties, and to the complex interrelation of social organisation and conduct in Arab society. Once a woman 
breaks the rules, the whole family will be drawn into a sea of shame’. 
111 Refugee Appeal Nos. 76264, 76265 & 76266, Nos. 76264, 76265 & 76266, New Zealand: RSAA 
(16 December 2008). 
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violation of human rights’.112 Unlike their previously judgments, the RSAA, 
here, mainly focused on the absence of systematic physical violence and 
failed to discuss other parameters such as the impact that these events had on 
the emotional stability of the applicant, and whether this treatment breached 
other protection standards.  
 
This high threshold was reaffirmed in Refugee Appeal No. 76501 
where the RSAA recognised a refugee a woman from the Fiji Island who had 
suffered ongoing incidents of severe physical violence and harassment for 
several years. The RSAA concluded that her predicament had met ‘the 
threshold of persecution as it [constituted] a breach of the fundamental human 
rights not to be subjected to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment’.113 Whilst the outcome was positive in this case, the threshold 
set by the court appeared, again, quite high given the particularly severe forms 
of harm faced.114 Overall, it seems that the human rights narrative adopted by 
some decision makers in New Zealand led to the imposition of different 
thresholds, depending on the modalities adopted. 
 
Cases in the USA followed the same inconsistent pattern of 
interpretation, in particular when references to human rights treaties were 
made. Given that some domestic violence cases in the US remained 
unpublished for a long period of time,115 an exhaustive analysis of the 
approach adopted by American jurisdictions is difficult. Anker, however, 
argued that human rights activism had influenced the US jurisprudence in a 
positive manner leading judges to recognise more often certain forms of 
gender-based violence.116 Whilst this element is not denied, it seems that the 
influence of human rights has not fostered much clarity in the case law. In 
particular, published cases of domestic violence victims who have been 
                                                
112 Ibid at [42]. 
113 Refugee Appeal No. 76501, RSAA (19 November 2010) at [56]. 
114 On the existence of high threshold see also Refugee Appeal No. 75805 and 75806, RSAA (30 
November 2007): claimant was granted refugee status but she had to endure years of physical, 
psychological and sexual abuse. 
115 Anker (n 16) 52. Karen Musalo, ‘A Short History of Gender Asylum in the United States Resistance 
and Ambivalence May Very Slowly be Inching Towards Recognition of Women's Claims’ [2010] 
29 Refugee Survey Quarterly 46, 62. Musalo also pointed that the government does not maintain 
statistics on gender-claims.  
116 Anker (n 16).  
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granted refugee status are rare. Additionally, the victims that have been 
recognised have usually suffered egregious forms of harm for a long period 
at the hands of their family members, thus reflecting extreme cases of 
violence.  
 
For instance, in the case of Rudi Alvaro Pena, the BIA initially 
rejected the claim of a Guatemalan applicant who had faced severe forms of 
domestic violence over several years, and who tried to seek protection from 
the police a few times, but to no avail. Initially, the BIA considered that the 
harm faced by the applicant was so intense that it could amount to 
persecution. In spite of this conclusion, the case was rejected due a lack of 
Convention nexus117 but the decision was eventually overturned about 10 
years later.118 This case showed that, whilst some reluctance has been 
expressed by US judges to recognise victims of domestic violence, 
individuals who have endured severe forms would tend to be more favourably 
adjudicated. This high threshold requirement seems to have been later 
confirmed when the BIA in the US published a landmark decision in 2014, 
stating that another Guatemalan woman who had suffered years of abuse at 
the hands of her husband faced harm amounting to persecution.119 In this case 
the abuse that the claimant had faced was quite abhorrent as it included 
physical beating, burning, rape and death threats. It remains unclear whether 
milder forms of ill-treatment in the US would meet the threshold to be 
recognised as a refugee.   
 
The Australian case law is also marred with uncertainty in that 
regards. The position of the jurisprudence on gender-based claims was 
affirmed in the landmark decision, Khawar.120 In this case, the judges 
considered that the violence experienced by the claimant compounded by the 
discriminatory attitude of the police towards women, amounted to a violation 
                                                
117 Matter of R-A- 22 I&N Dec 906 (Board of Immigration Appeal 1999) 910: mentioned in Musalo (n 
117) 57. See also a positive decision: DHS's Supplemental Brief, Matter of L-R- (Board of Immigration 
Appeal, 2009):  
https://cgrs.uchastings.edu//sites/default/files/Matter_of_LR_DHS_Brief_4_13_2009.pdf  
118 Matter of R-A, Interim Decision, 24 I&N Dec 629 (Attorney General 2008).  
119 Matter of A-R-C-G 26 I&N Dec 388 (Board of Immigration Appeal 2014) 388. 
120 Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Khawar [2002] HCA 14, Australia: High 
Court, 11 April 2002.  
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of her fundamental human rights. Reference was made to Hathaway’s 
framework requiring ‘sustained and systematic violations of a basic human 
right’,121 thus setting again a relatively strict test. It was also considered that 
the absence of state protection was an element of persecution.  
 
The interpretive methodology developed in Khawar has not, 
fortunatelly, been scrupulously followed in subsequent cases. Since then, the 
claims of victims of domestic violence have tended to be more favourably 
adjudicated, but judges have adopted variable approaches for interpreting 
persecution.  In many cases, they did not use a fundamental human rights 
framework, but rather focused on the ‘serious harm’ approach, therefore 
evaluating the harm more on an ad hoc basis. Unlike the high threshold 
adopted in Khawar, other cases have adopted different views, recognising a 
wider variety of types of harm as persecution. For instance, it was determined 
that ‘serious physical harm’,122 ‘physical harassment’123 or mere ‘threat’,124 
could amount to serious harm, and thus persecution. Whilst the above 
decisions appear more protective of refugees today, the consequential impacts 
of the domestic violence suffered was not assessed and, therefore, the 
decision makers did not provide a clear reasoning as to why they considered 
that such acts amounted to persecution. As a result, no consistent pattern of 
interpretation could be identified.  
 
iii- Domestic violence in the jurisprudence of European countries: 
inconsistent interpretations of the threshold and nature of harm 
 
The case law on domestic violence in European countries is even more 
inconsistent both between and within jurisdictions. Indeed, some judges 
consider that acts of domestic violence amount to persecution if they are 
sufficiently severe while others consider that such claims simply fall outside 
the ambit of the 1951 Convention. For instance, in the seminal case, Islam; 
Ex parte Shah, the UK House of Lords examined the claim of two Pakistani 
                                                
121 Ibid at [70]. 
122 Case no. 1406045, RRTA 47 (9 February 2015) at [24]. 
123 Case No. 0907337, RRTA 165 (15 March 2010) at [87].  
124 Case No.1002606, RRTA 484 (6 June 2010) at [107]. 
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women who were both victims of domestic violence at the hands of their 
husband. Because of the discriminatory treatment of women in Pakistan and 
the lack of effective protection, the court found that women in Pakistan 
constituted a particular social group125 and therefore, victims of domestic 
violence could be granted refugee status. In these cases, the harm feared by 
the claimants was quite severe (prosecution on account of false accusation of 
adultery) and little doubt was expressed as the fact that such harm amounted 
to persecution.  
 
In cases of other forms of harm, different views have, however, been 
noted.  For instance, in DM Albania, the asylum judges applied a very high 
threshold in assessing the notion of persecution as they analysed the harm 
suffered by the claimant against Article 3 of the ECHR. The judges found that 
the continued life threats and harassment together with one incident of 
physical violence and one unsuccessful attempt at relocation were not 
sufficient to conclude that the treatment faced by an Albanian woman by her 
ex-partner constituted a breach of Article 3 of the Convention. Consequently, 
they decided that such harm did not amount to persecution and added that, in 
any case, state protection was available.126 A recent report published by the 
European Parliament on the treatment of gender-related claims in Europe 
lamented the fact that judges in the UK ‘do not always appreciate that where 
there had been one incident of physical violence in the relationship 
(irrespective of other forms of psychological abuse) this could amount to 
persecution’.127 
 
Conversely, in another decision, judges considered that the threats and 
intimidations by the claimant’s husband, compounded by a short term of 
detention (based on false adultery charges that were likely to be dropped) 
                                                
125 Islam v Secretary of State for the Home Department; R v Immigration Appeal Tribunal, ex parte 
Shah [1999] 2 AC 629 UKHL (Judicial Committee), 25 March 1999. 
126 DM (Sufficiency of Protection - PSG - Women - Domestic Violence) Albania v Secretary of State for 
the Home Department, CG [2004] UKIAT 00059, 1 April 2004. At [14] ‘We are therefore satisfied 
that, upsetting though they may have been, the actions of the former boyfriend did not amount to 
persecution or prohibited treatment for the purposes of Article 3 as they were not engaging a sufficiently 
high threshold to do so’. 
127 Cheikh Ali et al (n 66) 39.  
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amounted to persecution.128 In this case, the court relied on the guidance 
provided by the QD, and seemed to set a high threshold to the test of 
persecution by referring to Article 3 of the ECHR as a benchmark. This led 
to considerations that first appeared relatively severe in the sense that the 
detention experience of the applicant was considered in the abstract and was 
not found to amount to persecution per se. The court, however, went on to 
acknowledge that other circumstances, such as the harassment that the 
applicant was facing at the hands of her husband, should be taken into 
consideration. All her experiences were found, cumulatively, to reach the 
level of persecution. It was, however concluded that the claimant could 
relocate within Pakistan, far from her husband. Although the assessment of 
the notion of persecution was quite comprehensive in this case, the IFA test 
was applied in a restrictive manner. For the IFA test, UNHCR usually 
recommends assessing whether it is reasonable129  for an applicant to relocate 
in light of their personal circumstances, but, in this decision, the tribunal 
considered that in spite of ongoing discriminations faced by single women in 
Pakistan, the applicant could settle alone in another city, which seems rather 
strict in light of UNHCR recommendations. This is unfortunate, in particular 
given the thorough and protective approach initially adopted by the judges 
when they evaluated the notion of persecution. 
 
The uncertainty of the adequate threshold to apply in domestic 
violence cases is also exemplified in another case in which the first instance 
and appeal decisions makers reached completely different conclusions by 
applying different interpretive approaches. The first instance tribunal 
considered that the treatment faced by an applicant at the hands of her 
husband, namely a series of physical ill-treatments such as slaps, pushing and 
on one occasion a punch, constituted ‘occasional outburst of violence’130 and 
did not amount to persecution as per Art. 9 of QD. According to the tribunal, 
                                                
128 KA, AA, & IK (domestic violence - risk on return) Pakistan v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department, CG [2010] UKUT 216 (IAC), 22 April 2010 at [260]. 
129  UNHCR Guidelines on International Protection No 4: ‘Internal Flight or Relocation Alternative 
Within the Context of Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention and/or Protocol Relating to the Status of 
Refugees’, HCR/GIP/03/04, 23 July 2003, 5. 
130 D-D- (Anonymity direction made) and Secretary of State for the Home Department [2016] AA 
12842, Upper Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) 12 December 2016 at [17]. 
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it simply did not amount to a serious violation of basic human rights. 
Adopting a very different view on this, the Appeal Tribunal considered that 
the first instance decision makers have erred in concluding that the applicant 
did not experience persecution. Instead, it was considered that: 
 
 ‘a horrible element of domestic violence is […] the fact that 
violence inflicted in a relationship where the victim […] should 
be entitled to support and affection. When that is replaced by 
violence, bullying and controlling behavior it is horrible for her 
and there is clear evidence here of repeated nasty acts of 
violence intended to humiliate the victim. This is clearly 
sufficiently severe as to amount to persecution’.131  
 
In this case, both tribunals adopted very different lines of 
interpretation, which led to opposite outcomes. The first instance tribunal 
relied on a rather formalist human rights narrative, whilst the Appeal 
Authority, did not develop a clear methodology and simply assessed the level 
of ‘gravity’ of the act, which resulted in a more protective approach. In all, 
the jurisprudence in the UK has generally adopted the view that domestic 
violence could amount to persecution, but the forms that domestic violence 
could take remain unclear depending on the interpretive method used.   
 
 More significant inconsistencies are notable in French jurisdictions 
where victims of domestic violence are not normally considered eligible to 
refugee protection because domestic violence is deemed a personal act. 
Therefore, only subsidiary protection is granted to claimants. Further, the 
threshold for that is rather high, as victims would be granted protection if the 
act of domestic violence is accompanied by other elements such as forced 
marriage or opposition to social mores.132 The interpretive methodology of 
the appeal court is rather confusing because little explanation is provided to 
                                                
131 Ibid at [34]. 
132 CNDA, BA, n°09 023 070, 17
 
November 2010; CNDA, n°09 006 617, 26 October 2010 mentioned 
in Cheikh Ali et al (n 66) 39. See also: Asise Mateo, Elodie Soulard, ‘Le Droit d’Asile Au Féminin, 
Cadre Législatif et Pratique’ (Observatoire de L’Asile et des Refugies) Les Cahiers du Social, No 32, 
36. 
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justify this orientation. For instance, in Mme T. ép. M.133, the judges 
considered that a Russian claimant who had experienced ill-treatment from 
her husband did not meet the eligibility criteria of the 1951 Convention and 
was granted subsidiary protection. However, no explanation was given for 
such a decision. Other cases followed the same position.134 Conversely, in 
Belgium, a Russian claimant who also experienced violence similar to the one 
mentioned above was granted refugee status.135  Unlike the approach in 
France, Belgian judges took into account all the personal circumstances of 
the claimants in order to evaluate the risk of harm upon return, including the 
trauma suffered and mental distress caused by the experience of mistreatment 
and considered that such violence is based on a convention ground.136 This 
approach has been reiterated in a recent case137 and has been labelled as a 
‘good practice’ by researchers of the European Parliament,138 making the 
notion of persecution more adapted to these cases. As such, victims in 
Belgium are more generally entitled to refugee status under the 1951 
Convention.  
 
iv- Concluding remarks  
 
In spite of inconsistent decisions amongst domestic jurisdictions, we 
observe an increased tendency to consider domestic violence as a form of 
persecution. Although this trend had perhaps been encouraged by the 
development of women’s rights on the international scene, as some authors 
have argued, the application of a human rights framework for interpreting 
persecution has not revealed itself to be particularly protective of the interests 
of women in a number of cases, thus undermining the relevance of the notion 
of persecution in certain situations. Additionally, the vagueness of human 
rights standards has caused inconsistent interpretations of the Convention 
                                                
133 CRR 2 Novembre 2007 412955, Mme T. ép. M.  Cour Nationale du Droit d'Asile, Contentieux des 
Réfugiés: Jurisprudence du Conseil d'État et de la Cour nationale du droit d'asile, 15 April 2008. 
134 CNDA 26 Fevrier 2009, n° 23.825; CNDA 9 juillet 2008, n° 13.874; CNDA 6 Septembre 2011 Mme 
V. n° 10023173 R; CNDA 12 Mars 2013, Mme H.K, épouse G, n°12017176 C. 
135 CNDA 9 juillet 2008, n° 13.874. 
136 CRR 14
 
December 2006 n°06-0817/F2548, mentioned in Cheikh Ail et al (n 66) 39. 
137 X v Commissaire général aux réfugiés et aux apatrides, Case No 177 178, Conseil du Contentieux 
des Etrangers, 27 Octobre 2016; see also Arrêt n° 72 002, Belgium: Conseil du Contentieux des 
Etrangers, 16 Décembre 2011, at 5.5.7. 
138 Cheikh Ail et al (n 66) 39. 
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with a particular focus on physical harm. Whilst extreme forms of harm do 
not seem to raise debate, milder breaches of human rights or other complex 
situations are more problematic so that the degree of harm required to amount 
to persecution remains unclear in most cases, as exemplified in the above 
analysis. Ad hoc approaches adopted by civil-law countries have also led to 
very divergent outcomes. As a result, a more coherent interpretive approach 
in order to evaluate the harm faced by an applicant appears necessary to 
reassert the importance of the concept of persecution for cases of domestic 
violence. Psychological as well as physical mistreatment need to be taken into 
consideration, in addition to the different protected interests of the claimants 
and the consequential impact that the violations of such interests can have on 
their lives. In particular, the political view that domestic violence is based on 
the traditional perception of women’s roles in certain societies or 
communities, leading to possible ostracism or stigmatisation, should not be 
ignored as is too often the case in certain decisions.  
 
C)   Trafficking in persons and the conceptualisation of 
persecution 
 
i-Definition and legal framework  
 
Trafficking is a complex phenomenon that has been defined  
internationally in the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in 
Persons, through a lengthy formulation, pointing to the importance of the 
means and purpose of the act of trafficking.139 According to the UNHCR, 
                                                
139 Article 3: of Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women 
and Children, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, 
New York 15 November 2000, UNTS, Vol. 2237, 319, Doc.A/55/383: “ For the purposes of this 
Protocol:  (a) ‘Trafficking in persons’ shall mean the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring 
or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of 
fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability, or of the giving or receiving 
of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the 
purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution 
of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar to 
slavery, servitude or the removal of organs. (b) The consent of a victim of trafficking in persons to the 
intended exploitation set forth in subparagraph (a) of this article shall be irrelevant where any of the 
means set forth in subparagraph (a) have been used; (c) The recruitment, transportation, transfer, 
harbouring or receipt of a child for the purpose of exploitation shall be considered "trafficking in 
persons" even if this does not involve any of the means set forth in subparagraph (a) of this article'. 
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trafficking involves ‘interrelated actions’140 such as ‘abduction, incarceration, 
rape, sexual enslavement, enforced prostitution, forced labour, removal of 
organs, physical beatings, starvation, the deprivation of medical treatment’.141 
 
The causes and consequences of trafficking are multiple and have 
raised interpretive challenges in the jurisprudence. As pointed out by 
Dorevitch and Foster, the harm faced by victims of trafficking ‘is inflicted by 
multiple actors across a temporal and geographical continuum’ and therefore 
raises complex issues.142 In particular, given the numerous forms of harm that 
trafficking entails, confusion has emerged as to the types of predicaments that 
are involved in a situation of trafficking and whether such predicaments 
should amount to persecution. The absence of a nexus143 or the availability of 
state protection have often constituted elements on which decision makers 
have relied for rejecting asylum applications of victims of trafficking. A 
comprehensive analysis of the Convention nexus or the availability of state 
protection would fall outside the purview of the present research as previously 
argued but the qualification of the harm faced by victims of trafficking as 
persecution has also raised major contention that will be assessed below.   
 
Firstly, it should be noted that the causes of trafficking are an 
important element that can have a major importance in assessing the notion 
of persecution and should be factored into the analysis of the refugee 
definition. Some international instruments have emphasised the vulnerability 
of victims of trafficking by pointing to the root causes of this phenomenon. 
For instance, the Beijing Declaration considered that majors barriers to the 
security of women were ‘systematic or de facto discrimination, violations of 
and failure to protect all human rights and fundamental freedoms of all 
women, and their civil, cultural, economic, political and social rights, 
                                                
140 UNHCR (n 49) at [10]. 
141 Ibid at [15] 
142 Anna Dorevitch and Michelle Foster, ‘Obstacles on the Road to Protection: Assessing the Treatment 
of Sex-­‐trafficking Victims under Australia's Migration and Refugee Law’ (2008) 9 Melbourne Journal 
of International Law 1, 40. 
143 Satvinder S. Juss, ‘Recognizing Refugee Status for Victims of Trafficking and the Myth of Progress’ 
[2015] 34 Refugee Survey Quarterly 107, 116. See also French jurisprudence rejecting claimants on the 
absence of a nexus: Décision du Conseil d’État, Arrêt du 7 Novembre 2011, n°348228; Décision du 
Conseil d’État n° 350661, recueil Lebon, lecture du 25 Juillet 2013. 
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including the right to development and ingrained prejudicial attitudes towards 
women and girls’.144 The UN General Assembly also highlighted the 
underlying causes of trafficking by mentioning ‘gender inequality, poverty, 
unemployment, lack of socio-economic opportunities, gender-based 
violence, discrimination and marginalization’.145 Similarly, the UNHCR 
considered that ‘scenarios in which trafficking can flourish frequently 
coincide with situations where potential victims may be vulnerable to 
trafficking [as it is the case for instance in states] prone to increased poverty, 
deprivation and dislocation of the civilian population’.146 Finally, in 2002 the 
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human 
Rights (OHCHR) issued Recommended Principles and Guidelines on Human 
Rights and Human Trafficking, identifying inequality, poverty and 
discrimination as major causes of trafficking.147  As such, the social and 
economic situation of the victims prior to the trafficking experience is an 
important aspect that can have an impact on the condition of victims upon 
return to their country and, therefore, should have a major relevance for 
assessing the notion of persecution.  
 
Moreover, in addition to the physical violence endured by the victims, 
certain consequences of trafficking are also important to evaluate what types 
of harm amount to persecution. In particular, various documents have 
highlighted the medical and psychological effect that trafficking has on the 
victims. For instance, the Beijing Declaration affirmed that ‘exploitation 
places girls and women at high risk of physical and mental trauma’.148 The 
UNHCR also insisted on the ‘ongoing traumatic psychological effects’149 of 
trafficking experiences. Some UN resolutions insisted on the necessity of 
adopting a gender- and age- sensitive approach to the problem of 
                                                
144 Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, Fourth World Conference on Women, 15 September 
1995, A/CONF.177/20 (1995) and A/CONF.177/20/Add.1 (1995) at [42]. 
145 Resolution adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 19 December 2016, [on the report 
of the Third Committee (A/71/477)] A/RES/71/167, 4/13. 
146 UNHCR (n 49) at [31]. 
147 Office of the UNHCHR, Recommended Principles and Guidelines on Human Rights and Human 
Trafficking (HR/PUB/02/3), 2010, 1. 
148 Beijing Declaration (n 144) at [100]. 
149 UNHCR (n 49) at [16]. 
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trafficking150 by noting the ‘heightened vulnerability’151 of women and girls 
who have been trafficked. These instruments all pointed to the various forms 
and intensity of harms resulting from trafficking.   
 
From the normative framework described above, a series of 
vulnerabilities and predicaments can be identified as the root causes and 
consequences of trafficking. Prior to being trafficked, most victims would 
have generally experienced situations of gender discrimination and socio-
economic disadvantage and, after being trafficked, they often suffer the 
psychological and physical consequences of their traumatic experience. It 
should be, therefore, expected that these conditions, including the socio-
economic position of the claimant, which has been described by one author 
as the ‘most pervasive’152 reason for trafficking, would be taken into account 
to understand the profile of victims when interpreting the notion of 
persecution. Persecution being a forward-looking test, not all victims of 
trafficking might be entitled to refugee status but it will be necessary to assess 
whether the vulnerable profile of a claimant, compounded by other risk 
factors, can lead to further persecution. In this view, the UNHCR considered 
that even when the trafficking instance was a ‘one-off experience’153 and is 
not likely to be repeated, other forms of harm could be faced by former 
trafficking victims upon return to their country. In particular, they could 
suffer from severe psychological difficulties arising out of past 
persecution,154 potential reprisals155 or ostracisms and discrimination.156  
 
A large variety of parameters therefore needs to be taken into 
consideration when interpreting the notion of persecution in order to make 
this notion relevant in the context of trafficking cases. Unfortunately, decision 
                                                
150 Resolution adopted by the General Assembly (n 145) at [34]. 
151 Ibid 4/13; see also Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 30 July 2010 (A/64/L.64)] 
64/293, A/64/PV.109, United Nations Global Plan of Action to Combat - Trafficking in Persons that 
promotes a ‘human rights based, gender- and age-sensitive approach in addressing all factors that make 
people vulnerable’ at [50]. 
152 Theodore R. Sangalis, ‘Elusive Empowerment: Compensating the Sex Trafficked Person Under the 
Trafficking Victims Protection Act’ [2011] 80 Fordham Law Review 403, 41. 
153 UNHCR (n 49) at [16]. 
154 Ibid. 
155 Ibid at [17]. 
156 Ibid [18]. 
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makers in national jurisdictions have adopted inconsistent approaches on 
these issues as will be demonstrated below.  
 
ii-The risk of (re)trafficking as a form of persecution 
	  
Saito observed that the risk of being trafficked itself (or re-trafficked) 
is consensually considered persecution in national jurisdictions.157 Given the 
egregious forms of violence that trafficking entails, such as rape, forced 
labour, organ removal, beating and other forms of ill-treatment, the 
qualification of persecution has raised little debate. According to Saito, ‘cases 
show a general consensus in considering trafficking as a human rights 
violation that could amount to persecution’.158 Dorevitch and Foster also 
considered that these types of acts clearly ‘are flagrant violations of 
international human rights’159 and, therefore, are sufficiently serious as to 
amount to persecution.  
 
In opposition to the above views, some early cases in Canada have 
adopted quite a narrow understanding of the harm that could be faced by the 
victims of trafficking by considering that when the consent of the claimant 
was initially given, the subjection to forced labour did not amount to 
trafficking. Therefore, in the cases of trafficking of Chinese minors, the Court 
disregarded the trafficking elements and simply analysed the penalty imposed 
on individuals for leaving a country illegally.160 The applicants were rejected 
as it was considered that receiving a penalty for illegal departure did not rise 
to the level of persecution. The trafficking element was not taken into 
consideration, because the victims (who were minors at the time) had 
voluntarily left their country through illegal means and, therefore, it was not 
accepted that they had been trafficked against their will. Fortunately, this 
approach was overturned in Li v Canada as the court considered that 
                                                
157 Saito Kaori, Research Paper No 149, ‘International protection for trafficked persons and those who 
fear being trafficked’ Policy Officer Division of Human Resource Management UNHCR, December 
2007 Geneva, 16. 
158 Ibid 11. 
159 Dorevitch and Foster (n 142) 19. 
160 Bian v (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) [2000] IMM-1640-00, Canada: Federal Court; see 
also Zhu v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) [2001] F.C.J. No 1251, 2001 FCT 884, 
Canada: Federal Court.  
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‘applicants were persecuted by virtue of their being “trafficked”, regardless 
of their initial consent to resort to an agent’.161  
 
Whilst these cases concerned boy applicants, the principles posed by 
the court, namely that the consent of the victims should not have a negative 
impact on the case, is valid in most trafficking cases for female applicants as 
well.  In Liv, the court adopted a human rights approach as it considered that 
it could not be concluded that the victims had provided their consent to the 
journey proposed by traffickers given their young age as per the standards set 
out in the CRC. The court referred the case back to the Immigration and 
Refugee Board for a redetermination of the facts ‘taking into account the 
values reflected in international human rights law as aids to help inform the 
contextual approach to interpretation of the definition of the Convention’.162 
In this context, references to external human rights norms have been 
conducive to a rather protective understanding of the terms of the 1951 
Convention.  
 
Similar views have been expressed in the jurisprudence examined in 
Australia,163 the United Kingdom,164 France,165 the United States166 whereby 
the harm arising out of the risk of being trafficked or re-trafficked would 
easily rise to the level of persecution. In these cases, the human rights 
narrative constituted a convenient approach because it clearly identified 
violations of basic protection standards. However, more complex situations 
in which the claimants are not likely to be re-trafficked (either because they 
can benefit from state protection or because they have been trafficked in a 
different place than their place of origin) have raised more uncertainty. 
 
                                                
161 Li v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2000] IMM-932-00, Canada: Federal Court 
at [23]. 
162 Ibid at [27].  
163 Case no NO3/47757 RRTA 355 (11 May 2004). VXAJ v Minister for Immigration and 
Another [2006] FMCA 234 (20 April 2006); Case No. 0903290, [2009] RRTA 727 (4 August 2009). 
164 AM and BM (Trafficked women) Albania v Secretary of State for the Home Department, [2010] 
UKUT 80 (IAC) 18 March 2010. 
165 CNDA, 24 Mars 2015, n°10012810, Mlle J.E. F; CNDA, 29 Avril 2011, n°10012810; CNDA, 12 
Juillet 2012, n°11026228; CNDA, 29 Avril 2011, Melle E., n°10012810.  
166 Matter of O-, CGRS Case No 275 (Russia), (Board of Immigration Appeal 2003) cited in Kairo (n 
157), 12. 
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iii- Inconsistent approaches regarding the peripheral harms 
surrounding the trafficking experience  
 
Whilst international guidance indicates that a variety of factors should 
be taken into consideration for adjudicating claims of trafficking victims, the 
jurisprudence has remained inconsistent in considering these elements.  
 
Some decisions in the UK followed a narrow line of analysis, by 
simply assessing the level of safety that the former victims could face upon 
return to their country.167 For instance, the Upper Tribunal recently rejected 
a Vietnamese claimant who was trafficked from Vietnam to Hungary and 
sexually exploited. The tribunal concluded that: 
 
‘Vietnam is a large country of some 90 million people with a 
number of large cities in it. If the appellant were able to return, 
a matter to which we shall have to return, she would not be a 
person of any adverse interest to the government, and the 
chance of coming across her traffickers is very slight’.168   
 
The court, however, did not assess other harms, such as the impact of 
a possible trauma,169 or the risk of being ostracised or stigmatised. On another 
occasion, the Upper Tribunal also rejected the appeal application of a 
trafficking victim by considering that there was no real - risk of being re-
trafficked and the claimant would have the opportunity to benefit from the 
protection of available shelters in her country.170 In this case, the appeal 
authority did not consider that other forms of harm could impact the 
applicant’s daily life upon return,171 thus failing to engage in a more 
                                                
167 Inter alia, VD (Trafficking) Albania v Secretary of State for the Home Department, CG [2004] 
UKIAT 00115, 26 May 2004; MP [Trafficking - Sufficiency of Protection] Romania v Secretary of 
State for the Home Department [2005] UKIAT 00086, 21 April 2005; NA (Kyrgyz Woman) Tajikistan 
v Secretary of State for the Home Department, CG [2004] UKIAT 00133, 28 May 2004. 
168 Nguyen (Anti-Trafficking Convention: respondent's duties) v. The Secretary of State for the Home 
Department [2015] UKUT 00170 (IAC), 25 March 2015, at [51] 
169 Although in this case a medical report attesting to the fact that the applicant’s suffered from PTSD 
was produced.  
170 PO (Trafficked Women) Nigeria v Secretary of State for the Home Department, CG [2009] UKAIT 
00046, 23 November 2009, at [212]. 
171 It was considered that an NGO could provide support for her trauma but further consideration would 
have been desirable regarding her chances of reintegration as a single mother with a child (presumably 
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circumstantial and holistic assessment of her circumstances. Fortunately, this 
restrictive approach was abandoned in D (Trafficked women) Nigeria CG172 
as the tribunal conducted a detailed analysis of the claimant’s individual 
circumstances by relying extensively on the UNHCR guidelines173 for victims 
of trafficking and concluded that ‘if the appellant is met by NAPTIP shelter 
on arrival in Nigeria […][although] she would not be at risk of being 
trafficked […] she would in effect be locked up for the duration of her stay 
and only allowed out with a chaperone’. It was further stated that ‘in this 
appellant’s case such restriction on her movements would […]  cause 
significant re-traumatisation’.174 The importance of the trauma faced, 
compounded by the lack of family support, was the basis for granting refugee 
status to this applicant. To reach this conclusion, the tribunal adopted a 
circumstantial approach by acknowledging ‘the need for critical and close 
analysis of the particular personal circumstances of a victim of trafficking in 
the context of the evidenced background material’.175 A rather similar view 
was adopted in the case of a Congolese applicant in the US as the decision 
makers accorded significant weight to the psychological harm faced by the 
applicant.176 
 
In light of the above, it can be observed that when decision makers 
take into account the psychological element for assessing the risk of 
persecution, the outcome tends to be positive for the applicants.177  However, 
the risks of ostracism, stigma and alienation are rarely considered, which is 
                                                
born out of her trafficking experience). She had no family network and had been subjected to child 
labour.  
172D (Trafficked Women) Nigeria CG [2016] UKUT 00454 (IAC) October 2016.  
173 Ibid at [21]. 
174 Ibid at [212]. 
175 Ibid at [70]. 
176 Matter of X, United States Executive Office for Immigration Review, 9 August 2011, available at: 
http://www.refworld.org/cases,USIC,4ea6e2a62.html: in this case, the psychiatrist who performed an 
evaluation in preparation for the hearing of the claimant before the Court determined that it would be 
‘highly detrimental’ for her to return to her country because she had no family members who could 
provide her with emotional or financial support and returning her to the DRC would force her to relive 
her traumatic experiences, which would be very damaging, especially if she were not able to obtain 
mental health care (p.13). Given the nature of the respondent's past persecution and her particularly 
vulnerable position as a young woman with no familial connections and limited income, the Court 
found it very likely that she would suffer serious harm if removed to the DRC.  
177 AM and BM (Trafficked women) Albania v Secretary of State for the Home Department, [2010] 
UKUT 80 (IAC), March 2010: The Tribunal granted refugee status to a claimant acknowledging that 
victims of trafficking were likely to suffer PTSD syndromes that could affect their ability to reintegrate 
in the society.   
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an unfortunate approach because these aspects could further inform the 
interpretation of the notion of persecution. For instance, in Australia, in 
Appeal No. 1105325178, the Appeal Tribunal rejected the asylum application 
of a Korean applicant who had gone to Australia to seek better opportunities 
but who was eventually forced to work in a brothel by her agent. The tribunal 
noted that the applicant had been unable to present a psychological report 
attesting to her fragile mental state and that she was not at serious risk of 
being re-trafficked. Her claim was therefore rejected. The tribunal then 
acknowledged that the claimant’s ‘family may have learned about her sex 
work and drug use in Australia, and, as a result, will reject her’. It was further 
stated that there was a ‘possibility that such knowledge may reach her family, 
and that they may disapprove or even reject her because of that activity’179. 
However, the tribunal concluded that such a reaction or rejection would not 
amount to ‘serious harm’.180 While the mere fact of being rejected by one’s 
family might not indeed amount to persecution, the evaluation of this element 
would have required a more thorough examination of her various 
circumstances. In particular, the claimant’s ability to meet her needs alone in 
Korea and the potential ostracism that she could face without family support 
could have also been assessed to reach a more transparent conclusion. Foster 
pointed out that, for instance, ‘a trafficked woman may face isolation from 
traditional support networks, leading to destitution, which may itself 
constitute persecution’.181 This aspect was not sufficiently taken into 
consideration in this case. 
 
Conversely to the above, a recent evolution has been noted in France 
in such cases.  In some trafficking cases, the appeal court has taken into 
account not only the risk to applicants of being re-trafficked and facing 
reprisals, but also the possibility of ‘social alienation’,182 ostracism from the 
family and community as well as discrimination.183 This has led to more 
positive outcomes for applicants. In certain traditional and paternalistic 
                                                
178 Case No.1105325 [2012] RRTA 272 (20 March 2012). 
179 Ibid at [75]. 
180 Ibid at [75]. 
181 Dorevitch and Foster (n 142) 2. 
182 CNDA, 24 March 2015, Décision n° 10012810, Mlle JEL. 
183 CNDA, 12 juillet 2013 n° 13003859, 4. 
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societies where a family or community network is essential, the position that 
the victim of trafficking will have in her society upon return might indeed be 
important in order to assess the level of harm that she could face.  
 
A singular approach pertaining to mental harm is the one adopted in 
the US, whereby an applicant can be granted asylum if her past experience 
has been deemed particularly atrocious, even when no prospective risk of 
physical harm is identified.184 In this sense, the US legislator has introduced 
the possibility to recognise an applicant for ‘compelling reasons’ based on 
past persecution.185 UNHCR considers, that in extreme cases, forms of mental 
suffering could amount to persecution when the extremely fragile 
psychological state of mind of the applicants could render their return to the 
country unendurable.186 Gauci distinguished this aspect from the concept of 
‘continuing persecution’187 caused by a trauma that makes an applicant more 
vulnerable to other forms of harm such as the ability to reintegrate into the 
society. This is different to considering the trauma itself as a form of mental 
persecution, as suggested by the UNHCR guidelines. Whilst the difference is 
slight, this option has rarely been adopted by national courts, save for the US. 
This unfortunately demonstrates the reluctance of domestic jurisdictions to 
accept mental harm as a form of persecution per se as courts usually require 
that applicants also demonstrate a risk of facing other forms predicament in 
addition to the trauma experienced. 
 
iv-Concluding remarks  
 
Apart from the above-mentioned cases, the previously discussed 
decisions generally fail to consider the individual circumstances of the 
trafficked claimants, their role in the society as well as the stigmatisation, 
isolation and ostracism that they could face upon return to their country. A 
strict interpretation of persecution would only assess the risk of experiencing 
continuous instances of trafficking while a broader understanding of the 
                                                
184 Matter of Chen, 20 I&N Dec 16 (Board of Immigration Appeal 1989) and Matter of B-, 21 I&N Dec 
66 (Board of Immigration Appeal 1995). 
185 Title 8 Code of Federal Regulations, para 208.13(b)(1)(iii)(A). 
186 UNHCR (n 49) at [16]. 
187 Jean-Pierre Gauci, Trafficked Persons as Refugees, (King’s College London 2013) 224-225. 
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notion, which is more desirable in these cases, would take into account an 
accumulation of different elements and the adverse impact that they have on 
the physical and psychological integrity of the claimants. In particular, 
Kneebone pointed out that the phenomenon of trafficking reveals the 
deficiencies of certain social systems whereby some women are in a position 
of vulnerability.188 These aspects are important elements that need to be 
evaluated in order to adopt a more holistic approach to persecution so as to 
facilitate a better understanding of this notion in trafficking cases. 
 
Part 3- Concluding remarks  
 
This chapter has analysed how new claims arising out of situations of 
gender-based violence, often perpetrated in the private sphere, have been 
addressed in the jurisprudence. Whilst some jurisdictions have been quite 
reluctant to consider that private individuals could be agents of persecution, 
this position has progressively evolved, making the notion of persecution 
more relevant to the claims of refugee women in the 21st century. 
Regrettably, the interpretation of the various forms of harm that non-state 
agents of persecution can cause still raises dissension because gender-based 
persecution cases are usually complex and involve a wide array of harms that 
are inconsistently taken into account. Whilst acts of physical violence such as 
FGM, domestic violence and trafficking in persons are generally found to 
amount to persecution, ‘milder’ forms of violence peripheral to those harms 
are more variably addressed, causing a ‘degree of uncertainty about how to 
approach matters in which issues of gender and refugee law intersect’..189 This 
state of the jurisprudence led Kallinosis to speak again of a ‘refugee 
roulette’190 for the ‘refugee woman’ and tend to set an undesirably high 
threshold.  
 
                                                
188 Susan Kneebone, ‘Human Trafficking and Refugee Women’ in Efrat Arbel, Catherin Dauvergne, 
Jenni Millbank (eds) Gender in Refugee Law - From the Margins to the Centre (Routledge 2014) 197-
219. 
189 Kneebone (n 3).  
190 Kallinosis (n 24) 80. 
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Overall, inconsistent approaches are partly due to the fact that 
different interpretive patterns have been used by decision makers as observed 
in this chapter. It appears that most common-law jurisdictions have often 
relied on human rights as interpretive benchmarks for assessing the notion of 
persecution but they have done so through divergent parameters. Other 
jurisdictions have adopted ad hoc narratives, on a case-by-case basis, thus 
creating further uncertainty for asylum seekers and refugees. More 
consistency should be, therefore, fostered in national jurisdictions in order to 
provide decisions that are better adapted to the protection needs of refugees. 
For this, a holistic assessment of the different circumstances of refugee 
women should be conducted, taking into account the complexity of their 
experiences in both the public and private spheres and recognising that both 
spheres, in fact, closely intersect.  
 
In this sense Crawley called for a ‘contextual analysis [of refugee 
claims] that includes gender relations and gender equality and moves beyond 
discrete monolithic categories of men and women that flatten out the 
complexity and diversity of experience’.191 An absolute harmonisation of 
jurisprudential practices is rather difficult to achieve, but lending more weight 
to the personal circumstances of refugees and their individual profile for 
interpreting persecution could encourage fairer and more transparent 
outcomes and reassert the relevance of the notion of persecution in these 
cases.  
 
The preceding chapters have explored the relevance of the notion of 
persecution in various types of claims that generally involve individual forms 
of harm. It was concluded that persecution remains relevant in most cases, 
only if a holistic and comprehensive method is adopted, factoring in a 
circumstantial approach. The following and final chapter will now assess the 
limits of the concept of persecution in cases of generalised forms of hardship 
in order to delineate the confines of the 1951 Convention.  
                                                
191 Crawley (n 10) 348.  
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Chapter 6: The limitations of the notion of 
persecution and collective forms of harm 
  
The previous chapters have demonstrated that the notion of 
persecution is a relatively malleable notion that remains relevant to a large 
variety of situation, generally involving personal forms of harm. However, 
the application of the notion of persecution to asylum cases involving 
collective forms of predicaments poses different conceptual challenges that 
will be analysed below. These forms of harm have become more frequent in 
the past decades and have brought to light some of the inherent limitations of 
the concept of persecution, thus questioning the ‘enduring relevance’ of the 
Convention.1 As a result, one might wonder to what extent the notion of 
persecution is applicable in contemporary contexts of collective hardship?    
 
The first part of this chapter will highlight the main interpretive 
difficulties for applying the notion of persecution to certain types of mass 
displacement. It will then be observed that multiple national systems have 
flourished in response to these conceptual challenges, leading to a 
fragmentary state of refugee law at the global level. In particular, it will be 
pointed out that this situation questions the centrality of ‘persecution’ in the 
refugee definition. It will be argued that the complementary forms of 
protection and extended definitions have unduly encroached on the 1951 
Convention although the Convention should remain applicable to a large 
number of cases, even in situations of mass displacement (Part 1). The second 
part will consider the limitations of the notion of persecution. It will be argued 
that a change of paradigm is not needed to reshape the notion of refugeehood 
at the international level because the 1951 Convention corresponds to one 
form of protection that might not suit all forms of displacements worldwide 
(Part 2).    
 
                                                
1 Jane McAdam, ‘The Enduring Relevance of the 1951 Refugee Convention’ [2017] 29 International 
Journal of Refugee Law 1. 
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Part 1) The 1951 Convention vs extended definitions and 
complementary forms of protection: a fragmentary system of 
protection for individuals fleeing collective forms of harm 
 
The present section will first highlight the new interpretive challenges 
brought to light in contexts of large-scale displacement or generalised 
violence (A). It will be then demonstrated that these challenges have been 
circumvented by domestic legislations through the implementation of 
complementary protection regimes or extended definitions. Different state 
approaches will be analysed with a particular focus on the complementary 
protection scheme provided by the QD, given that it constitutes the first 
attempt to harmonise approaches at the transnational level. It will be then 
argued that, generally, the development of these complementary protection 
schemes by host states has been inconsistent and inadequate. In addition to 
that, the parallel use of extended definitions has further contributed to the 
creation of an imbalance system of protection (B).  
 
A) Generalised forms of violence and large-scale displacements  
 
i-Patterns of displacement that challenge the notion of persecution  
  
As pointed out in chapter 1, new forms of displacement have emerged 
since the end of the Cold War. Some of these new displacement patterns are 
distinct from the ‘classical persecution-driven movements’,2 in particular due 
to the absence of individualised harm that generally ensues. In these contexts, 
people are often facing the indirect consequences of certain situations rather 
than targeted forms of persecution as noted by some authors.  
 
For instance, Feller fleshed out the existence of three new categories 
of forced displacement relating to generalised forms of harm, namely 
‘violence accompanying conflicts or civil disturbance’, ‘natural disasters or 
                                                
2 Erika Feller, ‘The Refugee Convention at 60: Still Fit for Its Purpose? Protection Tools for Protection 
Needs’ in Susan Kneebone, Dallal Stevens, Loretta Baldassar (eds) Refugee Protection and the Role of 
Law: Conflicting Identities (Routledge Research in Asylum, Migration and Refugee Law 2015).  
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human-made calamities’ and mixed situations involving individuals who 
move for various reasons, including poverty.3 Betts also highlighted the 
emergence of similar drivers, such as ‘environmental change, food insecurity, 
and state fragility’.4 In particular, he pointed to the severity of the situations 
faced by these new migrants, who are forced to leave their country to ensure 
their economic survival, rather than fleeing one specific agent of harm. He 
therefore called these new drivers, ‘survival migration’.5 On a different note, 
Lambert and Farell noted the existence of emerging push-factors, in the 
context of what they called the ‘new wars’.6 They considered that these wars 
are distinct from traditional conflicts in that they involve a larger variety of 
actors and have wider repercussions on large segments of civilian 
populations.7 They explained that such conflicts usually involve ‘a broad 
range of military actors, including insurgents, militias and criminals, as well 
as state-based military forces’, thus enhancing the complexity and magnitude 
of the violence, indirectly affecting civilians. Farell and Schmitt made the 
same observations and spoke of an ‘excess death’ rate to designate the large 
amount of people ‘killed […] indirectly by the effects of conflict on 
population displacement, food insecurity and ill-health’.8 They observed that 
‘far more civilians die as an indirect consequence of armed conflict, than 
directly in armed conflict itself’.9 The above authors all pointed to the 
existence of new categories of displacement prompted by the indirect 
consequences of external events on civilian populations and different from 
the targeted forms of violence usually encompassed by the notion of the 
persecution.   
 
These emerging forms of harm have been acknowledged by the 
UNHCR, who observed that ‘poverty, economic decline, inflation, violence, 
                                                
3 Ibid.  
4 Alexander Betts, Survival Migration: Failed Governance and the Crisis of Displacement (Cornell 
University Press 2013) 15. 
5 Ibid.  
6 Hélène Lambert and Theo Farell, ‘Changing Character of Armed Conflict and the Implications for 
Refugee Protection Jurisprudence’ [2010] 22 International Journal of Refugee Law 237, 257. 
7 Ibid 258.  
8 Theo Farell and Olivier Schmitt, ‘The Causes, Character and Conduct of Armed Conflicts and the 
Effects on Civilian Populations, 1990-2010’ [2012] 03 Legal and Protection Policy and Research Series 
UNHCR DIP 1-44, 7. 
9 Ibid 10.  
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disease, food insecurity and malnourishment’10 were new major drivers in the 
21st century. This position was later reiterated by the Refugee Agency 
through one of its representatives, who lamented the indirect effects of armed 
conflicts and generalised violence on civilians.11 He pointed out that sizable 
segments of populations could be now concerned by these situations, which 
raises major challenges for differentiating individuals in need of international 
protection from individuals merely leaving to seek a better life.  
 
Due to the mixed and overlapping motives of displacements induced 
by state fragility, armed conflict, economic deprivation, climate change or 
environmental changes, statistics regarding the number of those displaced and 
the exact causes of displacement are extremely difficult to gather.12 It is 
particularly difficult to address the existence of mixed flows13 involving 
people fleeing a wide variety of complex and entangled predicaments ranging 
from economic harm to threat to physical insecurity and environmental 
damage, as there is no common metric by which to measure the severity of 
these types of harm. In this context, interpreting the notion of persecution is 
highly challenging for a few reasons that will be analysed in turn. 
 
ii-Interpretive challenges   
 
As demonstrated in preceding chapters, the notion of persecution 
implies the existence of some form of individual treatment inflicted upon 
certain individuals.14 In a Note on International Protection in 1998, the 
UNHCR pointed out that ‘persecution always involves some form of 
discrimination’.15 Whilst this element has been debated in previous chapters, 
                                                
10 UNHCR, ‘Summary Conclusions on International Protection of Persons Fleeing Armed Conflict and 
Other Situations of Violence; Roundtable 13 and 14 September 2012, Cape Town, South Africa’ 
(UNHCR December 2012). 
11 Volker Türk, ‘Protection Gaps in Europe? Persons fleeing the indiscriminate effects of generalized 
violence’, (UNHCR 2011) 4. 
12 The UNHCR estimated that in 2016, 65.6 millions of individuals were forcibly displaced. This figure, 
however, encompasses a wide variety of drivers referred to as ‘persecution, conflict, violation or human 
rights violations’. This includes therefore, refugees, but also IDPs, stateless persons and returnees. 
UNHCR, Global Trend, Forced Displacement 2016, 19 June 2017. 
13 Feller (n 2).  
14 See chapter 3, Part 2 (B).   
15 UNHCR Standing Committee, Note on International Protection Note on International Protection 
EC/48/SC/CRP.27, 25 May 1998. See also Chapter 2, whereby numerous authors argued that 
discrimination is an essential, although not sufficient, element of the notion of persecution.  
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it remains that persecution implies the necessity to target an individual or a 
group for a specific characteristic that they have (either for personal 
motivation or other discriminatory reasons).16 As a result, the Refugee 
Agency recently stated that the 1951 Convention should not apply to those 
‘fleeing the indiscriminate effects of violence and the accompanying disorder 
in a conflict situation, with no element of persecution’.17 This particular 
aspect of persecution therefore poses interpretive difficulties when applied to 
generalised forms of violence and other human rights violations that 
seemingly engender unselective predicaments as is often the case, for 
instance, during armed conflicts. In this sense, the UNHCR Handbook 
considered that ‘war refugees’ should be treated as a ‘special case’18 because 
they do not fit easily within the criteria of ‘well-founded fear of persecution’. 
War refugees arguably escape a general situation of instability rather than 
targeted harm perpetrated by one or several people and as such, have 
difficulties in demonstrating that they have faced persecution. 
 
Another major feature of the notion of persecution lies in its necessary 
human agency. The previous chapters have analysed cases of individuals who 
have experienced harm at the hands of either state or non-state agents. All 
these cases had in common the existence of a human persecutor. The 
possibility that persecution could stem from a general situation without 
identifiable agent of harm was not considered in the travaux preparatoires of 
                                                
16 See authors who have argued that persecution supposes an action that targets people for their actual 
or perceived characteristics: Jean-Francois Durieux, ‘Three Asylum Paradigms’ [2013] 20 International 
Journal on Minority and Group Rights 147, 157; Daniel J. Steinbock, ‘Interpreting the Refugee 
Definition’ [1998] 45 UCLA Law Review 733; Andrew I. Schoenholtz, ‘The New Refugees and the 
Old Treaty: Persecutors and Persecuted in the Twenty-First Century’ [2015] 16 Chicago Journal of 
International Law 8, 120; Mirko Bagaric and Penny Dimopoulos, ‘Discrimination as the Touchstone 
of Persecution in Refugee Law’ [2007] 3 Journal of Migration and Refugee Issues 14. For a different 
perspective see: in Jean-Yves Carlier, ‘The Geneva Refugee Definition and the ‘Theory of the Three 
Scales’ in Frances Nicholson and Patrick Twomey (eds) Refugee Rights and Realities: Evolving 
International Concepts and Regimes (CUP 1999) 37-54, the author considers that persecution consists 
more in the disproportionate violations of human rights than discrimination.  
17 UNHCR, The UNHCR's Observations on the European Commission's Proposal for a Council 
Directive on Minimum Standards for the Qualification and Status of Third Country Nationals and 
Stateless Persons as Refugees or as Persons Who Otherwise Need International Protection (Brussels, 
12 September 2001, COM (2001) 510 final, 2001/0207 (CNS), 1 November 2001, [42].  
18 UNHCR Handbook and Guidelines on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status under 
the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, December 2011, 
HCR/1P/4/ENG/REV.3. at Chapter V.  
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the 1951 Convention and neither is it featured in the UNHCR Handbook19 or 
any other interpretive guidelines. This suggests that a human actor of 
persecution remains necessary in every case and poses challenges for 
determining the protection needs of people who are fleeing external 
situations. For instance, this is particularly problematic in the case of 
individuals fearing economic harm. Indeed, the Handbook noted that the 1951 
Convention was not meant to cover economic migrants20 unless they can 
prove having faced intentional harm as a result of discriminatory policies. 
Although the UNHCR Handbook establishes a certain nuance to this 
approach by considering that in certain situations, economic measures can 
amount to acts of persecution, it highlighted the difficulty of addressing these 
cases in the terms of the Convention. Harding,21 in particular, pointed out that 
it is generally hard to identify those responsible for the economic suffering of 
entire populations, which in turn makes it difficult to apply the concept of 
persecution. To Harding, this situation is, to a great extent, what feeds the 
migrants/refugees dichotomy as it causes refugees to be viewed with more 
sympathy than people escaping poverty,22 given that the latter are generally 
perceived to move by choice. Other authors pointed out that the lack of a 
human persecutor and the lack of targeted action was also problematic in the 
cases of individuals fleeing climate change or environmental disasters 
because it is difficult to ascribe responsibility for these types of predicaments. 
In particular, Ni noted that it is ultimately ‘difficult to fit climate change into 
the persecutor mold.’23 
 
Whether the notion of persecution can fit into the situations described 
above has been widely questioned by countries in which people seek asylum. 
In order to respond to such situations, some states have eschewed the 
                                                
19 Ibid, [65]. The UNHCR Handbook pointed out that persecution normally relates to acts perpetrated 
by the authorities of a country or by the local populace thus pointing out that some form of conscious 
or intentional action by a person is required.  
20 Ibid 62-64. 
21 Jeremy Harding, The Uninvited: Refugees at the Rich Man's Gate (Profile Books 2000). For Harding 
refugees generally attract greater international sympathy than economic migrants because there is an 
identifiable persecutor, as opposed to a general degree of economic difficulty that prevails in some parts 
of the world. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Xing-Yin Ni, ‘A Nation Going Under: Legal Protection for “Climate Change Refugees"’ [2015] 38 
Boston College International & Comparative Law Review 329, 339. 
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interpretive problem by either resorting to complementary forms of protection 
or extending the benefit of the Convention to wider categories of populations. 
Unfortunately, responses have been provided in an uncoordinated manner 
and, in certain cases, have reflected restrictive interpretations of the refugee 
definition, as well as a certain misunderstanding of the scope of persecution.  
 
B) The fragmentary responses of the international community to 
individuals displaced by generalised violence and other human 
rights violations 
 
i-Complementary protection and extended refugee definitions: a 
fragmentary system of protection?  
 
Some countries in Africa and Latin America have reshaped the notion 
of a refugee by adding broader criteria to the refugee definition in order to 
adapt it to new displacement patterns. A new definition was first developed 
in 1969 in Africa by the Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of 
Refugee Problems in Africa taken under the auspices of the Organisation of 
African Unity (the OAU Convention).24 The OAU Convention adopted the 
1951 Convention definition as a departure point to determine who is a refugee 
and further enlarged the eligibility criteria by considering that the mere 
existence of situations such as ‘external aggression, occupation, foreign 
domination or events seriously disturbing public order’ could warrant 
international protection. In 1984, the Cartagena Declaration on Refugees 
(‘Cartagena Declaration’)25 adopted a similar narrative and added new 
elements to the causes of flight, namely ‘generalized violence’, ‘internal 
aggression’, and ‘massive violation of human rights’. Both definitions 
developed a new refugee paradigm by referring to objective conditions in 
refugee-producing countries and ruling out the concept of persecution.26 
 
                                                
24 OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems (concluded at Addis Ababa 
on 10 September 1969, registered on 31 March 1976) 1001 UNTS 45 (OAU Convention). 
25Cartagena Declaration on Refugees, (adopted on 22 November 1984) OAS Doc. 
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.66/doc.10, 190 (Cartagena Declaration). 
26 José H. Fischel De Andrade, ‘Regional Policy Approaches and Harmonization: a Latin American 
Perspective’ [1998] 10 International Journal of Refugee Law 389, 402.  
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 After the emergence of new regional approaches, the UNHCR 
acknowledged the particularity of certain local situations and commended 
such developments.27 Although the Refugee Agency re-affirmed that the 1951 
definition remained the foundation of international refugee law, it also 
considered that other forms of protection were needed to respond to the needs 
and priorities of newly displaced people.28 In order to remedy the lack of 
international legislation covering situations of generalised violence in other 
countries, the UNHCR issued a number of recommendations and guidance 
notes to encourage states to respect, at a minimum, the principle of non-
refoulement,29 even for individuals who were not eligible to refugee status 
under the 1951 definition.  
 
In spite of these new situations of generalised violence, most 
industrialised states continued to apply the traditional definition of a refugee. 
In these countries, the notion of persecution remained a pivotal concept in the 
determination of refugee status and claimants at risk of indiscriminate or 
general forms of harms tended to be rejected under the 1951 Convention.30 In 
lieu of an extended definition, national systems created complementary forms 
of protection31 to address the plight of these ‘new refugees’. They, however, 
adopted differentiated standards to determine who was eligible to protected 
status.  
 
                                                
27 ExCom Conclusion No 81 (XLVIII) ‘General Conclusion on International Protection’ – 1997: ‘The 
Executive Committee […] (k) Encourages States and UNHCR to continue to promote, where relevant, 
regional initiatives for refugee protection and durable solutions, and to ensure that regional standards 
which are developed conform fully with universally recognized standards and respond to particular 
regional circumstances and protection needs’. 
28 UNHCR ExCom Conclusion No. 87 (L) ‘General Conclusion on International Protection’ – 1999 (f) 
Reaffirms ‘that the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol remain 
the foundation of the international refugee regime; recognises, however, that there may be a need to 
develop complementary forms of protection, and in this context, encourages UNHCR to engage in 
consultations with States and relevant actors to examine all aspects of this issue’; Excom Conclusion 
No. 103 (LVI) ‘General Conclusion on International Protection’ – 2005 – Provision on International 
Protection Including Through Complementary Forms of Protection […] the Excom recognises: 
‘Recognizing that, in different contexts, there may be a need for international protection in cases not 
addressed by the 1951 Convention and its 1967 Protocol’. 
29 UNHCR Excom Conclusions No 87 (L) ‘General Conclusion on International Protection’ (1999); 
UNHCR Excom Conclusions No 89 (LI) ‘General Conclusion on International Protection’ (from 2000 
UNHCR Excom meeting)’ (2000); UNHCR Excom Conclusions No. 103 (LVI) ‘Conclusion on the 
Provision on International Protection Including Through Complementary Forms of Protection’ (2005). 
30 Hugo Storey, ‘Armed Conflict in Asylum Law: The “War-Flaw”’ [2012] 31 Refugee Survey 
Quarterly 1, 5. 
Storey highlighted the existence of a ‘first wave’ of jurisprudence, in the late 1990s in Western Europe.  
31 Jane McAdam, Complementary Protection in International Refugee Law (1st edn OUP 2007) 1.  
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For instance, in the US, complementary protection takes the form of a 
temporary status granted to people who face a threat to their safety in their 
country, either because of an armed conflict, environmental disasters or if 
there ‘exist extraordinary and temporary conditions in the foreign state’ that 
could justify such protection.32 Protection seekers could also apply for 
withholding of removal under the CAT.33 In Canada, legal status is afforded 
to individuals deemed ‘in need of protection’ if they can demonstrate that they 
are at risk of torture or cruel and inhuman treatment upon return.34 In 
Australia, a protection visa can be granted to individuals likely to face 
‘significant harm’ in their country; ‘significant harm’ being defined as 
arbitrary deprivation of life, the death penalty, torture, cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment.35 Further, in New Zealand protected 
status is also given if there are substantial grounds for believing that 
individuals would be in danger of being subject to torture36 or arbitrary 
deprivation of life or cruel treatment37 in their place of origin. Finally, the 
European Union also developed a ‘subsidiary protection’ system in Article 
15 of the QD, stating that protection can be provided to people at risk of facing 
serious harm upon return to their country, namely (a) the death penalty, (b) 
torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment or (c) a serious and 
individual threat to someone’s life due to indiscriminate violence in situations 
of international or non-international armed conflicts.38 For countries that have 
not developed specific schemes of protection, the customary principle of non-
refoulement39 under international human rights law40 and European law41 
                                                
32 The US Code of Law [1254] a L.114-19 (1)B. 
33 Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), Section 241(b)(3). 
34 The Immigration and Refugee Protection Act 2001 (c.27) 97.1 (A) (B). 
35 The Migration Act 1958 (No 62) 36 (2A). 
36 The Immigration Act 2009, S130. 
37 Ibid, S131.  
38 Directive 2011/95/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011 on 
standards for the qualification of third-country nationals or stateless persons as beneficiaries of 
international protection, for a uniform status for refugees or for persons eligible for subsidiary 
protection, and for the content of the protection granted, Article 15(c). 
39 UNHCR, The Principle of Non-Refoulement as a Norm of Customary International Law. Response 
to the Questions Posed to UNHCR by the Federal Constitutional Court of the Federal Republic of 
Germany in Cases 2 BvR 1938/93, 2 BvR 1954/93, 31 January 1994. See also doctrinal approach: 
Daniel Bethlehem and Elihu Lauterpacht, ‘The Scope and Content of the Principle of Non-
Refoulement. Opinion’ in Erika Feller, Volker Turk and Frances Nicholson (eds), Refugee Protection 
in International Law: UNHCR’s Global Consultations on International Protection (CUP 2003) at 
[253]. 
40 See inter alia, Article 7 ICCPR, Article 22 CAT. 
41 Art. 3 ECHR.  
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remains applicable to prevent forcible returns of persons at risk of facing 
certain types of human rights violations in their country.   
 
The multiplicity of these different standards reflects a considerable 
splintering of the international protection schemes. The differentiation of 
protective statuses under extended refugee definitions, complementary 
regimes of protection and other human rights obligations, further reinforces 
the fragmentation of this system at the global level. In the words of Cantor 
and Durieux, ‘adhoc-ism’42 now prevails on the international scene. 
 
ii-An imbalanced system of protection at the global level? 
 
 
As a result of this splintered system, the same category of people 
seeking protection can receive different answers depending on the country 
they lodge an asylum application to. This situation has been particularly 
detrimental for individuals escaping from armed conflicts and other forms of 
human rights violations. What follows will demonstrate how these 
inconsistent standards are applied in particular situations.  
 
ii-(a) Armed conflicts  
Although armed conflicts per se are not mentioned in the extended 
refugee definitions, they can easily be covered under the OAU definition 
(‘external aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events seriously 
disturbing public order’)43 and the Cartagena Declaration (‘generalized 
violence, foreign aggression, internal conflicts, massive violation of human 
rights’).44 The mere existence of a situation of instability as described  above 
will suffice to grant refugee status without any other major other requirement. 
This rather broad scope of the OAU Convention and Cartagena Declaration 
                                                
42 David James Cantor and Jean-François Durieux, ‘Refuge from Inhumanity? Canvassing the Issues’ 
in David James Cantor and Jean-Francois Durieux (eds), Refuge from Inhumanity? War Refugees and 
International Humanitarian Law (Brill Nijhoff 2013) 3-35, 20. 
43 OAU Convention, art 1(2).  
44 Cartagena Declaration, pt III (3). 
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was pointed out by some authors such as Wood,45 Rankin,46 Simeon47, Cantor 
and Trimino.48 They all demonstrated that these definitions were able to cover 
a wide spectrum of violent events without a strict condition of intensity, thus 
seemingly setting a low threshold for the recognition of people fleeing armed 
conflicts. On this point, it should, however, be noted that few RSD decisions 
have been made under the extended definitions, in particular under the OAU 
Convention, as it has been mostly applied through prima facie procedures.49 
There is also a significant lack of doctrinal analysis of these definitions.50 
This could suggest that interpretive barriers have, so far, been overlooked. In 
this sense, Edwards pointed out that the wide coverage of the OAU definition 
owes more to a certain political will and wide interpretation of its terms than 
to its intrinsic scope.51 Whilst it is possible that broad interpretations of the 
regional definitions, motivated by local necessities, have allowed a generous 
application of these definitions, it cannot be denied that, by referring to 
external situations rather than individual circumstances of refugees, these 
definitions have a greater potential for being applied to large scale movements 
of people escaping armed conflicts.52  
 
                                                
45  Tamara Wood, ‘The African War Refugee: Using IHL to Interpret the 1969 African Refugee 
Convention’s Expanded Refugee Definition’ in David James Cantor and Jean-Francois Durieux (eds), 
Refuge from Inhumanity? War Refugees and International Humanitarian Law (Brill Nijhoff 2013) 179-
203, 179. Wood noted that the OAU definition is said to ‘better reflect and respond to situations of 
mass displacement from civil war and other forms of violence, conflict and unrest that have 
characterised much of the forced migration on the African continent’. 
46 Micah Bond Rankin, ‘Extending the limits or narrowing the scope? Deconstructing the OAU refugee 
definition thirty years on’ [2005] New Issues in Refugee Research UNHCR Working Paper No. 113, 
1-29, at 21. Rankin argued that the OAU can apply to a large set of situations, including mere 
‘disturbance and tensions’ ranging from armed violence and violence of a lower threshold. 
47 James C. Simeon, ‘A New Protection Orientation and Framework for Refugees and Other Forced 
Migrants’ [2017] 6 Laws 1, 9: he calls these definitions the ‘most progressive and advanced’. 
48 David James Cantor and Diana Trimiño Mora, ‘A Simple Solution to War Refugees? The Latin 
American Expanded Definition and its relationship to IHL’ in David James Cantor and Jean-Francois 
Durieux (eds), Refuge from Inhumanity? War Refugees and International Humanitarian Law (Brill 
Nijhoff 2013) 204-224, 216-217. 
49 Tamara Wood, ‘Expanding Protection in Africa? Case Studies of the Implementation of the 1969 
African Refugee Convention's Expanded Refugee Definition’ [2014] 26 International Journal of 
Refugee Law 555, 561-574: the author considered the poor implementation of the OAU Convention in 
South Africa and Kenya; Alice Edwards, ‘Refugee Status Determination in Africa’ [2006] 14 African 
Journal of International and Comparative Law 204, 205. See also Feller (n 2). 
50 Wood (n 45) 182. In Rankin (n 46) 4, the authors consider that there is an ‘illusion of consensus’ on 
the OAU Convention 4; see also Marina Sharpe, ‘The 1969 African Refugee Convention: Innovations, 
Misconceptions and Omissions’ [2012] 58 McGill Law Journal 95, 99. 
51 Edwards (n 49) 232. 
52 Vincent Chetail, “Armed Conflict and Forced Migration: A Systemic Approach to International 
Humanitarian Law, Refugee Law and Human Rights Law” in A. Clapham & P. Gaeta (eds), The Oxford 
Handbook of International Law in Armed Conflict, (Oxford, Oxford University Press August 12, 2013) 
700-734, 725: to Chetail, the regional definitions are “ultimately less convoluted and more protective”. 
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Conversely, the approaches of states applying other forms of 
complementary protection have been more restrictive and, also, rather 
inconsistent. Canadian,53 New Zealand,54 and Australian55 legislations have 
not specifically mentioned armed conflict as a basis for protection but instead 
referred to the dispositions of the CAT, therefore requiring a different test to 
assess the likelihood of harm. This test is more based on the individual 
circumstances of protection seekers rather than external factors and, as such, 
has a higher evidentiary burden than the extended definitions.56 However, in 
Europe57 and in the US,58 direct references to armed conflicts are expressed 
in the legislation as a ground justifying the application of protection schemes. 
In spite of references to external situations, these legislations seem to impose 
an even stricter requirement given the necessity to qualify an external 
situation as an ‘armed conflict’ prior to determining the merits of the claim, 
which seems to also add an extra burden of proof on claimants.  
 
The QD in particular adopted ambiguous terms in Article 15(c), by 
using contradictory concepts such as individual threats and indiscriminate 
violence in situations of armed conflict. Turk pointed out that this formulation 
was ‘convoluted’ and noted that the ‘individual threat’ element in a context 
of generalised violence presents a conceptual difficulty.59 The terms used by 
the QD in fact seem to prompt an analysis that is akin to the notion of 
persecution and somehow blurs the distinction between the 1951 Convention 
and subsidiary protection criteria. For instance, Juss noted that the necessity 
to show a discriminate impact of indiscriminate violence, ‘is every bit as real 
as individual-based persecution’.60 As such, the QD creates some conceptual 
confusion as to the perimeters of the 1951 Convention and subsidiary 
protection.  
                                                
53 The Immigration and Refugee Protection Act 2001(c.27) 97.1 (A) (B). 
54 The Immigration Act 2009, s 130 and 131. 
55 The Migration Act 1958 (No 62) 36 (2A). Jane McAdam (n 31), 252. 
56 McAdam (n 31) Chap 3 127: McAdam explained the various procedural requirements when seeking 
protection under international human rights law of complementary scheme of protection. For instance, 
she pointed that the standard of proof to establish a risk under the CAT in the US is “more likely than 
not” which is higher than “reasonably possibility”. 
57 Revised Qualification Directive, art 15 (c).  
58 8 The U.S. Code of Law para 1254a L.114-19 (1)B 1(A). 
59 Turk, (n 10). 
60 Satvinder Juss, ‘Problematizing the Protection of “War Refugees”: A Rejoinder to Hugo Storey and 
Jean-François Durieux’ [2013] 32 Refugee Survey Quarterly 122,132. 
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In order to overcome these interpretive hurdles, the CJEU was asked 
to provide advice on how to interpret Article 15(c) of the QD.61 However, the 
court provided rather confusing guidance in Elgafaji, as the European judges 
proposed to rely on a sliding scale to evaluate the level of harm faced by the 
claimants. For the court, the more an asylum seeker is personally affected by 
a situation of violence in his/her country, the lower the level of indiscriminate 
violence required in order to qualify for subsidiary protection.62 Lambert 
noted that, in this case, the court raised ‘two key issues of procedure: how to 
assess conflict severity and the seriousness of risks to individuals’ but did not 
provide any answer to these questions.63 Indeed, the judges did not explain 
how the threshold of an individual threat versus the level of indiscriminate 
violence should be assessed, and therefore reinforced the confusion as to the 
practical application of those two contradictory concepts.  
 
Another caveat of Elgafaji, is that it did not clarify whether the notion 
of armed conflict should be understood as the traditional armed conflict 
concept defined in IHL.64 Fortunately, a later decision of court65 further 
addressed this point, and specified that recourse to IHL standards was not 
necessary for qualifying the existence of an armed conflict. The court then 
provided its own understanding of the eligibility criteria for engaging the 
application of Article 15(c) by stating that an armed conflict exists ‘if a state’s 
armed forces confront one or more armed groups or if two or more armed 
groups confront each other’.66 Whilst this decision has been welcomed as 
broadening the scope of the subsidiary protection regime,67 its repercussions 
on EU case law need to be further assessed in the future to ensure that the 
                                                
61 Case C-465/07 Meki Elgafaji, Noor Elgafaji v Staatssecretaris van Justitie [2009] ECR I-921 (CJEU, 
17 February 2009). 
62 Ibid at [39]. 
63 Hélène Lambert, ‘The Next Frontier: Expanding Protection in Europe for Victims of Armed Conflict 
and Indiscriminate Violence’ [2013] 25 International Journal of Refugee Law 207, 214. 
64 Although it should be noted that this question was not directly asked to the court.  
65  Aboubacar Diakité v Commissaire général aux réfugiés et aux apatrides, C-285/12, (CJEU, 30 
January 2014). 
66 Ibid at [25]. This view is in line with Juss’s proposal to consider apply a sui generis approach to 
Article 15 (c) in Juss (n 60).  
67 Celine Bauloz, ‘The Definition of Internal Armed Conflict in Asylum Law: The 2014 Diakite 
Judgment of the EU Court of Justice’ [2014] 12 Journal of International Criminal Justice 835, 844.  
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autonomous meaning of armed conflict proposed by the court does not lead 
to fragmentary jurisprudence in the EU. 
 
Overall, it appears that, so far, the guidance provided by the court has 
been of limited assistance in harmonising the different approaches in Europe, 
in particular in the context of the refugee influx to the continent, starting in 
2014. The European Asylum Support Office (EASO) reported that the 
interpretation of the notion of subsidiary protection has been uneven amongst 
member states. For instance, the EASO noted significant disparities in the 
type of status provided to Afghans in 2016, with a recognition rate varying 
between 2% and 97% depending on the country of asylum.68 In France, close 
to 75% and in Italy more than 90% of cases obtained subsidiary protection 
whilst Germany barely granted any subsidiary protection.69 The Syrian 
caseload also reflected inconsistent approaches. For example, Spain provided 
subsidiary protection to close to 100% of applicants whilst the UK instead 
granted refugee status to around 90% of Syrian applicants, barely resorting to 
subsidiary protection.70 Whilst the EASO acknowledged that a certain 
disparity of profiles could explain such discrepancies, the organisation also 
raised concerns regarding the divergent interpretations of the criteria for 
international protection in the European Union.71  
 
In light of the foregoing, it can be observed that different regimes are 
applied today for the protection of individuals fleeing armed conflicts, 
depending on the country they seek asylum in.  
 
ii-(b) Other human rights violations 
Other causes of displacement referring to various types of human 
rights violations have been also addressed through complementary protection 
schemes and extended definitions in inconsistent manners. Although Chetail 
considered that ‘human rights law […] remains the most clear-cut avenue for 
                                                
68 Annual Report on the Situation of Asylum in the European Union 2016, European Asylum Support 
Office (EASO) (Publication Office, 2017) 48.  
69 Ibid.  
70 Ibid 44. 
71 Ibid 26.  
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compensating the restrictive interpretation of the Refugee Convention’,72 
different normative standards have been relied upon and have further 
undermined the coherence of the international asylum regime. For instance, 
the US considered that environmental disasters73 could constitute a ground 
for protection per se, whilst this is not the case for other countries. The death 
penalty is mentioned in the European and Australian legislations only but is 
absent from the other jurisdictions mentioned above. Similarly, ‘arbitrary 
deprivation of life’74 is only a ground for protection in Australia but not 
anywhere else. Almost all of the countries, however, rely on the notion of 
‘torture’75 or ‘inhuman or degrading treatment’76 save for the US which 
mentions instead ‘environmental disasters’ or ‘extraordinary and temporary 
conditions in a foreign country’ thus rather focusing on external situations. 
To Goodwin-Gill, these schemes indeed represent ‘selective domestic 
implementation(s) of State’s international obligations’,77 thus causing 
considerable disparities at the international level.78 The narrow definitions of 
the above regimes further contrast with the broader formulations of the OAU 
and Cartagena Declaration which have a better potential to encompass certain 
groups of individuals barely covered by national legislations of Western 
countries.79 It can be, therefore, observed that people fleeing various forms of 
                                                
72 Chetail (n 52) 725.  
73 8 The US Code of Law para 1254a L.114-19 (1)B 1(A). 
74 Australia: The Migration Act 1958 (No 62) 36 (2A). New Zealand: The Immigration Act 2009, S 
130. 
75 Canada: The Immigration and Refugee Protection Act 2001 (c.27) 97.1 (A) (B). Australia: The 
Migration Act 1958 (No 62) 36 (2A). New Zealand: The Immigration Act 2009, S 130. European 
Union: Article 15b of the European Parliament and Council Directive 2011/95/EU of 13 December 
2011. 
76 Canada: The Immigration and Refugee Protection Act 2001 (c.27) 97.1 (A) (B). Australia: The 
Migration Act 1958 (No 62) 36 (2A). New Zealand: The Immigration Act 2009, S 130. European 
Union: Article 15b of the European Parliament and Council Directive 2011/95/EU of 13 December 
2011. 
77 Ibid 333. 
78 Jane McAdam, ‘The European Union Qualification Directive: The Creation of a Subsidiary 
Protection Regime’ [2005] 17 International Journal of Refugee Law 461, 493: as observed by 
McAdams, in the absence of a universal system to harmonise practices, there is an unfortunate 
‘splintering of the concept of international protection’ through the existence of ‘differentiated statuses 
and unprotected categories’. McAdam also demonstrated that the concept of ‘inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment’ can encompass various scenarios such as the situation of a ‘father who 
suffered, and continues to ‘suffer, distress and anguish as a result of the disappearance of his two sons’ 
or ‘denial of insufficient provision of basic services necessary for a dignified existence, including 
access to health, shelter, social security, and the education and protection of children, provided that a 
minimum level of severity is met’. For non-refoulement obligations of countries party to the ECHR, 
the test is even higher. It must amount to ‘flagrant denial’ of certain rights. In McAdam (n 31) 142-143 
and 171.  
79 However, there is still a significant lack of interpretive doctrine, thus bringing some uncertainty as 
to whether or not these treaties can be applied broadly. See Jane McAdam, ‘Climate Change 
Displacement and International Law: Complementary Protection Standards’ Legal and Protection 
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human rights violation are also faced with great uncertainty when seeking 
protection at the international level.80  
 
It is evident from the above that inconsistent regimes are applied for 
the protection of people fleeing armed conflicts and other human rights 
violations, not only between legal systems relying on extended definitions 
and complementary protections, but also within the complementary systems 
of protection themselves. The following section will demonstrate that this 
general lack of harmonisation has unfortunately allowed states to use the 
complementary protection criteria in an extensive manner, to the detriment of 
the 1951 Convention. This, in fact, has questioned the relevance of the 
Refugee Convention and its ability to foster a coherent system of protection 
globally.  
 
Part 2) The persecution paradigm in international refugee law: 
need for a change?  
 
 
The present section will argue that the extended definitions and the 
complementary protection schemes described above have unduly encroached 
on the regime of the 1951 Convention. It will be first examined how the 
notion of persecution can be interpreted in contexts of mass displacement and 
other forms of human rights violations in order to argue that a proper 
understanding of persecution can ensure the relevance of the 1951 
Convention even in such situations (A). The limitations of the notion of 
persecution will then be examined, only to conclude that amending the 
Convention to develop a new refugee paradigm is currently not needed, as 
long as a suitable application of the diverse forms of protection is ensured 
(B).   
                                                
Policy Research Series, (UNHCR Department of International Protection, May 2011) 15: McAdam 
made reference to Edwards and noted that countries parties to the OAU have generally granted 
protection to individuals fleeing climate change but have not made reference to the disposition of the 
OAU. For her, ‘this is significant because the explanation a State gives for acting in a particular way is 
relevant to ascertaining whether it supports or rejects a liberal interpretation of the treaty’. 
80 For complementary protection system see: Goodwin-Gill Guy and Jane McAdam, The Refugee in 
International Law, (3rd edn, OUP 2011) 330. Goodwin-Gill and McAdam stated that the ‘nature, 
duration and application’ of these multiple forms of complementary protections ‘vary considerably 
amongst States’ thus reflecting different practices.   
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A)   The application of the notion of persecution to large-scale 
displacements and other forms of human rights violations  
 
i- Persecution as a cornerstone of the refugee protection system  
 
Authors have observed that extended definitions or complementary 
forms of protection have either encroached on the international refugee 
definition or serve as an excuse for states to deny protection to individuals 
who might have, otherwise, been eligible to refugee status. For instance, Turk 
stated that ‘with the emergence of […] supplementary legal categories, some 
refugees who would otherwise fulfil the criteria of the 1951 Convention are 
being instead subsumed under the broader category’.81 He further pointed out 
that ‘an even greater concern is that some persons we would consider refugees 
do not receive any protection at all’.82 Whilst he noted that this issue is 
particularly concerning in Europe, this concern could be generalised to other 
regions. For instance, Storey made the same observations regarding the 
general situation of individuals fleeing armed conflict everywhere in the 
world, as he contended that both the extended definitions and complementary 
protection schemes have been detrimental to war refugees. For him, the 
existence of various interpretive approaches has led to a fragmentary state of 
the protection regime for persons fleeing armed conflict and has raised some 
uncertainty regarding their legal status.83   
 
It should be pointed out that, since the end of the cold war and before 
the advent of all the current complementary protection schemes, Western 
states had already applied very restrictive interpretations of the 1951 
Convention in situations of large-scale displacement and generalised 
violence.84 UNHCR observed in 1999 a ‘worrying tendency on the part of 
                                                
81 Turk (n 11) 8. 
82 Ibid. On restrictive interpretations of complementary protection criteria from states see also Naomi 
Hart, ‘Complementary Protection and Transjudicial Dialogue: Global Best Practice or Race to the 
Bottom?’ [2016] 28 International Journal of Refugee law 171. 
83 Hugo Storey, ‘The “War-Flaw” and Why it Matters’ in David James Cantor and Jean-Francois 
Durieux (eds), Refuge from Inhumanity? War Refugees and International Humanitarian Law (Brill 
Nijhoff 2013) 39-56, 40. 
84 Walter Kalin, ‘Flight in Times of War’ [2001] 83 International Review of the Red Cross 629, 635 -
642; Stéphane Jaquemet, ‘Expanding Refugee Protection through International Humanitarian Law- 
Driving on a Highway or Walking near the Edge of the Abyss?’ in David James Cantor and Jean-
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some states […] to argue […] that the 1951 Convention offers an increasingly 
inadequate framework to address present-day refugee challenges’.85 Indeed, 
the existence of mass influx seemed to have acted as a political deterrent for 
states to adopt an broad interpretation of the Convention86 in an early period. 
As such, these narrow views cannot be attributed to the emergence of 
complementary protections schemes only. It remains that these schemes have 
failed to encourage states to adopt a wider understanding of the 1951 
Convention, and, at times, have even served as an excuse for them not to do 
so. 
 
In particular, Storey lamented the existence of a ‘first wave’ of 
jurisprudence that considered people escaping from armed conflict as falling 
outside the ambit of the 1951 Convention, unless they could demonstrate an 
element of persecution through the existence of a ‘differential’ treatment.87 
Storey termed this approach, the ‘exceptionality approach’,88 characterising 
the ‘war-flaw’89 of the Convention. Hathaway also pointed to the 
misconception of certain decisions makers, who required applicants to have 
been effectively singled out in the past for ill-treatment in order to be eligible 
to refugee status.90 In particular, he noted that this view was inadequate as 
nothing in the refugee definition prevents its application to large groups of 
people, regardless of the existence of past persecution. In fact, he considered 
                                                
Francois Durieux (eds), Refuge from Inhumanity? War Refugees and International Humanitarian Law 
(Brill Nijhoff 2013) 79-98, 83; Eric Fripp, ‘Inclusion of Refugees from Armed Conflict, Combatants 
and Ex-combatants’ in ibid 128-154, 134. See, for instance, jurisprudence where the 1951 Convention 
was applied in a restrictive manner: France: CNDA 31 Mars 2011 Mr. A N.100013192: the CNDA 
stated that the alleged acts of violence against a Somali claimant of a minority clan were not established 
and that nothing enabled the Court to believe that the applicant would face persecution. Although it 
was accepted that the claimant was from a minority clan, he was granted subsidiary protection; AMM 
and others (conflict; humanitarian crisis; returnees; FGM) Somalia v. Secretary of State for the Home 
Department, CG [2011] UKUT 00445 (IAC), 25 November 2011: a similar reasoning was applied for 
Appellant F in this case.  
85 Director of UNHCR February 1999 quoted in Jaquemet, ibid 83. 
86 Fripp (n 84). See also Hart (81): Hart argues that states have interpreted complementary protection 
schemes in a rather narrow manner in order to avoid providing comparatively broader protection than 
other states and receiving disproportionate numbers of protection seekers.  
87 Hugo Storey, ‘Armed Conflict in Asylum Law: The “War-Flaw”’, [2012] 31 Refugee Survey 
Quarterly 1, 6. 
88 Ibid 4. He pointed out that this had been encouraged by the Handbook in 1979. This was exemplified 
in Secretary of State for the Home Department, Ex Part Adan [1998] UKHL 15. 
89 Ibid.   
90 James C. Hathaway and Michelle Foster, The Law of Refugee Status, (2nd edn; CUP 2014) 174. See 
also UNHCR, Guidelines on International Protection No 12, Claims for refugee status related to 
situations of armed conflict and violence under Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention and/or 1967 
Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees and the regional refugee definitions, 2 December 2012, 
HCR/GIP/16/12 at [17]. 
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that individuals fleeing en masse might still be eligible to refugee status, even 
if they had not been individually affected by any harm because, in these cases, 
the experiences of similarly situated persons could be indicative of a risk of 
individual persecution.91 For both Hathaway and Storey, the refusal to accept 
that group persecution could warrant protection under the 1951 Convention 
was misplaced and, although Storey observed some positive evolution in that 
sense, he regretted that the case law remains very fragmentary.92 
Unfortunately, narrow interpretations of all the claims, potentially affecting 
large portions of a population, generally prevail in some jurisdictions. For 
instance, gender-based violence, which could concern very large groups of 
people, has often been mistakenly93 considered to fall outside the realm of the 
1951 Convention, and countries have regrettably tended to grant 
complementary protection to the victims, rather than to grant refugee status.94 
 
To resolve these concerns, the UNHCR95 has affirmed several times 
the centrality of the 1951 Convention and its capacity to apply in situations 
of large scale displacements. Indeed, in many circumstances, it is in fact 
possible to identify a discriminatory pattern of harm caused by certain agents 
of persecution. A closer look at some specific cases will demonstrate that the 
1951 Convention is sufficiently flexible and able to cover individuals fleeing 
en masse and/or other human rights violations if a sufficiently broad 
understanding of the notion is adopted.  
 
For instance, Edwards demonstrated that the 1951 Convention 
remains relevant in most situations of large-scale displacement in Africa. For 
                                                
91 Ibid 174.  
92 Storey (n 87) 9.  
93 Refer to Chapter 5.  
94  Jamie Chai Yun Liew, ‘Taking It Personally: Delimiting Gender-Based Refugee Claims Using the 
Complementary Protection Provision in Canada’, [2014] 26 Canadian Journal of Women and the Law 
300; Hana Cheikh Ali, Christel Querton and Elodie Soulard, Gender-related Claims in Europe: 
Comparative Analysis of Law, Policies and Practice Focusing on Women in Nine EU member states 
(Directorate General for Internal Policies, Policy department C: Citizens’ rights and Constitutional 
Affairs, European Parliament, 2012) 46. 
95 Inter alia, UNHCR, ‘The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees: Its Relevance in the 
Contemporary Context’, 1 February 1999 at [7]; UNHCR ExCom Conclusion No. 87 (L) – 1999 (f) 
Reaffirms ‘that the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol remain 
the foundation of the international refugee regime’; UNHCR Guidelines on International Protection 
No. 12 (2012) ibid (89) at [9], [45], [87]. 
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her, the refugee definition can encompass a wide range of cases96 through a 
liberal interpretation of its provisions. In particular, she pointed out that 
‘forced displacement, serious restrictions on freedom of movement, armed 
attacks, violence, and other serious human rights violations, constitute forms 
of persecution protected by the 1951 Convention’.97 She also argued that the 
increased polarisation and sectarian nature of violence in Africa often falls 
within at least one of the five Convention grounds. As a result, individuals 
fleeing tensions, disturbances, conflicts or general instability in the African 
continent might be covered by the terms of the refugee definition. Fortin made 
similar observations with regards to the application of the Cartagena 
Declaration. He noted more specifically that, whilst the Declaration 
considered that ‘massive violations of human rights’ would warrant 
international protection, such violations are almost always perpetrated for a 
Convention reason.98 As a result, the victims of such human rights violations 
might as well easily be granted refugee status under the 1951 Convention.  
 
 It could also be pointed out that Fortin’s observations appear valid for 
individual human rights violations in the form of torture or inhuman or 
degrading treatment as referred to in various systems of complementary 
protection adopted in countries in the global north.  Indeed, the infliction of 
such harms can often amount to persecution given the high degree of 
suffering caused. In many cases, it might be possible to attach these forms of 
harm to a Convention ground, in particular when referring to the existence of 
‘imputed’ reasons. The UNHCR, for instance, considered that in most 
situations, the types of threats that are enumerated under the European 
subsidiary protection scheme, ‘indicate a strong presumption for Convention 
refugee status’.99 
  
                                                
96 Alice Edwards, “Refugee Status Determination in Africa” [2006] 14 African Journal of International 
and Comparative Law 204, 232. 
97 Ibid 231. 
98 Antonio Fortin, ‘Doctrinal Review of the Broader Refugee Definition Contained in the Cartagena 
Declaration’ in Memoria del Vigésimo Aniversario de la Declaración de Cartagena sobre los 
Refugiados (1984–2004) 273-306, 295.   
99 UNHCR’s Observations on the European Commission’s Proposal for a Council Directive on 
Minimum Standards for the Qualification and Status of Third Country Nationals and Stateless Persons 
as Refugees or as Persons Who Otherwise Need International Protection’ (12 September 2001) 
14109/01 ASILE 54 at [42]. 
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Authors have also argued that the notion of persecution is applicable 
to the specific context of armed conflict contrary to what has been advanced 
by certain countries. In particular, Storey demonstrated that the 1951 
Convention is relevant in cases of displacements occurring as a result of 
armed conflict.100 Similarly, Durieux agreed that persecution can occur both 
in peace and in war time, including in situations of generalised violence and, 
as a result, the existence of an armed conflict should simply be treated as 
‘contextual’, or ‘neutral’.101 Durieux further explained his position by 
mentioning the example of Syria ‘in which the State […] targets cities, or 
other geographic areas, that are deemed to be sympathetic to the opposition, 
hence ‘enemies of the State’.102 He argued that ‘to refer to this form of 
violence as indiscriminate would be an error, and typical Convention refugee 
notions, such as […] persecution should suffice’. 103 He goes on to conclude 
that ‘a Convention refugee claim is hardly a matter of armed conflict – it is 
[primarily] a matter of fear of persecution’. Juss also supported his view by 
observing that Durieux’s position regarding the notion of persecution is 
‘modern’ and ‘expansive’,104 which is adequate for the protection of refugees 
fleeing armed conflict. 
 
The view that persecution remains central to interpreting claims 
arising out of armed conflict was recently reiterated by the UNHCR.105 For 
the Refugee Agency, the 1951 Convention should be the first instrument to 
consider for identifying protection needs. Only individuals, for whom no 
element of discriminatory violence exists, might be considered under 
complementary forms of protection. Turk, in fact, pointed out that the people 
who did not meet the 1951 Convention, would only be the ones targeted for 
‘gratuitous or opportunistic violence’ or ‘persons who have no stake in an 
armed conflict or socio-­‐economic-­‐political order’ and who may ‘suffer the 
                                                
100 Storey (n 87) 9-13. 
101 Jean-Francois Durieux, ‘Of War, Flows, Laws and Flaws: A Reply to Hugo Storey’ [2012] 31 
Refugee Survey Quarterly 161, 163.  
102 Ibid 166.  
103 Ibid. 
104 Ibid.  
105 UNHCR, ‘Safe at Last? Law and Practice in Selected EU Member States with Respect to Asylum-
Seekers Fleeing Indiscriminate Violence” (UNHCR 2011) 101; See also UNHCR (89).  
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consequences of targeted action’.106 When an element of individual risk of 
violence can be noted in the harm endured, including through broader 
concepts of imputed characteristics, the application of the 1951 Convention 
appears therefore more adequate. 
 
Whilst persecution should remain the cornerstone of the refugee 
definition, it cannot be denied that practical concerns can arise in situations 
of mass displacement. Indeed, authors107 demonstrated that although the 1951 
Convention applies doctrinally to these situations, it is procedurally difficult 
to assess individual claims of asylum seekers when they are displaced en 
masse. It could be, however, contended that this procedural aspect should not 
constitute a major obstacle to the application of the 1951 Convention in all 
cases. Whilst true, this consideration does not justify the tendency of some 
Western jurisdictions to over-rely on complementary protection schemes 
when they conduct refugee status determination through a judicial process, in 
particular in urban settings.   
 
The emergence of complementary forms of protection has therefore 
raised concern with regard to the relevance of the 1951 Convention and the 
scope of the notion of persecution. These new types of protection were only 
supposed to cover residual caseloads of individuals who did not meet the 
criteria of the 1951 Convention. However, the interpretation of the 1951 
criteria in situations of generalised violence has so far been quite inconsistent, 
restrictive and has reflected a certain misunderstanding of the scope of 
persecution. Whilst various interpretive frameworks to the notion of 
persecution have been assessed in the preceding chapters, such frameworks 
have, unfortunately, been less diligently applied in cases of generalised forms 
of harm. An adequate interpretation of persecution in these contexts should 
instead reaffirm the primacy of the 1951 Convention in order to avoid any 
detournement of the refugee definition and extensive applications of 
complementary schemes.  
                                                
106 Turk (n 11). 
107 Feller (n 2); Kalin (n 84) 637; Goodwin-Gill and McAdam (n 80) 335.  
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In order to overcome these interpretive problems, some authors have 
proposed to apply a principled approach in the particular case of people 
fleeing armed conflict. Scholars have particularly reflected on these situations 
because armed conflicts constitute some of the most contentious cases due to 
the large number of individuals that could potentially be granted refugee 
status and due to the arguable reluctance of national adjudicators to open a 
Pandora’s box. Different views will be assessed below.  
 
ii- The need for a principled approach tailored to the particular case 
of armed conflicts? 
 
Population movements in situations of armed conflict, account for a 
considerable proportion of human displacements on the international scene. 
Yet, responses to the plight of ‘war refugees’ have been quite divergent and, 
as noted by Storey, the dominant human rights approach has not revealed 
itself to be sufficiently protective in these contexts.108  
  
In order to overcome such hurdles, Storey proposed a new approach 
for evaluating the claims of war refugees. Given the peculiar conditions of 
these individuals, he contended that rules of IHL should be the primary 
benchmarks for assessing persecution. Firstly, he pointed out that IHL is the 
lex specialis in situations of armed conflict and, thus, more adapted to the 
peculiar situations of individuals fleeing war.109 Secondly, according to him, 
the fact that the jurisprudence has developed considerably in that field 
reinforces this proposal.110 He also provided concrete examples in order to 
illustrate his statements.  In an earlier article, he and Wallace mentioned, for 
instance, the case of an armed conflict involving the use of chemical weapons. 
According to them, the claim of an individual who refuses to return to a 
country where he/she could be involved in a conflict where chemical weapons 
were used, in violation to IHL norms, would be more straightforwardly 
                                                
108 Storey (n 87) 13. 
109 Ibid 14.  
110 Ibid 15. 
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adjudicated by considering IHL, rather than IHRL standards. They considered 
that: ‘it would be circuitous to analyse this assertion in human rights terms, 
when it is known that the use of chemical weapons is proscribed by several 
international humanitarian law treaties’.111  Although Storey considers that 
IHL should be the main reference point for assessing the protection needs of 
individuals in the context of armed conflict, he does not entirely dismiss the 
relevance of IHRL as he considers that ‘if human rights law provides more 
extensive protection then it will be the correct law to apply’.112 He, however, 
maintains that when ‘IHL provides the same level of protection then 
[persecution] should be analysed in IHL terms’,113  as a ‘primary reference 
point’.114  
 
Conversely to what has been proposed by Storey, other scholars have 
argued against the application of IHL as a main source for interpreting the 
notion of persecution in the case of war refugees. For instance, Durieux115 
considered that persecution may occur in many different circumstances and 
those circumstances should not be the ‘starting point’ of a refugee status 
determination process. The existence of an armed conflict is merely a 
contextual element that should not have a major bearing on the way we 
understand the refugee definition. Additionally, he argued that using IHL as 
a primary reference for interpreting persecution entails the inevitable risk of 
limiting the protection scope of the Convention.116 Therefore, he advocates a 
‘non-exclusive, coordinated relationship between IHL, IHRL, and IRL’.117 In 
a similar manner to Durieux, Fripp also departed from Storey’s view by 
considering that IHL should not be the principal set of rules that ought to be 
referred to when interpreting refugee claims. He contended that referring to 
IHL norms is simply not in line with the rules of treaty interpretation whereby 
the Convention has a human rights object and purpose.118 He further observed 
                                                
111 Hugo Storey and Rebecca Wallace, ‘War and Peace in Refugee Law Jurisprudence’ [2001] 95 AJIL 
349, 357. 
112 Ibid 31. 
113 Ibid 31.  
114 Storey (n 87) 18. 
115 Durieux (n 101) 164.  
116 Ibid 166. 
117 Ibid 175. 
118 Eric Fripp, ‘International Humanitarian Law and the Interpretation of “Persecution” in Article 1A(2) 
CSR51’ [2014] 26 International Journal of Refugee Law 382, 398. 
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that there was no mention of any of the 1949 Geneva Conventions on the rules 
of war in the preamble although they had already been adopted. In light of the 
above arguments, he concluded that IHL norms should not be used as primary 
sources of interpretation, even in the context of an armed conflict. He stated, 
however, that IHL could be considered ‘a lex specialis enhancing the 
interpretation of open-ended IHRL standards in appropriate 
circumstances’.119  Other authors have also expressed concern regarding the 
use of IHL as a mean of interpretation, stating that it can sometimes lead to a 
restrictive understanding of the notion of protection and more particularly of 
the notion of persecution. Holzer, for instance, considered that IHL should 
provide ‘interpretative guidance only if it enables an inclusive interpretation 
of the refugee definition and thereby strengthens refugee protection’.120 
Similarly, Chetail considered that because IHL provides, at times, minimal 
standards of protection, a complementary approach to the different branches 
of law should be rather adopted.121 
 
The view that rules of IHL should not be used as the main referential 
standards for interpreting persecution was supported by the UNHCR in the 
guidelines related to situations of armed conflict and violence. In these 
guidelines, the Refugee Agency stated that ‘for the purposes of determining 
refugee status, the existence of violations of IHL can be informative but not 
determinative of whether a conduct amounts to persecution within the 
meaning of the 1951 Convention’.122 The UNHCR then proposed a different 
line of analysis to assess the notion of persecution in situations of armed 
violence whereby human rights references come as a starting point and IHL 
appears to be treated as a complementary means of interpretation.123  
 
In addition to the potentially limitative scope that IHL could have on 
the notion of persecution, it should be noted that the set of rules it provides is 
                                                
119 Ibid 403. 
120 Vanessa Holzer, ‘Persecution and the Nexus to a Refugee Convention Ground in Non-International 
Armed Conflict: Insights from Customary International Humanitarian Law’ in David James Cantor and 
Jean-Francois Durieux (eds), Refuge from Inhumanity? War Refugees and International Humanitarian 
Law (Brill Nijhoff 2013) 101-127, 107.  
121 Chetail (n 52) 732-733.  
122 UNHCR (n 89) at [15].  
123 Ibid at [11].  
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relatively narrow. Indeed, the idea that IHL could be used as a primary 
reference point for interpreting the refugee definition only to be departed from 
when IHRL is more protective, as suggested by Storey, seems to imply that 
IHL is sufficiently developed and can be applied in almost all circumstances 
of an armed conflict. However, it can be contented, here, that, in a number of 
cases, IHL is in fact less detailed than IHRL and does not constitute a 
sufficiently detailed framework of interpretation. Where IHL fails to address 
a particular situation, other approaches will need to be applied in order to fill 
this normative gap, even when those approaches are not more protective. This 
is the case, for instance, in situations of non-international armed conflicts 
(NIAC). Under IHL, Prisoners of War should not to be prosecuted for their 
participation in the hostilities when they are involved in an international 
armed conflict.124 However, the Geneva Conventions on the rules of war do 
not entail such a restriction for prisoners who have been caught during the 
hostilities in a NIAC. Armed members of opposing groups do not enjoy the 
status of combatants. Although IHL protects them against murder, torture, 
humiliating or degrading treatment,125 they might face criminal prosecution 
for the mere fact of taking up arms.126 IHL does not offer particular guidance 
as to the acceptable standards for the trial of armed group members in a NIAC 
although it provides specific rules about their treatment in detention. In order 
to assess whether their prosecution amounts to persecution, it is necessary to 
refer to other interpretive means, such as, for instance, basic international 
human rights standards.127 In this situation, IHRL applies but it can lead to 
the conclusion that the prosecution faced by the armed opponents does not 
amount to persecution and that they are not eligible for refugee status. In such 
circumstances, IHRL appears to be the relevant standard although it is not 
more protective than IHL. IHRL is, however, applied simply because it 
provides a more comprehensive answer to the situation of individuals fleeing 
armed conflicts than IHL. In this view, Matthews has acknowledged that ‘the 
                                                
124 Convention (III) relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (Geneva, 12 August 1949) 75 UNTS 
135, art 87.  
125 Common Article 3 to the Four Geneva Conventions, 1949.  
126 Hannah Matthews, ‘The interaction between international human rights law and international 
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protection offered to civilians under international human rights law is wider 
in scope than that of international humanitarian law in terms of the rights 
covered and depth of protection offered’.128 In particular, in the context of 
NIAC, she stressed that IHL is sparse.129 This points to the fact that recourse 
to other means of interpretation will be inevitable in certain situations to fill 
the gaps in IHL.  
 
Holzer proposed a third approach that could be used for interpreting 
the claims of ‘war refugees’ and reconciles the above narratives. For her, 
‘careful attention must be paid to the individual circumstances of the case at 
hand’.130 As such, she reminds us of the importance of the UNHCR’s 
circumstantial approach even in situations of armed conflicts. The UNHCR 
repeated this view in its Guidelines on International Protection No. 12, by 
stating that, even though IHL could be considered relevant in evaluating the 
notion of persecution, ultimately, what amounts to persecution will ‘depend 
on the circumstances of the individual, including the age, gender, opinions, 
health, feelings and psychological make-up of the applicant’.131 It remains 
therefore a matter a degree, which is assessed by factoring in a large variety 
of personal circumstances of the claimants.  
 
Although inconsistent views have been expressed on the approach to 
be adopted for interpreting the notion of persecution in times of war, the 
above authors all rightly pointed to the necessity of relying on a specific and 
principled narrative in order to avoid inadequate and inconsistent 
interpretations. Indeed, it is necessary to ensure that the refugee definition be 
given its full meaning and that excessive recourse to complementary forms 
of protection do not undermine the relevance of the Convention. Most authors 
agree that IHL needs to be taken into consideration when adjudicating claims 
of individuals fleeing armed conflict as it adequately reflects the specificity 
of these situations and sheds light on what the cogent protection standards 
are. This should, however, be done through a flexible interpretive method that 
                                                
128 Matthews (n 126) 633. 
129 Ibid, 638. 
130 Holzer (n 120) 114.  
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takes into consideration different areas of international law as well as the 
individual circumstances of refugees as proposed by the UNHCR 
circumstantial approach.  
 
In light of the foregoing, it can be concluded that a proper 
understanding of the notion of persecution in situations of armed conflict is 
needed in order to re-assert the primacy of the 1951 Convention and ensure 
that the concept of persecution is applied in a relevant manner, without unduly 
resorting to complementary protection schemes or other types of protection.   
 
Although the 1951 refugee definition appears sufficiently flexible to 
be applied in many situations of armed conflict and other forms of generalised 
human rights violations as above demonstrated, it should be acknowledged 
that the notion of persecution entails certain intrinsic limitations that cannot 
be overcome even through an adequate and principled interpretation of the 
notion. These limitations will be assessed in the following section. 
 
B)   The limits of persecution and the need for a different refugee 
paradigm? 
 
i-Inherent limitations to the notion of persecution 
 
 
Although a proper interpretation of the notion of persecution can 
ensure that the 1951 Convention remains applicable in many cases of forced 
displacements, it should be reminded that the plenipotentiaries intended to set 
some limitations to the number of people entitled to receive international 
assistance. According to the UNHCR Handbook, the expression ‘owing to 
well-founded fear of being persecuted […] makes all other reasons for escape 
irrelevant to the definition. It rules out such persons as victims of famine or 
natural disaster’.132 Indeed, as previously pointed out, the notion of 
persecution necessarily excludes some individuals from the protection 
scheme of the 1951 Convention by requiring, at a minimum, the existence of 
a human agent of persecution133 and an intent to perpetrate an act that could 
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result in harmful consequences.134 People fleeing general circumstances, 
external socio-economic conditions and climate change are therefore unlikely 
to be considered at risk of persecution, essentially because it is difficult to 
identify an agent of persecution who has an underlying intent to engage in 
such actions and/or to demonstrate that certain individuals are being 
particularly targeted. In this sense, Shacknove considered that persecution is 
‘just one manifestation of the absence of physical security’,135 which could 
also be impacted by threats to ‘vital [economic] subsistence, and natural 
calamities’.136 He noted, however, that these threats cannot be encompassed 
by the persecution paradigm. Similarly, Betts noted that ‘environmental 
change, natural disaster, food insecurity, famine and drought, state fragility 
and collapse of livelihoods’137 do not fit the notion of persecution but 
constitute major drivers of populations.    
 
Although the above authors are right in pointing to the limitations of 
persecution, it should be noted that the refugee definition can remain 
applicable in some of the situations described above.138  For instance, in cases 
of state fragility and economic breakdown, certain groups of the population, 
such as isolated women, members of minority clans or children might be 
disproportionately affected by the level of violence and, as a result, more 
vulnerable to abuse by different parties. These individuals are discriminately 
impacted by the action of identifiable agents of persecution, and therefore, 
depending on the threshold of harm experienced, might fall under the 1951 
Convention. For others who merely experience the economic consequences 
of instability in their country, it is true that this possibility remains remote. 
Feller, for instance, noted that economic factors in themselves ‘were never 
intended to be addressed through refugee protection mechanisms’.139 
Overpopulation, lack of infrastructure, endemic corruption leading to slow 
development and reduced economic opportunities are indeed unlikely to be 
                                                
134 Andrew E. Shacknove, ‘Who Is a Refugee?’ [1985] 95 Ethics 274, 279: For him the 1951 
Convention requires the commission of ‘violent acts one person perpetrates against another’.  
135 Ibid 279.  
136 Ibid 278. 
137 Betts (n 4) 13-14. 
138 UNHCR (n 18) [39]: Although the handbook excludes victims of famine or natural disaster, it 
mentions that these people can still be recognized if a well-founded fear of persecution is identifiable.  
139 Feller (n 2).  
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covered by the refugee definition. In these situations, Feller considered that 
the ‘1951 Convention is obviously not the answer’.140 
 
A particular interpretive challenge can also be noted with regard to 
people escaping climate-related problems. Cooper141 has argued that the 
notion of persecution is applicable in such cases as she considered that the 
‘governments of the developed world’ can be viewed as persecuting affected 
populations.142 She indeed contended that governments have a major 
responsibility in the plight of ‘climate refugees’ as they refused to ‘commit 
their collective resources to fight global warming’.143 Therefore, she believed 
that the notion of persecution could apply in such cases. However, her 
position remains quite marginal and has been rejected by most authors. In 
particular, McAdam deemed her arguments ‘unconvincing’ and maintained 
that the problem with climate change is to identify a persecutor.144 In Teitotia, 
the New Zealand High Court examined the argument that individuals 
displaced due to climate change could claim asylum based on the 1951 
Convention. The judges, however, rejected the idea that the international 
community could be seen as an agent of persecution as they considered that 
this assertion would ‘completely reverse the traditional refugee paradigm’ 
since the claimant would be ‘seeking refuge within the very countries that are 
allegedly persecuting him’.145 
 
Although the notion of persecution is hard to fit into the climate 
change narrative, there might be some hypothetical cases, whereby climate 
change and environmental disasters are used by governments or non-state 
actors to disproportionally target some groups. In such scenarios, it could be 
possible to apply the 1951 Convention.146 These cases, however, appear 
                                                
140 Ibid.  
141 Jessica B. Cooper, ‘Environmental Refugees: Meeting the Requirements of the Refugee Definition’ 
[1998] 6 NYU Environmental Law Journal 480. 
142 Ibid 520. 
143 Ibid.  
144 Jane McAdam, Climate Change, Forced Migration and International Law (OUP 2012) 43.  
145 Iona Teitiota v The Chief Executive of the Ministry of Business Innovation and Employment [2013] 
NZHC 3125 (26 November 2013) at [55]. This rejection was confirmed by the Supreme Court in 
Teitiota v Chief Executive of the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment NZSC 107 (20 July 
2015). 
146 Christopher M. Kozoll, ‘Poisoning the Well: Persecution, the Environment, and Refugee Status’ 
[2004] 15 Colorado Journal of International Environmental Law and Policy 271, 274. See also Florian 
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limited as in many situations, the intent of human actors in inflicting some 
form of harm might be difficult to establish. For instance, McAdam 
mentioned that in most cases governments are willing to improve the situation 
of citizens in their own country.147 Bush also pointed out that the notion of 
persecution is likely to be irrelevant in these situations because one ‘must 
possess a certain level of intent’148 to harm people (or to engage in actions 
that result in harm) and, arguing that policies negatively impacting the 
environment are an indirect form of persecution would excessively stretch 
this notion.149 Last but not least, it should be added that the large variety of 
profiles and experiences of people displaced by natural occurrences might 
call for different solutions and are not easily encompassed under one legal 
regime.150 
 
 Although it has been demonstrated that the 1951 Convention is rather 
flexible and able to address the plight of certain categories of individuals 
fleeing general circumstances, it remains that a large proportion of people will 
be unable to demonstrate a risk of persecution in the type of situations 
described above. Whilst complementary protection schemes and extended 
definitions have been useful to extend protection to some of them, such forms 
of protection are rather inconsistently applied and raise legal uncertainty for 
protection seekers as previously noted. This begs the question whether, 
ultimately, a paradigm shift is needed to address the needs of all individuals 
who cannot sustain a reasonably ‘good’ life in their country of origin and who 
are not covered by the 1951 Convention.   
 
ii- Need for a paradigm shift?  
 
 
Authors have argued that the 1951 Convention is fundamentally 
flawed and that refugee protection should be extended to wider groups of 
                                                
François Hoepfner, L’évolution de la notion de réfugié, Publication de la fondation Marangopoulos 
pour les droits de l’homme, (Série 18, Paris Pedone, 2014) 425 and Hathaway (n 90) 175. 
147 McAdam, (n 144) 45. See also Ni (n 23) 339.  
148 Brittan J. Bush, ‘Redefining Environmental Refugees’ [2013] 27 Georgetown Immigration Law 
Journal 553, 564. 
149 Ibid 566. 
150 McAdam (n 79) 11. McAdam laid out different typologies of ‘climate refugees’ involving, for 
instance, IDPs. 
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people. As such, various benchmarks have been proposed to better evaluate 
the protection needs of people, in lieu of the concept of persecution. 
Shacknove, for instance, considered that refugee status should be afforded to 
individuals whose basic needs are not protected by their own state. For him, 
the severing of a ‘minimal social bond’151 is what makes someone a refugee. 
He added that alienage should not be considered an eligibility criterion to 
determine refugee status because international assistance should be provided, 
whenever possible.152 On a different note, Betts argued that refugee 
protection should be extended to all ‘survival migrants’, namely to people 
who have escaped from their country not only because of a risk of 
persecution, but also due to an ‘existential threat for which they have no 
access to a domestic remedy or resolution’.153  
  
The above authors proposed to reshape the notion of refugeehood as 
they consider that persecution is too restrictive a concept to constitute the 
cornerstone of the refugee definition. However, practical concerns might be 
raised regarding such a paradigm shift. Durieux has contended that states 
which grant asylum have committed to protect refugees and admit them to 
their territory because their plight resonates with some fundamental values of 
the host society.154 As such, he demonstrated that the delivery of international 
protection is determined by the ethical values of the aider rather than the 
actual protection needs of people. This, in fact, points to a deeply embedded 
understanding that states have of the concept of refugee protection, indicating 
that it will, most probably, be difficult to fundamentally alter the notion of 
refugeehood in the short run.   
 
Whilst the difficulty of the task should not be considered an 
insurmountable obstacle, it nonetheless begs another question: is there any 
other way forward for guaranteeing sufficient protection to individuals in 
need of assistance and not falling under the protection scope of the 1951 
Convention?  The previous chapters have demonstrated that the notion of 
                                                
151 Shacknove (n 134) 278. 
152 Ibid 277. 
153 Betts (n 4) 23.  
154 Durieux (n 17) 157. 
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persecution, which is the cornerstone of the refugee definition, is a flexible 
notion that can make the 1951 Convention adaptable to the changing 
circumstances of refugees. It cannot be stretched to such an extent that any 
person compelled to leave their country of origin would be granted refugee 
status, but it nonetheless appears to be able to encompass the needs of a rather 
large number of people if an appropriate interpretation of the notion of 
persecution is made, as demonstrated in the present thesis. Indeed, the 
perceived restrictiveness of the Convention can be partly overcome by re-
affirming its centrality and developing more principled and broader 
approaches to the notion of persecution. 
 
For the remaining groups of people, some authors have argued that 
their protection needs might, in fact, require other responses than refugee 
protection.  The protection afforded under refugee status ensures admission 
and progressive assimilation into a host country. Indeed, according to the 
1951 Convention, refugees should receive treatment similar to the most 
favoured foreigners, with a possible view to being eventually naturalised.155 
It therefore sets an ‘incremental protection regime’.156 According to some 
scholars, this kind of regime might not be suitable for all displaced people. 
For instance, Lister argued that temporary forms of protection and on-site 
help might be much more sustainable than incremental admission within a 
country granting asylum for people fleeing poverty, famine, climate change 
or natural disasters.157 Other authors have also noted that, given the 
complexities of the plight of people facing environmental problems, 
admission into a host country is not the only form of protection that could be 
provided. Bush, for instance, pointed to the necessity of developing a new 
convention that would specifically distinguish between temporary and long-
term protection. For her, this is justified by the fact that ‘climate refugees’ 
have different circumstances and that, therefore, it is important to 
differentiate those who have temporary protection needs from the ones who 
                                                
155 Ibid 156. 
156 Vincent Chetail, ‘Are Refugee Rights Human Rights? An Unorthodox Questioning of the Relations 
between Refugee Law and Human Rights Law’ in Ruth Rubio-Marín (eds), Human Rights and 
Immigration (OUP 2014) 19-72, 43. 
157 Matthew Lister, ‘Who are Refugees’ [2013] 32 Law and Philosophy 645, 660. 
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have more permanent problems.158 From a different point of view, Ni noted 
that so-called environmental refugees do not all wish to be labelled 
refugees159 as it diminishes their ‘adaptation efforts’160 to overcome the 
adverse impacts of climate change. According to her, refugee protection 
addresses the concerns of only a small proportion of individuals displaced by 
climate change and is therefore not the right model.161 At the other end of the 
spectrum, Mayer considers that protection for ‘climate migrants’ differs from 
the protection offered to refugees in that it is clear from the outset that, for 
most of them, a permanent status is required. He contended that individuals 
forced to leave their place of origin because of environmental disasters are 
unlikely to be able to return home, unlike refugees who could reasonably 
expect that persecution will cease at some point in the future. In that sense, 
he recommends that naturalisation be immediately provided to climate 
migrants in the home country,162 instead of incremental integration.  
 
The above authors pointed to the diversity of the protection needs of 
forcibly displaced people, whilst the Refugee Convention constitutes only 
one suitable answer for certain populations. This does not mean that asylum 
should be denied to anybody escaping indiscriminate harm. In some 
situations, complementary forms of protection, based on human rights 
standards, provide useful answers to protect people fleeing generalised 
violence and to correct certain limitations of the 1951 Convention. Whilst 
lacking some coherency, such systems of protection worldwide have the 
capability of providing a fairly decent protection scheme and ensuring that 
states evenly grant asylum to people in need. However, this can only be 
achieved if a sufficiently flexible and adequate interpretation of the notion of 
persecution is adopted in order to avoid the situation in which inconsistent 
complementary protection schemes unduly encroach upon the 1951 
Convention or undermine its regime. As pointed out by Lister, a broad 
                                                
158 Bush (n 148) 574. 
159 Ni (n 23) 335-336. 
160 Ibid, 336.  
161 Ibid 341. 
162 Benoit Mayer, ‘The International Legal Challenges of “Climate induced” Migration: Proposal for 
an International Legal Framework’ [2011] 22 Colorado Journal 
of International Environmental Law and Policy 357, 390. 
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understanding of the 1951 Convention would be desirable to ensure its 
relevance in the 21st century.163 Not only would it provide a more adequate 
protection scheme, but it also appears sufficiently in line with the intention of 
the plenipotentiaries who introduced the flexible notion of persecution into 
the refugee definition to make the Convention adaptable to the changing 
circumstances of refugees.  
 
This is not to deny that, in the future, displacement patterns might 
continue to evolve and that eventually a paradigm shift might be needed. It 
appears, however, that the refugee definition of the 1951 Convention should 
not be considered a major obstacle to the delivery of protection as long as a 
proper interpretation of its terms, and in particular of the notion of 
persecution, is adopted.  
 
Part 3- Conclusion 
 
 
Whilst previous chapters have demonstrated that the notion of 
persecution can be interpreted in a flexible and evolutionary manner in order 
to make the 1951 Convention adaptable to the evolving needs of refugees 
who are at risk to face some form of individualised harm, the present chapter 
has shed some light on interpretive challenges arising out of situations of 
generalised violence and other external circumstances.  Due to the large 
number of displaced people potentially concerned, recipient states have 
adopted rather conservative interpretations of the notion of persecution, and 
have instead implemented different protection schemes in these contexts. 
These protection schemes have taken the form of ‘extended definitions’ or 
‘complementary protection’ and relied on divergent standards of protection, 
thus creating some legal uncertainty for protection seekers on the 
international scene. Further, their extensive application has reflected a certain 
misunderstanding of the scope of persecution and undermined the centrality 
of the Refugee Convention.   
 
                                                
163 Lister (n 157). 
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In light of this situation, it has been argued that the primacy of the 
refugee definition should be reaffirmed so that it remains applicable in many 
cases of generalised violence. Whilst the inherent limitations of the notion of 
persecution have also been fleshed out in these circumstances, it has been 
argued that a radical paradigm shift is not currently needed but that a broader 
and more consistent understanding of the notion of persecution would be 
more desirable, in particular by reasserting the importance of the 
circumstantial approach proposed by the UNHCR even in cases of collective 
forms of hardship. This has been exemplified through the development of 
interpretive frameworks applicable to the specific cases of armed conflict. 
Whilst most non-convention refugees could receive assistance under the 
complementary protection regimes, some cases such as economic migrants or 
‘climate refugees’, seem to have other forms of protection needs that would 
be more adequately tackled through the development of separate instruments.  
 
It is, however, beyond the purview of the present chapter to analyse 
the appropriate standards that should be developed in that regard. It remains 
that, as a long as the international refugee definition can encompass the 
circumstances of the majority of forcibly displaced people, the 1951 
Convention should remain the primary instrument for providing protection in 











The present thesis has pointed out that the notion of persecution was 
considered the cornerstone of the 1951 Convention. However, the absence of 
a definition in international refugee law has created major risks of 
inconsistent interpretations, that have, in turn, led to variable applications of 
the Convention and questioned the relevance of this notion in certain cases. 
 
Concerns of interpretation are, in fact, quite recent as, for a long 
period, the concept of persecution did not raise particular debate. In the 
aftermath of the WWII, persecution was almost always understood as a form 
of harm occurring in the public sphere, perpetrated by repressive states, 
persecuting members of the political opposition or minorities. Whilst scholars 
seemed to have always considered that persecution could take various forms 
beyond state repression, in practice the notion was almost always perceived 
as a political act. The way it was interpreted was in fact serving interests of 
recipient countries, viewing refugees as individuals who were voting with 
their feet to disavow their own state’s officials and policies.   
 
           The interpretation of persecution, however, started raising contention 
in the past few decades when refugee claims progressively diversified and 
when people started claiming new forms of harm at the hands of non-state 
actors. Members of communities, members of the family, local or criminal 
groups came to the fore as possible agents of persecution, which had been not 
anticipated by the plenipotentiaries.  
 
           The present thesis observed that, at the end of the cold war polarity, 
national jurisdictions gradually moved away from a political application of 
the refugee definition and started interpreting its terms in a manner that better 
reflected contemporary concerns. Different legal approaches, influenced by 
grassroots human rights activism and the legal scholarship, had been adopted 
for applying the notion of persecution, thus giving rise to new methodologies 
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of interpretation. As principled approaches started being developed, it 
appeared that the application of the 1951 Convention entered a new judicial 
phase in the 1990s. However, these approaches emerged in a rather 
inconsistent manner, which shed some light on the difficulty in defining the 
meaning of persecution in contemporary contexts.  In particular, persecution 
appeared to be a general and malleable concept, that could be variably 
interpreted through subjective views shaped by cultural, gender, religious or 
social influences. This led many authors to point out that persecution itself 
had tainted the international regime of refugee protection with a strong 
subjective bias, raising concerns of inadequate or inconsistent applications of 
refugee law.  
 
           The quest for the right meaning to the notion persecution has been both 
encouraged and challenged, in recent decades, by the continuing 
diversification of refugee situations and the surging number of displaced 
individuals on the international scene. The multiplicity of refugee profiles 
has, in particular, questioned the relevance of persecution in the 21st century 
and the necessity to interpret it in an evolutionary manner to ensure the 
‘enduring relevance’1 of the 1951 Convention. UNHCR expressed these 
concerns at the 60th anniversary of the Convention by stating that there were 
now significant ‘gaps in the scope of the existing refugee protection 
framework’.2 It was noted that, today, numerous displaced individuals, in 
need of some form of assistance are often falling outside the ambit of the 
international protection regime, in particular because they have difficulties in 
demonstrating that they fit the persecution criteria. As a result, they are left 
without protection.  
 
           The present thesis has, therefore, attempted to assess whether these 
protection gaps could be overcome through an evolutionary understanding of 
the notion of persecution or whether a shift of paradigm is needed to adapt 
                                                
1 Jane McAdam, ‘The Enduring Relevance of the 1951 Refugee Convention’ [2017] 29 International 
Journal of Refugee Law 1. 
2 UNHCR, Background Paper, 2010 High Commissioner's Dialogue on Protection Challenges, 
‘Protection Gaps and Challenges’, 22 November 2010, available at: 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/4cef89242.html.  
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the current refugee law regime to the protection needs of forcibly displaced 
people on the international scene.   
 
            In order to solve the risk of inconsistent and inadequate applications 
of the Convention, scholars have developed principled frameworks for 
interpreting persecution. The dominant one, as analysed in the present thesis, 
relies on basic human rights norms to define what persecution is. Human 
rights criticisms have, however, pointed to the rigidity of this approach, 
highlighting its unduly formalistic character. It has been also demonstrated, 
in some of the preceding chapters, that this paradigm, whilst providing 
objective benchmarks for interpretation, is not adequate for some cases 
because it fosters a compartmentalised assessment of persecution, at times 
obviating certain aspects of the harms experienced by refugees. This 
framework is opposed to a more holistic understanding of persecution, based 
on the personal circumstances of each individual as proposed by the UNHCR 
in its ‘circumstantial approach’. Whilst the UNHCR’s model requires a case-
by-case analysis, and, as such, raises concerns of inconsistent and subjective 
interpretations, the refugee agency nonetheless proposed objective indicators 
to minimise such pitfalls by taking into account the individual circumstances 
of refugees. 
 
           In spite of the existence of theoretical models for interpreting the 
notion of persecution, the preceding chapters have observed that national 
jurisdictions have still not applied consistent methodologies of interpretation. 
Although some judges have formally acknowledged the relevance of basic 
human rights as adequate interpretive tools, most of them have, in practice, 
adopted variable modalities of interpretation. Whilst human rights have, to a 
certain extent, allowed for an evolutionary understanding of persecution, they 
have not abided by their promise to foster greater consistency in the 
international system of protection. Additionally, unduly restrictive 
interpretations of the notion of persecution have been noted in some cases, 
and in particular in cases of gender-related forms of harm. This is especially 
unfortunate given the increasing number of refugee women in the world 
today. As such, a fragmentary system of protection seems to have arisen on 
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the international scene, with the risk of undermining the coherence of the 
international refugee law regime, and creating both legal uncertainty and 
incentives for asylum shopping.  
 
            In order to fill these gaps, more coherence in interpreting the terms of 
the refugee definition, and in particular the notion of persecution, would be 
desirable, not only between jurisdictions but also within them. Attempts to 
define persecution have been met with little success,3 as defining this notion 
would most probably confer too much rigidity on the 1951 Convention. Given 
the constantly evolving circumstances of refugees, a flexible approach 
remains desirable, but consistent methodologies of interpretation should be 
adopted. Whilst the basic human rights model has proven to be useful, it 
should not be applied in a rigid manner. The UNHCR’s proposal to 
complement this mode of interpretation with a more circumstantial approach 
appears to be both sufficiently principled and flexible in order to adapt to the 
evolving protection needs of refugees and adequately assess the thresholds of 
harm required to fall under the purview of the 1951 Convention. As pointed 
out by the Refugee Agency a ‘balanced and holistic application of the 
definition, incorporating human rights law principles, has the best chance of 
yielding the correct result’.4 
 
           It should be, however, acknowledged that the notion of persecution has 
some inherent limitations that cannot be overcome without entirely 
contravening the initial intention of the plenipotentiaries. These limitations 
lie in the fact that, at a minimum, an individual form of harm5, perpetrated by 
an identifiable agent of persecution is usually needed to apply the concept of 
persecution. Generally, scholars have indeed agreed that human agency is a 
necessary requirement of the 1951 Convention.  
 
                                                
3 UNHCR, Handbook and Guidelines on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status under 
the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, December 2011, 
HCR/1P/4/ENG/REV.3 at [51]. 
4 UNHCR, ‘Note on The International Protection of Refugees: Interpreting Article 1 of the 1951 
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees’, [2001] 20 Refugee Survey Quarterly 77. 
5 Individual forms of harm can affect very large groups of population as long as individuals, or 
similarly situated individuals are being disproportionately at risk due to some real or perceived 
characteristics.  
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            As a result, there are major challenges for applying persecution, in 
particular, in contexts of mass displacement occurring, for instance, in times 
of war or due to a general breakdown of the state structures and economy. In 
these situations, it could be difficult to identify one particular individual 
responsible for the harm of others or to distinguish specific groups at risk 
more than the rest of the population. Many countries have eschewed this 
interpretive difficulty and developed other types of complementary 
protection, without any effective coordination or harmonisation. 
Consequently, multiple standards are nowadays applied on the international 
scene resulting in a splintered system of asylum, or as one author expressed, 
in an ‘institutional schizophrenia’.6  
 
            It is true that the definition of the 1951 Convention makes it necessary 
to carry out an individual determination for refugee status, and therefore 
raises procedural challenges in situations of mass displacement, in particular 
in the contexts of refugee camps. Some alternative protection mechanisms 
might be needed in these circumstances in order to better fit the needs and 
resources of the host country. However, numerous individuals who are 
fleeing generalised forms of harm are also seeking asylum in urban or 
national settings where domestic jurisdictions have sufficient capacity to 
carry out individual refugee status determination procedures. In these 
circumstances, the interpretation of the notion of persecution remains a 
crucial matter. Unfortunately, as observed in the last chapter, states have too 
often ignored the refugee definition and instead applied complementary 
systems of protection (that generally provide fewer entitlements) or even 
denied assistance to asylum seekers, including in urban contexts.  
 
           The present thesis has argued that a proper understanding of the notion 
of persecution, based on a holistic approach, factoring in a human rights and 
circumstantial analysis as proposed by the UNHCR, would in fact cover a 
sufficiently broad number of people seeking assistance, even in cases of 
                                                
6 In Durieux Jean-Francois, ‘Of War, Flows, Laws and Flaws: A Reply to Hugo Storey’ [2012] 31 
Refugee Survey Quarterly 161, 176: the author stated that ‘the co-existence within the world-wide 
regime of both “refugee” and “non-refugee/subsidiary” definitions, covering in essence the same 
situations, induces a sort of institutional schizophrenia’. 
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generalised forms of harm or other human rights violations. Authors have, in 
particular, proposed models for interpreting persecution in situations of 
armed conflict. Whilst there has been a considerable debate on the modalities 
of these models, the existence of a principled approach in such circumstances 
is desirable because it would encourage more consistent applications of the 
refugee definition and avoid unduly restrictive applications of the 1951 
Convention.  
 
            It remains, however, that the 1951 Convention is not able to ensure 
protection for all individuals in situations of forced displacement even 
through the application of an adequate interpretive framework. For instance, 
people fleeing general economic hardship, environmental disasters or climate 
change would still have difficulties in falling within the ambit of the Refugee 
Convention, and in particular within the criteria of persecution. It is true that 
in some cases, nature or economic rights are used as tools by humans to inflict 
harm upon others, thus as a means of persecution. In these circumstances, the 
1951 Convention would then be still relevant. However, in most situations, it 
remains difficult to ascribe responsibility for these types of harm, and, hence 
the notion of persecution is unlikely to apply.    
  
            As a result, even though it has been argued that the notion of 
persecution has the ability to cover a wide array of people, a large number of 
them are still unprotected under the 1951 Convention. This begs the question 
as to whether or not a paradigm shift would eventually be needed to protect 
all people in need of assistance. To answer this concern, it was argued that 
refugee protection provides one specific type of protection, which can be 
called incremental integration and which fits well with certain humanitarian 
needs. It appears unreasonable to consider that one single convention or 
protection scheme would be sufficient to cover the situation of all displaced 
individuals on the international scene regardless of their profiles or 
experiences. Since the needs of displaced people might greatly differ 
depending on their circumstances, the application of differentiated protection 
schemes might therefore be more appropriate. This is in particular the case 
for people fleeing the lack of development in their country or environmental 
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disasters. They should indeed be afforded other forms of protection that better 
suit their situation whilst the 1951 Convention still has the ability to apply to 
a large number of individuals who are facing targeted forms of harm, either 
individually or in group.      
 
           As pointed out by one author, a ‘broad reading’7 of a (seemingly) 
narrow definition appears desirable because it allows for a broad application 
of the 1951 Convention, beyond the confines of the current states’ practices. 
It also clarifies the duties of states towards refugees and the nature of the 
assistance required. At this stage, therefore, the notion of persecution does 
not appear to be obsolete but still has the capacity to encompass a wide array 
of situations. In fact, it remains a flexible tool to adapt the 1951 Convention 
to the evolving needs of refugees in the 21st century and delineates its ambit 
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